# BLAUSER

> District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania · October 17, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11172926

## Case

- **Full name:** Michael Jeffrey Blauser v. Caleb Quimby
- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** October 17, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11172926

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that the pro se plaintiff was still “required to designate specific facts by use of affidavits, depositions, admissions, or answers to interrogatories . . . sufficient to convince a reasonable fact finder to find all the elements of her prima facie case”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MICHAEL JEFFREY BLAUSER, )
)
Plaintiff, ) Civil Action No. 2:23-cv-2028
)
v. )
) Magistrate Judge Patricia L. Dodge
CALEB QUIMBY, )
)
Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

Plaintiff Michael Jeffrey Blauser (“Blauser”), a former inmate lodged in the Mercer County
Jail, has brought this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Caleb Quimby
(“Quimby”), a corrections officer at the Mercer County Jail. He asserts a claim for cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment.
Pending before the Court is Quimby’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 48.) For
the reasons that follow, his motion will be granted.
I. Procedural History
Blauser’s Complaint was received by the Clerk of Court in November 2023. After he
corrected certain procedural deficiencies, his Complaint was docketed on December 22, 2023. (ECF
No. 7). Quimby then filed a Motion to Dismiss and/or Motion for a More Definite Statement (ECF
No. 17), both of which were denied. (ECF No. 31.)

1 In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), the parties voluntarily consented to
have a United States Magistrate Judge conduct proceedings in this case, including entry of a final
judgment.
After the close of discovery, Quimby filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, a Brief in
Support, a Concise Statement of Material Facts, and Exhibits. (ECF Nos. 48-51.) Blauser filed a
Response. (ECF No. 55.) Thus, Quimby’s motion is ripe for review.
II. Factual Background2

A. The Underlying Incident
On December 26, 2022, Blauser and his cellmate engaged in an altercation that required
intervention from corrections officers. (ECF No. 50 ¶ 3.) Blauser was handcuffed following the
incident and placed in another cell. (Id. ¶ 4.) Officers were unable to remove the handcuffs in the
new cell due to Blauser’s combative nature. (Id. ¶ 5.) Quimby approached the cell several minutes
later and, although Blauser stated that he was calm, he charged at Quimby when the cell door
opened. (Id. ¶¶ 6-7.) Quimby blocked Blauser with his arms and pushed him to the center of the
cell so he could close the cell door. (Id. ¶ 8.) Blauser stumbled and fell before immediately jumping
up and charging Quimby again. (Id. ¶ 9.) Quimby then closed the cell door. (Id. ¶ 10.)
Following these incidents, Blauser was found to have a laceration on his head and a broken

arm. (Id. ¶ 11.) An investigation was conducted into the incident in which it was determined that
only passive restraint techniques and action to repel Blauser were used when he lunged towards
officers. (Id. ¶ 27.)
B. The Grievance Process
At the time of the incident, the Mercer County Jail had a written policy that governed the
submission and review of inmate grievances (the “Policy”). (ECF No. 50 ¶ 12; ECF No. 50-5.)
Section III(h) of the Policy provides that all grievances must be made in writing on an “Inmate

2 The factual background is derived from Quimby’s Concise Statement of Material Facts. (ECF
No. 50.) Blauser has not disputed these facts.
Grievance Form” and placed in the grievance box located in each housing unit or via electronic
grievance through the Inmate Kiosk. (ECF No. 50 ¶ 13; ECF No. 50-5 at 2.) The Inmate Handbook
that was distributed to all inmates also explains the grievance process. (ECF No. 50-6 at 43-44.)
Blauser had access to the Inmate Request Forms and the Kiosk System through which to

file a grievance. (ECF No. 50-7 at ¶ 11.) However, he did not file any grievances related to the
incident on December 26, 2021. (ECF No. 50-7 ¶ 7; ECF No. 50-8 ¶ 7.) In his Complaint, Blauser
admits that the Mercer County Jail had a grievance procedure at the time of the incident, but he did
not file a grievance. (ECF No. 7 at 6-7.)3 He states in the Complaint that he did not do so because
“I don’t spell well.” (Id. at 8.) Instead, he only spoke to the Warden and his family, who advised
him to file a lawsuit. (Id.) He did not allege in his Complaint or in his response to Quimby’s motion
for summary judgment that the grievance process was unavailable to him or that he did not
understand the procedures.
III. Legal Standard
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that: “The court shall grant

summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment
may be granted against a party who fails to adduce facts sufficient to establish any element
essential to that party’s case, and for which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The moving party bears the initial burden of showing
the absence of a genuine, material dispute and an entitlement to judgment. Id. at 323. This showing
does not necessarily require the moving party to disprove the opponent’s claims. Instead, this

