# Rose

> District Court, S.D. Illinois · October 22, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11175916

## Case

- **Full name:** Tina Rose v. City of West Frankfort, Timothy C. Arview, and Thad Snell
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** October 22, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11175916

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that “res judicata is an affirmative defense for the defendant” and generally “cannot be raised until a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c)”
- finding that “the federal suit could be considered both vexatious and contrived” when “all claims and all parties could” have been “part of one suit”
- finding that, since the incentives and goals of the added defendants in the federal action align with the defendant in the state court action, the parties in the two suits are substantially the same

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

TINA ROSE,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 25-cv-00845-JPG

CITY OF WEST FRANKFORT,
TIMOTHY C. ARVIEW, and
THAD SNELL,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This case is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Stay, or in the Alternative,
Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 29). In the motion, Defendants make two arguments to stay this
litigation. First, they argue that res judicata applies. Second, they argue that the Court should
abstain under Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
In the alternative, they ask the Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s amended complaint pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Plaintiff filed a response (Doc. 35).
I. BACKGROUND
A. General Background of this Litigation:
This litigation, which involves numerous lawsuits in both state and federal court, arises
from a property dispute between Plaintiff Tina Rose and two neighboring landowners, Robert
Stanley and Randy Trone. Plaintiff believes that three surrounding properties—406 North Bryan
Street, 1109 East Lindell Street, and 1109 ½ East Lindell Street—violate several building and
zoning codes. Beginning in 2023, Plaintiff started to complain about the code violations to city
officials. She alleges that, instead of acting on her complaints, city officials initiated a pattern of
harassment and discriminatory conduct against her. As a result of this alleged conduct, Plaintiff
has filed multiple lawsuits against the city and its officials.
B. Complaint and Screening Order:
On May 2, 2025, Plaintiff Tina Rose filed an eleven-count complaint in this Court against
Defendants City of West Frankfort (“the City”), Mayor Timothy Arview (“Arview”),

individually and in his official capacity, Code and Zoning Officer Thad Snell (“Snell”),
individually and in his official capacity, and West Frankfort Police Department (“the West
Frankfort PD”). The Court screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and issued an
Order for Service that allowed Plaintiff to proceed with her claims against the City, Arview, and
Snell, but dismissed with prejudice her claims against the West Frankfort PD.
Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on May 30, 2025. The amended complaint
contained the original eleven counts and added six new claims. It alleges that Defendants
“initiated a pattern of harassment and discriminatory conduct” against Plaintiff that included:
a. Revoking her previously approved fencing permit;

b. Threatening demolition of her home without due process;

c. Selectively enforcing code violations against her while ignoring violations by
others;

d. Filing false police reports against her;

e. Initiating a false order of protection against her;

f. Attempting to get her falsely arrested;

g. Signing false statements under oath to cause harm to her;

h. Making false statements in city council meetings and on Facebook to destroy
her reputation;

i. Recklessly endangering her by refusing to address a neighboring property that
was ordered to be torn down in 2016 and that is a source of drugs in the
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community; and

j. Causing conditions that allowed a violent home invasion to occur against her.

It also alleges that Defendants “obstructed Plaintiff’s access to public safety services, ADA
accommodations, and city zoning protections for over one year in retaliation for her exercise of
protected rights” by:
a. Telling her she could only have 5 minutes to speak to the zoning board during
audience comments;

b. Attempting to get her falsely arrested to prevent her from attending the zoning
board meeting;

c. Emailing city workers before the zoning board meeting and telling them to
refuse to speak to her;

d. Screaming “whistleblower” when she attempted to speak to the zoning board;
and

e. Filing a falsified order of protection against her.

