# Opinion

> District Court, C.D. California · October 3, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11173282

## Case

- **Full name:** Joe Lewis Valentine v. The Executive Officer of the Board of Parole Hearings et al.
- **Court:** District Court, C.D. California
- **Decided:** October 3, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11173282

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- concluding that plaintiff’s allegation that defendants violated his due process rights when they relied on false information in his prison file to find him ineligible for parole was barred by Heck
- affirming that claims against state department of corrections is barred by Eleventh Amendment

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
WESTERN DIVISION

JOE LEWIS VALENTINE, No. CV 25-02436-VBF (DFM)

Plaintiff, ORDER OF DISMISSAL

v.

THE EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF
THE BOARD OF PAROLE
HEARINGS et al.,

Defendants.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Joe Lewis Valentine, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has
filed a civil rights Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Dkt. 1 (“Compl.”).
Plaintiff asserts claims against the Executive Officer of the Board of Parole
Hearings, the Executive Officer of the California Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation, and the District Attorney of Los Angeles (collectively,
“Defendants”) arising from the denial of his parole in May 2020. See id. at 3-4.
Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A, the Court must screen the
Complaint to determine whether it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a
claim on which relief might be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a
defendant who is immune from such relief. As discussed below, the Complaint
must be dismissed because it fails to state a claim. Because the deficiencies in
the Complaint cannot be cured, dismissal is without leave to amend.
Il. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff is a California state prisoner currently serving a sentence of 25-
years-to-life for his conviction of conspiracy to commit murder. See Compl. at
13. Plaintiff challenges his parole denial related to this conviction, asserting
that Defendants violated his due process rights during his May 21, 2020, parole
hearing. See id. at 7. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants
mischaracterized his conviction by concluding that he was convicted of both
conspiracy to commit murder and the actual murder of the victim, Johnny Ray
Bright, when in fact, he had not been convicted on the murder charge. See id.
In reaching this conclusion, according to Plaintiff, the Parole Board improperly
relied upon a 1982 probation report and 1983 state appellate court decision,
even though the probation report contains inaccurate and unreliable
information, and the appellate decision clarifies that he was not convicted of
murder. See id. at 10-11. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages,
as well as an order that the Parole Board provide him a new parole hearing.
See id. at 6.
Plaintiff previously filed a federal habeas action challenging the same
denial of parole. See Joe Lewis Valentine v. F. Guzman, Case No. CV 24-
02127-VBF-DFM (C.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2024). Plaintiff's habeas petition was
denied on November 20, 2024, on the ground that it failed to state a cognizable
federal habeas claim. See id., Dkts. 10, 11.
IW. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law for failure to state a
claim for two reasons: (1) lack of a cognizable legal theory or (2) insufficient
facts under a cognizable legal theory. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t,
901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). In determining whether the complaint states
a claim on which relief may be granted, its allegations of material fact must be

taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See Love v.
United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1989). Because Plaintiff is
appearing pro se, the Court must construe the allegations of the complaint
liberally and afford him the benefit of any doubt. See Karim-Panahi v. L.A.
Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). But “the liberal pleading
standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff’s factual allegations.” Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). “[A] liberal interpretation of a civil
rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not
initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th
Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).
A “plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to
relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption
that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations and alteration
omitted); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (holding that “a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” (citation
omitted)).
If the Court finds that a complaint should be dismissed for failure to state
a claim, it has discretion to dismiss with or without leave to amend. Lopez v.
Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-30 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Leave to amend
should be granted if it appears possible that the defects in the complaint could
be corrected, especially if a plaintiff is pro se. See id. at 1130-31; see also Cato
v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995) (“A pro se litigant must be
given leave to amend his or her complaint, and some notice of its deficiencies,
unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be
cured by amendment.”) (citing Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir.
1987)). But if after careful consideration it is clear that a complaint cannot be
cured by amendment, the Court may dismiss it without leave to amend. See id.
at 1105-06; Chaset v. Fleer/Skybox Int’l, 300 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002)
(holding that “there is no need to prolong the litigation by permitting further
amendment” when plaintiffs could not cure the “basic flaw” in the pleading);
Lipton v. Pathogenesis Corp., 284 F.3d 1027, 1039 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Because
any amendment would be futile, there was no need to prolong the litigation by
permitting further amendment.”).
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Plaintiff’s Claims are Heck-Barred
Civil tort actions, including § 1983 suits, are not an appropriate means to
challenge the validity of outstanding criminal judgments where success in the
civil action would necessarily require a plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of
his conviction or confinement. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486
(1994). To recover damages, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove “that the conviction
or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order,
declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or
called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.”
Id. at 487.
The Ninth Circuit has held that Heck applies with equal force in the
context of parole and probation. See Butterfield v. Bail, 120 F.3d 1023, 1024
(9th Cir. 1997) (“We have no difficulty in concluding that a challenge to the
procedures used in the denial of parole necessarily implicates the validity of the
denial of parole and, therefore, the prisoner’s continuing confinement.”)
(citation omitted); Baskett v. Papini, 245 Fed. App’x 677, 678 (9th Cir. Aug.

