# PACIULETE

> District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · October 10, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11170695

## Case

- **Full name:** Clara Paciulete v. Anthony Fahm, aka/Paciulete, et al.; Clara Paciulete v. Anthony A. Paciulete
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** October 10, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11170695

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that a constitutional claim based on verbal threats will fail whether asserted under the ban against cruel and unusual punishment in the Eighth Amendment or the substantive due process clause in the Fourteenth Amendment
- explaining that “§ 1985(3) defendants must have allegedly conspired against a group that has an identifiable existence independent of the fact that its members are victims of the defendants’ tortious conduct”
- holding that ICCPR is not privately enforceable

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CLARA PACIULETE, :
Plaintiff, :
:
v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 25-CV-4896
:
ANTHONY FAHN, aka/PACIULETE, :
et al., :
Defendants. :

______________________________________________________________________________

CLARA PACIULETE, :
Plaintiff, :
:
v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 25-CV-5472
:
ANTHONY A. PACIULETE, :
Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM
KENNEY, J. OCTOBER 10, 2025
Currently before the Court are two civil matters containing federal and state claims filed
by pro se Plaintiff Clara Paciulete. In the first action, filed on August 26, 2025 (Civil Action No.
25-4896 (hereafter “Paciulete I”)), the Court previously entered an order granting Paciulete’s
motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 8), and the matter is now ripe for screening under
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). As to the second case, filed on September 23, 2025 (Civil Action
No. 25-5472 (hereafter “Paciulete II”)), Paciulete’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis
submitted with her Complaint will likewise be granted, and the matter screened under §
1915(e)(2)(B). For the following reasons, the Court will dismiss Paciulete II because it is
duplicative of Paciulete I. Paciulete I will be dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Factual Allegations1
Paciulete maintains that, since 2022, the father of her child, Anthony Fahn,2 family

members, and various unnamed officials from federal and state law enforcement, offices of
attorneys general, courts, and medical institutions have engaged in threats, physical violence,
surveillance, and sabotage. (Paciulete I, ECF No. 1 at 3-4; Paciulete II, ECF No. 2 at 2.)
Without providing any additional facts, Paciulete opaquely alleges that her child was kidnapped
in May 2022, but that “disclosure [was] delayed” for approximately ten days. (Paciulete I, ECF
No. 1 at 2.) She states that her reports of the abduction to the State Department, the Department
of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the National Center for Missing & Exploited
Children “were ignored, escalating retaliation and threats.”3 (Id.) She claims to have endured

1 The factual allegations set forth in this Memorandum are taken from the Complaints in
Paciulete’s two civil matters. (No. 25-4896, ECF No. 1; No. 25-5472, ECF No. 2.) The Court
may also consider publicly available dockets that are relevant to Paciulete’s claims. See Buck v.
Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006). The Court adopts the sequential
pagination assigned to the Complaint by the CM/ECF docketing system.

2 Paciulete used different last names for the child’s father in her two Complaints. For
clarity, the Court will refer to the Defendant by the last name “Fahn,” the one Plaintiff used in
Paciulete I.

3 In addition to the two civil actions filed in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
Paciulete filed a civil action in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey in
which she sought relief related to the alleged May 2022 abduction. See Paciulete v. New Jersey,
No. 25-090, 2025 WL 1125516, at *1 (D.N.J. Apr. 16, 2025). In that matter, she claimed a
babysitter abducted the child, apparently as part of a conspiracy with Paciulete’s family, “aimed
at undermining her legal rights, protection, safety and freedom.” (Id., ECF No. 1 (Complaint) at
3). She alleged that members of the local police department, Child Protective Services, and
judicial authorities “engaged in a systematic pattern of bribery that compromised the integrity of
the judicial system,” which resulted in “favorable treatment toward certain parties” at Paciulete’s
expense. Id. at 5. In April 2025, the District Court dismissed the Complaint on grounds that it
“ongoing attempts on [her own] life,” including the denial of police protection and medical care,
“[d]enial of life-saving care at Virtua Voorhees Hospital,” a “[f]orced psychiatric commitment”
for ten days in June 2024, being poisoned in July 2025, which was allegedly “misclassified as [a]
mental health crisis,” and various alleged intimidating and violent acts.4 (Paciulete I, ECF No. 1

at 2-3; Paciulete II, ECF No. 2 at 2.) She further claims that, on August 30, 2025, Fahn
kidnapped their child and stole her vehicle as leverage to force her commitment in psychiatric
hospitalization. (Paciulete II, ECF No. 2 at 2.) Paciulete asserts that Fahn and his family
members have repeatedly given her drugs without her consent and unlawfully placed hidden
devices in her vehicle. (Id.)

contained only conclusory allegations against various public entities and failed to put the
defendant on notice of the basis of claims against it, in violation of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8. Paciulete, 2025 WL 1125516, at *2. The Court granted Paciulete leave to amend
her complaint, but she did not do so.