The Court screened the amended complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and issued a
Memorandum and Order. The following eleven claims are currently pending against Defendants:
Count 1: a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all defendants for
violations of Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights by retaliating
against her for her speech and advocacy by obstructing public
services, selectively enforcing codes, revoking permits, pursuing
false police actions, and obtaining a false order of protection;

Count 2: a claim under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., against the City of West
Frankfort for failing to provide reasonable accommodations and
for discrimination on the basis of disability;

Count 3: a claim under the § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“RA”),
29 U.S.C. § 794, against the City of West Frankfort for failing to
provide reasonable accommodations and for discrimination on the
basis of disability;

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Count 4: a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all defendants for violation
of Rose’s Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by permit
revocation and threats of demolition;

Count 5: a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all defendants for violation
of Rose’s Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights for
selective code enforcement because of her disability;

Count 6: a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all defendants for civil
conspiracy to deprive Rose of her First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights;

Count 7: a state common law claim against all defendants for intentional
infliction of emotional distress;

Count 8: a state common law claim against all defendants for malicious
exploitation of a disabled adult as defined by 320 ILCS 20/2(e);

Count 9: a state common law claim against all defendants for abuse of
process;

Count 10: a state common law claim against all defendants for public
nuisance; and

Count 16: a claim for violation of the Illinois Hate Crime statute, 720 ILCS
5/12-7.1(c) against all defendants for conduct aimed at her because
of her disability (to the extent based on criminal intimidation).
C. Three Relevant State Court Lawsuits:
Prior to filing this lawsuit, Plaintiff brought three state court actions against the same
defendants.
i. State Court Lawsuit #1 – Tina Rose v. West Frankfort and Thad Snell, Franklin
County Case No. 2024-LA-47 (“Rose v. City and Snell”):
On September 5, 2024, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit in the Franklin County Circuit Court
against the City and Snell. In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Snell “has failed to enforce [the
building] codes as written, allowing specific individuals, including friends and relatives of city
council members, to violate [them] without consequence.” The complaint lists all the building
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codes that Plaintiff believes the neighboring houses violate. She alleges that, because of Snell’s
failure to enforce the building codes, she has suffered “undue mental harassment, intimidation,
psychological and physical harm, and privacy violations, and is forced to live next to dangerous
nuisance buildings.” In addition, she alleges that the lack of enforcement led to her being

physically attacked in her home. The complaint alleges that Snell has engaged in many acts of
intimidation and harassment, including: (1) threatening to take land from Plaintiff to give an
easement to one of the neighboring property owners; (2) threatening to tear Plaintiff’s house
down; and (3) intimidating Plaintiff at her back door over minor fence plan alterations that were
agreed on by her neighbor. It asserts claims of negligence, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, violation of privacy, harboring a private nuisance, harboring and protecting a public
nuisance, threats, and dereliction of duty.
On October 18, 2024, the City and Snell filed a combined motion to dismiss pursuant to
735 ILCS 5/2-619.1. In the motion, they argued that the case should be dismissed because they
are immune from liability under sections 2-103 and 2-205 of the Local Governmental and

Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act. Plaintiff filed a response, and the City and Snell
filed a reply. On February 7, 2025, the Franklin County Circuit Court granted the motion and
dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice. On February 24, 2025, Plaintiff filed a notice of
appeal. On June 24, 2025, the Fifth District Appellate Court affirmed. Four days later, the
appellate court denied Plaintiff’s petition for rehearing.
ii. State Court Lawsuit #2 – Tina Rose v. Timothy Arview, Franklin County Case
No. 2025-LA-2 (“Rose v. Arview”):
On March 28, 2025, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit in the Franklin County Circuit Court against
Arview, in his individual capacity. The complaint alleges that Arview “has abused his position as
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Mayor . . . to orchestrate a coordinated effort to deprive Plaintiff of her property, safety, and
peace of mind—including filing false court actions, enabling city officials to threaten Plaintiff’s
home, and encouraging a network of local actors to stalk and intimidate her.” She alleges that
Arview “engaged in a targeted campaign of harassment against” her, including:

a. Threatening to demolish her home;

b. Publicly taunting her on social media;

c. Encouraging false code enforcement actions against her;

d. Filing fraudulent orders of protection against her;

e. Standing over her in an intimidating manner and berating her while
ensuring she has no escape; and

f. Attempting to set her up for false criminal charges by luring her into
situations where he could justify calling law enforcement.

