# Opinion

> District Court, D. Oregon · September 16, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11171505

## Case

- **Full name:** Regional Local Union Nos. 846 and 847, International Association of Bridge, Structural, Ornamental and Reinforcing Iron Workers, AFL-CIO; Regional District Council Welfare Plan and Trust, f/k/a Local 846 Rebar Welfare Trust, By and Through Its Board of Trustees; Regional District Council Retirement Plan and Trust, f/k/a Rebar Retirement Plan and Trust, By and Through Its Board of Trustees; Regional District Council Training Trust, f/k/a Local 846 Training Trust, By and Through Its Board of Trustees; and Regional District Council Vacation Trust Fund, f/k/a Local 846 Vacation Trust, By and Through Its Board of Trustees v. Triton Steel, LLC
- **Court:** District Court, D. Oregon
- **Decided:** September 16, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

REGIONAL LOCAL UNION NOS. 846 and Case No. 3:24-cv-02072-JR
847, International Association of Bridge,
Structural, Ornamental and Reinforcing Iron
Workers, AFL-CIO; REGIONAL DISTRICT FINDINGS AND
COUNCIL WELFARE PLAN AND TRUST, RECOMMENDATION
f/k/a LOCAL 846 REBAR WELFARE TRUST, By
and Through Its Board of Trustees; REGIONAL
DISTRICT COUNCIL RETIREMENT PLAN
AND TRUST, f/k/a REBAR RETIREMENT
PLAN AND TRUST, By and Through its Board
of Trustees; REGIONAL DISTRICT COUNCIL
TRAINING TRUST, f/k/a LOCAL 846 TRAINING
TRUST, By and Through Its Board of Trustees;
and REGIONAL DISTRICT COUNCIL
VACATION TRUST FUND, f/k/a LOCAL 846
VACATION TRUST, By and Through Its Board
of Trustees,

Plaintiffs,

v.

TRITON STEEL, LLC,

Defendant.
________________________________________

RUSSO, Magistrate Judge:
Plaintiffs Regional Local Union Nos. 846 and 847 (“Plaintiff Unions”), Regional District
Council Welfare Plan and Trust, Regional District Council Retirement Plan and Trust, Regional
District Council Training Trust, and Regional District Council Vacation Trust Fund (collectively
“Plaintiff Trusts”) move for default judgment against defendant Triton Steel, LLC pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 55(b). For the reasons stated below, plaintiffs’ motion is granted.
BACKGROUND
This action arises out of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) and
Labor Management Relations Act.1 Defendant entered into a collective bargaining agreement
(“CBA”) with Plaintiff Unions which requires employers to submit: (1) “dues and working

assessments and a list of covered employees each month”; (2) “contributions and monthly reports
reflecting the hours worked by its employees to the Regional District Council Fringe Benefit
Funds”; and (3) “contributions to the Ironworkers Management Progressive Action Cooperative
Trust (‘IMPACT’).” Winter Aff. ¶¶ 6-8 (doc. 22-5); Winter Aff. Ex. 1 (doc. 22-6).
Defendant also agreed to be bound by the “terms of the various trust and plan documents
as they currently exist, and as they may be amended by the trustees.” Winter Aff. Ex. 1, at 11 (doc.
22-6). The trust agreements delineate monetary consequences for failure to contribute and give
Plaintiff Trusts the authority to audit employers. Winter Aff. Ex. 6 (doc. 22-11).
Plaintiffs initiated this action on December 16, 2024, and filed a certificate of service
requiring defendant to answer or respond to the complaint by January 9, 2025. On January 13,

2025, the Court granted plaintiffs’ motion for entry of default.
Pursuant to their first motion for default judgment filed on January 16, 2025, plaintiffs
asserted that defendant failed to make timely fringe benefit contributions between January 2020
and December 2022 which, pursuant to the CBA and trust agreements, entitled them to the
delinquent amounts plus interest at the rate of 1.5% per month, liquidated damages, accounting

