# Harris

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · September 15, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11170715

## Case

- **Full name:** Walter Harris v. Lt. Biscoe, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** September 15, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11170715

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding a reasonable inference of deliberate indifference where the plaintiff-inmate “repeatedly advised” officials of the threat posed to him by specific gang members who threatened him for being an informant
- concluding that a prisoner’s reputation as a snitch allowed one to reasonably infer that placing him with violent inmates “created a substantial risk of serious harm.”
- holding that “as a matter of statutory interpretation that parties have a right to a jury trial on PLRA exhaustion when that issue is intertwined with the merits of a claim... .”
- concluding prisoner failed to exhaust by not naming defendant in grievance as required by the updated iteration of DC-ADM 804

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
WALTER HARRIS, : No. 1:22-CV-1512
Plaintiff : (Munley, J.)
Vv. □ (Caraballo, M.J.)
LT. BISCOE, et al.,
Defendants
REPORT & RECOMMENDATION
I. Introduction
On July 29, 2022, plaintiff Walter Harris initiated this civil rights
action against 12 Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”)
employees affiliated with State Correctional Institution Mahanoy (“SCI
Mahanoy”). Doc. 1-4. Before the Court are Harris’s Eighth Amendment
failure to protect claims against remaining defendants Lt. Biscoe,
Michael Dunkle, Wesley Matrey, Theresa Delbalso, and Dawn Santana,
premised on allegations that they knowingly failed to protect him
against a serious risk of harm. Doc. 1-4 at 9-11. On May 23, 2024, the
defendants moved for summary judgement against Harris, seeking
dismissal of all remaining claims. Doc. 54. The motion was fully briefed,

is ripe for decision, and was referred to the undersigned to issue a
report and recommendation.
As set forth below, Harris failed to exhaust administrative
remedies for his Eighth Amendment failure to protect claims against
Delbalso, Dunkle, and Matrey before filing this suit, as required under
the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). Moreover, his remaining
claims against Santana and Biscoe are substantively flawed, for want of
personal involvement in the alleged wrongs, and the absence of
deliberate indifference. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends
granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and dismissing
all remaining claims and defendants with prejudice.
II. Background
A. Relevant Procedural History
Harris is a state inmate who, during the relevant period, was
confined at SCI Mahanoy. Doc. 55-4 at 6—7. The facts underlying this
action pertain to an event that occurred at SCI Mahanoy in 2020, where
Harris was attacked by another inmate, Laquan Harris-Bracey, after
being placed in a cell together. Doc. 1-4 at 9. According to Harris, the

assault resulted from prison staff disclosing his status as an informant
during misconduct proceedings. Id.
Harris brought a complaint on July 29, 2022, against 12 SCI
Mahanoy personnel, advancing claims of failure to protect under the
Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments (Count I), negligence
(Count IL), and Monell liability (Count III). Doc. 1-4. Although Harris
initially filed suit in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, it

was removed to the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania on August 19, 2022. Doc. 1.
On September 23, 2022, Harris voluntarily dismissed defendant
Brian Shiptoski, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
41(a)(1)(A)G). Doc. 14. Through stipulation of the parties, the suit was
transferred to this district on September 28, 2022. Docs. 16, 17, 18.
On November 16, 2022, and prior to the defendants serving an answer

or moving for summary judgment, Harris unilaterally withdrew the
Monell liability claim at Count ITI, pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(@i). Doc.
28. The defendants answered Harris’s complaint on April 21, 2023, and
discovery closed on March 12, 2024. Docs. 34, 50.

On May 28, 2024, the defendants moved for summary judgment,
seeking dismissal of all claims. Doc. 54. In their motion, the defendants
contend that Harris failed to exhaust his administrative remedies
before bringing this suit, as required under the PLRA. Doc. 56 at 5-8.
They also argue that Harris failed to establish the defendants’ personal
involvement in the underlying facts for purposes of a Section 1983 claim
and, alternatively, that Harris cannot meet one or more of the elements
of his failure to protect claim under the undisputed facts. Jd. at 8-15.
Finally, the defendants contend that Harris’s negligence claim fails,
because they are shielded by sovereign immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment. Id. at 25-28.
Harris filed a timely opposition and statement of facts on July 17,
2028. Doc. 61. In opposition to the defendants’ request for summary
judgment on the failure to protect claim, Harris counters that record
evidence demonstrates administrative exhaustion. Id. at 13. He also

avers that the evidence in the record supporting his claim warrants
surviving summary judgment. Jd. at 5-13.
In his brief, Harris also seeks to withdraw his negligence claim at
Count II, and to withdraw all claims against six of the remaining

defendants: C.O. Rivello, Bernadette Mason, Jennifer Mahally, Lori
White, Laura Banta, and Charles Stetler. Doc. 61 at 13.1 As Harris did
not file a stipulation of dismissal for those claims and defendants, as
required by Rule 41(a)(1)(A)Qi), the premise for the request remains
unclear. Accordingly, the undersigned construes the requested
withdrawal as a non-opposition to defendants’ motion for summary
judgment, and recommends dismissal of Count II and defendants
Rivello, Mason, Mahally, White, Banta, and Stetler, with prejudice.
Thus, remaining before the Court is Harris’s Eighth Amendment failure
to protect claim (Count I) against defendants Biscoe, Dunkle, Matrey,
Delbalso, and Santana. See Doc. 61 at 138-14.
In his complaint, Harris alleged that he suffered injuries from
Harris-Bracey during the underlying attack, and that prior to the
attack, he “requested to stay in a cell by himself,” because there were

1 Harris also seeks to withdraw all claims against Shiptoski who, as noted above,
was voluntarily dismissed from this action shortly after it was removed from county
court. Doc. 14.
2 The defendants aver that the failure to protect claim has no basis in the Fourth
Amendment, and that the Fourteenth Amendment is simply a vehicle for Harris to
assert his Kight Amendment claim. Doc. 56 at 10 n.1. Harris does not dispute that
characterization, and styles his claim as one falling under the Eighth Amendment
in his opposition. See Doc. 61 at 5. Accordingly, the undersigned addresses the
remaining claim only through the lens of the Eighth Amendment.

