# Steward

> District Court, N.D. Ohio · October 20, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11174223

## Case

- **Full name:** Pamela Steward, Ralph Magers, and Mark Felton v. Roppe Corporation, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** October 20, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11174223

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding complaint plausibly alleged common management where the same individual was president of both entities
- concluding two companies had common management because they had nearly identical officers and the same individual was president of both

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION

Pamela Steward, et al., Case No. 3:18-cv-2905

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER

Roppe Corporation, et al.,

Defendants.

I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs Pamela Steward, Ralph Magers, and Mark Felton are individuals with disabilities
who are employed by Defendant Seneca Re-Ad Industries, Inc. (“Seneca Re-Ad”), in a
manufacturing workshop located within Defendant Roppe Corporation’s commercial flooring
products manufacturing facility in Fostoria, Ohio. Seneca Re-Ad leases space within Roppe’s facility
for its workshop, in which Seneca Re-Ad employees produce flooring samples that are then sold to
Roppe. (See Doc. No. 84-1 at 19-22).
Plaintiffs allege Roppe and Seneca Re-Ad have violated Title I of the Americans with
Disabilities Act and Ohio Revised Code § 4112.02(A) by discriminating against them with regard to
training and promotional opportunities and compensation, as well as by failing to individually assess
Plaintiffs’ work capabilities or provide them with reasonable accommodations. (Doc. No. 116).
Roppe has moved for summary judgment on all claims asserted against it by Plaintiffs. (Doc. No.
151). Plaintiffs filed a brief in opposition to the motion, (Doc. No. 154), and Roppe filed a brief in
reply. (Doc. No. 155). For the reasons stated below, I grant Roppe’s motion.
II. STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant demonstrates there is no genuine dispute
of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
All evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and all reasonable
inferences are drawn in the nonmovant’s favor. See, e.g., Ondo v. City of Cleveland, 795 F.3d 597, 603
(6th Cir. 2015) (citing cases). A factual dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury could resolve the

dispute and return a verdict in the nonmovant’s favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986). A disputed fact is material only if its resolution might affect the outcome of the case
under the governing substantive law. Rogers v. O’Donnell, 737 F.3d 1026, 1030 (6th Cir. 2013).
IV. DISCUSSION
Roppe contends it is entitled to summary judgment on all of Plaintiffs’ claims because it is
not Plaintiffs’ direct employer and neither of the “single-employer” or “joint-employer” theories
apply in this case. (See Doc. No. 151). Plaintiffs do not dispute that Roppe is not their direct
employer, but they argue a reasonable jury could conclude Roppe is liable for disability
discrimination under either the single-employer theory or the joint-employer theory. (See Doc. No.
154).
A. SINGLE EMPLOYER
“A single employer analysis asks whether ‘two nominally independent entities are so
interrelated that they actually constitute a single integrated enterprise.’” Nat’l Lab. Rels. Bd. v. Bannum

Place of Saginaw, LLC, 97 F.4th 351, 359 (6th Cir. 2024) (quoting Swallows v. Barnes & Noble Book
Stores, Inc., 128 F.3d 990, 993 n.4 (6th Cir. 1997)).1 In determining whether to treat two entities as a
single employer, Courts consider four factors in determining whether two covered entities should be

1 Courts “look to both labor cases and civil rights cases for guidance” on the single-employer and
joint-employer theories, because those theories arose in the labor relations context “and were
subsequently imported into the civil rights context.” Swallows, 128 F.3d at 993 n.3.
treated as a single employer: “(1) interrelation of operations, i.e., common offices, common record
keeping, shared bank accounts and equipment; (2) common management, common directors and
boards; (3) centralized control of labor relations and personnel; and (4) common ownership and
financial control.” Swallows, 128 F.3d at 993–94 (citing York v. Tenn. Crushed Stone Ass’n, 684 F.2d
360, 362 (6th Cir. 1982)). “No one factor is conclusive, but control over labor relations is a central
concern.” Arnold v. Taylor Corp., No. 3:17 CV 1381, 2019 WL 10694451, at *6 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 3,

