# ALVAREZ

> District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · October 16, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11172216

## Case

- **Full name:** King Alvarez v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** October 16, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11172216

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that “the Pennsylvania state courts . . . are entities of the state of Pennsylvania”
- recognizing that Title II of the ADA validly abrogates state sovereign immunity
- finding “no support” for plaintiff’s assertion that the ADA requires the court to appoint counsel

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

KING ALVAREZ, :
Plaintiff, :
:
v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 25-CV-4941
:
COMMONWEALTH OF :
PENNSYLVANIA, :
Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM

Pappert, J. October 16, 2025

Pro se plaintiff King Alvarez asserts against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 et seq.
He alleges he was denied reasonable accommodations during civil proceedings before
the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas and seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
For the following reasons, the Court will grant Alvarez leave to proceed in forma
pauperis and dismiss his complaint.
I1
Alvarez states that he suffers from “extreme depression, anxiety, and Complex-
PTSD” as a result of the “torment” he suffered at multiple residential treatment
facilities over the course of a decade. (Compl. at 2-4.) After the City of Philadelphia
terminated Alvarez’s “life-sustaining housing subsidy” in September 2022, his mental
health deteriorated further, causing him to experience a “serious decline” in his “mental

1 The factual allegations set forth in this Memorandum are taken from Alvarez’s
complaint. (Dkt. No. 1.) The Court adopts the sequential pagination assigned to the
complaint by the CM/ECF docketing system.
and physical abilities.”2 (Id. at 4, 7.) For example, Alvarez suffers from memory loss,
vision loss, and a “decreased inability to focus or enjoy hobbies.” (Id. at 7.)
Alvarez claims the judge in his state court case “repeatedly . . . denied [his] civil
case [as] frivolous.” (Id.) Alvarez was told that “all the court can do is offer [him] a

stenographer.” (Id.) Although he used the stenographer, it was “still [] not good
enough for the court to hear [his] legitimate case.” (Id. at 6.) Alvarez states that he
was denied as an “ADA accommodation” his request to “submit a judicial complaint” to
the Judicial Conduct Board of Pennsylvania. (Id.) Based on these allegations, Alvarez
asserts claims under Title II of the ADA. He seeks money damages and for the Court to
compel the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to provide him an attorney. (Id. at 7.)
II
The Court grants Alvarez leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Accordingly, 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) requires the Court to dismiss the complaint if it fails to state a

claim. Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed
by the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), see Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999),
which requires the Court to determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

2 Alvarez also states that he lost his housing subsidy because a nonprofit director
lied during a meeting, causing his “fair housing rights” continue to be violated. (Compl. at
4.) Alvarez previously filed two cases asserting Fair Housing Act claims in connection with
the discontinuation of his housing subsidy. See Alvarez v. City of Philadelphia, No. 24-
3127; Alvarez v. HUD, No. 22-3631. Both cases were dismissed. See Alvarez v. City of
Philadelphia, No. 24-3127, 2024 WL 3606347, at *4 (E.D. Pa. July 31, 2024); Alvarez v.
HUD, No. 22-3631, 2022 WL 17252193, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 28, 2022). Although the Court
understands this case to assert claims under Title II of the ADA only, to the extent that
Alvarez attempts to reassert any FHA claims in connection with his housing subsidy, the
claims are dismissed.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations omitted). At this early stage of
the litigation, the Court will accept the facts alleged in the pro se complaint as true,
draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, and ask only whether the
complaint contains facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Shorter v. United

States, 12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021), abrogation on other grounds recognized by
Fisher v. Hollingsworth, 115 F.4th 197 (3d Cir. 2024). Conclusory allegations do not
suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Because Alvarez is proceeding pro se, the Court
construes his allegations liberally. Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing
Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244-45 (3d Cir. 2013)).
III
Alvarez claims that the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas has not provided
him with reasonable accommodations for his disabilities, in violation of the ADA.3 Title
II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of

such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the
services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by
any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. This provision provides a cause of action for
disabled individuals claiming that they were denied access to state courts because of
their disabilities. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533-34 (2004) (recognizing that Title
II of the ADA validly abrogates state sovereign immunity).
To state a plausible claim under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must allege that

3 The Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas is an arm of the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania. See Callahan v. City of Philadelphia, 207 F.3d 668, 674 (3d Cir. 2000); see
also Andrews v. Hens-Greco, 641 F. App’x 176, 180 (3d Cir. 2016) (stating that “the
Pennsylvania state courts . . . are entities of the state of Pennsylvania”); Geness v. Cox, 902
F.3d 344, 362 (3d Cir. 2018) (permitting Title II ADA claims against the Commonwealth).
“(1) he is a qualified individual; (2) with a disability; (3) who was excluded from
participation in or denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public
entity, or was subjected to discrimination by any such entity; (4) by reason of his
disability.” Geness, 902 F.3d at 361 (quoting Haberle v. Troxell, 885 F.3d 170, 178-79

