# LaRose > District Court, S.D. California · October 16, 2025 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11172249 ## Case - **Full name:** Jose Virgilio Martinez Aranda v. Christopher J. LaRose, et al. - **Court:** District Court, S.D. California - **Decided:** October 16, 2025 - **Opinion:** 100trialcourt - **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11172249 ## Opinion text 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 Jose Virgilio MARTINEZ ARANDA, Case No.: 25-cv-2730-AGS-AHG 4 Petitioner, ORDER SCREENING HABEAS 5 v. PETITION (ECF 1) 6 Christopher J. LaROSE, et al., 7 Respondents. 8 9 Petitioner Jose Martinez Aranda seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 10 § 2241 challenging his immigration detention. (See ECF 1.) 11 SCREENING 12 The Court first must screen the habeas petition and dismiss it “if it plainly appears 13 from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief.” See 14 Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, Rule 4; id., 15 Rule 1(b) (permitting court to apply Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases to any “habeas 16 corpus petition”). To survive screening, the petitioner need only state a claim that is 17 sufficiently “cognizable” to warrant a return or answer from the government. See Neiss v. 18 Bludworth, 114 F.4th 1038, 1045 (9th Cir. 2024) (cleaned up). “[A]s long as a petition has 19 any potential merit, it is not so frivolous or incredible as to justify summary dismissal[.]” 20 Id. 21 On “June 28, 2025,” according to Martinez Aranda’s petition, he was arrested by 22 Immigration and Customs Enforcement. (ECF 1, at 2.) Although initially “granted release 23 from custody,” the government appealed that decision to the Board of Immigration 24 Appeals, which is “currently pending.” (Id.) He’s also requested asylum, withholding from 25 removal, and adjustment of status, all of which are purportedly “pending.” (Id. at 6–7.) In 26 his petition, he seeks release because his continued detention violates “8 U.S.C. § 1231(a).” 27 (Id. at 9 (Count I).) He also alleges his arrest was “without reasonable suspicion in violation 28 of the Fourth Amendment safeguard against unreasonable seizures.” (Id. at 11 (Count II).) 1 More specifically, he argues that his arrest violated the Ninth Circuit’s holding that “ICE 2 agents” are not “permitted to carry out preplanned mass detentions, interrogations, and 3 arrests” at a work site “without individualized reasonable suspicion.” (Id. at 7 (quoting 4 Perez Cruz v. Barr, 926 F.3d 1128, 1133 (9th Cir. 2019)). Finally, he asserts that his 5 continued detention deprives him of his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment 6 because he does not “pose a danger to the community” nor “a risk of flight.” (Id. at 14 7 (Count III).) 8 There are concerning legal holes in the petition. For example, Martinez Aranda does 9 not suggest how this Court has authority to review bond determinations—especially those 10 currently on appeal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) (“The Attorney General’s discretionary 11 judgment regarding the application of this section [regarding, among other things, bond 12 decisions after “the detention of any alien”] shall not be subject to review. No court may 13 set aside any action or decision by the Attorney General under this section regarding the 14 detention of any alien or the revocation or denial of bond or parole.”). Nor does he explain 15 why release from immigration detention is a proper remedy for an allegedly problematic 16 seizure. Cf. United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 474 (1980) (noting, in the criminal 17 context, that the Fourth Amendment’s “exclusionary principle” “delimits what proof the 18 Government may offer against the accused at trial, closing the courtroom door to evidence 19 secured by official lawlessness,” but an individual “is not himself a suppressible ‘fruit’”). 20 And his claim concerning the final-removal-order detention provisions in 8 U.S.C. § 1231 21 is puzzling, as he does not claim to be under an order of final removal. (See generally ECF 22 1.) 23 Regardless, although the question is a close one, the Court concludes that Martinez 24 Aranda’s allegations are “not so frivolous or incredible as to justify summary dismissal[.]” 25 See Neiss, 114 F.4th at 1045. So, respondents must answer. 26 CONCLUSION 27 The Court orders as follows: 28 l 1. By November 6, 2025, respondents must file their answer to the habeas petition 2 and show cause why the writ should not be granted. 3 2. By November 20, 2025, Martinez Aranda must file any reply to the government’s 4 answer. 5 3. On Thursday, December 2, 2025, at 10:00 a.m., the Court will hold a hearing 6 regarding the habeas petition. 7 Dated: October 16, 2025 9 Hon. Andrew G. Schopler 10 United States District Judge 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11172249. Public record. Not legal advice.