“rumors within the prison” he was a snitch, which left him in fear for
his safety. Doc. 1-4 at 9. Harris seeks to hold SCI Mahanoy corrections
officers Biscoe, Dunkle, and Matrey liable for the attack, alleging that
they “were responsible for [his] placement in Harris-Bracey’s cell[,]” and
that they “knew or should have known [he] would not be safe with
Harris-Bracey.” Id. Similarly, Harris seeks to hold SCI Mahanoy
facilities manager Delbalso liable for the attack, alleging that she “knew

or should have known that [he] was at risk for being attacked and/or
that inmate Harris-Bracey was dangerous,” and that it was her
responsibility to “have done something about it.” Id. at 10. Harris
separately seeks to hold SCI Mahanoy hearing officer Santana liable for
the attack, based on her alleged review of a grievance arising out of the
assault. Specifically, the complaint alleges that Harris “filed a grievance
regarding his egregious treatment[,|” that Santana reviewed it, but that
“nothing was done.” Id.
B. Factual Background
The parties do not dispute many of the facts relevant to this
lawsuit, and the record is well developed. The physical assault giving
rise to this action transpired on February 24, 2020, while Harris was

incarcerated in SCI Mahanoy’s restricted housing unit. Doc. 55 at 1—2;
Doc. 61-2 at 1. That day, Harris was handcuffed in the front and
escorted by non-party corrections officers to a cell containing another
inmate, Harris-Bracey. Doc. 55-3 at 9-17; Doc. 55 at 2; Doc. 61-2 at 1;
Doc. 61 at 6. Upon Harris’s entry into the cell and the securing of the
door, and while Harris was still handcuffed, Harris-Bracey approached
him from the front and struck him in the face and head area witha
closed fist. Doc. 55-3 at 9-17; Doc. 55 at 2; Doc. 61-2 at 1. The attending
officers ordered Harris-Bracey to stop, and when he failed to comply,
they fired OC spray into the cell. Doc. 55-3 at 7, 9, 11, 18, 15. The cell
door was then opened, Harris and Harris-Bracey were separated, and
both were removed from the cell. Id.
Harris and Harris-Bracey were later admitted to the medical
department for treatment. Jd. Upon examination, Harris was treated
for abrasions on the left side of his head and a laceration on his bottom
lip; Harris-Bracey was treated for lacerations on his back caused by an
improvised weapon used by Harris. Jd. at 23, 32-47.
During the period of January through March 2020, which

encompasses the events giving rise to this action, Harris filed two

grievances with SCI Mahanoy. As set forth below, Harris pursued both
grievances through all three levels of administrative review—initial
review, appeal, and final review:
1. On January 3, 2020, Harris filed grievance #843207. Doc. 61-8
at 9. In it, he alleged that prison personnel were deliberately
indifferent to his safety when they revealed in a misconduct
report pertaining to inmate Shields that information provided
by Harris led to Shields being disciplined. Jd. at 9-10. Harris
specifically accused defendant Biscoe and non-party
Ellenberger of being the source of the “leaked” information, and
Biscoe of prompting a rumor among the prison that Harris was
an informant. Id. at 10. Harris attached as an exhibit to the
grievance a copy of the misconduct report in question. Jd. at 7.
In the misconduct report, the hearing examiner, defendant
Santana, described Biscoe’s report that Harris admitted to
being involved in a prison narcotics scheme with Shields. Id. at
7. The grievance was denied at initial review, on the merits, by
defendant Dunkle. Harris appealed, claiming that he
mistakenly accused Ellenberger, instead of Santana, of being
one of the disclosing parties. Id. at 4-5. Harris also took
exception to the response by the initial reviewer, Dunkle, and
accused him of being wrong on key facts, including his finding
that prison staff had not acted with deliberate indifference
toward Harris’s safety. Doc. 61-8 at 4-5. The initial appeal was
denied on the merits by defendant Delbalso; the appeal to final
review was likewise denied on the merits. Jd. at 2-8.
2. On February 25, 2020, Harris filed grievance #853530,
concerning the February 24, 2020, assault by Harris-Bracey.
Doc. 55-9 at 8. In the grievance, Harris attributed the assault
to two circumstances. First, that prison personnel (none of
whom are defendants here) failed to follow procedure when
they left Harris-Bracey unsecured in his cell while Harris was
placed inside. Id. at 8—9. Second, the circumstances alleged in
srievance #843207, in which Harris’s alleged status as an

informant was revealed during misconduct proceedings. Id.
Harris noted that he “wrote” to defendants Matrey and Biscoe
before submitting the grievance. Jd. at 8. On initial review,
Matrey denied the grievance on the merits, noting that staff
never referred to Harris as a “snitch,” and that he requested to
be moved to Harris-Bracey’s cell. Jd. at 7. In his initial appeal,
Harris contended that Matrey was mistaken on key facts,
including on his claim that Harris requested to be housed in
the same cell as Harris-Bracey. Jd. at 4-5. This appeal, and
Harris’s subsequent appeal to final review, were both denied on
the merits. Jd. at 2-8.
Thus, both grievances that Harris filed and later appealed during
the period at issue were related to his federal action and ultimately
denied on the merits at the final level of administrative review.
III. Discussion
A. Motion for Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate only when record materials,
including but not limited to, “the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Wishkin v. Potter, 476 F.3d 180, 184 (8d Cir. 2007); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a),
(c)(1)(A). In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists,
the court must view the evidence “in the light most favorable to the non-

moving party and must make all reasonable inferences in that party’s
favor.” Wishkin, 476 F.3d at 184.
A factual dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). And a fact is
material only if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law ....’ Jd. But “a complete failure of proof concerning an
essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all
other facts immaterial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 328
(1986).
The movant “bears the initial responsibility of informing the
district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions
of [the record, including but not limited to] the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact.” Jd. “‘[T]he non-moving party must
[then] oppose the motion and, in doing so, may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of his pleadings’ but, instead, ‘must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Bare