4 Without specifying dates, actors, or locations, Paciulete claims that she was:

Subjected to vehicular attacks, vandalism, nails in tires, theft, and
destruction of property, three years of terroristic harassment,
vandalism, death threats, location distribution, gun shots around the
house, men in dark colored vehicles watching Plaintiff repeatedly for
two to three hour periods and driving near her and minor child, men
idling near home with headlights pointed at Plaintiff’s car[,] use of
loud noises in the middle of the night, home break-ins while Plaintiff
and child are sleeping[,] destruction of computers and phones,
retaliation with food, prescribed medication, shelter due to being kept
in only temporary housing controlled by the father of the child,
threats of being left stranded on the street with no money, food, and
no protections with men that have followed and induced fear nearby
to reinforce enforced disappearance, and homicide, destruction of
vehicle without repairs, threats of incarceration, threats of homicide,
threats against child, and threats of online cyber violence recruitment
and collusion to harm or injure Plaintiff.

(Paciulete I, ECF No. 1 at 2.) (emphasis omitted).
Paciulete alleges that multiple officials in law enforcement, mental health, medicine, and
the judiciary have colluded to sabotage, surveil, and retaliate against her. (Paciulete I, ECF No.
1 at 2-3; Paciulete II, ECF No. 2 at 2.) Police officers detained or threatened her with
psychiatric detention and filed false reports when she reported tracking devices, being stalked,

and attempted murder. (Paciulete I, ECF No. 1 at 2-3; Paciulete II, ECF No. 2 at 2.) Paciulete
faults them for failing to investigate the kidnapping(s) of her child and the crimes against her.
(Id.) At Virtua Willingboro and Hampton Hospitals, physicians purportedly falsified records that
omitted her status as a victim of violence, and medical professionals credited statements of Fahn
over hers to justify her involuntary confinement. (Paciulete I, ECF No. 1 at 2-3; Paciulete II,
ECF No. 2 at 2.) She claims to have been denied access to six Pennsylvania and thirty New
Jersey women’s shelters, which reflects “systemic collusion.” (Paciulete I, ECF No. 1 at 3.)
Without citing specific conduct, she claims that federal and state courts have denied her petitions
for protection and asylum without substantive review. (Paciulete II, ECF No. 2 at 2.)
B. Procedural History

Paciulete filed Paciulete I, naming as Defendants Fahn, “Law enforcement officers in
New Jersey and Pennsylvania (named and unnamed),” “Officials of the New Jersey and
Pennsylvania Attorney General Offices,” “Federal officials (FBI, DOJ, DHS) who failed to
investigate or provide protective measures,” “Medical professionals who falsified reports and
concealed attempted homicide,” and “John/Jane Does 1-50: unknown actors engaged in
surveillance, retaliation, or collusion.” (Paciulete I, ECF No. 1 at 1-2.) She seeks to raise claims
for violations of her civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985,
habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (“ICCPR”). (Id. at 3-4.) In addition to her motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF
No. 2), Paciulete moves to seal the proceedings (ECF No. 5), for an emergency temporary
restraining order (ECF No. 3), and for injunctive relief (ECF No. 4). On September 28, 2025,
she submitted various exhibits and a “Declaration” (ECF Nos. 9, 10, 11) reiterating and

supporting her prior claims. Paciulete requests injunctive, mandamus, and monetary relief, and
requests emergency relocation, housing, and access to the witness protection program. (ECF No.
1 at 3.)
On September 23, 2025, Paciulete filed Paciulete II, naming only her child’s father,
Fahn, as a Defendant. (Paciulete II, ECF No. 2 at 2.) Like her prior case, she seeks to assert
claims under § 1983, CAT, ICCPR, and habeas corpus, plus a claim for relief under the Violence
Against Women Act (“VAWA”). (Id. ECF No. 2 at 1, 3, 4.) Paciulete filed motions for
emergency relief (ECF Nos. 3, 10), a protective order (ECF No. 8), and a request to seal the
proceedings (ECF No. 9.). She requests injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief. (ECF No.
2 at 5.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court previously granted Paciulete’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
in Paciulete I and will now grant leave in Paciulete II because it appears that she does not have
the ability to pre-pay the fees to commence this case. Accordingly, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)
and (ii) require the Court to dismiss the Complaint if it is frivolous or fails to state a claim. A
complaint is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The use of the term “frivolous” in § 1915 “embraces not only the
inarguable legal conclusion, but also the fanciful factual allegation.” Id. Section 1915 accords
judges “the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss
those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless . . . .” Id. at 327. “[A] finding of
factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the
wholly incredible[.]” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). A claim is legally baseless
if it is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080,

