# Thompson

> District Court, E.D. New York · October 21, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11175179

## Case

- **Full name:** Cassandra T. Thompson v. Douglas A. Collins, Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Christine Carballo; and Michael Ingino
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. New York
- **Decided:** October 21, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
------------------------------------x

CASSANDRA T. THOMPSON,

Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM & ORDER
22-CV-4732 (EK)(SDE)
-against-

DOUGLAS A. COLLINS, SECRETARY OF
VETERANS AFFAIRS; CHRISTINE CARBALLO;
and MICHAEL INGINO,

Defendants.

------------------------------------x
ERIC KOMITEE, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Cassandra Thompson brings various civil
rights claims against her supervisors at the U.S. Department of
Veterans Affairs (the “VA”).1 Proceeding pro se here, she claims
that her employer discriminated against her based on her race,
color, sex, gender, disability, and veteran status; retaliated
against her for one of her EEOC complaints; and created a
hostile work environment.
The government now moves to dismiss. For the reasons
that follow, that motion is granted.

1 The Clerk of Court is respectfully requested to substitute Douglas A.
Collins, the current Secretary of Veterans Affairs, as a party in his
official capacity, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), and to
update the caption accordingly.
The defendants are Secretary Collins; Christine Carballo, the Veterans
Affairs Department’s Chief of Material Management; and Michael Ingino, an
Associate Director in the department.
Background
A. Factual Background

We take the following facts from Thompson’s complaint
and opposition papers and assume them to be true for the
purposes of the instant motion.2 Thompson was a “Program Support
Assistant” at the VA’s Logistics Services operation in New York.
The pleadings do not explain her job duties. As far as the
complaint indicates, she remained in the position when she filed
this case.
Thompson’s factual recitation is short and highly
general. She complains of a “fabricated” “report of contact”
that defendant Carballo filed against her in March 2018, but
provides no information about the underlying events. Compl.
Supp. 5, ECF No. 1-1. The report recommended that she lose

overtime pay and be suspended from any involvement in the
“inspection” of “[w]eapons inventory.” Pl. Opp’n 4-5, ECF No.
33. Around this time, Carballo also “display[ed] favoritism
toward[] [Thompson’s] white male counterparts and continued to

2 Thompson’s brief alleges several facts that she did not include in the
complaint, notwithstanding that she was offered multiple opportunities to
amend and declined. In an effort to frame the dispute, and given that the
disposition is against her, we will “take account of all the facts contained
in both [Thompson’s] complaint and h[er] opposition papers.” Small v.
Ortlieb, No. 10-CV-1616, 2012 WL 3229298, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2012);
Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 122 n.1 (2d Cir. 2013) (“A district court
deciding a motion to dismiss may consider factual allegations made by a pro
se party in [her] papers opposing the motion.”). We also note certain facts
taken from the 2022 EEOC Decision attached to the complaint. ATSI Commc’ns,
Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007) (on a motion to
dismiss, “we may consider any written instrument attached to the complaint”).
undermin[e] [Thompson’s] character and work ethic[].” Compl.
Supp. 5.
Later — after Thompson complained to the EEOC — she

was “transfer[red] to [a] less prestigious” campus. Pl. Opp’n
2. She had been working at the VA’s Brooklyn campus since 2010
“as an agreed upon accommodation”; in 2018, however, the agency
involuntarily reassigned her — “without following proper
protocol” — to work in Manhattan. Id. at 2, 5. The complaint
is not entirely clear on how her job duties changed as a result
of this reassignment: she alleges that she was “removed” from
“duties at all campus[es],” see id. at 3, 5, but also says she
was told to “continue to do what [she] was doing before” at the
Manhattan campus. Id. at 5. Around the time her first
complaint was dismissed by the EEOC, Ingino called her a “cancer
to the service.” Id. at 6.

Thompson also levels allegations of unequal pay. She
performed duties that would typically be associated with a
higher pay grade, but her supervisor “refused to give [her] the
pay grade and title” higher than the GS-8 status she held. Id.
at 5. She “outperformed [her] white male coworkers (who were
GS9, 11, 12).” Id. She “applied on several occasions for the
Property Manager (NX) position and continued to be non-selected
where the job was canceled each time [she] applied, and 2 males
were hired who were not more qualified.” Id. at 6.
B. Procedural Background