21, 2007) (affirming Heck denial because the complaint “necessarily call[ed]
into question the validity of the probation revocation” and plaintiff “failed to
allege that his sentence ha[d] been invalidated.”). District courts, in turn, have
repeatedly found that the Heck bar applies to claims that challenge the fact or
duration of parole. See, e.g., Breitbard v. California Dep’t of Corr. and Rehab.,
No. 22-0653, 2022 WL 3048173, at *7 (C.D. Cal. June 27, 2022) (“Because
success on Plaintiff’s claims would necessarily undermine the validity of
Plaintiff’s parole term, the instant claims for damages are barred by the Heck
doctrine.”), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 3047131 (C.D.
Cal. Aug. 2, 2022); Bailey v. Nevada Parole Bd., 2022 WL 980551, at *2 (D.
Nev. Mar. 31, 2022) (“The Heck test also applies to proceedings that affect the
fact or duration of parole.”).
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his constitutional rights when
they denied him parole based on his refusal “to accept the Board Panel’s
improper legal position and prejudicial conclusion—i.e., that his commitment
offense is a conspiracy to kill and killing Bright.” Compl. at 8. Plaintiff’s claim
falls squarely within the proscription of the Heck doctrine. Indeed, “[f]ew
things implicate the validity of continued confinement more directly than the
allegedly improper denial of parole. This is true whether that denial is alleged
to be improper based upon procedural defects in the parole hearing or upon
allegations that parole was improperly denied on the merits.” Butterfield, 120
F.3d at 1024 (concluding that plaintiff’s allegation that defendants violated his
due process rights when they relied on false information in his prison file to
find him ineligible for parole was barred by Heck).
In Nonnette v. Small, 316 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2002), the Ninth Circuit
recognized a narrow exception to Heck’s general applicability for claims
brought by “former prisoners challenging loss of good-time credits, revocation
of parole or similar matters” where a habeas remedy is unavailable due to
mootness because the prisoner had “fully served the period of incarceration
that he is attacking” before he was able to obtain habeas relief. Id. at 876. As
the Ninth Circuit has explained: “Nonnette was founded on the unfairness of
barring a plaintiff’s potentially legitimate constitutional claim when the
individual immediately pursued relief after the incident giving rise to those
claims and could not seek habeas relief only because of the shortness of his
prison sentence.” Guerrero v. Gates, 442 F.3d 697, 705 (9th Cir. 2006).
Here, the Nonnette exception does not apply to Plaintiff. As an initial
matter, Plaintiff is not challenging the loss of good-time credits or the
revocation of parole; instead, he is challenging the denial of parole and thus
does not fall within the narrow parameters of the Nonnette exception.
Moreover, even if Plaintiff’s claims fell within the scope of the Nonnette
exception, Plaintiff’s ability to obtain habeas relief was not cut short by his
release from custody. Instead, Plaintiff remains in custody where he sought
habeas relief, which was denied.1 As such, the concern underlying Heck—the
need to avoid “the possibility of the claimant [sic] succeeding in the tort action
after having been convicted in the underlying criminal prosecution, in
contravention of a strong judicial policy against the creation of two conflicting
resolutions arising out of the same or identical transaction”—requires
application of the Heck doctrine in this case to avoid conflicting judgments.
Heck, 512 U.S. at 486 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims related to the denial of his parole are
Heck barred and must be dismissed.