1085 (3d Cir. 1995).
Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the
same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),
see Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999), which requires the Court to
determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quotations omitted). Conclusory allegations do not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
As Paciulete is proceeding pro se, the Court construes her allegations liberally. Vogt v.
Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239,
244-45 (3d Cir. 2013)). The Court will “apply the relevant legal principle even when the

complaint has failed to name it.” Id. However, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts
in their complaints to support a claim.” Id. (quoting Mala, 704 F. 3d at 245). An unrepresented
litigant “cannot flout procedural rules — they must abide by the same rules that apply to all other
litigants.” Id. With respect to affirmative defenses, such as res judicata, dismissal is proper if
application of the defense is apparent on the face of the complaint; [the Court] may also look
beyond the complaint to public records, including judicial proceedings.” Weinberg v. Scott E.
Kaplan, LLC, 699 F. App’x 118, 120 n.3 (3d Cir. 2017); Gimenez v. Morgan Stanley DW, Inc.,
202 F. App’x 583, 584 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (observing that “[r]es judicata is a proper
basis for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)”).
Furthermore, the Court must dismiss any claims over which it lacks subject matter
jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-
matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”); Grp. Against Smog and Pollution, Inc. v.
Shenango, Inc., 810 F.3d 116, 122 n.6 (3d Cir. 2016) (explaining that “an objection to subject

matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time [and] a court may raise jurisdictional issues sua
sponte”). A plaintiff commencing an action in federal court bears the burden of establishing
federal jurisdiction. See Lincoln Ben. Life Co. v. AEI Life, LLC, 800 F.3d 99, 105 (3d Cir. 2015)
(“The burden of establishing federal jurisdiction rests with the party asserting its existence.”).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Claim Splitting Doctrine Applies to Paciulete II
Federal courts recognize a prohibition against splitting of claims relating to the same
transaction or occurrence. See Walton v. Eaton Corp., 563 F.2d 66, 70 (3d Cir. 1977). “Just as
res judicata applies to a second action filed after a final adjudication of the first action, the rule
against claim splitting applies when . . . two suits are pending at the same time.” Id. The

doctrine reflects that a district court, “[a]s part of its general power to administer its docket, has
the authority to stay or dismiss a suit that is duplicative of another case then pending in federal
court.” Curtis v. Citibank, N.A., 226 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing Colorado River Water
Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976)). The rule applies when two civil
actions: “(1) take place in the same court; (2) with the same defendants; (3) involving the same
subject matter.” McKenna v. City of Philadelphia, 304 F. App'x 89, 92 (3d Cir. 2008).
Paciulete I and II plainly meet these criteria. Paciulete II echoes the first lawsuit in
nearly all respects. Paciulete II includes the same defendant, Fahn, and although Paciulete has
removed the rest of the named Defendants, she continues to make the same collusion arguments
about various entities without expressly naming them. The two cases share the same operative
facts and rely on nearly all the same legal theories.5 At bottom, Paciulete makes allegations in
both actions about “[o]rchestration of violence and legal abuse,” and “coercion” by Fahn and
numerous other unnamed parties. (See Paciulete I, ECF No. 1 at 2; Paciulete II, ECF No. 2 at

6.) “When the difference between the two cases is ‘purely semantic’ and both cases rely on the
‘same operative facts and legal principles,’ the cases involve the same subject matter.” Matthews
Int’l Corp. v. Lombardi, No. 20-89, 2020 WL 1309399, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 2020) (citing
McKenna, 304 F. App’x at 92). Because the two actions are duplicative, the Court will dismiss
Paciulete II without prejudice.6 McKenna, 304 F. App’x at 93 (noting that a court may dismiss
without prejudice, stay, or consolidate two duplicative lawsuits).
B. Claims Under § 1983 and § 1985
1. § 1983 Claim Against Fahn Regarding Custody Rights
The vehicle by which federal constitutional claims may be brought in federal court is 42
U.S.C. § 1983. “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right

secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged
deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.
42, 48 (1988); see also Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F .3d 628, 638 (3d Cir. 1995) (“The
color of state law element is a threshold issue; there is no liability under § 1983 for those not
acting under color of law.”).