She alleges that this “pattern of conduct has severely deteriorated [her] mental and physical
health, exacerbating pre-existing medical conditions, isolating her from her community, and
subjecting her to a constant state of fear, stress, and emotional agony.” She asserts claims for
intentional infliction of emotional distress, malicious prosecution, and abuse of power that
violates her civil rights.
iii. State Court Lawsuit #3 – Tina Rose v. Thad Snell, Franklin County Case No.
2025-LA-3 (“Rose v. Snell”):
On March 28, 2025, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit in the Franklin County Circuit Court against
Snell, in his individual capacity. In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Snell “repeatedly targeted
[her] for selective enforcement, retaliation, intimidation, and relentless harassment due to [her]
lawful and constitutionally protected activities, including publicly speaking out against local
corruption, code violations, and misconduct within city government.” Specifically, she alleges
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that Snell “maliciously threatened [her] with the unlawful demolition of [her] home,” “willfully
refused to enforce evident building and zoning code violations” at neighboring properties,
“recklessly permitted dangerous and hazardous nuisance conditions” at neighboring properties
which “contributed to [her] becoming the victim of a violent crime at her own residence,” and

“consistently and deliberately engaged in behavior intended to severely distress [her].” Plaintiff
also alleges that Snell “refused to leave [her] property when explicitly requested, forcing [her] to
seek police intervention.” She asserts two claims: (1) intentional infliction of emotional distress;
and (2) retaliation and violation of civil rights.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Dismissal Standard:
When reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all
allegations in the complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state
a claim, a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). This requirement is satisfied if the complaint
(1) describes the claim in sufficient detail to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is
and the grounds upon which it rests and (2) plausibly suggests that the plaintiff has a right to
relief above a speculative level. Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555; EEOC. v. Concentra Health
Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009) (citing Bell Atl.
Corp., 550 U.S. at 556). Although liberal federal notice pleading standards ensure that even non-

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detailed complaints can survive a motion to dismiss, they will not prevent dismissal of
complaints that plead too much. A case can be dismissed because a complaint pleads facts
establishing that the defendant is not entitled to prevail. Bennett v. Schmidt, 153 F.3d 516, 519
(7th Cir. 1998); Soo Line R.R. Co. v. St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co., 125 F.3d 481, 483 (7th Cir. 1997).

III. ANALYSIS
A. Res Judicata:
Defendants first argument is that the Court should stay this case because the doctrine of
res judicata applies. The doctrine of res judicata, also known as claim preclusion, prevents
relitigation of matters that were or could have been raised in an earlier suit. Cole v. Bd. of Trs. of
Univ. of Ill., 497 F.3d 770, 772 (7th Cir. 2007); Garcia v. Vill. of Mt. Prospect, 360 F.3d 630,
634 n.6 (7th Cir. 2004). Because of the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, federal
courts must give a state court judgment the same preclusive effect that the court rendering the
judgment would give it. Licari v. City of Chicago, 298 F.3d 664, 666 (7th Cir. 2002); Rooding v.
Peters, 92 F.3d 578, 580 (7th Cir. 1996). Thus, when examining whether an Illinois court

judgment bars a federal lawsuit because of res judicata, the Court looks to the preclusive effect
an Illinois court would give the judgment in question. Groesch v. City of Springfield, 635 F.3d
1020, 1029 (7th Cir. 2011); Licari, 298 F.3d at 666. Under Illinois law, res judicata applies if the
prior decision (1) was a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction, (2) involved the same parties or their privies, and (3) constituted the same cause of
action as the current suit. Nowak v. St. Rita High Sch., 757 N.E.2d 471, 478 (Ill. 2001); People ex
rel. Burris v. Progressive Land Devs., Inc., 602 N.E.2d 820, 825 (Ill. 1992); Groesch, 635 F.3d
at 1029.

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As an initial matter, the Court must consider whether Defendants’ res judicata argument
is premature. Res judicata is an affirmative defense, and it is not one of the defenses that Rule
12(b)(6) permits to be made by motion rather than in an answer to the complaint. See FED R. CIV.
P. 8(c); Forty One News, Inc. v. Cnty. of Lake, 491 F.3d 662, 664 (7th Cir. 2007) (stating that