2019) (citing Swallows, 128 F.3d at 994). As I discuss below, none of these factors weigh in favor of
a single employer finding.
1. Interrelation of Operations
As the Sixth Circuit has held, “there is insufficient evidence of interrelation of operations”
between two companies that have “kept their own records[] and maintained separate bank accounts
and offices.” Swallows, 128 F.3d at 994. Roppe represents, and Plaintiffs do not dispute, that Roppe
and Seneca Re-Ad keep their own records and maintain separate bank accounts. (See Doc. No. 151
at 19-21). Roppe also asserts that the $1 per year lease agreement it maintains with Seneca Re-Ad
and Roppe’s provision of maintenance for some of Seneca Re-Ad’s equipment does not rise to the
level of interrelated operations. (See Doc. No. 85-1 at 13; Doc. No. 151-3 at 8-9).
Plaintiffs dispute Roppe’s argument that their case relies only on the “provision of free rent,
maintenance, and equipment to Seneca Re-Ad.” (Doc. No. 154 at 28). They contend the record
“demonstrates Roppe’s control and use of Seneca Re-Ad at every level” and therefore, there is an

interrelation of operations between the two companies.
But Plaintiffs’ representations of “control” rely, in the end, on the fact that Seneca Re-Ad
sells the samples its employees produce almost exclusively to Roppe. (See, e.g., id. at 30). While that
circumstance may be uncommon in the marketplace, Plaintiffs have not pointed to any case in
which a court has held that a supplier’s dependence on its customer demonstrates an interrelation of
operations to the same extent as shared bank accounts or common offices and record keeping.
Plaintiffs assert, and Roppe does not dispute, that Seneca Re-Ad employees use certain
equipment owned by Roppe. (Doc. No. 154 at 30). But the two companies do not share that
equipment, as Roppe’s production work is performed at another location. (Doc. No. 83-1 at 1).
And Roppe is not responsible for Seneca Re-Ad’s utility costs associated with operating the

equipment. (See Doc. No. 151-5 at 14). Plaintiffs have not met their burden to show a reasonable
jury could conclude this evidence is sufficient to establish “the type of interrelation found in cases
treating two entities as a single employer.” Swallows, 128 F.3d at 994.2
2. Common Management, Directors, and Boards
The second factor looks for the presence of “common officers or board members.”
Swallows, 128 F.3d at 994 (citing York, 684 F.2d at 362). See also Bannum Place, 97 F.4th at 360
(concluding two companies had common management because they had nearly identical officers and
the same individual was president of both); Boyd v. James S. Hayes Living Health Care Agency, Inc., 671
F. Supp. 1155, 1164 (W.D. Tenn. 1987) (finding two organizations had common management where

2 The Sixth Circuit relied on the following cases to describe the “type of interrelation” that satisfies
the first factor of the single employer inquiry:

Armbruster[ v. Quinn], 711 F.2d [1332,] 1338 [(6th Cir. 1983)] (finding interrelation of
operations where parent company “handled” subsidiary’s accounts receivable and its
payroll and cash accounting, provided it with administrative backup, monitored its
sales shipments, allowed subsidiary’s managerial employees to use its company credit
cards, and housed subsidiary’s bank accounts at its headquarters); McKenzie v.
Davenport–Harris Funeral Home, 834 F.2d 930, 933-34 (11th Cir. 1987) (parent and
subsidiary companies were marketed as “twins in service,” and parent kept
subsidiary’s books and records, issued its payroll checks and paid its bills); EEOC v.
Dolphin Cruise Line, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 1550, 1553-54 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (two companies
provided exclusive services to each other, were marketed as twin operations, used
each other’s logo and letterhead interchangeably, issued checks on each other’s
behalf, and kept business and personnel records at the same office).

Swallows, 128 F.3d at 994.
the board of the first entity selected the board of the second entity and the second entity’s board
chairman was the executive director of the first entity); E.E.O.C. v. Care Ctrs. Mgmt. Consulting, Inc.,
942 F. Supp. 2d 771, 779 (E.D. Tenn. 2013) (finding complaint plausibly alleged common
management where the same individual was president of both entities).
Plaintiffs assert this factor is met because two Roppe employees – Brian Cooper and Galen
Dillon – served on Seneca Re-Ad’s board. But there is no dispute that Cooper and Dillon are not