5 Because the Complaint in Paciulete I was filed on August 26, it did not describe the
alleged August 30 abduction of Paciulete’s child, but the Plaintiff included that allegation in a
subsequent “Declaration” submitted in Paciulete I. (See Paciulete I, ECF No. 11 at 3-4.)

6 When final judgment is entered in Paciulete I, any second action in federal court will be
barred by res judicata. Walton, 563 F.2d at 71 n.4; McKenna, 304 F. App’x at 94. As noted
infra, Paciulete will not be prevented from bringing state law claims in state court.
Paciulete asserts that Fahn colluded with police, judges, and agencies to deprive her of
her parental custodian rights. (See Paciulete I, ECF No. 1 at 2-4.) However, the factual
allegations in the Complaint do not plausibly assert that Fahn is a state actor amenable to suit
under § 1983. Whether a private individual is acting under color of state law — i.e., whether the

defendant is a state actor — depends on whether there is “such a close nexus between the State
and the challenged action’ that seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated as that of the
State itself.” Leshko v. Servis, 423 F.3d 337, 339 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal quotations omitted).
“To answer that question, [the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit] outlined
three broad tests generated by Supreme Court jurisprudence to determine whether state action
exists: (1) whether the private entity has exercised powers that are traditionally the exclusive
prerogative of the state; (2) whether the private party has acted with the help of or in concert with
state officials; and (3) whether the state has so far insinuated itself into a position of
interdependence with the acting party that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the
challenged activity.” Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal quotations and

alteration omitted); see also Borrell v. Bloomsburg Univ., 870 F.3d 154, 160 (3d Cir. 2017) (to
support a finding of state action, “the government must be ‘responsible for the specific conduct
of which the plaintiff complains.’”) (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982)).
Paciulete does not allege that Fahn exercised powers that are traditionally the exclusive
power of the state. Rather, she claims that Paciulete worked in concert with “police, judges, and
agencies” to deprive her of her custody rights. However, it is well established that “merely
resorting to the courts and being on the winning side of a lawsuit does not make a party a co-
conspirator or a joint actor with the judge.” Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 28 (1980); see also
Walsh v. Walsh, 765 F. App’x 243, 246 (3d Cir. 2019). Thus, her claim that Fahn is a state actor
via custody proceedings that have not been resolved in her favor is not plausible.7
2. § 1983 Claims Against State and Federal Law Enforcement Officials
and Medical Personnel

Paciulete contends that law enforcement officials violated her civil rights by allegedly
failing to investigate the kidnapping of her child and the crimes committed against her, and by
threatening her with psychiatric hospitalization when she reported “stalking, surveillance
devices, and attempted murder.”8 (Paciulete I, ECF No. 1 at 2-3.) As to the first claim, “[a]n
allegation of a failure to investigate, without another recognizable constitutional right, is not
sufficient to sustain a section 1983 claim.” Graw v. Fantasky, 68 F. App’x 378, 383 (3d Cir.
2003) (quotations omitted); see also Boseski v. N. Arlington Municipality, 621 F. App’x 131, 135

7 Paciulete broadly refers to “judges” in her statement alleging Fahn’s collusion with
entities to deny her custody rights, but she does not name any judges as Defendants. Even if she
had, that claim would be dismissed with prejudice. Judges are entitled to absolute immunity
from civil rights claims that are based on acts or omissions taken in their judicial capacity, so
long as they do not act in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. See, e.g., Stump v. Sparkman,
435 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1978); Harvey v. Loftus, 505 F. App’x 87, 90 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam);
Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303-04 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam). An act is taken in a
judge’s judicial capacity if it is “a function normally performed by a judge.” Gallas v. Supreme
Ct. of Pa., 211 F.3d 760, 768 (3d Cir. 2000). Moreover, “[g]enerally . . . ‘where a court has
some subject matter jurisdiction, there is sufficient jurisdiction for immunity purposes.’”
Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 443-44 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Barnes v. Winchell, 105
F.3d 1111, 1122 (6th Cir. 1997)). A judge ruling on a petition for custodial rights filed in a case
he or she is presiding over is acting in his or her judicial capacity over an action and would be
absolutely immune from suit for money damages.
8 Although Paciulete lists “Officials of the New Jersey and Pennsylvania Attorney
General Offices” among the Defendants, she never mentions those prosecutorial offices or
individuals from those offices in the body of her Complaint. To the extent she is referring to
prosecuting attorneys, they are generally shielded from suits for damages alleging on civil rights
claims. See Foster v. Penn. Hum. Rel. Comm’n, 157 F. App’x 488, 490 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976)).
(3d Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (“Boseski has no cognizable claim against a government entity for
its failure to investigate or bring criminal charges against another individual.”).
As for her allegation that police “threatened” her with psychiatric care, it is unclear what
Constitutional right she believes was infringed. To the extent that she alleges it constituted