Between 2016 and 2022, Thompson filed six complaints
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Her first
claim alleged race, gender, and disability discrimination; this
did not lead to the issuance of a right-to-sue letter. See
Frassinelli Decl. ¶¶ 12-15, ECF No. 27-2; 2016 EEOC Compl. 2,
ECF No. 32.
After filing an EEOC claim in 2018, however, she
obtained a decision authorizing suit. This claim alleged sex
discrimination and retaliation — but not discrimination on the
basis of race, disability, or veteran status. This claim was
predicated on Carballo’s report, the transfer of location, and
her being “charged . . . Absent Without Leave (AWOL)” at the new
location. Decision on Req. for Recons. (“EEOC Decision”) 2, ECF
No. 1-2. This suit was timely filed thereafter.3

Thompson’s complaint can be liberally construed to
assert federal claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,
the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, the
Equal Pay Act, Section 1981, and the Family and Medical Leave
Act. She has also brought analogous state and local
antidiscrimination claims and common law claims for defamation

3 Her third and fourth complaints are currently being investigated; the
fifth has reached a final administrative decision that Thompson did not
appeal; and the sixth is pending acceptance. Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss 6-8, ECF
No. 27-1.
and intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Compl. 3,
ECF No. 1. As discussed further below, the complaint does not
state which facts support which claims. She requests injunctive
and monetary relief. Id. at 6.
Standard of Review

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a
complaint must plead facts sufficient “to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).4 A claim is facially
plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009). The Court must accept all factual allegations
in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in
the plaintiff’s favor. See Lundy v. Cath. Health Sys. of Long
Island Inc., 711 F.3d 106, 113 (2d Cir. 2013). However, the

Court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched
as a factual allegation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Pro se complaints are “held to less stringent
standards” than pleadings drafted by attorneys, and the Court
will read a pro se complaint liberally and interpret it as
raising the strongest claims it suggests. Erickson v. Pardus,

4 Unless otherwise noted, when quoting judicial decisions this order
accepts all alterations and omits all citations, footnotes, and internal
quotation marks.
551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Still, a pro se plaintiff is not exempt
from “compliance with relevant rules of procedural and
substantive law.” Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir.
1983). Thus, a pro se complaint must still plead sufficient

facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
Discussion
A. Administrative Exhaustion
Before the EEOC, Thompson complained of sex
discrimination and retaliation (as reflected in the right-to-sue
letter she received in January 2022). See EEOC Decision 1-2.
She did not allege discrimination on the basis of race,
disability, or veteran status. (Nor does she allege facts
sufficient to support such claims in the complaint.) Based on

her failure to exhaust, she may not pursue those claims here.
A plaintiff bringing a claim under Title VII, the ADA,
and the Rehabilitation Act must exhaust administrative remedies
through the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); Soules v.
Connecticut, 882 F.3d 52, 57 (2d Cir. 2018) (Title VII, ADA);
Boos v. Runyon, 201 F.3d 178, 181 (2d Cir. 2000) (Rehabilitation
Act). Dismissal is appropriate when a plaintiff fails to
exhaust. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f); Boyar v. Yellen, No. 21-507,
2022 WL 120356, at *2 (2d Cir. Jan. 13, 2022). This requirement
is not jurisdictional, but is a mandatory claims-processing
rule. Fort Bend County v. Davis, 587 U.S. 541, 550-51 (2019).
The plaintiff does not have to allege the precise
facts on which a suit is based before the EEOC. Instead,

“claims that were not asserted before the EEOC may be pursued in
a subsequent federal court action if they are ‘reasonably
related’ to those that were filed with the agency.” Soules, 882
F.3d at 57. This is the case when “(1) the claim would fall
within the reasonably expected scope of an EEOC investigation of
the charges of discrimination; (2) it alleges retaliation for
filing the EEOC charge; or (3) the plaintiff alleges further
incidents of discrimination carried out in precisely the same
manner alleged in the EEOC charge.” Id.
Thompson’s new allegations of race, disability, and
veteran-status discrimination do not meet this standard. A

claim is not “reasonably related” when it is based on “a wholly
different type of discrimination” than the one alleged before
the EEOC. Alonzo v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 25 F. Supp. 2d
455, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). So a disability claim, for example,
cannot be brought in federal court alongside a Title VII claim
when the plaintiff’s “EEOC charge did not mention any disability
or health issue.” Kirkland-Hudson v. Mt. Vernon City Sch.
Dist., 665 F. Supp. 3d 412, 440 (S.D.N.Y. 2023); see also
Espinoza v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., No. 19-CV-258, 2022 WL
623809, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2022) (“[C]ourts in this Circuit
have typically found that Title VII claims are not reasonably
related to ADA claims.”).