1 According to publicly available records, Plaintiff remains incarcerated
at California State Prison, Centinela, following his stipulation to unsuitability
for parole on May 13, 2025. See California Incarcerated Records and
Information Search, https://ciris.mt.cdcr.ca.gov/search (search by name “Joe
Lewis Valentine”). He is next eligible for parole in May 2028. See id.
B. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Plaintiff sues the Executive Officer of the Board of Parole Hearings, the
Executive Officer of the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation, and the District Attorney of Los Angeles in their official
capacity. See Compl. at 3.2 The Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
bars suits against states, state agencies, and state officials in their official
capacities. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). An
“official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit
against the entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). Such a suit
“is not a suit against the official personally, for the real party in interest is the
entity.” Id.
Here, Defendants are officers or agents of the California Department of
Corrections or the Los Angeles District Attorney’s Office. Plaintiff’s official-
capacity claims against these Defendants are tantamount to claims against the
State of California. See Brown v. Or. Dep’t of Corr., 751 F.3d 983, 988-89 (9th
Cir. 2014) (affirming that claims against state department of corrections is
barred by Eleventh Amendment); Del Campo v. Kennedy, 517 F.3d 1070,
1074 (9th Cir. 2008) (“California DAs . . . act as state officials, and so possess
Eleventh Amendment immunity, when acting in their prosecutorial capacity.”)
(citation omitted). Accordingly, the Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiff’s

2 It is not clear whether Plaintiff is attempting to pursue claims against
the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Board of Parole
Hearings, or the Los Angeles District Attorney’s Office. Although he
references these entities throughout the Complaint, they are not named in the
list of Defendants. See Compl. at 3-4. If he is pursuing claims against these
entities, such claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Pennhurst
State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99-100 (1984) (the Eleventh
Amendment prohibits suits against a State or its agencies in federal court
unless the State waives its immunity).
claims for damages against these Defendants in their official capacity.
C. Prosecutorial Immunity
In addition, the District Attorney of Los Angeles is entitled to immunity
for any role in Plaintiff’s parole hearing. “A prosecutor is protected by absolute
immunity from liability for damages under § 1983 ‘when performing the
traditional functions of an advocate.’” Genzler v. Longanbach, 410 F.3d 630,
636 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). “[P]rosecutors should be afforded
absolute immunity for parole recommendations, because parole decisions are a
continuation of the sentencing process.” Brown v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 554
F.3d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 2009).
D. Parole Board Immunity
Likewise, the Executive Officer of the Board of Parole Hearings is
immune from Plaintiff’s suit because his claims against him are based entirely
on the denial of Plaintiff’s parole. See Bermudez v. Duenas, 936 F.2d 1064,
1066 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Although a section 1983 action may be maintained
against officials acting in their individual capacities, parole board officials are
entitled to absolute immunity from liability for damages for their actions taken
when processing parole applications.” (citations omitted)).
D. Supervisory Liability
Finally, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants are based solely on their
supervisory status. Supervisory personnel generally are not liable under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 on any theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability, in the
absence of a state law imposing such liability. See Redman v. Cnty. of San
Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991), abrogated on other grounds by
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994). A plaintiff must allege either (1)
the supervisor’s personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a
sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the
constitutional violation. See Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011).
Here, Plaintiff has done neither, instead asserting only that Defendants
“sanctioned” the “incorrect legal conclusion that [he] committed murder.”
Compl. at 3.
Accordingly, because allowing further amendment of Plaintiff's claims
would be futile for the reasons discussed above, they will be dismissed without
leave to amend.
V. CONCLUSION
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)
and 1915A, that this action is dismissed without leave to amend. Judgment
shall be entered accordingly.

Dated: October 3, 2025 /s/ Valerie Baker Fairbank

VALERIE BAKER FAIRBANK
United States District Judge
Presented by:

DOUGLAS F. a—\
United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11173282. Public record. Not legal advice.