harassment or threat of force, such allegations without injury or damage do not state a § 1983
claim. See Burkholder v. Newton, 116 F. App’x 358, 360 (3d Cir. 2004); Wilson v. Horn, 971 F.
Supp. 943 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (verbal abuse and harassment does not rise to the level of a
constitutional violation). Maclean v. Secor, 876 F. Supp. 695, 698 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (noting that a
constitutional claim based on verbal threats will fail whether asserted under the ban against cruel
and unusual punishment in the Eighth Amendment or the substantive due process clause in the
Fourteenth Amendment). Her civil rights claims alleged against unidentified officers are thus not
plausible and will be dismissed.
Paciulete also takes issue with unidentified medical personnel for their alleged role in her
involuntary commitments. Those claims are best construed under Pennsylvania’s Mental Health
Procedures Act (“MHPA”).9 The purpose of the MHPA, 50 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. §§ 7301, et

seq., is “to assure the availability of adequate treatment to persons who are mentally ill, and . . .
to establish procedures whereby this policy can be effected.” Id. § 7102. The MHPA permits
the involuntary commitment of persons who constitute a “clear and present danger” to
themselves or others. Id. § 7301(a). Section 301(b) provides guidance to determine what

9 For purposes of statutory screening, the Court assumes the involuntary commitment
occurred in Pennsylvania and only addresses any such claim. It appears, however, that events
mentioned in Paciulete’s Complaint may have occurred in the State of New Jersey. (See
Paciulete I, ECF No. 1 at 2, 3 (referring to Virtua Willingboro, Hampton Hospital, and Virtua
Voohees Hospital). If she intended to assert claims for involuntary commitments, or any other
events, that took place in New Jersey, venue for such claims would not be proper in this District
and should be brought in the District of New Jersey. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 110, 1391(b) & 1406(a).
constitutes a “clear and present danger” warranting immediate emergency care. Id. § 7301(b).
Section 302 allows involuntary commitment of a person for emergency psychiatric examination
for up to 120 hours, where “reasonable grounds [exist] to believe that [the person] is severely
mentally disabled and in need of immediate treatment.” Id. § 7302(a). Involuntary treatment

pursuant to this section may be obtained with or without a warrant. See id. § 7302(a)(1)-(2).
The duration of involuntary treatment may be extended in certain circumstances. Id. § 7302(d).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has found that the initial seizure
and involuntary commitment ordered pursuant to the MHPA satisfies both the Fourth
Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment, provided that the government officials reasonably
determined that the individual posed a “clear and present danger” to themselves or others. See
Doby v. DeCrescenzo, 171 F.3d 858, 871-72 (3d Cir. 1999). Short-term involuntary
commitments under the MHPA, even without a hearing, generally do not violate procedural or
substantive due process. See Benn v. Universal Health Sys., 371 F.3d 165, 174 (3d Cir. 2004)
(citing, inter alia, Doby, 171 F.3d at 870, 871 n.4). Critically, in the context of commitments

under the MPHA, “courts have held that private health care facilities and physicians acting under
the provisions of the MHPA are not state actors for purposes of Section 1983.” Little v. Outlaw,
No. 24-4033, 2025 WL 581164, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 20, 2025) (quoting Covell v. Smith, No. 95-
0501, 1996 WL 750033, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 1996) (collecting cases)). Since nothing in the
Complaint suggests otherwise, § 1983 is inapplicable here. See, e.g., Benn, 371 F.3d at 173
(holding that persons who petition for the involuntary commitment of others are not state actors);
Covell, 1996 WL 750033, at *6 (finding doctor acting under MHPA not a state actor); Janicsko
v. Pellman, 774 F. Supp. 331, 338-39 (M.D. Pa. 1991) (finding that private hospital and
physicians were not state actors acting under MHPA), aff’d, 970 F.2d 899 (3d Cir. 1992).
Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Paciulete’s constitutional claims based on her allegations of
involuntary commitment.10
3. Does #1-50, Claims Against Actors Engaged in “Surveillance,
Retaliation, and Collusion”