(3d Cir. 2018)). Because Alvarez seeks compensatory damages, he must also plead that
he suffered intentional discrimination under a deliberate indifference standard. See
Haberle, 885 F.3d at 181 (citations omitted). A plaintiff may meet that standard in two
ways: “first, by alleging facts suggesting that the existing policies caused a failure to
adequately respond to a pattern of past occurrences of injuries like the plaintiff’s, or,
second, by alleging facts indicating that he could prove that the risk of cognizable harm
was so great and so obvious that the risk and the failure to respond will alone support
finding deliberate indifference.” Id. (cleaned up). To allege plausibly that he is a
“qualified individual with a disability,” Alvarez must provide facts to show that he has

a “disability,” which is defined as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more major life activities of such individual . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A).
“[M]ajor life activities include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself, performing
manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending,
speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and
working.” Id. at § 12101(2)(A).
Title II of the ADA includes within its prohibition against discrimination the
failure to make “reasonable accommodations.”4 See Haberle, 885 F.3d at 180. When

4 Although Title II’s definition of “qualified individual with a disability” uses the
term “reasonable modification” as opposed to “reasonable accommodation,” as used in Title
I of the ADA, courts treat the two phrases synonymously. See Berardelli v. Allied Servs.
determining whether an accommodation is reasonable, courts consider “‘whether it
alters the essential nature of the program or imposes an undue burden or hardship in
light of the overall program.’” Doe 1 v. Perkiomen Valley Sch. Dist., 585 F. Supp. 3d
668, 694-95 (E.D. Pa. 2022) (quoting Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 337 (3d Cir.

1995)). “A public entity need not make ‘fundamental’ or ‘substantial’ alterations to
accommodate a disabled individual.” Id. at 695 (citing Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S.
287, 300 (1985)).
The Court understands Alvarez to assert failure to accommodate claims under
Title II of the ADA. He specifically alleges that he suffers from extreme depression,
anxiety, and Complex-PTSD and that, as a result, he struggles with memory and vision
loss and a decreased ability to focus or enjoy hobbies. Assuming that these allegations
are sufficiently specific to address the first two prongs of his ADA claim, Alvarez’s
allegations are too vague to plausibly allege that the Philadelphia Court of Common

Pleas denied him a service or program by reason of his disability or denied him a
reasonable accommodation for such service or program. Alvarez alleges that, for nearly
three years, he has been “denied reasonable accommodations and access to the Court of
Common Pleas.”5 (Compl. at 6.) Alvarez does not elaborate on the specific

Inst. of Rehab. Med., 900 F.3d 104, 117 (3d Cir. 2018); see also Haberle, 885 F.3d at 181
n.11.

5 Alvarez provides no specific dates for when he was allegedly denied reasonable
accommodations. If Alvarez chooses to file an amended complaint, he should be mindful
that claims asserted under Title II of the ADA are subject to a two-year statute of
limitations. See Disabled in Action of Pa. v. Se. Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 539 F.3d 199,
208 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[W]e hold that the statute of limitations applicable to claims under
Title II of the ADA . . . is the statute of limitations for personal injury actions in the state in
which the trial court sits”); see also 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5524. “The general rule is
that the statute of limitations begins to run as soon as a right to institute and maintain suit
arises.” Haugh v. Allstate Ins. Co., 322 F.3d 227, 231 (3d Cir. 2003).
accommodations he has requested and been denied regarding access to the court. He
alleges instead that he is unable to represent himself in court due to his disabilities and
that he needs an attorney to assist with his state case. (Id. at 5.) Alvarez also alleges
that his state case was “repeatedly denied” as “frivolous” and that, despite his use of a

court stenographer, his “legitimate case” was still not heard. (Id. at 6.) Alvarez also
states that his request to file a judicial complaint, purportedly as a reasonable
accommodation, was denied.
Alvarez’s allegations fail to state a plausible claim to relief. He has not alleged
with sufficient specificity the services or programs he was denied, what
accommodations he requested to access those services or programs, which of those
accommodations were afforded to him and which were denied, and how he was injured
by any denials. To the extent Alvarez contends that the Commonwealth has failed to
accommodate his disabilities by not appointing him an attorney, such a claim lacks

merit because there is no right to an attorney under Title II of the ADA. See Douris v.
New Jersey, 500 F. App’x 98, 100 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal of
ADA claims where the plaintiff alleged that “the New Jersey courts failed to provide
him with legal counsel” because “there is no requirement under the ADA that courts
provide legal counsel for a person with disabilities”); Pinson v. Equifax Credit Info.
Servs., Inc., 316 F. App’x 744, 749 (10th Cir. 2009) (finding “no support” for plaintiff’s
assertion that the ADA requires the court to appoint counsel). Moreover, Alvarez has
not alleged any facts which could allow the Court to conclude that the Commonwealth’s
alleged denial of accommodations for his disabilities amounted to intentional
discrimination under a standard of deliberate indifference. See Fowler v. UPMC
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[A] complaint must do more than
allege the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief. A complaint has to ‘show’ such an
entitlement with its facts.”); McDonald-Witherspoon v. City of Phila., No. 17-1914, 2017
WL 3675408, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 25, 2017) (dismissing ADA Title II claim because

complaint did not contain any facts showing that plaintiff was discriminated against
because of his disability).
IV
For the foregoing reasons, Alvarez’s Complaint will be dismissed without
prejudice. Alvarez will be granted leave to file an amended complaint to clearly set out
the factual bases of any ADA claim he seeks to present against the Commonwealth. An
Order with additional instructions for amendment follows.
BY THE COURT:

/s/ Gerald J. Pappert
GERALD J. PAPPERT, J.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11172216. Public record. Not legal advice.