# ARBOUR

> District Court, D. Maine · October 21, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11175078

## Case

- **Full name:** Steven Matthew Clark v. Maine Department of Corrections, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, D. Maine
- **Decided:** October 21, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MAINE

STEVEN MATTHEW CLARK, )
)
Plaintiff )
)
v. ) 2:25-CV-00178-LEW
)
MAINE DEPARTMENT OF )
CORRECTIONS, et al. )
)
Defendants

ORDER ON REVIEW OF OBJECTION TO RECOMMENDED DECISION
OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

On June 5, 2025, United States Magistrate Judge John C. Nivison filed with the
Court, with a copy to the Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, his Recommended Decision
After Review of Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 11), screening Plaintiff’s Motion for
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 3) pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e). The Magistrate Judge recommended that the Court dismiss the
Complaint (ECF No. 1) unless the Plaintiff filed within 14 days an amended complaint to
assert facts that would support a retaliation claim. The Plaintiff filed an Amended
Complaint on July 22, 2025 (ECF No. 14).
On September 4, 2025, the Magistrate Judge filed with the Court, with a copy to the
Plaintiff, his Recommended Decision After Review of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint
(ECF No. 19). In this second Recommended Decision, the Magistrate Judge withdrew the
initial Recommended Decision. Following review of Plaintiff’s expanded allegations and
claims, the Magistrate Judge once again recommended the dismissal of Plaintiff’s federal
claims and relinquishment of jurisdiction over the related state law claims.

In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts federal claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1983,
alleging deprivations involving speech retaliation (First Amendment), denial of due
process (Fourteenth Amendment), and deliberate indifference (Eighth Amendment). Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 97, 100, 113, 130, 146, 151, 238. The Amended Complaint also raises a claim
under 28 U.S.C. § 1985. Id. ¶ 107. Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681, is also asserted as a basis
for relief. Id. ¶¶ 172, 193.

The Plaintiff filed an Objection (ECF No. 20) and a Motion to Continue (ECF No.
21). In terms of the Motion to Continue, Plaintiff states that he believes it would be
productive to wait for answers to be filed to petitions he filed in state court challenging
prison administrative actions under Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 80-C. This Court is at
present conducting a screening of Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis pleadings under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e). As such, there is no need to consider pleadings filed in the state court and the
request for a continuance is therefore DENIED.
Having reviewed and considered the Recommended Decision, together with the
Plaintiff’s Objection and the entire record, I have made a de novo determination of all
matters adjudicated by the Recommended Decision. Based on this review, explained more

fully below, I conclude that a limited portion of Plaintiff’s claims should proceed to service.
I therefore REJECT the Recommended Decision IN PART. I otherwise AFFIRM and
ADOPT the Recommended Decision, IN PART, insofar as it recommends denial of
Plaintiff’s plea for immediate, preliminary injunctive relief, the dismissal of Plaintiff’s
deliberate indifference claims, and the dismissal of the claim asserted under 28 U.S.C. §
1985, without further discussion. I separately assess a Title IX claim not addressed in the

Recommended Decision, which I dismiss.
Due Process
In his Objection, Plaintiff argues that a five-year computer restriction and an
indefinite suspension from the educational wing precludes him from completing his Ph.D.,
in which he has a protected liberty or property interest. Obj. at 5-15. In the Recommended
Decision After Review of the Amended Complaint, it is stated that “Plaintiff was evidently

provided [with] a hearing and merely contests the outcome of the process.” RD at 6.
Because the Magistrate Judge determined that the requirements of due process were met,
he did not address the baseline issue of whether Plaintiff had a liberty or property interest
in his educational plans or job that would substantiate his due process claim. Id. at 5 n.3.
Based on my own reading of the Amended Complaint, it is not evident that Plaintiff

stated that he received any meaningful hearings in connection with these deprivations of
programming, such as review by a neutral officer, effectively pleading himself out of a
case. I therefore consider, instead, whether Plaintiff’s allegations raise a viable liberty or
property interest that would be deserving of due process protection. To start, I conclude
that Plaintiff’s liberty claim is undercut by Sandin v. Conner’s “atypical and significant

hardship” standard, see 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). “[T]he touchstone of the inquiry into
the existence of a protected, state-created liberty interest in avoiding restrictive conditions
of confinement is not the language of regulations regarding those conditions but the nature
of those conditions themselves ‘in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.’”
Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 223 (2005) (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. 484).

The First Circuit has elsewhere observed that the replacement of a “measure of
freedom” an inmate has enjoyed in the past, such as access to educational and work
opportunities, with restrictions “of a sort commonly associated with prison life” does not
implicate the Due Process Clause—even if that change results in “a ‘significant’
deprivation.” Dominique v. Weld, 73 F.3d 1156, 1160 (1st Cir. 1996) (removal from work
release and return to regular confinement did not implicate the Due Process Clause).