and have never been Roppe officers or board members. And Plaintiffs have not identified any case
in which a court held that an employee of one organization acting as a board member of another
organization was sufficient to satisfy this factor.
Plaintiffs also assert Roppe exerts managerial control over Seneca Re-Ad “because Seneca
Re-Ad has no officers of its own.” (Doc. No. 154 at 32). But, as I have previously discussed, the
Seneca County Board of Developmental Disabilities (“SCBDD”), “is charged with providing
services to meet the needs of Seneca County residents who are individuals with developmental
disabilities.” (Doc. No. 111 at 1) (citing Ohio Rev. Code §§ 5126.04(A) and 5126.05(A)).
To do so, the SCBDD “may enter into contracts with other such boards and with
public or private, nonprofit, or profit- making agencies or organizations.” Ohio Rev.
Code § 5126.05(C). The SCBDD entered into one such contract with not-for-profit
corporation Seneca Re-Ad Industries, Inc. (Doc. No. 18-1). . . .
Pursuant to the Contract for Vocational Services between the SCBDD and Seneca
Re-Ad, Seneca Re-Ad agreed to operate a sheltered workshop, employing only
individuals with disabilities. But these Seneca Re-Ad employees were to be
supervised on-site by employees of the SCBDD. The contract provided that the
SCBDD Director of Adult Services serve as the liaison between Seneca Re-Ad and
the SCBDD and assist Seneca Re-Ad in the implementation of the contract. (Doc.
No. 18-1 at 2, 13).
(Doc. No. 111 at 1-2) (footnote omitted).
In short, SCBDD, not Roppe, is responsible for many, if not all, of Seneca Re-Ad’s officer-
level functions.3 I conclude this factor weighs in favor of Roppe.
3. Centralized Control of Labor Relations and Personnel
The “‘critical’” inquiry relevant to the question of whether Roppe maintained control over
Seneca Re-Ad’s labor relations and personnel is “‘[w]hat entity made the final decisions regarding
employment matters related to the person claiming discrimination?’” Swallows, 128 F.3d at 995

(quoting Frank v. U.S. West, Inc., 3 F.3d 1357, 1363 (10th Cir. 1993)) (alteration by Frank) (further
citation and quotation marks omitted). This factor weighs in favor of Roppe, because there is no
record evidence that shows Roppe had any control over Seneca Re-Ad’s employment matters.
Plaintiffs dispute this conclusion, arguing “Roppe requirements determine the daily tasks and
take-home pay of Seneca Re-Ad workers.” (Doc. No. 154 at 31). Plaintiffs do not identify any
policies which might support this argument. Instead, they point to the fact that “Roppe is the
workshop’s only customer,” apparently contending that the type and volume of product samples
contained in Roppe’s purchase orders equates to control of Seneca Re-Ad’s workforce. (Id.).
But, as Roppe argues, Roppe and Seneca Re-Ad’s “vendor-vendee relationship” is
insufficient to demonstrate centralized control of labor relations. (Doc. No. 155 at 11). While
Seneca Re-Ad may depend on Roppe’s purchase orders to pay its employees, there is no evidence
that Roppe has “authority to hire or fire [Seneca Re-Ad] employees . . . [or] pay[s] their wages and
benefits.” Sanford v. Main St. Baptist Church Manor, Inc., 449 F. App’x 488, 495 (6th Cir. 2011).

Plaintiffs again argue that “because Seneca Re-Ad has no officers and no employees – other
than the individuals with disabilities who actually participate in the manufacturing process – the

3 Nor does Hays v. Chattanooga Tank Wash, LLC, 658 F. Supp. 3d 589 (E.D. Tenn. 2023), help
Plaintiffs. (See Doc. No. 154 at 32). In that case, the two defendant-entities did not dispute that the
employees of one defendant “perform[ed] practical managerial functions over [the other’s]
operations.” Hays, 658 F. Supp. 3d at 595. Here, there is no evidence that Roppe employees
performed managerial functions for Seneca Re-Ad employees.
resulting power vacuum is filled by officials at Roppe.” (Doc. No. 154 at 33). To support this
assertion, Plaintiffs point to a 2014 request by Roppe officials “that an employee at Seneca Millwork,
an [Roppe Holding Company] subsidiary, be transferred into the [Seneca Re-Ad] workshop.” (Id.).
This argument fails as well. Seneca Re-Ad represents that SCBDD’s “Division Manager is
responsible for training workshop specialists employed by” SCBDD, as well as “providing
habilitation services and various administrative functions.” (Doc. No. 83-8 at 8). “Roppe is not

involved in training workshop specialists.” (Id.). Thus, the evidence establishes that it is SCBDD,
not Roppe, that fills any alleged “power vacuum” with respect to training Seneca Re-Ad’s
workforce.4
Moreover, Roppe’s “request” that an individual be evaluated for a transfer to Seneca Re-Ad
was only that, a request. That individual could not begin working for Seneca Re-Ad until after
SCBDD determined he met the required eligibility requirements, and the individual was terminated
from Seneca Millwork’s employment. (See Doc. No. 151 at 30).
Plaintiffs have not met their burden to point to evidence from which a reasonable jury could
conclude Roppe maintained control over Seneca Re-Ad’s labor relations and personnel. Therefore,
I conclude this factor weighs in favor of Roppe.
4. Common Ownership and Financial Control
Finally, Roppe asserts, and Plaintiffs do not dispute, that Seneca Re-Ad has a distinct legal
identity and that Roppe does not have an ownership interest in Seneca Re-Ad. (See Doc. No. 83-1 at