1 As the Court previously denoted, “defendant is an ‘employer,’ Plaintiff Unions are ‘employee
organizations,’ Plaintiff Trusts are ‘employee benefits plans,’ and the board of trustees,
representing Plaintiff Trusts, are ‘fiduciaries’ under ERISA,” and plaintiffs “are authorized to
maintain this action under the civil enforcement provision of ERISA.” Reg’l Loc. Union Nos. 846
& 847, Int’l Assoc. of Bridge, Structural, Ornamental & Reinforcing Iron Workers, AFL-CIO v.
Triton Steel, LLC, 2025 WL 1225398, *1 n.1 (D. Or. Mar. 31), adopted by 2025 WL 1221020 (D.
Or. Apr. 28, 2025) (citations and internal brackets omitted).
fees, and attorney fees and costs. See, e.g., Winter Aff. ¶¶ 9-12 (doc. 11-5); Winter Aff. Ex. 6 (doc.
11-11). In addition, plaintiffs sought an order compelling a subsequent accounting beginning
January 1, 2023, to the present to determine defendant’s compliance and calculate additional
delinquent amounts.

On April 28, 2025, the Court granted plaintiff’s motion and entered a partial default
judgment against defendant in the amount of $13,999.81. See generally Reg’l Loc. Union Nos. 846
& 847, 2025 WL 1221020; Partial Default J. (doc. 16). On August 19, 2025, plaintiffs filed the
present motion, seeking default judgment in relation to the amounts owed pursuant to the
subsequent audit.
STANDARDS
The decision to grant or deny a motion for default judgment is within the discretion of the
court. DIRECTV, Inc. v. Hoa Huynh, 503 F.3d 847, 852 (9th Cir. 2007). The court must consider
seven factors, often referred to as the Eitel factors, in resolving such a motion: (1) the possibility
of prejudice to the plaintiff; (2) the merits of plaintiff’s substantive claim; (3) the sufficiency of

the complaint; (4) the sum of money at stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute
concerning material facts; (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect; and (7) the strong
policy favoring decisions on the merits. Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986).
Upon the entry of default, the court accepts “the well-pleaded factual allegations in the
complaint as true.” DIRECTV, Inc., 503 F.3d at 854. However, the court “does not accept as
admitted facts that are not well-pleaded, conclusions of law, or facts relating to the amount of
damages.” United States v. RiverCliff Farm, Inc., 2017 WL 3388172, *1 (D. Or. Aug. 7, 2017)
(citations omitted); see also Derek Andrew, Inc. v. Poof Apparel Corp., 528 F.3d 696, 702 (9th
Cir. 2008) (“[t]he general rule of law is that upon default the factual allegations of the complaint,
except those relating to the amount of damages, will be taken as true”) (citation and internal
quotations omitted). In other words, “[i]t is well settled that a default judgment for money may not
be entered without a hearing unless the amount claimed is a liquidated sum or capable of
mathematical calculation.” Davis v. Fendler, 650 F.2d 1154, 1161 (9th Cir. 1981).

DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs seek $24,029.44 in delinquent contributions from January 1, 2023, through
December 31, 2024, plus $3,647 for the cost of the second audit. Vivirito Aff. ¶¶ 3-4 (doc. 22-3);
Vivirito Aff. Ex. 1, at 2 (doc. 22-4). Plaintiffs also seek supplemental attorney fees in the amount
of $2,419. Evans Aff. ¶¶ 4-7 (doc. 22-1). The Court first addresses the appropriateness of default
judgment pursuant to the Eitel factors, and then assesses damages and any reasonable attorney
fees. Stross v. Smith Rock Masonry Co., 2021 WL 2453388, *2 (D. Or. June 16, 2021).
I. Eitel Factors
The Court accepts plaintiffs’ well-pleaded factual assertions as true because default has
been entered against defendant. And the Court concludes that the Eitel factors, on balance, support