“res judicata is an affirmative defense for the defendant” and generally “cannot be raised until a
motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c)”). However, the defense may be raised in
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion when it “is disclosed in the complaint.” Novickas v. Proviso Twp. High
Sch. 209, No. 09-cv-3982, 2010 WL 3515793, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 31, 2010); Muhammad v.
Oliver, 547 F.3d 874, 878 (7th Cir. 2008). In other words, res judicata provides a proper basis
for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion “where (1) the facts that establish the defense are definitely
ascertainable from the allegations of the complaint, the documents (if any) incorporated therein,
matters of public record, and other matters of which the court may take judicial notice; and (2)
those facts conclusively establish the defense.” Novickas, 2010 WL 3515793, at *2; In re
Colonial Mortg. Bankers Corp., 324 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 2003) (cited in Muhammad, 547 F.3d

at 878). The Court may take judicial notice “of a document that a party filed in another court as
long as that document is offered to show what was stated to the court rather [than] for the truth of
the matter asserted.” Novickas, 2010 WL 3515793, at *2; Opoka v. I.N.S., 94 F.3d 392, 395 (7th
Cir. 1996). It may also take notice “of the contents of other courts’ records.” Novickas, 2010 WL
3515793, at *2.
Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s federal action is barred by res judicata because
Plaintiff previously litigated claims arising out of the same core of operative facts in Rose v. City
and Snell. In support of their motion, Defendants submitted the complaint filed in that case and

9
the appellate court’s order that affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal of the case with prejudice.
The Court takes judicial notice of the complaint and order that Defendants attached. Based on
those two documents, and the complaint in this action, the Court must determine whether all
three elements of res judicata are met. It finds that the third requirement—that the state court

decision constitutes the same cause of action as this federal suit—is not met here. “Generally, a
defendant’s continuing course of conduct, even if related to conduct complained of in an earlier
action, creates a separate cause of action.” D’Last Corp. v. Ugent, 681 N.E.2d 12, 17 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1997). In other words, “res judicata does not bar claims for continuing conduct complained
of in the second lawsuit that occur[s] after judgment has been entered in the first lawsuit.” Id. In
Rose v. City and Snell, Plaintiff filed her complaint on September 5, 2024. The Franklin County
Circuit Court granted the City and Snell’s joint motion to dismiss on February 7, 2025. Both that
state court lawsuit, and this federal action, arise from Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants have
engaged in a pattern of harassment and discriminatory conduct against her. However, Plaintiff’s
claims in this federal action, at least in part, arise from retaliatory escalation that occurred after

the state court case was dismissed. Therefore, this federal suit is a separate cause of action and is
not barred by res judicata.
B. Colorado River Abstention:
Defendants second argument is that the Court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction
under the Colorado River doctrine. “Federal courts have a ‘virtually unflagging obligation’ to
exercise the jurisdiction given to them.” City of Fishers v. DIRECTV, 5 F.4th 750, 752 (7th Cir.
2021) (quoting Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817). Due to this obligation, “[a]bstention from the
exercise of federal jurisdiction is the exception, not the rule.” Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 813.

10
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has identified several situations where abstention would be
proper. J.B. v. Woodard, 997 F.3d 714, 722 (7th Cir. 2021). The defendants have cited one of
these prior applications: Colorado River abstention. To determine whether abstention under the
Colorado River doctrine is appropriate, the Court must conduct a two-part analysis. Tyrer v. City

of S. Beloit, 456 F.3d 744, 751 (7th Cir. 2006). First, it must decide whether the concurrent state
and federal actions are parallel. Id. If there is doubt about whether actions are parallel, the Court
should not abstain under Colorado River. Huon v. Johnson & Bell, Ltd., 657 F.3d 641, 646 (7th
Cir. 2011). But if the actions are parallel, the Court must determine if “exceptional
circumstances” exist to justify Colorado River abstention. Tyrer, 456 F.3d at 751.
In this case, there are three relevant state court actions. Rose v. City and Snell has been
decided by the Franklin County Circuit Court and the Fifth District Appellate Court. However,
Defendants assert, based on information and belief, that Plaintiff will appeal the decision to the
Illinois Supreme Court. As such, that action is still pending and is a potential parallel action. The
other two state cases, Rose v. Arview and Rose v. Snell, are still pending in the Franklin County

Circuit Court. Therefore, the Court will consider all three state court lawsuits in determining
whether to abstain under Colorado River.
i. Parallel Actions:
For two actions to be parallel, “it is not necessary that there be formal symmetry.” Id. at
752. Instead, suits are considered “parallel when substantially the same parties are
contemporaneously litigating substantially the same issues in another forum.” Id. “[T]o
determine whether two suits are parallel, a district court should examine whether the suits
involve the same parties, arise out of the same facts and raise similar factual and legal issues.” Id.