Among the groups listed as Defendants in the Complaint, Paciulete includes “John/Jane
Does 1-50: unknown actors engaged in surveillance, retaliation, or collusion.” (Paciulete I, ECF
No. 1 at 2.) Despite a lengthy list of “Ongoing Attempts [on her] Life” itemizing seemingly
specific events, Paciulete provides no description of any perpetrators or surrounding
circumstances and she does not give a time frame for the “attempts.” (Id.) Although the Court
must liberally interpret her pro se Complaint, Paciulete’s allegations are not only conclusory, but
“too fanciful, fantastic or delusional” to comprise a plausible claim. Campbell v. Columbia
Univ., No. 22-10164, 2023 WL 6038024, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2023); see also Neitzke, 490
U.S. at 325 (holding that the use of the term “frivolous” in § 1915 “embraces not only the
inarguable legal conclusion, but also the fanciful factual allegation.”).

10 Paciulete asserts that medical professionals misused her medical records and/or
statements she made in them. (See Paciulete I, ECF No. 1 at 2.) To the extent she intended to
bring a federal claim for violations of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act (“HIPPA”), there is no federal private right of action under HIPAA. See, e.g., Dodd v.
Jones, 623 F.3d 563, 569 (8th Cir. 2010); Webb v. Smart Document Solutions, LLC, 499 F.3d
1078, 1082 (9th Cir. 2007); Acara v. Banks, 470 F.3d 569 (5th Cir. 2006); Altavilla v. Geisinger
Wyoming Valley Med. Ctr., No. 17-1704, 2018 WL 1630961, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2018),
report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 1629870 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 4, 2018) (‘“The ability
to bring an enforcement action to remedy HIPAA violations, and ensure that a healthcare
provider is HIPAA compliant, lies within the exclusive province of the Secretary of Health and
Human Services, not the hands of private citizens.’”) (quoting Polanco v. Omnicell, Inc., 988 F.
Supp. 2d 451, 469 (D.N.J. 2013)). See also, Cobb v. PrimeCare Med. Corp., No. 18-1516, 2020
WL 13729620, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2020) (citations omitted), report and recommendation
adopted, 2020 WL 13730063 (Feb. 24, 2020) (stating that HIPAA “does not create a private
right of action for alleged disclosures of confidential medical information. . . . Therefore, neither
[HIPAA] nor 42 U.S.C. § 1983 supports an action based on HIPPA violations.”) (internal
quotation omitted).
Among her allegations, Paciulete claims that “men in dark colored vehicles watch[ ]
Plaintiff repeatedly for two to three hour periods and driving near her and minor child,” and she
takes note of “men idling near [her] home with headlights pointed at Plaintiff’s car . . . [and] loud
noises in the middle of the night.” (Id.) She alleges that she has endured “three years of

terroristic harassment, vandalism, death threats, location distribution, [and] gun shots around the
house,” as well as “home break-ins” where computers and phones have been destroyed. (Id.)
Some of her statements in the “ongoing attempts” are disjointed and unintelligible: “no
protections with men that have followed and induced fear nearby to reinforce enforced
disappearance [] and homicide,” and “threats of homicide, threats against child, and threats of
online cyber violence recruitment and collusion to harm or injure Plaintiff.” (Id.) Considering
this litany of suspicious, and in some instances fantastical, acts she relates here, the Court
concludes that these allegations lack a basis in fact, and they will be dismissed as frivolous.
See, e.g., Caterbone v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 698 F. App’x 678, 679 (3d Cir. 2017) (per curiam)
(dismissing appeal as lacking an arguable basis in fact where underlying allegations were based

on plaintiff’s assertion that he was a “victim of U.S. sponsored mind control and cointelpro
harassment program”); Campbell, 2023 WL 6038024, at 7-8 (dismissing claim where pro se
plaintiff’s allegations describing a “vast conspiracy” by Columbia where it engaged in a bribery
campaign targeting her sorority sisters to convince them to stalk and kill plaintiff, as well as
other schemes to harass and assassinate her were wholly conclusory and fantastical); Price v.
Fed. Bureau of Investigation, No. 20-3015, 2020 WL 4368063, at *3 (E.D. Pa. July 30, 2020)
(finding plaintiff’s allegations to be factually frivolous where plaintiff asserted that “numerous
law enforcement agencies, attorneys, prison officials, and medical professionals have used
neurological and psychological technology to control the ‘four basic groups of his brain and
mental functions’ and “that the use of this ‘technology’ and ‘mind control’ has caused him
numerous impairments and drove him to criminal and erratic behavior”), aff’d, 845 F. App’x 106
(3d Cir. 2021); Sanders v. New York Times, No. 23-2105, 2023 WL 3724818, at *5 (S.D.N.Y.
May 30, 2023) (a pro se “Plaintiff's generalized assertions – that the United States military is