granting plaintiffs’ motion.
The first factor “considers whether a plaintiff would suffer prejudice if default judgment is
not entered, and any potential prejudice to the plaintiff favors granting a default judgment.”
Contractors Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Radian Constr. Corp., 2021 WL 5927682, *2 (D. Or. Nov. 29,
2021), adopted by 2021 WL 5925962 (D. Or. Dec. 15, 2021) (citation and internal quotations
omitted). Because plaintiffs have no other recourse for recovery without a default judgment, the
first factor favors granting plaintiffs’ motion.
The second and third factors – the merits of plaintiffs’ claims and the sufficiency of their
complaint – also favor default judgment. The Ninth Circuit has directed that the second and third
factors, taken together, require the dispositive pleading to “state a claim on which the [plaintiff]
may recover.” Danning v. Lavine, 572 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 1978). Here, the complaint and
supporting documents establish that defendant agreed to be bound to the CBA and trust
agreements, and then subsequently failed to fulfill the obligations outlined therein. See, e.g.,

Winter Aff. ¶¶ 5-13 (doc. 22-5); see also Masonry Indus. Admin., Inc. v. Chris Lee Masonry, Inc.,
2016 WL 3396939, *2 (D. Or. June 14, 2016) (“Plaintiff submitted reports and affidavits showing
that Defendants failed to make contributions as required by the agreements; therefore, Plaintiff
states a valid ERISA claim”).
The fourth factor considers the sum of money at stake in this action. The damages here are
neither nominal nor particularly substantial, as plaintiffs seek nearly $28,000 (along with attorney
fees). Cf. Masonry Indus. Admin., Inc., 2016 WL 3396939 at *2 (in weighing the fourth Eitel
factor, over $54,000 in damages was “appropriate considering the number of workers the
Defendants employed and the number of months Defendants failed to make contributions”). The
Court concludes that the fourth factor is neutral.

The fifth factor considers the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts. As
discussed above, defendant was properly served but has not appeared in this case. The Court must
thus accept as true plaintiffs’ well-pleaded factual allegations that defendant violated binding
agreements and ERISA by failing to make contributions and to supply monthly reporting.
Moreover, plaintiffs support their request for damages with documentation of a payroll
examination cataloging amounts owed by defendant pursuant to the CBA and trust agreements.
Vivirito Aff. ¶¶ 2-3 (doc. 22-3); Vivirito Aff. Ex. 1, at 2-6 (doc. 22-4). Because the complaint is
bolstered by an audit,2 “the possibility of a dispute over material facts is low, if it exists at all.”
Trs. of Emp. Painters’ Tr. v. Silverton Glass, LLC, 2021 WL 2046447, *6 (D. Or. Apr. 28), adopted
by 2021 WL 2043212 (D. Or. May 21, 2021).
Finally, the sixth and seventh factors favor granting plaintiffs’ motion. The sixth factor

considers whether defendant’s default was due to excusable neglect. The record demonstrates that
defendant was served but has not appeared, or otherwise indicated an intent to do so. As to the
seventh factor, “default judgments are disfavored because cases should be decided on their merits
whenever reasonably possible [but] the policy . . . favoring decisions on the merits does not weigh
against default judgment because [the defendant’s] failure to appear makes a decision on the merits
impractical.” Contractors Bonding & Ins. Co., 2021 WL 5927682 at *3 (citations and internal
quotations and brackets omitted). In sum, after balancing the Eitel factors, the Court concludes
that default judgment should be entered.
II. Relief
Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2), if a judgment is entered in favor of the plaintiff, the

“court shall award”:
(A) the unpaid contributions,
(B) interest on the unpaid contributions,
(C) an amount equal to the greater of-
(i) interest on the unpaid contributions, or

2 The accounting firm engaged by plaintiffs observed a distinction between its payroll examination
and a formal audit. That is, the accounting firm did not conduct an audit “which would be the
expression of an opinion on the employer’s fulfillment of the requirements of the Collective
Bargaining and Trust Agreements,” but rather determined “whether contributions to the Plan were
made in accordance with the Collective Bargaining and Trust Agreements.” Vivirito Aff. Ex. 1,
at 1 (doc. 22-4). This distinction appears to be technical such that the Court uses the term “audit”
colloquially in accordance with plaintiffs.
(ii) liquidated damages provided for under the plan in an amount not in
excess of 20 percent (or such higher percentage as may be permitted under
Federal or State law) of the amount determined by the court under
subparagraph (A),