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The Court has reviewed the complaints in the state court actions and this federal action
and has determined that there is no meaningful distinction between them. It starts by
acknowledging that the names appearing on the federal complaint are not identical to those
appearing on any one of the state complaints. In Rose v. City and Snell, Plaintiff is suing the City

and Snell, in his official capacity. In Rose v. Arview, the defendant is Arview, in his individual
capacity. In Rose v. Snell, Plaintiff is suing Snell, in his individual capacity. In this action, the
defendants are the City, Arview, in his official and individual capacity, and Snell, in his official
and individual capacity. As such, this federal action has additional defendants as compared to
each of the state lawsuits. But “[t]he addition of a party or parties to a proceeding, by itself, does
not destroy the parallel nature of state and federal proceedings.” Clark v. Lacy, 376 F.3d 682,
686 (7th Cir. 2004). Parties are “substantially the same” for Colorado River purposes when they
have “nearly identical interests.” Id.
Here, the City, Arview, and Snell have the exact same incentives and goals with regards
to this litigation. This is true even though some of the actions name Arview and Snell in their

individual capacity, and others name Arview and Snell in their official capacity. In all four
lawsuits, the defendants are proceeding jointly using the same counsel and have not raised any
individual defenses.1 See DeCola v. Starke Cnty. Council, No. 3:20-CV-869 JD, 2021 WL
1701359, at *5 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 29, 2021). Based on the defendants’ litigation conduct, it is clear
that they have nearly identical interests. See Stevens v. Umsted, 131 F.3d 697, 706–07 (7th Cir.

1 Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ motion should be stricken because their counsel, Mr. Hill, has an unwaivable
conflict. She alleges that he represents defendants with irreconcilable defenses because the City must argue that
there was no official policy that permitted the conduct, while Arview and Snell must argue that they had policy
authorization. The Court rejects this argument. While the parties could assert contradicting defense theories, they
have not done so. Instead, they have pursued a unified defense. There is no basis for the Court to decide that another
strategy would be more optimal. Therefore, at this stage in the litigation, the Court is satisfied that Mr. Hill can
provide competent and diligent representation to all Defendants.
12
1997) (holding that “[a] court must also consider the manner in which the parties have treated the
suit”). Therefore, they are substantially the same for Colorado River purposes. See Antosh v. Vill.
of Mount Pleasant, 99 F.4th 989, 994 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding that, since the incentives and goals
of the added defendants in the federal action align with the defendant in the state court action, the

parties in the two suits are substantially the same).
In addition, the state actions and this federal action involve substantially the same issues.
The Court starts by noting that Plaintiff’s claims for relief are different in this case than they are
in her three state cases. Even though the cases involve different claims, they all arise from the
same facts, raise similar factual and legal issues, and will be resolved by the same evidence. All
of Plaintiff’s claims, whether under federal or state law, arise from the same alleged course of
conduct. In all four cases, Plaintiff is alleging that: the city and its officials selectively enforced
building and zoning codes; she complained to city officials about the selective enforcement; and,
as a result of her complaints, city officials retaliated against her through harassment,
intimidation, threats, and denial of reasonable accommodations.

Since the facts alleged in all four complaints are nearly identical, the cases will be
resolved largely by reference to the same evidence. See Tyrer, 456 F.3d at 752–53 (citing Vulcan
Chem. Techs., Inc. v. Barker, 297 F.3d 332, 341 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that, since the federal
court was required to consider the “same evidence and arguments” as the state court did in an
earlier action, dismissal or stay under Colorado River was proper); New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc.
v. Council of City of New Orleans, 911 F.2d 993, 1005 (5th Cir. 1990) (“There is little to be
gained from rehashing the same evidence in another forum . . . . The district court thus properly
concluded that the desire to avoid piecemeal litigation counseled in favor of a stay.”)).