10

assertions, conclusory allegations, or suspicions will not suffice.’ ”

Jutrowski v. Twp. of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 288-89 (8d Cir. 2018)
(quoting D.E. v. Cent. Dauphin Sch. Dist., 765 F.3d 260, 268-69 (8d Cir.
2014)).
Even where, as here, the movant argues that the non-movant has
failed to produce sufficient evidence to prevail on a claim at trial, the
movant must still satisfy the initial burden of informing the court of the
basis for its motion. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323 (‘[A] party seeking
summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing
the district court of the basis for its motion[.]”). This means that
“Twlhere the moving party does not have the burden of proof on the
relevant issues,” and they have pinpointed in their motion “deficiencies
in the opponent’s evidence” sufficient to show no reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the non-movant, they are entitled to “judgment as a
matter of law.” Anchorage Assocs. v. Virgin Islands Bd. of Tax Rev., 922
F.2d 168, 175 (8d Cir. 1990).
B. Failure to Exhaust Under the PLRA
The defendants contend that Harris failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies before filing this lawsuit, thus warranting

11

dismissal of all defendants. Specifically, they aver that Harris did not

name any of the remaining defendants in grievance #853530, which
concerned the Harris-Bracey assault, beyond claiming that he “wrote”
to Matrey and Biscoe. Doc. 56 at 7-8. Thus, the DOC was not put on
notice through the grievance process of the claims Harris now brings in
this federal action. Id. Harris, in opposition, highlights the instances in
which both grievances #853530 and #843207 reference Biscoe, Dunkle,
Matrey, and Santana; Delbalso goes unmentioned. Doc. 61 at 13. Harris
alternatively requests an exhaustion hearing if the Court finds his
grievances insufficient. Id.
A review of grievances #853530 and #848207 finds that they did
not put the DOC on notice of the claims Harris now brings against
defendants Delbalso, Dunkle, and Matrey, which therefore should be
dismissed with prejudice. The grievances did, however, sufficiently
notify the DOC of the claims now asserted in this federal action against
defendants Biscoe and Santana, thus warranting further analysis.
The PLRA provides that before prisoners file suit in federal court

over the conditions of their confinement, they must have first exhausted
all “administrative remedies as are available[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).

12

This legislation was intended to “eliminate[] courts’ conducting case-by-
case inquiries until after a prisoner has presented his [current] claims
to a particular administrative remedy program, which often helps focus
and clarify the issues for the court.” Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 74 (8d
Cir. 2000) (quoting Alexander v. Hawk, 159 F.3d 1321, 1326 n.11 (11th
Cir. 1998)).
Thus, “just as subject-matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction,
and venue, exhaustion is a threshold issue that courts must address to
determine whether litigation is being conducted in the right forum at
the right time.” Small v. Camden Cnty., 728 F.3d 265, 269-70 (8d Cir.
2013). Because administrative exhaustion is a threshold issue, “factual
disputes relevant to exhaustion” may usually be resolved by a district
judge without the participation of a jury, provided that the parties
receive “some form of notice ... and an opportunity to respond[.]” Prater

v. Dep’t of Corr., 76 F.4th 184, 265 (8d Cir. 2023); but see Perttu v.
Richards, 605 U.S. 460, 468 (2025) (holding that “as a matter of
statutory interpretation that parties have a right to a jury trial on
PLRA exhaustion when that issue is intertwined with the merits of a
claim... .”). Although exhaustion under the PLRA is a threshold issue,

13

it nevertheless is an affirmative defense that the defendant must
themselves assert. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007) (“We
conclude that failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense under the
PLRA[.]”).
Exhaustion under the PLRA must be “proper” to be effective.
Shifflett v. Korszniak, 934 F.3d 356, 364 (8d Cir. 2019) (quoting
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90-91 (2006)). Proper exhaustion
requires full compliance “with the prison’s administrative regulations
governing inmate grievances.” Prater, 76 F.4th at 208. In practice, this

means the inmate cannot have “further avenues of relief... available to
him within the ... grievance process[,]” and his grievance cannot have
been denied by the prison for procedural deficiencies. Spruill v. Gillis,
372 F.8d 218, 232 (8d Cir. 2004).
Accordingly, a prison’s specific grievance procedures “supply the
yardstick for measuring” whether a claim has been properly exhausted.
Id. at 231. The Pennsylvania Inmate Grievance System Policy has been
in force at all DOC facilities, including SCI Mahanoy, since 2015. See

14

DC-ADM 804 at 13 (“This policy is applicable to all facilities operated
under the jurisdiction of, or conducting business with the Department of
Corrections|.]”).