Accordingly, we proceed to consider Thompson’s claims
of gender discrimination and retaliation.
B. Title VII Discrimination Claim
1. Discrimination
To plead a Title VII claim for gender discrimination,
a plaintiff must allege facts to support “(1) that she is a
member of a protected class, (2) that she was qualified for the
position she sought, (3) that she suffered an adverse employment
action, and (4) can sustain a minimal burden of showing facts
suggesting an inference of discriminatory motivation.”
Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297, 311 (2d Cir.

2015). Thompson’s claim falters on the third and fourth
requirements.
Adverse Action. Thompson’s claims about her
supervisors’ insults, the false disciplinary report, and her
designation as AWOL do not qualify as adverse employment
actions. But two alleged actions do: the failure to promote her
and the lateral transfer.
“To make out a Title VII discrimination claim, a
[plaintiff] must show some harm respecting an identifiable term
or condition of employment.” Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601
U.S. 346, 354-55 (2024). Thompson states that her supervisors
insulted her — for example, when Ingino called her “a cancer to
the service.” Pl. Opp’n 6. These statements did not, as

alleged, affect the terms or conditions of Thompson’s
employment.
As to the false report of contact, negative
evaluations and disciplinary write-ups do not suffice when they
only constitute “notices” and do not “result in disciplinary
action.” Fletcher v. ABM Bldg. Value, 775 F. App’x 8, 14 (2d
Cir. 2019). The EEOC decision indicates that Thompson’s
supervisor made a “recommendation that [Thompson] be suspended
from weapons inspection / Police Inventory, no longer be granted
overtime and that an incident of record be documented in her
mid-year performance review.” EEOC Decision 1-2 (emphasis
added). However, the complaint (and the entire record here)

offers no indication that any of these recommendations came to
fruition. Therefore, the report does not qualify as adverse
employment action, either.
Thompson being designated “AWOL” does not constitute
an adverse employment action for the same reason — the complaint
includes no facts suggesting that this designation resulted in
adverse consequences. Sosa v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 368 F.
Supp. 3d 489, 520 (E.D.N.Y. 2019).
The failure to hire or promote, on the other hand, are
classic adverse employment actions. Burlington Indus., Inc. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998). Similarly, a lateral
transfer can qualify as adverse employment action, so long as it
“injures” the plaintiff in some way. Back v. Hapoalim, No. 24-

1064, 2024 WL 4746263, at *2 (2d Cir. Nov. 12, 2024) (holding
that allegations are sufficient where an involuntary transfer
would be perceived as a demotion); see also Muldrow, 601 U.S. at
359 (“The transfer must have left her worse off, but need not
have left her significantly so.”).
Here, Thompson argues that with her reassignment to
Manhattan, she was removed from her “duties at all
campus[es].” Pl. Opp’n 5. But she contradicts herself shortly
thereafter: she goes on to say she performed the same duties
“for the Manhattan campus only.” Id. She does write, in her

opposition brief, that the transfer to Manhattan “imposed a
hardship on [her] for transportation, health / medical
condition, medical care [she] received in BK.” Id. Apart from
this, the record does not reveal how the transfer “left her
worse off” with respect to the terms and conditions of her
employment, Muldrow, 601 U.S. at 359, and her complaint and
briefing provide little detail on what her actual
responsibilities were.
We will assume, however, that the transfer constituted
adverse employment action. Cf. id. (imposition of “less
regular” schedule and loss of take-home car, together with other

setbacks, left plaintiff “worse off several times over”).
Accordingly, we next consider whether Thompson has alleged facts
giving rise to an inference of discrimination in connection with
the failure to promote her or the transfer to Manhattan.
Inference of Discrimination. On a failure-to-promote
claim, “it is not enough for the plaintiff simply to allege that
[s]he was qualified for a position but did not get it.” Ghosh
v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., No. 21-CV-6139, 2023 WL 3612553, at *10
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2023), report and recommendation adopted,
2023 WL 3746617 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2023). Instead, she must
plausibly allege “that the employer took adverse action against
her at least in part for a discriminatory reason.” Vega v.
Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 87 (2d Cir. 2015).