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Accordingly, the state lawsuits and this federal action involve substantially the same issues.
Since all four actions involve substantially the same parties and substantially the same issues,
they are parallel suits under the Colorado River doctrine. Because the state and federal actions
are parallel, the Court must determine whether exceptional circumstances exist that justify

Colorado River abstention.
ii. Exceptional Circumstances:
To determine whether exceptional circumstances exist, the Court must consider ten non-
exclusive factors:
1) whether the state has assumed jurisdiction over property; 2) the inconvenience
of the federal forum; 3) the desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation; 4) the
order in which jurisdiction was obtained by the concurrent forums; 5) the source
of governing law, state or federal; 6) the adequacy of state-court action to protect
the federal plaintiff's rights; 7) the relative progress of state and federal
proceedings; 8) the presence or absence of concurrent jurisdiction; 9) the
availability of removal; and 10) the vexatious or contrived nature of the federal
claim.
Tyrer, 456 F.3d at 754 (citing Caminiti & Iatarola, Ltd. V. Behnke Warehousing, Inc., 962 F.2d
698, 701 (7th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted)); accord Moses H. Cone Mem’l
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1983). No single factor is determinative,
and “the weight given to any particular factor will vary greatly from case to case, depending on
the particular factual setting of the case at hand.” LaDuke v. Burlington N. R. Co., 879 F.2d
1556, 1559 (7th Cir. 1989). In addition, because of the presumption against abstention, neutral
factors weigh against it. Huon, 657 F.3d at 648.
1. Whether the State Has Assumed Jurisdiction Over Property:
This factor “is relevant only if there is property at issue in both the federal and the state
proceedings.” Loughran v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2 F.4th 640, 650 (7th Cir. 2021). That is not
14
the case here. This factor is neutral, so it weighs against abstention.
2. The Inconvenience of the Federal Forum:
Here, the state and federal courts are in Benton, Illinois. Since both courts are in the same
town, they are equally convenient. This factor is neutral, so it weighs against abstention.

3. The Desirability of Avoiding Piecemeal Litigation:
“Piecemeal litigation occurs when different tribunals consider the same issue, thereby
duplicating efforts and possibly reaching different results.” Tyrer, 456 F.3d at 755. If Plaintiff
pursues all her state and federal actions, “substantially similar issues will be litigated
simultaneously in different forums.” Id. This raises “concerns about the efficient use of judicial
resources and the public’s perception of the legitimacy of judicial authority.” Id. at 756. As the
Seventh Circuit explained:
When a case proceeds on parallel tracks in state and federal court, the threat to
efficient adjudication is self-evident. But judicial economy is not the only value
that is placed in jeopardy. The legitimacy of the court system in the eyes of the
public and fairness to the individual litigants also are endangered by duplicative
suits that are the product of gamesmanship or that result in conflicting
adjudications.
Id.
As discussed above, Plaintiff’s claims in all four suits are predicated on the same course
of conduct and will be resolved largely by the same evidence. They all require the court to
examine the alleged pattern of harassment and intimidation that Plaintiff has experienced at the
hands of city officials. “To that end, the same persons will be deposed, the same witnesses called
and the same evidence produced.” Id. Such duplicative litigation wastes judicial resources and
creates a risk of conflicting final judgments on Plaintiff’s claims. Since there is a high danger of
piecemeal litigation, this factor weighs strongly in favor of abstention.
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4. Order in Which Jurisdiction Was Obtained by the Concurrent Forums:
All three state court actions were filed before this federal action. This federal action was
filed on May 2, 2025. The first state court lawsuit, Rose v. City and Snell, was filed on
September 5, 2024, over eight months before this federal action. The other two state court

lawsuits, Rose v. Arview and Rose v. Snell, were filed on March 28, 2025, around five weeks
before this federal action. This factor weighs in favor of abstention.
5. The Source of Governing Law:
The federal action involves federal and state law claims. This factor is neutral, so it
weighs against abstention.
6. The Ability of State-Court Action to Protect Plaintiff’s Rights:
Plaintiff argues that this Court should not abstain because the Franklin County Circuit
Court is unable to provide fair proceedings. The Court disagrees. The Seventh Circuit has
rejected the “insinuation that Illinois courts will not live up to the standard of full and fair
adjudication of the issues.” See id. at 757 (citing AXA Corp. Sols. v. Underwriters Reinsurance