attempting to kill her and that the defendant media companies have failed to report her
allegations – do not provide any plausible factual support for a viable legal claim and appear to
rise to the level of the irrational.”).
4. Claim under § 1985
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) creates a cause of action against any two persons who “conspire . . .
for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the
equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws. . . .” 42
U.S.C. § 1985(3). To state a plausible claim under § 1985(3) a plaintiff must allege the
following elements: (1) a conspiracy; (2) motivated by a racial or class based discriminatory
animus designed to deprive, directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal

protection of the laws; (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (4) an injury to person or
property or the deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States. Lake v.
Arnold, 112 F.3d 682, 685 (3d Cir.1997); see also Farber v. City of Paterson, 440 F.3d 131, 136
(3d Cir. 2006) (explaining that Ҥ 1985(3) defendants must have allegedly conspired against a
group that has an identifiable existence independent of the fact that its members are victims of
the defendants’ tortious conduct” ); Hauptmann v. Wilentz, 570 F. Supp. 351, 386 (D.N.J. 1983)
(“If the conspiracy only affects the plaintiff individually, the allegations will not satisfy the class-
based animus requirement.”), aff’d, 770 F.2d 1070 (3d Cir. 1985), and aff’d sub nom., Appeal of
Hauptmann, 770 F.2d 1070 (3d Cir. 1985). Nothing in the Complaint suggests any factual basis
for race or class-based discrimination, and the allegations only discuss the harms that allegedly
affected Paciulete personally. To the extent Paciulete invokes this statute, her claim is not
plausible.
B. CAT and ICCPR Claims
Paciulete’s claims under the CAT and the ICCPR are not plausible and will be dismissed.

Courts have held that the treaties like the CAT and the ICCPR are “not self-executing and do not
confer rights beyond those granted by the implementing legislation.” Feng Ying Li v. Att’y Gen.
of U.S., 321 F. App’x 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Jin v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 143, 159–60 (2d
Cir. 2008)); see also Brown v. Victor, 337 F. App’x 239, 241 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Auguste v.
Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 132 n.7 (3d Cir. 2005)) (Courts have held that the CAT “is not self-
executing, and, therefore, does not create judicially enforceable rights unless it is first given
effect by implementing legislation.”); Igartua De La Rosa v. United States, 32 F.3d 8, 10 n. 1
(1st Cir. 1994) (holding that ICCPR is not privately enforceable); Nall v. Sussex Corr. Inst., No.
19-2187, 2020 WL 1975155, at *4 (D. Del. Apr. 24, 2020) (“Similarly, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not provide for a private cause of action.”). Courts

have also held that domestic laws implementing the CAT do not provide civil redress for torture
within the United States. Brown, 337 F. App’x at 241 (citing Renkel v. United States, 456 F.3d
640, 644-45 (6th Cir. 2006)). In sum, neither of these provisions provide a plausible basis for a
claim here.
C. Claim Under the ADA
Paciulete asserts as the basis for her ADA claim that she has been discriminated against
“as mother, woman, and caregiver of a child with special needs,” and that she has experienced
“custody interference and targeting based on gender role and disability-related vulnerabilities.”
(Paciulete I, ECF No. 1 at 4.) Although she does not specify the provision, the Court
understands Paciulete to seek relief under Title II of the ADA. To allege a plausible violation of
Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must assert that (1) she is a “qualified individual with a
disability;” (2) he is being excluded from participation in or being denied the benefits of some
“services, programs, or activities,” by reason of her disability; and (3) the entity which provides