The policy, formally known as DC-ADM 804, provides a three-
tiered system of review for inmate grievances. Id. at 4-25. The first tier
is the initial review stage (id. at 9); the second tier is the appeal stage
(id. at 15); and the third tier is the final review stage (id. at 18). The
DOC also has form-based procedural requirements for grievances,
including that the grievance “be legible [and] understandable”; “include

a statement of the facts relevant to the claim,” including “the date,
approximate time, and location of the event(s) that gave rise to the
grievance’; that the prisoner “identify individuals directly involved in
the event(s)”; and that “[a]ny grievance based on separate events must
be presented separately, unless it is necessary to combine the issues to
support the claim.” DC-ADM 804 at 5-6.
Thus, for a grievance to be properly exhausted, it must be grieved
through all three tiers of review and comport with applicable procedural

3 Located at https://www.pa.gov/content/dam/copapwp-
pagov/en/cor/documents/about-us/doc-policies/804%20Inmate%20Grievances.pdf.
15

requirements. See Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90-91 (“Proper exhaustion
demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical
procedural rules because no adjudicative system can function effectively
without imposing some orderly structure on the course of its
proceedings.”); Rinaldi v. United States, 904 F.3d 257, 271 (3d Cir.
2018) “[W]hen an inmate’s allegations have been fully examined on the
merits and at the highest level, they are, in fact, exhausted.”)
(quotations omitted).
The first of Harris’s two relevant, fully exhausted grievances,
#843207, involved allegations that prison staff were deliberately
indifferent to his safety when they disclosed in a misconduct report that
Harris provided information leading to another inmate being
disciplined. Doc. 61-8 at 9-10. Harris specifically identified Biscoe as
the responsible party, and as the source of rumors in SCI Mahanoy that
Harris was an informant. Id. Harris initially identified non-party
Ellenberger as a second culpable party, subsequently clarifying on
appeal that Santana, not Ellenberger, should have been named in the
grievance. Id. at 4—5. Then, in grievance #8535380, Harris specifically
attributed the assault by Harris-Bracey to the circumstances alleged in

16

grievance #843207. Doc. 55-9 at 8-9. That sequence of grievances put
the DOC on notice, during the administrative process, of the allegations
that now form the premise for Harris’s federal claims against Biscoe
and Santana.
Generally, an inmate’s failure to name a defendant in their initial
grievance means the inmate’s claims against them have not been
exhausted. See Spruill, 372 F.3d at 234 (explaining that plaintiff's
failure to name defendant in initial grievance, despite DC-ADM 804
requiring prisoners to identify “facts relevant to the claim,” meant any
claim against that defendant was procedurally defaulted unless
otherwise excused); Byrd v. Shannon, 715 F.3d 117, 127 (8d Cir. 2018)
(concluding prisoner failed to exhaust by not naming defendant in
grievance as required by the updated iteration of DC-ADM 804).
But this identification requirement is subject to a caveat. Namely,
because “[t]he primary purpose of a grievance is to alert prison officials
to a problem, not to provide personal notice to a particular official that
he may be sued|[,]” Williams v. Beard, 482 F.3d 637, 640 (8d Cir. 2007)
(quoting Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 219 (2007)), an inmate’s failure to
specifically identify a defendant may be excused where the facts of the

17

erievance sufficiently notified the prison of the defendant’s involvement.
Travillion v. Wetzel, 765 F. App’x 785, 789 (8d Cir. 2019) (per curiam).
For example, the Court of Appeals determined that when an inmate
vaguely claimed in his grievance that “SCI-Rockview staff and/or
administration” were responsible for an Eighth Amendment violation,
but also “specified the date, location, and relevant facts related to his
claim,” he sufficiently complied with the identification requirement of
DC-ADM 804 against those defendants who fit the functional
descriptions he provided in the grievance. Id.
Here, Harris advanced grievance #843207 against Biscoe

specifically, and a comparison of the allegations finds that they align
sufficiently with certain averments in the Complaint. Compare Doc. 61-
8 at 9-10 (“(Lt. Biscoe) accusing prisoner (Harris #GN-5486) of ratting
on inmate-staff report constitutes deliberate indifference[.]”) with Doc.
1—4 at J 20 (‘Plaintiff had previously requested to stay in a cell by
himself as there were rumors within the prison that Plaintiff was a
‘snitch’ (informant). Because of this, Plaintiff feared for his safety.”).
Although Harris does not mention Santana by name in the initial
grievance, Harris averred that the grievance arose from a misconduct

18

report written by Santana. Doc. 61-8 at 9-10 (“That a substantial risk
of serious harm exists to me by stating what was said on inmate Shields

... disciplinary hearing report”). Moreover, Harris clarified during his
initial appeal that he mistakenly accused Ellenberger, instead of
Santana, of being one of the disclosing parties that prompted rumors of
Harris’s status as an informant. Id. at 4-5. Thus, the DOC would have
been on notice of both Biscoe’s and Santana’s alleged involvement for

purposes of exhaustion under the identification requirement of DC-
ADM 804. Williams v. Beard, 482 F.3d at 640; Travillion, 765 F. App’x
at 789.
The same cannot be said for defendants Dunkle, Delbalso, and
Matrey. Grievance #843207 was denied at initial review, on the merits,
by Dunkle. Doc. 61-8 at 8. In his first appeal of that denial, Harris
contested Dunkle’s findings, but the appeal was nonetheless denied by
Delbalso. Doc. 61-8 at 3—5. Neither Dunkle, nor Delbalso, otherwise
make an appearance in the history of grievance #843207, and Matrey is

never referenced in that record.
Despite Harris mentioning Dunkle and Delbalso in his appeals, he
failed to name them or Matrey in his initial grievance. Jd. at 9-10.

19

Critically, neither Dunkle, Delbalso, nor Matrey were accused of any
involvement with the “date, location, and relevant facts,” Travillion,
765 F. App’x at 789, that concern the underlying misconduct report or

rumors of Harris being an informant. See Doc. 61-8 at 2-10. Indeed, the
only discontent expressed by Harris concerning Dunkle and Delbalso

appears to be anchored in their roles in denying his grievance, not
prompting it; a factual premise that is wholly distinct from his
allegations in the complaint that they were responsible for putting him

at risk of the attack by Harris-Bracey. See Doc. 1-4 at J 24, 28.
Indeed, Harris’s disagreement with the denial of his grievance on
initial review and appeal could not form a premise for this federal
action. As “an inmate has no constitutional right to a grievance
procedure,” the denial of a grievance is not itself a constitutional
violation, and thus cannot give rise to an actionable claim under Section
1983. Caldwell v. Beard, 324 F. App’x 186, 189 (8d Cir. 2009).
Accordingly, while grievance #843207 supports the exhaustion of those
claims Harris brings against Biscoe and Santana, it fails to support
those claims he brings against Dunkle, Delbalso, and Matrey.
Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90-91.