3 Blauser used the Pro Se Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights (Prisoner) that includes questions
regarding the exhaustion of administrative remedies.
burden may often be discharged simply by pointing out for the court an absence of evidence in
support of the non-moving party’s claims. Id.
Once the moving party has met their initial burden, then the burden shifts to the non-
moving party to demonstrate, by affidavit or other evidence, “specific facts showing that there is

a genuine issue for trial,” or the factual record will be taken as presented by the moving party and
judgment will be entered as a matter of law. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Corp. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). A non-moving party must “go beyond the pleadings” and show
probative evidence creating a triable controversy. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. An issue is genuine
only if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In following this directive, a court must
take the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and must draw all reasonable
inferences and resolve all doubts in that party’s favor. Hugh v. Butler Cty. Fam. YMCA, 418 F.3d
265, 267 (3d Cir. 2005).
Courts must hold pro se pleadings to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted

by lawyers,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). At the summary judgment stage,
however, a pro se plaintiff is not exempt from his burden of providing some affirmative evidence,
not just mere allegations, to show that there is a genuine dispute for trial. See, e.g., Barnett v. NJ
Transit Corp., 573 Fed. Appx. 239, 243 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding that the pro se plaintiff was still
“required to designate specific facts by use of affidavits, depositions, admissions, or answers to
interrogatories . . . sufficient to convince a reasonable fact finder to find all the elements of her
prima facie case”) (citation and quotation omitted); Siluk v. Beard, 395 Fed. Appx. 817, 820 (3d
Cir. 2010) (“[T]he right of self-representation does not exempt a party from compliance with
relevant rules of procedural law.”); Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir.
2013) (pro se plaintiffs “cannot flout procedural rules—they must abide by the same rules that
apply to all other litigants.”)
IV. Discussion
Quimby argues that he in entitled to summary judgment because Blauser failed to exhaust

his administrative remedies. (ECF No. 49 at 4-8.)
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) provides that:
No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of
this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or
other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are
exhausted.

42 U.S.C. § 1997(e)(a). The Supreme Court has held that prisoners must exhaust their
administrative remedies before bringing suit. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2006). The PLRA’s
mandatory exhaustion requirement means not only that a complaint filed before administrative
remedies are exhausted is premature and cannot be entertained, but also that a failure to exhaust
administrative remedies in accordance with a prison’s grievance procedures constitutes procedural
default. That is so because “the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement requires proper exhaustion.”
Woodford, 548 U.S. at 93-95; see also Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 227-30 (3d Cir. 2004).
Importantly, the prison’s grievance policy is what “define[s] the boundaries of proper
exhaustion.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007); Spruill, 372 F.3d at 231 (“prison grievance
procedures supply the yardstick for measuring procedural default.”). Thus, the procedural
requirements for exhaustion in a given case are drawn from the policies of the prison in question
rather than from any free-standing federal law. Shifflett v. Korszniak, 934 F.3d 356, 364 (3d Cir.
2019) (citing Spruill, 372 F.3d at 231).
Failure to exhaust available administrative remedies is an affirmative defense. Jones, 549
U.S. at 216. As a result, the defendant has the burden of pleading and proving that a prisoner failed
to exhaust available administrative remedies. Brown v. Croak, 312 F.3d 109, 111 (3d Cir. 2002).
It is undisputed that at all relevant times, the Mercer County Jail had a written grievance

policy. It is uncontroverted that Blauser had access to the mechanisms by which to grieve the
incident and failed to use them. As he admits, and as supported by the uncontroverted facts of
record, Blauser did not employ the procedures in the Policy by filing a grievance regarding the
incident described in the Complaint. Further, there are no genuine issues of material fact that would
otherwise support a conclusion that the grievance process was unavailable to him or that he did not
understand the process.
Quimby has met his burden to establish that Blauser failed to exhaust the available
administrative remedies for inmates in the Mercer County Jail. As a result, Blauser’s claim is
procedurally defaulted, which precludes him from pursuing his claim. Thus, Quimby is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law and his motion for summary judgment will be granted.

An appropriate Order follows.

Dated: October 17, 2025 /s/ Patricia L. Dodge
PATRICIA L. DODGE
United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11172926. Public record. Not legal advice.