Here, Thompson’s complaint says virtually nothing that
would permit an inference of discrimination. She refers, in the
midst of a long list of conclusory fragments, to defendant
Carballo having denied her “promotions, training, and pay
opportunities as that of [her] white male counterparts.” Compl.
Supp. 5. Her opposition brief does not go meaningfully farther:
there, she states that she “applied on several occasions for the
Property Manager (NX) position and continued to be non-selected
where the job was canceled each time [she] applied, and 2 males
were hired who were not more qualified than [her].” Pl. Opp’n
5; see also id. at 6 (“I was not given fair pay or equal pay as

my white male co-workers nor the appropriate fair evaluations
where I outperformed my coworkers.”).
So the record is devoid of any factual content
supporting the inference that Carballo was motivated by
discriminatory animus. Moreover, plaintiff does not indicate
when she applied for the position she was denied. Absent
clarity concerning whether she applied before or after
Carballo’s report, the report cannot form the basis for an
inference of discrimination.
In the end, plaintiff’s threadbare allegations do not
clear the relatively low bar set by the Second Circuit in Vega
and Littlejohn (or by the Supreme Court in Iqbal and Twombly).
See Ghosh, 2023 WL 3612553, at *10 (“While the plaintiff’s

initial pleading burden as to the necessary discriminatory
intent is low, it is not non-existent.”); Moss v. Bd. of Educ.
of Brentwood Sch. Dist., No. 23-CV-6571, 2025 WL 1548945, at *11
(E.D.N.Y. May 30, 2025) (dismissing discrimination claims where
complaint contained “no factual allegations suggesting
Defendants’ selection of [someone else] for the Principal
position instead of Plaintiff had any nexus whatsoever to
Plaintiff’s race”).
On the lateral transfer, Thompson again pleads no
facts that give rise to an inference of gender-based
discrimination. Although she indicates that the transfer was

involuntary, she does not allege (even in her brief) any facts
that suggest it was because of her gender — just that Ingino
decided to reassign her “suddenly” and that the decision was
“unfair[].” Pl. Opp’n 5. Accordingly, the claim of Title VII
discrimination must be dismissed.
2. Retaliation
Thompson’s retaliation claim also warrants dismissal.
To sustain a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, a
plaintiff must demonstrate “(1) she was engaged in protected
activity; (2) the employer was aware of that activity; (3) the
employee suffered a materially adverse action; and (4) there was
a causal connection between the protected activity and that
adverse action.” Lore v. City of Syracuse, 670 F.3d 127, 157

(2d Cir. 2012).
Thompson points to only one adverse action taken in
retaliation for her EEOC complaint: the transfer to Manhattan.
Thompson has fallen short of plausibly pleading any causal
connection between the transfer and her prior EEOC complaint. To
be sure, she does say that Ingino’s decision to reassign her in
April 2018 was “sudden”; but her original EEOC complaint was
filed in 2016. Pl. Opp’n 5. The Second Circuit has stated
clearly that a two-year temporal gap is “too great to raise a
plausible inference of” retaliation. Dhar v. City of New York,
655 F. App’x 864, 866 (2d Cir. 2016). Accordingly, the

retaliation claim must be dismissed.
3. Hostile Work Environment
Thompson also fails to state a hostile work
environment claim. To establish a hostile work environment, a
plaintiff must show that her “workplace [was] permeated with
discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult . . . that
[was] sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions
of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working
environment.” Schiano v. Quality Payroll Sys., Inc., 445 F.3d
597, 604 (2d Cir. 2006). Incidents must be “more than episodic;
they must be sufficiently continuous and concerted in order to
be deemed pervasive.” Holtz v. Rockefeller & Co., 258 F.3d 62,

75 (2d Cir. 2001). For a single event to be sufficient, it must
be “extraordinarily severe.” Banks v. Gen. Motors, LLC., 81
F.4th 242, 263 (2d Cir. 2023). The “mistreatment at work” must
be because of an employee’s protected characteristic. Brown v.
Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2001).
Thompson concedes that the “abusive verbal behavior”
of her employer was not “severe or pervasive.” Pl. Opp’n
2. And even putting the severity aside, she has not plausibly
alleged causation: she sets forth no facts at all suggesting
that she experienced mistreatment because of a protected
characteristic. Brown, 257 F.3d at 252. Therefore, her hostile
work environment claim must be dismissed.