20

The second grievance Harris filed within the operative period,
#853530, involved allegations that prison staffs deliberate indifference
to his personal safety resulted in the assault by Harris-Bracey on
February 24, 2020. Doc. 55-9 at 8-9. Harris protested that staff failed to
follow prison procedure when they placed him in the cell with Harris-
Bracey while handcuffed, and that his name was “leaked” in the
misconduct report he discussed in grievance #843207. Id. Critically,
none of the defendants are named as the parties responsible for putting
Harris in the cell with Harris-Bracey. Rather, he identifies Corrections
Officers Torres and Martin as the SCI Mahanoy personnel who placed
him in the cell. Doc. 55-9 at 8.
The only references to any defendants in the history of this
erievance are of the procedural variety. Namely, Harris listed Matrey
and Biscoe in a section of his initial grievance denoting individuals he
“wrote” before filing the grievance. Id. at 8-9. And after Matrey denied
the grievance, Harris expressed his disagreement on appeal, and
refuted Matrey’s finding that Harris had requested to move into the cell
inhabited by Harris-Bracey. Id. at 4—5, 7.

21

Contrary to Harris’s position, simply naming Matrey and Biscoe

as individuals who he contacted before submitting a grievance, does not
suffice the purposes of administrative exhaustion. Doc. 61 at 13. Rather,
it highlights the absence of any specific allegation against either
defendant in the grievance itself, as Matrey and Biscoe apparently were
the individuals that Harris contacted after the fact to protest the
actions of other SCI Mahanoy staff. Doc. 55-9 at 8.
Although Harris, on appeal, objected to Matrey’s denial of the
grievance, that disagreement failed to put the DOC on notice that
Harris held Matrey accountable for the underlying grievance itself.
Moreover, Matrey’s denial of the grievance cannot serve as a basis for
this federal action, Caldwell, 324 F. App’x at 189, particularly when the
federal claims against Matrey are premised on a different set of facts;
namely, placing Harris in a cell with Harris-Bracey. And to the extent
that, on appeal, Harris raised Matrey’s earlier rejection of Harris’s
request to be housed with a handicapped inmate, Doc. 55-9 at 4—5, that
complaint is not related to the “date, location, and relevant facts” of the
underlying grievance. Travillion, 765 F. App’x at 789. At no point in his
grievance history does Harris aver that Matrey was responsible for

22

placing him in the cell with Harris-Bracey, or involved with disclosing
Harris’s status as an informant.
Accordingly, Harris failed to exhaust his claims against Dunkle,
Delbalso, and Matrey, as required under the PLRA. Summary judgment
should be granted in their favor and the claims against them should be
dismissed with prejudice. Small, 728 F.3d at 269. Harris requests that
the Court hold an exhaustion hearing in the event it finds his
“grievances in any way deficient.” Doc. 61 at 13. That request, however,
should be denied, because Harris does not claim, and the record does
support any inference, that the grievance process was unavailable to
him.
A hearing concerning exhaustion under the PLRA, termed a Small
hearing, is reserved for situations where the Court must resolve factual
disputes not intertwined with the merits of a claim, but that are
nonetheless relevant to the question of exhaustion. Paladino v.
Newsome, 885 F.3d 203, 210-11 (8d Cir. 2018); Small v. Camden Cnty.,
728 F.3d 265, 270-71 (3d Cir. 2013); Perttu, 605 U.S. at 468.
Specifically, Small hearings are held where, in the Court’s opinion,
there is evidence that the plaintiff has not properly exhausted the

23

claims, but also that the defendant may have acted or failed to act such
that it rendered grievance remedies “unavailable.” Paladino, 885 F.3d
at 210-11.
In contrast to the common scenarios where Small hearings are
warranted, no evidence exists in the record here showing that the
defendants acted or failed to act such that Harris may have been
deprived of access to the grievance process. Indeed, Harris does not

argue, nor does the record suggest, that he had any procedural
difficulties in administratively grieving his claims. See Doc. 61 at 13. To
the contrary, Harris’s ability to file and fully exhaust grievance #853530
and grievance #843207 evince his wherewithal. Simply requesting an
exhaustion hearing in the event of an adverse decision, without offering
any disputed facts or basis in the record, does not suffice to create an
issue over grievance process availability. Paladino,.885 F.3d at 210-11.
C. The Eighth Amendment Claim
1. Failure to protect claim against Biscoe
Biscoe seeks summary judgment on the premise that he had no
control over or personal involvement with Harris’s placement in the cell
with Harris-Bracey; a necessary component of a Section 1983 claim.