3). Therefore, this factor also weighs in favor of Roppe. See, e.g., Swallows, 128 F.3d at 995; E.E.O.C.
v. Wooster Brush Co. Emps. Relief Ass’n, 727 F.2d 566, 572-73 (6th Cir. 1984).

4 Plaintiffs’ deposition testimony supports this conclusion as well. Both Felton and Steward
testified they had never had any contact with anyone working for Roppe prior to their depositions.
(Doc. No. 89-1 at 5; Doc. No. 91-8 at 8).
5. Plaintiffs’ Alternative Argument
Plaintiffs also argue there are other considerations relevant to the single-employer analysis
beyond the four established factors. To this end, Plaintiffs assert that “the Sixth Circuit found a
single employer relationship where the companies, inter alia, ‘provided services for and made sales to
each other’ and held themselves out to the public as single-integrated business enterprises.’” (Doc.
No. 154 at 27) (quoting Nat’l Lab. Rels. Bd. v. Palmer Donavin Mfg. Co., 369 F.3d 954, 957 (6th Cir.

2004)). (See also Doc. No. 154 at 31). But Plaintiffs’ characterization of the Palmer Donavin holding is
misleading. Before citing evidence regarding sales and public-facing representations, the Sixth
Circuit first concluded there was evidence to satisfy all four of the factors enunciated in Swallows and
other cases:
Respondent P–D Midwest Transport, as a wholly owned subsidiary of Respondent
Palmer Donavin, shares common ownership with its parent. Additionally, there is
substantial overlap in management and officers of the Respondents. P–D exists
solely to deliver goods to Palmer Donavin customers, and its delivery trucks bear
Palmer Donavin’s company name. Moreover, they operate from the same facility,
have the same health, life insurance and profit-sharing plans, use the same payroll
system, enjoy the same work holidays, and the Respondents’ employees occasionally
fill in for each other. Furthermore, as the Board described, they have “formulated
and administered a common labor policy; . . . have provided services for and made
sales to each other; . . . have shared common advertising, . . . phones, sales, and
purchasing; and have held themselves out to the public as single-integrated business
enterprises.”
Palmer Donavin, 369 F.3d at 957 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting In Re Palmer Mfg. Co., 338 NLRB No. 23
(Sept. 30, 2002)) (emphasis added).
Plaintiffs’ argument is not persuasive. Even if the record evidence could reasonably be
viewed in the way Plaintiffs suggest, Plaintiffs have not identified any case in which a court held that
maintenance services, sales, and marketing materials could establish a single employer relationship in
spite of the absence of any of these four well-established factors.
I conclude Roppe is entitled to summary judgment on this theory of liability.
B. Joint Employer
The joint-employer approach “‘consider[s] whether one defendant has control over another
company’s employees sufficient to show that the two companies are acting as a “joint employer” of
those employees.” Harrison v. Soave Enters. L.L.C., 826 F. App’x 517, 522 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting
Swallows, 128 F.3d at 993). See also Carrier Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 768 F.2d 778, 781 (6th Cir. 1985) (If
“two or more employers exert significant control over the same employees – where from the

evidence it can be shown that they share or co-determine those matters governing essential terms
and conditions of employment – they constitute ‘joint employers.’”) (citation and quotation marks
omitted). “The major factors in this determination are the ability to hire, fire, and discipline, affect
compensation and benefits, and direct and supervise performance.” Sanford, 449 F. App’x at 492
(citation omitted).
As I concluded above with respect to the single-employer control-over-labor-relations
factor, Plaintiffs have not identified evidence in the record to demonstrate that Roppe has the
authority to determine the essential terms of their employment. There is no evidence that Roppe
has or shares the authority to hire, fire, or discipline Seneca Re-Ad employees, to set the terms of
their compensation, or to direct or supervise their performance. Roppe is entitled to summary
judgment on this basis as well.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, I grant Defendant Roppe Corporation’s motion for summary

judgment. (Doc. No. 151).

So Ordered.

s/ Jeffrey J. Helmick
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11174223. Public record. Not legal advice.