(D) reasonable attorney’s fees and costs of the action, to be paid by the defendant,
and

(E) such other legal or equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.
29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2). An award under this section is “mandatory and not discretionary” when
(1) the employer is delinquent at the time the action is filed; (2) the district court enters a judgment
against the employer; and (3) a binding agreement provides for such an award. Nw. Adm’rs, Inc.
v. Alberton’s, Inc., 104 F.3d 253, 257-58 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).
Because these requirements are met in the present case, defendant shall make all unpaid
contributions, interest, and liquated damages, along with auditor and attorney fees.
A. Damages
As stated above, defendant is bound by the CBA and trust agreements, which set forth
required contributions and penalties for failure to make such contributions. Plaintiffs engaged the
accounting firm WithumSmith+Brown, PC to conduct a payroll examination of defendant to
determine “if the required contributions have been made [from] January 1, 2023 through December
31, 2024.” Vivirito Aff. ¶¶ 2-3 (doc. 22-3). This payroll examination revealed defendant owes
$18,005.75 in fringe benefit contributions, $2,422.54 in interest, $3,601.15 in liquidated damages,
and $3,647 for the cost of the examination. Vivirito Aff. Ex. 1, at 2 (doc. 22-4). The Court finds
that plaintiffs are entitled to $27,676.44 in damages.
B. Attorney Fees
According to the CBA and trust agreements, delinquent employers must pay attorney fees
“as are necessary if litigation is filed to collect said delinquent amounts.” Winter Aff. ¶ 11 (doc.
22-5); Winter Aff. Ex. 1, at 11 (doc. 22-6); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1) (“the court in its
discretion may allow a reasonable attorney’s fee and costs of action to either party”). In
determining reasonableness in the context of a motion for default judgment, the court employs the
“‘lodestar method,’ which multiplies the number of hours the prevailing party reasonably

expended on litigation by a reasonable hourly rate.” Stross, 2021 WL 2453388 at *4. A reasonable
rate for legal services is “calculated according to the prevailing market rates in the relevant
community.” McElmurry v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 2008 WL 1925119, *3 (D. Or. Apr. 30, 2008)
(quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984)). “This District considers the most recent
Oregon State Bar Economic Survey . . . as its ‘initial benchmark’ in determining whether hourly
billing rates are reasonable.” Prison Legal News v. Umatilla Cnty., 2013 WL 2156471, *4 (D. Or.
May 16, 2013) (citations omitted).
Here, plaintiffs seek $2,419 in attorney fees for legal services provided since February 1,
2025. Specifically, attorney Michael Evans requests 8.2 hours at a rate of $295 per hour. Evans
Aff. ¶¶ 4-6 (doc. 22-1). In support of the attorney fees requested, plaintiffs have submitted an

itemized list of the work he undertook in this case during the relevant period. Evans Aff. Ex. 1
(doc. 22-2). The work does not appear excessive or duplicative. Mr. Evans also notes his
experience in the field from which the Court gleans that the requested hourly rate is below the
mean/median rate for Portland attorneys with the same level of experience. Evans Aff. ¶¶ 2-3, 6
(doc. 22-1). The Court therefore finds the hours expended and requested rate reasonable, such that
plaintiffs are awarded an additional $2,419 in attorney fees.
RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs’ Second Motion for Default Judgment (doc. 22) should
be granted, and damages and attorney fees should be awarded in the sum of $30,095.44.
This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment or appealable order. The
parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the court. Thereafter, the parties shall have
fourteen (14) days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections
to any factual determination of the Magistrate Judge will be considered as a waiver of a party’s
right to de novo consideration of the factual issues and will constitute a waiver of a party’s right
to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to this
recommendation.
DATED this 16th day of September, 2025.

________/s_/_ J_o_li_e_ A__. _R_u_s_s_o________
Jolie A. Russo
United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11171505. Public record. Not legal advice.