C. The Section 1981 and FMLA Claims Are Barred
Thompson’s Section 1981 and FMLA claims similarly
fail. The Section 1981 claim is barred because the defendants
were acting under federal law, not state law. Yan Ping Xu v.
City of New York, 612 F. App’x 22, 24-25 (2d Cir. 2015)
(dismissing a Section 1981 claim because the federal defendants
were “not acting under color of state law”). And although the
FMLA provides privately employed plaintiffs with a right of
action, “[t]he FMLA does not afford such a right of action to a
federal employee.” Ross v. Dep’t of the Army, No. 22-CV-670,
2023 WL 5494644, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2023); Malloy v.
Pompeo, No. 18-CV-4756, 2020 WL 5603793, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sep.
18, 2020); Beauchat v. Mineta, No. 03-CV-3196, 2006 WL 2711608,

at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 21, 2006). Accordingly, these claims must
be dismissed.
D. Equal Pay Act Claim
Thompson also fails to state a claim under the Equal
Pay Act. A plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of equal
pay discrimination by alleging that “(1) the employer pays
different wages to employees of the opposite sex; (2) the
employees perform equal work in jobs requiring equal skill,
effort, and responsibility; and (3) the jobs are performed under
similar working conditions.” Rizzo v. Kraus Org., No. 10-CV-
272, 2010 WL 2427434, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. May 25, 2010) (citing
Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1310 (2d Cir. 1995)). The

EPA typically has a two-year statute of limitations. 29 U.S.C.
§ 255(a).
Thompson identifies the comparative coworkers by their
pay grade: “GS9, 11, [and] 12.” Pl. Opp’n 5. She alleges that
she “perform[ed] the duties of an Inventory Manager NX (GS-9 and
GS-11) for over ten (10) years,” despite having the title of
“Program Support Assistant working in the GS-8 level.” Id. at
2. She does not say what these duties were. This is
insufficient. See Faughnan v. Nassau Health Care Corp., No. 19-
CV-3171, 2021 WL 1566138, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2021)
(dismissing Equal Pay Act claim in support of which “plaintiff

merely allege[d] the titles and salaries of” comparators and
that they “did the same work, without an explanation of what
that work entails”); United Probation Offs. Ass’n v. City of New
York, No. 21-CV-218, 2022 WL 875864, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24,
2022) (granting motion to dismiss against plaintiffs who failed
to “provide a sufficient description of the responsibilities,
requirements, or working conditions of” one class of workers
“that would allow the Court to plausibly infer that they perform
equal work to” the other).5
It is true that the bar is not high on this claim,

either, at the pleading stage: the Second Circuit has yet to
require plaintiffs to identify a specific comparator, for
example, Lavin-McEleny v. Marist Coll., 239 F.3d 476, 480 (2d
Cir. 2001); and all that is required in the comparison of job
duties is that they are “substantially equal.” Id. at 480-81.
But as with the pleading bar for discrimination in the failure
to promote, see Ghosh, 2023 WL 3612553, at *10, the bar is not
non-existent. For these reasons, Thompson’s Equal Pay Act claim
is dismissed.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, plaintiff’s federal
claims are dismissed without prejudice. Having dismissed the

federal claims, we will decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the state-law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2);
see also Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22,
31-32 (2025) (stating that when “the district court has

5 Cf. Chiaramonte v. Animal Med. Ctr., No. 13-CV-5117, 2014 WL 3611098,
at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2014) (denying motion to dismiss where plaintiff
“alleged that she and [another employee] both performed similar work as
veterinarians practicing internal medicine; that, in addition to those
duties, she shouldered responsibilities that [the comparator] did not match;
and that, if anything, she worked under more demanding conditions than [the
comparator]”); Crawley v. Macy’s Retail Holdings, Inc., No. 15-CV-2228, 2016
WL 6993777, at *8-9 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2016) (denying motion to dismiss where
the plaintiff’s comparator was in an “identical” role, and therefore
satisfied “equal responsibilities” and “similar working conditions”).
dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction,”
it “need not exercise” supplemental jurisdiction).
Still, given her pro se status, Thompson will be

granted thirty days from the date of this order to amend the
complaint (notwithstanding that she previously declined
invitations to amend). Any amended complaint will completely
replace, not supplement, the prior complaint. Therefore, the
amended complaint must include all claims and factual
allegations against all defendants, must be captioned an
“Amended Complaint,” and should bear the same docket number as
this Memorandum and Order. If Thompson fails to file an amended
complaint within the time allowed or cure the deficiencies
identified in this order, the case will be dismissed with
prejudice, and judgment shall enter. The Clerk of Court is
respectfully directed to mail a copy of this order to Plaintiff

and to note the mailing on the docket.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Eric Komitee
ERIC KOMITEE
United State

s District Judge

D ated: October 21, 2025
Brooklyn, New Yo rk

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11175179. Public record. Not legal advice.