District Courts in this Circuit have acknowledged this obstacle in a variety of contexts. See
Shabazz v. Cole, 69 F. Supp. 2d 177, 189-90 (D. Mass. 1999) (revocation of prison law
library privileges “falls well below the kind of atypical and significant hardship” necessary
to invoke the Due Process Clause); Linton v. O’Brien, 142 F. Supp. 3d 215, 218 (D. Mass.
2015) (“[t]he 14th Amendment does not recognize a liberty or property interest in

educational rehabilitative programs” and “failure to provide rehabilitative programs . . .
does not rise to the level of hardship” necessary to invoke the Due Process Clause). These
precedents, I conclude, would give all of the individual defendants who are properly
implicated in the due process claim qualified immunity against any damages award under
28 U.S.C. § 1983 because their alleged failure to afford due process would not have

violated a clearly established right. “[Q]ualified immunity protects government officials
from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). I therefore dismiss all individual liability
due process claims for damages against the Defendants but will preserve the claim for
declaratory and prospective injunctive relief against the most appropriate supervisory
defendant(s).1

I preserve the claim to that limited extent because a curious feature of this case
involves the special arrangement that attended Plaintiff’s pursuit of an advanced degree,
involving prior approvals and understandings that allegedly gave sufficient assurances to
Plaintiff that he could proceed with his education, including by investing considerable
funds in academic programming. It is conceivable that the due process requirements of

unwinding such an endeavor should be more fulsome than what occurred,2 potentially
based on a property interest even if not a liberty interest. However, this preliminary
observation is nothing more, and this ruling does not prejudice the remaining defendants’
ability to file a motion to dismiss the claim.
First Amendment

Plaintiff separately argues that the Magistrate Judge erred in concluding that he had
failed to state a First Amendment retaliation claim, specifically with respect to his
allegations that Defendant Simpson has threatened to transfer him out of state “if his
friends, family, and academic mentors continue to advocate on his behalf.” 3 Obj. at 15-17.

1 The Department of Corrections will be dismissed because the State and its agencies are not subject to suit
in federal court on Plaintiff’s claims. Poirier v. Mass. Dep’t of Corr., 558 F.3d 92, 97 (1st Cir. 2009).
Furthermore, “[n]o cause of action for damages is stated under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a state, its agency,
or its officials acting in an official capacity.” Nieves–Marquez v. Puerto Rico, 353 F.3d 108, 124 (1st Cir.
2003).

2 Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 647 (1997) (expressing concern for presence of unbiased decision
maker); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-66 (1974) (itemizing other procedural requirements).

3 Plaintiff also appears to suggest that his transfer from the Maine State Prison in Warren to the Maine
The Magistrate Judge observed that Plaintiff’s allegations are heavy on accusations
of various forms of retaliation—basically anything that was decided against him or

undermined his participation in education and employment programming—but lack a
coherent narrative connecting adverse outcomes to protected activity. RD at 9. See also
Hannon v. Beard, 645 F.3d 45, 48 (1st Cir. 2011) (“Because prisoner retaliation claims are
‘easily fabricated [ ] and ... pose a substantial risk of unwarranted judicial intrusion into
matters of general prison administration,’ courts must insist that such claims are bound up
in facts, not in the gossamer strands of speculation and surmise.” (quoting Bennett v.

Goord, 343 F.3d 133, 137 (2d Cir. 2003))). Plaintiff was advised that the Magistrate
Judge’s assessment would stand unless he objected to it.
In his Objection, Plaintiff acknowledges that he may have “muddied the waters by
adding too much to his claim.” Obj. at 15. He then asserts that he “alleges that he has been
threatened by Defendant David Simpson to be transfer[r]ed out of state if his friends,

family, and academic mentors continue to advocate on his behalf to the MDOC
administration.” Id. at 15-16. See also Am. Compl. ¶ 62. On its own, the threat of transfer
to another state may support a claim. See Mattei v. Dunbar, 217 F. Supp. 3d 367, 377 (D.
Mass. 2016) (“[T]hreats alone can constitute adverse action if the threat is capable of
deterring a person of ordinary firmness from engaging in protected conduct.”) (citing Hill

Correctional Center in Windham was also in retaliation from advocacy by friends and family. See Obj. at
17. This transfer does not appear to constitute adverse action—nor does he characterize it as such in the
Amended Complaint. For example, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Simpson told him and his family that
the transfer would accommodate Plaintiff’s education and work pursuits. Am. Compl. ¶ 66. Not long after
his transfer, Plaintiff’s education and work pursuits were accommodated. This is not consistent with the
notion that the transfer was punitive or retaliatory.
v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 474 (6th Cir. 2010)). So limited, I will let the First Amendment
claim proceed past the screening process against David Simpson, and will otherwise affirm

and adopt the Magistrate Judge’s assessment that dismissal of the First Amendment claim
is otherwise warranted. This ruling does not prejudice Defendant Simpson’s ability to file
a motion to dismiss the claim following service.
Title IX
The Recommended Decision on the amended complaint did not address Plaintiff’s
Title IX claim and the related allegation of sex discrimination. Nor did Plaintiff’s

Objection take issue with the proposed dismissal of his case without analysis of the Title
IX claim. I offer a few words to explain why dismissal is warranted.
Title IX provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance ....” 20