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Doc. 56 at 8-10. In the alternative, Biscoe avers that the evidence of
record does not establish his knowledge that Harris-Bracey posed a
specific danger to Harris. Id. at 12-16. In rebuttal, Harris argues that

- he has “adduced sufficient evidence to meet his burden in the summary
judgment context[,]” and that it is Biscoe’s burden to prove he was not

aware of “a severe and obvious threat to” Harris’s safety. Doc. 61 at 13.
As the record shows that no reasonable jury could find that Biscoe was
personally involved in placing Harris in a cell with Harris-Bracey, or
that Biscoe was deliberately indifferent to Harris’s safety, summary
judgment is warranted in Biscoe’s favor.
“The first step in evaluating a section 1983 claim is to ‘identify the

exact contours of the underlying right said to have been violated’ and to
determine ‘whether the plaintiff has alleged a deprivation of a
constitutional right at all.” Chavarriaga v. New Jersey Dep’t of Corr.,
806 F.3d 210, 222 (8d Cir. 2015) (quoting Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798,
806 (8d Cir.2000)). Second, “a plaintiff must demonstrate a defendant’s
‘personal involvement in the alleged wrong.’” Id. (quoting Rode v.
Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (8d Cir.1988)). “A plaintiff makes
sufficient allegations of a defendant’s personal involvement by

25

describing the defendant’s participation in or actual knowledge of and
acquiescence in the wrongful conduct.” Jd.
Harris’s Eighth Amendment claim against Biscoe appears to be
premised on two separate, but related contentions. First, that Biscoe
failed to protect Harris when disclosing (or causing Santana to disclose)
in a misconduct report that he was an “informant,” which Biscoe “knew

or should have known” would prompt rumors of Harris being a “rat” and
the concomitant danger. Doc. 1-4 at 9; Doc. 61 at 6; Doc. 61-8 at 9; Doc.
55-4 at 8-9. And second, that Biscoe failed to protect Harris when
placing him in the cell with Harris-Bracey. Doc. 1-4 at 9, 11.
Focusing on the second contention, which was more temporally
proximate to Harris’s physical injury, the credible evidence of record
shows that Biscoe was not among the prison staff who caused Harris to
be placed in Harris-Bracey’s cell on February 24, 2020. Thus, even
accepting that the challenged cell placement could constitute the
deprivation of a constitutional right, Harris cannot establish Biscoe’s
personal involvement for purposes of Section 1983 liability.
First, the incident reports generated from the assault list
Corrections Officers Derr, Torres, Martin, and Rakus as the prison staff

26

involved in physically moving Harris into the cell. Doc. 55-3 at 11, 18,
15, 17. Second, Biscoe testified in his deposition that he was not
involved in the cell assignment decision-making process, that he did not
work in the restricted housing unit where Harris and Harris-Bracey

were specifically housed, and that he had no general involvement in
Harris’s placement in a cell with Harris-Bracey. Doc. 55-8 at 13, 15, 16,
19.
In response, Harris offers only the deposition testimony of another
inmate, Deon Brown, which fails to establish Biscoe as a responsible
party for Harris’s housing with Harris-Bracey. Namely, Brown testified:
Q How about Corrections Officer Biscoe?
A Yep. That’s the big guy.
Q Is that the guy that put [Harris] in there with [Harris-
Bracey]?
A He is the boss boss. As far as I know nothing happened
without him knowing a hundred percent.

Q So from your understanding Harris-Bracey couldn't
have gone into that cell without Mr. Biscoe knowing
about it?
A hundred percent. A hundred percent.
Doc. 61-4 at 15.

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That testimony falls short of creating a disputed issue of material
fact when compared to the evidence of record showing Biscoe’s lack of
involvement with placing Harris in the cell with Harris-Bracey. Brown
did not testify to any direct knowledge of Biscoe moving Harris, or
causing others to move Harris, into the cell, offering only speculation
and hearsay that Biscoe knew of the cell transfer. Even Harris, in his

own deposition testimony, failed to aver that Biscoe was involved in
Harris’s placement in the cell with Harris-Bracey. Rather, Harris only
recounted how he told Biscoe through a request slip that he was in
generalized danger, and that Biscoe was to blame for Harris gaining a
reputation as an informant. Doc. 55-4 at 8-9. Accordingly, no
reasonable jury could conclude that Biscoe was involved in placing
Harris in the same cell as Harris-Bracey.
By contrast, the record contains sufficient evidence to create a
disputed issue of material fact concerning whether Biscoe was
personally involved with disclosing Harris’s status as an informant.
Thus, a more thorough analysis of the charged offense is warranted on
those grounds. To establish a prima facie Eighth Amendment failure to

protect claim, Harris must prove that: (1) he “was incarcerated under

28

conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm,” (2) prison officials

were “deliberately indifferent to that substantial risk to his health and
safety,” and (8) the officials’ “deliberate indifference caused him harm.”
Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 367 (8d Cir. 2012), abrogated on other
grounds by Mack v. Yost, 968 F.3d 311 (8d Cir. 2020).
Publicly labeling a prisoner an informant, or contributing to such

a label, can create a substantial and particular risk of serious harm
from other inmates for purposes of a failure to protect claim. See Moore

v. Mann, 823 F. App’x 92, 96 (8d Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (recognizing
that “other circuits have held that prison officials’ failure to protect an
inmate labeled a ‘snitch’ constitutes deliberate indifference”); Bistrian,
696 F.3d at 371 (concluding that a prisoner’s reputation as a snitch
allowed one to reasonably infer that placing him with violent inmates
“created a substantial risk of serious harm.”).
Here, the operative misconduct report for fellow inmate Shields,
authored by Santana, states, “per Lt. Biscoes written DC141 I/M Harris
another involved party admitted to BII agents that I/M Shields paid
him to get synthetic cannabinoids and that he instructed Ms. Edwards
to send the package of K2 to the Mt. Carmel address provided by