Corp., 347 F.3d 272, 280 (7th Cir. 2003)). In addition, even if the Court were to accept the
argument that the Franklin County Circuit Court is biased against Plaintiff, it does not believe
that would be a valid reason to not abstain. In Rose v. City and Snell, the Fifth District Appellate
Court affirmed the Franklin County Circuit Court’s decision, finding “no error in [the circuit
court’s] decision to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint.” In the other two pending state court cases,
Rose v. Arview and Rose v. Snell, the presiding judge is not from the Franklin County Circuit
Court. In fact, the presiding judge is not even from the Second Judicial Circuit, which oversees
twelve circuit courts including Franklin County. Rather, the presiding judge is from the First

16
Judicial Circuit.2 Therefore, even if the entire Franklin County Circuit Court is unable to provide
fair proceedings, which the Court doubts, a judge from a different circuit is presiding over
Plaintiff’s cases.
Plaintiff also alleges that “this case involves federal constitutional claims that require

federal court expertise.” However, “it is widely understood that state courts are very capable of
protecting a litigant’s constitutional rights.” DeCola, 2021 WL 1701359, at *6; see also
Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 735 (2009) (“[S]tate courts as well as federal courts are
entrusted with providing a forum for the vindication of federal rights violated by state or local
officials acting under color of state law.”). Further, the Court notes that this federal action will be
stayed rather than dismissed. Accordingly, Plaintiff “in principle could revive [her] federal case
in the event that certain issues survived the resolution of the” three state court lawsuits.
Loughran, 2 F.4th at 650. This factor weighs in favor of abstention.
7. The Relative Progress of State and Federal Proceedings:
The first state court lawsuit, Rose v. City and Snell, has made substantial progress. It was

dismissed with prejudice by the Franklin County Circuit Court and the dismissal was affirmed by
the Fifth District Appellate Court. The other two state court lawsuits, Rose v. Arview and Rose v.
Snell, are slightly ahead of this federal action. In those two cases, Arview and Snell filed motions
to dismiss on May 5, 2025. In this action, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on July 16, 2025,
over two months later. This factor weighs in favor of abstention.

2 On June 9, 2025, Plaintiff filed a federal lawsuit against the Second Judicial Circuit, including the Franklin County
Circuit Court. See Rose v. The State of Illinois, S.D. Ill. Case No. 25-cv-1207-NJR. On June 18, 2025, “[d]ue to the
filing of [the] federal complaint – and solely due to the filing of [the] federal complaint,” the Franklin County
Circuit Judge sent Plaintiff’s cases pending in the court to the Chief Judge of the Second Judicial Circuit for
consideration. Then, the Second Judicial Circuit Chief Judge made a request to the Illinois Supreme Court to assign
Plaintiff’s cases to another judicial circuit. On June 25, 2025, the Illinois Supreme Court ordered the Chief Judge of
the First Judicial Circuit to assign a judge from that circuit to preside over Plaintiff’s cases.
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8. The Presence or Absence of Concurrent Jurisdiction:
In this action, Plaintiff asserts claims under both state and federal law. The state court
clearly has jurisdiction over the state law claims. It also has concurrent jurisdiction over the
federal law claims. See Grubb v. Pub. Utilities Comm’n of Ohio, 281 U.S. 470, 476 (1930)

(“[S]tate and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction of suits of a civil nature arising under
the Constitution and laws of the United States, save in exceptional instances where the
jurisdiction has been restricted by Congress to the federal courts.”). See also Rasky v. Dep’t of
Registration & Educ., 553 F. Supp. 627, 632 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (state courts have concurrent
jurisdiction over section 1983 actions); Jones v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 859 F. Supp. 1144, 1146
(N.D. Ill. 1994) (state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over ADA claims); Lawler v. Peoria
Sch. Dist. No. 150, No. 12-1299, 2014 WL 12700576, at *3 (C.D. Ill. July 21, 2014) (state courts
have concurrent jurisdiction over Rehabilitation Act claims). Since the state court has concurrent
jurisdiction over all of Plaintiff’s claims, this factor weighs in favor of abstention.
9. The Availability of Removal:

This factor “intends to prevent a federal court from hearing claims that are closely related
to state proceedings that cannot be removed.” Freed v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 756 F.3d
1013, 1023 (7th Cir. 2014). “The unavailability of removal favors a stay, because the purpose of
this factor is to prevent litigants from circumventing the removal statute.” Loughran, 2 F.4th at
650. The first state action, Rose v. City and Snell, could not be removed. It asserted no federal
claims, and all the parties are citizens of Illinois. The other two state actions, Rose v. Arview and
Rose v. Snell, could have been removed because they assert federal claims. In Rose v. Arview,
Plaintiff alleges that Arview’s “coordinated efforts to deprive [her] of her home amount to an

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unlawful taking without just compensation, in violation of . . . federal laws.” She is attempting to
assert a claim under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. In Rose v. Snell, she alleges that Snell retaliated against her “for exercising
constitutionally protected rights of free speech, petitioning the government, and seeking

enforcement of lawful city codes,” which “constitutes a gross violation of [her] civil rights
guaranteed by the . . . U.S. Constitution.” This appears to be a claim under the First Amendment
of the United States Constitution. Although these two state actions could have been removed,
they were not. And the time for removal has passed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). Because the state
court actions cannot be removed, this factor weighs in favor of abstention.
10. The Vexatious or Contrived Nature of the Federal Claim:
Plaintiff’s claims in this federal action are substantially similar to her claims in the three
state court actions, so this “federal suit is ‘vexatious’ and ‘contrived’ within the meaning of
Colorado River.” Freed v. Friedman, 215 F. Supp. 3d 642, 657 (N.D. Ill. 2016). See also Freed,
756 F.3d at 1024 (“[T]his factor can weigh in favor of abstention when the claims and parties in

the federal suit could have been included in the original state court proceeding.”); Interstate
Material Corp. v. City of Chicago, 847 F.2d 1285, 1289 (7th Cir. 1988) (finding that “the federal
suit could be considered both vexatious and contrived” when “all claims and all parties could”
have been “part of one suit”). All of Plaintiff’s claims in this case could have been brought in her
state court lawsuits. This creates a presumption that this federal action is vexatious or contrived.
In addition, there is evidence that this action is the product of forum shopping and an attempt to
evade state court rulings. The state court has made rulings that are unfavorable to Plaintiff. She
asserts that, based on these unfavorable rulings, the state court is unable to provide unbiased

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proceedings. The unfavorable rulings, paired with the allegation by Plaintiff that the state court is
unable to fairly resolve her claims, show that this federal action is vexatious. See Freed, 215 F.
Supp. 3d at 657 (finding that there was overwhelming evidence that plaintiff behaved
vexatiously where the state court judge had made rulings that were unfavorable to plaintiff and

plaintiff stated that the federal action was an attempt to seek a forum above local prejudice). This
factor weighs heavily in favor of abstention.
The Court has reviewed all ten factors, and determined that seven (factors 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9,
and 10) weigh in favor of abstention. As such, exceptional circumstances exist that warrant
abstention. Since the state lawsuits and this federal action are parallel, and there are exceptional
circumstances to justify abstention, the Court will abstain from exercising jurisdiction under the
Colorado River doctrine.
IV. CONCLUSION
Res judicata does not apply to this action because Plaintiff’s claims in this federal action,
at least in part, arise from conduct that occurred after Rose v. City and Snell was dismissed by the

Franklin County Circuit Court. However, because the Court finds that the three state court
lawsuits and this federal action are parallel, and exceptional circumstances exist that warrant
abstention, it abstains from this action under the Colorado River doctrine. Accordingly, the Court
GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Stay, or in the Alternative, Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 29). This
action is stayed pending resolution of the three state court actions of Rose v. City and Snell, Rose
v. Arview, and Rose v. Snell. If any claims in this action survive resolution of the three state court
cases, Plaintiff may revive this case.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: October 22, 2025

s/ J. Phil Gilbert
J. PHIL GILBERT
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11175916. Public record. Not legal advice.