U.S.C. § 1681(a). “[S]ubject to a list of narrow exceptions not at issue here, [Title IX]
broadly prohibits a funding recipient from subjecting any person to ‘discrimination’ ‘on
the basis of sex.’” Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 173 (2005). “Title
IX does not provide for individual liability; only ‘a recipient of federal funds may be liable
in damages under Title IX’ and ‘only for its own misconduct.’” Bose v. Bea, 947 F.3d 983,

988 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 641
(1999)).
None of the individual defendants is subject to the Title IX claim. Furthermore,
when the Amended Complaint is read in light of the fact that the Department of Corrections
could only be subject to liability based on its own misconduct, I conclude that the
allegations do not plausibly support a finding that Plaintiff’s removal from educational and

employment programming was because of Plaintiff’s sex rather than other factors
suggested in the Amended Complaint. Plaintiff alleges, among other things, that Defendant
Getz (the alleged harasser) and several other staff members and administrators had it out
for all of the graduate programs that prisoners were participating in, not just his, evidently
because of the demands they imposed on administration. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 9, 16, 43, 105,
246, 247. Furthermore, Plaintiff participated in both his education and employment

programs well after his alleged reports of inappropriate conduct by Getz, and he alleges
that other officials within both the Maine State Prison and the Maine Correctional Center
were responsible for decisions that effectively deprived Plaintiff of these opportunities. It
is thus implausible that the Department’s alleged failure to rescue Plaintiff from these
allegedly improper sanctions was based on Plaintiff’s sex rather than another consideration.

I therefore conclude that Plaintiff has failed to state a Title IX claim against the Department.
State Law Claims
Plaintiff asserts a group of state law claims against every named defendant, in most
instances without differentiation. These claims assert emotional distress, negligence,
breach of contract, tortious interference with contractual relations, whistleblower

retaliation under 26 M.R.S. § 833(1)(a), and defamation. All of the underlying
circumstances that inform these claims involve the performance of discretionary functions
or duties associated with prison administration. As such, assuming that the state law tort
duties4 Plaintiff would assign to Defendants are actually owed to him by them in the prison
context, the individual defendants are nonetheless under state law “absolutely immune

from personal civil liability,” 14 M.R.S. § 8111(1), except for conduct “so egregious” that
it “exceeds as a matter of law, the scope of any discretion [they] could have possessed in
[their] official capacity.” Bowen v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 606 A.2d 1051, 1055 (Me.
1992) (quoting Polley v. Atwell, 581 A.2d 410, 414 (Me. 1990)).
The circumstances of this case involve prison administration associated with a
variety of components of life in prison, including housing determinations and participation

in betterment programs that are discretionary in nature. The facts alleged do not plausibly
depict actions “so egregious” that they would exceed the scope of any and all discretion
that an official might exercise in regard to such matters. At most, the allegations plausibly
suggest some instances in which discretion may have been abused. However, discretionary
function immunity applies even if the discretion is abused. Hildebrand v. Wash. Cnty.

Comm’rs, 33 A.3d 425, 429 (Me. 2011) (citing 144 M.R.S. § 8111(1)(C)). See also Roberts
v. Maine, 731 A.2d 855, 857 (Me. 1999) (“The management and care of prisoners is a
discretionary function.”) (quoting Erskine v. Comm’r of Corr., 682 A.2d 681, 686 (Me.
1996)). For these reasons, even assuming that the allegations would state one or more
plausible claim, the claims are nevertheless subject to dismissal because they seek

4 Plaintiff’s claim that he had a binding contract with some or all Defendants is a conclusory assertion and
is, moreover, implausible. Nor can Plaintiff sue the Department of Corrections in federal court as opposed
to state court on any of his claims due to the immunity conferred on the State of Maine and arms of the
state by the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Regents of the Univ. of California v. Doe, 519
U.S. 425, 429 (1997); Wojcik v. Massachusetts State Lottery Comm’n, 300 F.3d 92, 99 (1st Cir. 2002).
monetary relief against defendants who are immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).

Conclusion
The Recommended Decision of the Magistrate Judge (ECF No. 19) is hereby
AFFIRMED and ADOPTED, IN PART. Plaintiff’s request for an immediate award of
injunctive relief preventing transfer is DENIED and his Motion for Continuance (ECF No.
21) is DENIED.
Plaintiff’s § 1983 due process claim is DISMISSED as to all defendants to the extent

Plaintiff seeks monetary damages. The claim will be served exclusively on Defendants
Chris Arbour and David Simpson, deputy wardens of programs at the Maine Correctional
Center and the Maine State Prison, respectively, and will be limited to prospective relief
only.
Plaintiff’§ 1983 First Amendment claim is DISMISSED as to all defendants except

Defendant David Simpson, and the claim is limited to a claim alleging a threatened out of
state transfer.
Plaintiff’s § 1983 deliberate indifference claim is DISMISSED as to all defendants.
Plaintiff’s § 1985 claim is DISMISSED as to all defendants.
Plaintiff’s Title IX claim is DISMISSED as to all defendants.

Plaintiff’s state law claims are DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED. Dated this 21st day of October, 2025.

/s/ Lance E. Walker
CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11175078. Public record. Not legal advice.