29

Shields.” Doc. 61-8 at 7; Doc. 55-4 at 8. Harris also produced purported
letters from other inmates indicating that Harris was identified as a
cooperator after being named in the misconduct report. See Doc. 62 at
11, 18, 14, 15 (Ya big homies a rat”; “Yo look right someone gave me
‘Dannys’ misconduct & sanction report. Bro you know bool ‘[Harris]’ a
‘rat man.”; “[Harris] is no good. He str8 f rat.”; “J would be catious if

you go [to the unit] cuz alot of people are running your name in the
mud.”) (errors in originals).
Moreover, Harris produced evidence showing that he filed a
grievance concerning Biscoe’s alleged disclosure of the “confidential”
information and the resulting risk to his safety. Doc. 61-8 at 9-10.
Harris further testified that he attempted to inform Biscoe through a
“VIA request slip” that the disclosure endangered Harris and left him in
fear for his life. Doc. 55-4 at 20-21. Taken together, these factors
readily establish a disputed issue of material fact over whether Biscoe
(and Santana) placed Harris at a substantial risk of serious harm
during the misconduct proceedings for Shields, for purposes of the first
element of the offense. Moore, 823 F. App’x at 96; Bistrian, 696 F.3d at

30

371. For those same reasons, Harris can establish Biscoe’s personal
involvement in this aspect of the claim.
An evaluation of the second element, however, proves more
problematic for Harris. In his motion for summary judgment, Biscoe
contends that because Harris did not tell any prison officials Harris-
Bracey posed a danger to Harris’s safety, Biscoe could not have been

aware of the “specific danger presented to be deliberately indifferent.”
Doc. 56 at 14. In rebuttal, Harris highlights circumstantial evidence,
including the generalized danger inherent in being labeled an
informant in prison, and Harris-Bracey’s reputation for dangerousness.
Doc. 61 at 6. As the record undisputably shows that Biscoe did not know
that Harris-Bracey posed a threat to Harris’s safety, Harris cannot
establish Biscoe’s deliberate indifference, and summary judgment is
warranted in his favor.4
“The question of [a defendant’s] deliberate indifference is a
subjective inquiry ....” Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d

4 Putting aside the absent administrative exhaustion barriers set forth above, this
analysis applies equally to the Highth Amendment failure to protect claim against
Dunkle, Delbalso, and Matrey. Even viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to Harris, and assuming it sufficiently shows that Harris apprised these
three defendants of his generalized fear for his safety, it would still fail to establish
deliberate indifference.
31

249, 256 (3d Cir. 2010) Gnternal citations omitted). “[I]n determining
whether a prison official has shown deliberate indifference to inmate
health or safety, [a court] must look to what a prison official actually
knew rather than to what a reasonable official in his or her position
should have known.” Serafin v. City of Johnstown, 53 Fed. App’x. 211,
214 (8d Cir. 2002).
“A plaintiff may demonstrate deliberate indifference by showing
that the risk of harm was ‘longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or
expressly noted by prison officials in the past’ such that the defendants
‘must have known’ about the risk.” Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr.,
621 F.8d 249, 259 (8d Cir. 2010) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 837 (1994)). However, not only must a prison official be “aware of
facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm exists,” but the official “must also draw the inference.”
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Thus, “[t]o overcome a motion for summary
judgment, a plaintiff ‘must come forward with evidence from which it

can be inferred that the defendant-officials were ... knowingly and
unreasonably disregarding an objectively intolerable risk of harm.’ ”

32

Betts, 621 F.3d at 259 (quoting Beers—Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120,
132 (8d Cir. 2001)).
Here, Biscoe contends that he had no actual knowledge that
Harris was in danger, either generally or specifically from Harris-
Bracey. During his deposition testimony, Biscoe stated that he had no
knowledge of Harris informing any corrections officers that he felt he

was in danger, prior to Harris-Bracey’s attack. Doc. 55-8 at 138-14.
Biscoe likewise professed no knowledge of Harris having a reputation
for being a “rat.” Id. at 8. Biscoe also testified that he recognized Harris-
Bracey’s name, but had no knowledge or recollection of him being
dangerous or attacking people. Id. at 7-8.
In response, Harris avers that he notified SCI Mahanoy
personnel, including Biscoe, that he was in danger. During his
deposition, Harris testified that he “told everybody there basically that I
fear for my life and being in danger due to these reports” about him
being an informant. Doc. 55-4 at 20. He also testified that he “wrote
[Biscoe] VIA request slip as well,” and professed to have a copy. Id. at
21. Although Harris does not offer that request slip in evidence, or aver

a basis to believe it was received and reviewed by Biscoe, his testimony

33

gives rise to a factual dispute over whether Biscoe was on notice that
Harris believed he was in danger.
Viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to Harris, the
inquiry then turns to whether a generalized knowledge that Harris
might be in danger suffices to establish a prima facie case of deliberate
indifference. Critically, Harris admitted in his deposition that he never
told any prison officials that he was in danger from Harris-Bracey
specifically, and did not expect to be attacked by Harris-Bracey. Id. at
20, 28. Indeed, Harris and Harris-Bracey were cellmates prior to the
assault, during which time they reportedly did not have any issues with

one another. Jd. at 18; Doc. 55-6 at 10.
Thus, even if Harris conveyed his generalized safety concerns to
Biscoe, no reasonable jury could find him deliberately indifferent to any
threat posed specifically by Harris-Bracey to Harris. “It is true that the
requisite mindset may be proved by circumstantial evidence, such as
where a plaintiff demonstrates that a substantial risk was
‘longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or expressly noted by prison
officials in the past.’” Blackstone v. Thompson, 568 F. App’x 82, 84 (3d
Cir. 2014) (quoting Farmer’s, 511 U.S. at 842). Not so here, however,

34

where Harris offers no evidence showing a historically documented risk

to him from Harris-Bracey, or specific notice to Biscoe of Harris-
Bracey’s threat, and even offers testimony to the contrary. Id. (finding

no “indication in the record that [inmate] told [corrections officer] of any
specific incident or cause of tension between the cellmates from which a

greater inference of risk could be drawn.”); Bistrian, 696 F.3d at 8369-71
(finding a reasonable inference of deliberate indifference where the
plaintiff-inmate “repeatedly advised” officials of the threat posed to him
by specific gang members who threatened him for being an informant).
Indeed, to conclude otherwise would deem Biscoe deliberately
indifferent to a threat from Harris-Bracey to which Harris himself
professed ignorance during his deposition testimony. See Doc. 55-4 at 28
(‘T never believed I was in danger from him at all.”); see also Crowder v.
Wetzel, 2022 WL 4647369, at *7 (M.D. Pa. 2022) (granting summary
judgment where plaintiff inmate “did not inform anyone that he was in

imminent danger of being attacked by his assailant prior to the
incident—indeed, it is undisputed that [inmate] himself did not believe
he was in any danger.”).

35

Harris seeks to leverage evidence—primarily deposition testimony
from prison officials and other inmates—showing that Harris-Bracey

was an unpredictable inmate with a relatively violent history. See Doc.

61-7 at 12; Doc. 61-4 at 7-8; Doc. 61-5 at 7-8. However, “[t]he risk that

an inmate with some history of violence might attack another inmate
for an unknown reason, .. . is too speculative to give rise to an Eighth
Amendment claim.” Blackstone, 568 F. App’x at 84; see also Bistrian,
696 F.3d at 371 (same); Straker v. Valencik, 2021 WL 1134591, at *8
(M.D. Pa. 2021) (granting summary judgment where inmate plaintiff
“failed to allege that [prison officer] knew of a serious risk of harm by
the alleged assailant and that he disregarded that risk. .. . While
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant [] may have been aware of the
assailant's violence, there is no indication of that [Defendant] was

aware of any threats of physical harm or violence toward Plaintiff that

were disregarded. As such, Plaintiff's allegations are too speculative to

state a deliberate indifference claim... .”).
Accordingly, as the undisputed facts show that Biscoe was not

aware of any specific threat posed to Harris by Harris-Bracey, no

36

reasonably jury would find Biscoe deliberately indifferent, and

summary judgment is warranted.
2. Failure to protect claim against Santana
Santana requests summary judgment on the grounds that her
alleged failure to act on a grievance filed by Harris is not cognizable
under Section 19838. Doc. 56 at 11-12. In the alternative, Santana, like
Biscoe, avers that the record demonstrates Harris’s inability to
establish a prima facie failure to protect claim. Id. at 12-16. In rebuttal,
Harris simply cites to his grievance and states that “he told Defendant
Santana that he was in danger, but Santana failed to act.” Doc. 61 at
13. As nothing in the record supports that averment, and Harris’s claim
is solely, and impermissibly premised on Santana’s role in the grievance
process, summary judgment is warranted in his favor.
Again, “[t]he first step in evaluating a section 1988 claim is to
‘identify the exact contours of the underlying right said to have been
violated’ and to determine ‘whether the plaintiff has alleged a
deprivation of a constitutional right at all.” Chavarriaga, 806 F.3d at
222 (quoting Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 806 (8d Cir.2000)).
Importantly, “an inmate has no constitutional right to a grievance .

37

procedure,” and thus, the denial of a grievance does “not infringe upon
[the] constitutional right to petition the government for redress.”
Caldwell, 324 F. App’x at 189.
Here, Harris’s assertions and supporting evidence fall short of
demonstrating the necessary deprivation of a constitutional right
required under Section 1983. In his Complaint, Harris alleged that he
“filed a grievance regarding his egregious treatment[,]” that Santana
reviewed it, but that “nothing was done.” Doc. 1-4 at 125. He offers no
evidence in support of that claim against Santana, and in his
deposition, Harris only references Santana’s authorship of the
misconduct report identifying Harris as an informant. Doc. 55-4 at 11,
16. Accordingly, to the extent Harris’s claim against Santana is
premised on her evaluation or inaction on a grievance, it cannot proceed
as a matter of law. Caldwell, 324 F. App’x at 189.
Even if Harris’s claim is construed more broadly to encompass
Santana’s involvement in the misconduct hearing that disclosed
Harris’s status as an informant, it suffers from vulnerabilities identical
to those in the claim against Biscoe. Namely, Harris offers no evidence
showing that Santana was aware that Harris-Bracey presented a threat

38

to Harris’s safety. As with Biscoe, the testimony germane to Santana
lies in Harris’s own admissions that he never told any prison officials
that he was in danger from Harris-Bracey specifically, did not expect to
be attacked by Harris-Bracey, and did not view Harris-Bracey as
presenting a danger. Doc. 55-4 at 20, 28. Unlike Biscoe, Harris does not
offer any testimony that he specifically advised Santana of a perceived
threat, stating at most that he “told everybody” he felt in danger. Id. at
20. Absent greater specificity, no reasonably jury could conclude that
Santana was deliberately indifferent to Harris’s safety.
IV. Recommendation
For the reasons set forth above, it is RECOMMENDED that:
1. The Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. 54) be
GRANTED, and all remaining claims and defendants be
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; and
2. The Clerk’s Office be DIRECTED to TERMINATE Banta,
Biscoe, Delbalso, Dunkle, Mahally, Mason, Matrey, Rivello,
Santana, Stetler, and White as Defendants and CLOSE this

case.

39

The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local
Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge’s proposed
findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or
matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 686 (b)(1)(B) or making a
recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a
habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being
served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk
of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties,
written objections which shall specifically identify the
portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report
to which objection is made and the basis for such objections.
The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall
apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those
portions of the report or specified proposed findings or
recommendations to which objection is made and may accept,
reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or
recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge,
however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her
discretion or where required by law, and may consider the
record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or
her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge
may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or
recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with
instructions.
The failure to file timely objections to the foregoing Report and
Recommendation may constitute a waiver of any appellate rights.

Date: September 15, 2025 8/ Phillip J. Caraballo
Phillip J. Caraballo
United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11170715. Public record. Not legal advice.