the service, program or activity is a public entity. See, e.g., Layton v. Elder, 143 F.3d 469, 472
(8th Cir.1998); Bowers v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 9 F. Supp. 2d 460, 475 (D.N.J.
1998); Adelman v. Dunmire, No. 95-4039, 1997 WL 164240 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 1997).
Paciulete fails to articulate a plausible claim against any entity in this action. She appears
to allege that her rights under the ADA were infringed upon during the custody proceedings, but
she has not sued any Defendants that would be plausibly liable under Title II. The proper
defendant under a Title II claim is a public entity or an individual who controls or directs the
functioning of the public entity. See Emerson v. Thiel College, 296 F.3d 184, 189 (3d Cir. 2002).
Therefore, as an initial matter, any ADA claim alleged against Fahn must be dismissed with
prejudice because he is not a “public entity” within the meaning of the ADA, nor is it alleged

that he controls or directs the functioning of an appropriately identified public entity. See
Kokinda v. Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr., 779 F. App’x 938, 942 (3d Cir. 2019) (per curiam)
(“Kokinda’s claims for individual damages liability under Title II of the ADA fail for the simple
reason that there is no such liability.”) Furthermore, she has not sued a public entity in this
action, but only “officers” and “officials” in federal and state law enforcement and medical
professionals. (Paciulete I, ECF No. 1 at 1-2.) To the extent that she has sued persons who may
be employed by public entities, they are not liable under the ADA. See Emerson, 296 F.3d at
189, citing Walker v. Snyder, 213 F.3d 344, 346 (7th Cir. 2000) (“the ADA addresses its rules to
employers, places of public accommodation, and other organizations, not to the employees or
managers of these organizations”), overruled on other grounds by Bd. Of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v.
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001). Paciulete’s ADA claim also comes up short because she does not
allege that she is a “qualified individual with a disability” or that she is being excluded from
participation in a “service, program, or activit[y]” by reason of her disability. Paciulete refers to

her gender in discussing her ADA claim, but gender does not qualify as a disability. She vaguely
refers to “disability-related vulnerabilities,” but she provides no explanation of what disability
she is referring to. Accordingly, the claim will be dismissed.
D. Habeas Corpus Claim
Paciulete has requested habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, apparently
based on her involuntary psychiatric hospitalizations. But Paciulete’s only avenue for this relief
in federal court is through a habeas petition, not a civil action complaint like she filed here. See
Williams v. Consovoy, 453 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 2006) (stating that a § 1983 complaint that
seeks release may not proceed because the proper vehicle for such claims is a petition for writ of
habeas corpus). The Court will dismiss this claim with prejudice as it relates to a civil action,

but this does not prevent her from bringing the claims in a habeas petition if she chooses to do
so.
D. Request for Mandamus Relief
Paciulete also cites to 28 U.S.C. § 1361 as a basis of jurisdiction for her action.
(Paciulete I, ECF No. 1 at 1.) That statute provides that “[t]he district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the
United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.” 28 U.S.C. § 1361;
see also Semper v. Gomez, 747 F.3d 229, 250-51 (3d Cir. 2014) (for a district court to have
subject matter jurisdiction to compel the action of an individual pursuant to § 1361, the
individual must be “an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof.”). A
party seeking a writ of mandamus must show that he has “(i) no other adequate means of
obtaining the desired relief and (ii) a ‘clear and indisputable’ right to issuance of the writ.” Mote
v. United States Dist. Ct. for Middle Dist. of Pennsylvania, 858 F. App’x 39, 40 (3d Cir. 2021)

(per curiam) (citations omitted). Considering that Paciulete has failed to identify an appropriate,
individual official owing her duty, and that no cognizable and enforceable right to relief exists
here, there is no “clear and indisputable” right to issuance of the writ requiring federal officials
to act.11 This claim will be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
E. State Law Claims
Because the Court has dismissed Paciulete’s federal claims, the Court will not exercise
supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) over the remaining state law claims, which
are best construed as claims for invasion of privacy,12 assault, and property damage to her
vehicle. Accordingly, the only independent basis for jurisdiction over any such claims is 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a), which grants a district court jurisdiction over a case in which “the matter in

controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between
. . . citizens of different States.” “Section 1332(a) requires “‘complete diversity between all
plaintiffs and all defendants,’ even though only minimal diversity is constitutionally required.
This means that, unless there is some other basis for jurisdiction, ‘no plaintiff [may] be a citizen

11 28 U.S.C. § 1651 also confers jurisdiction on a district court to issue a writ of
mandamus “in aid of” its own jurisdiction. Section 1651 is not applicable here since Paciulete's
requested relief is not in aid of our jurisdiction.

12 It is difficult to discern what claims Paciulete intended to bring as it relates to her
allegations of violation of privacy. It appears to be related to her allegations that Defendant
Paciulete and his family placed hidden devices in her vehicle and unlawfully surveilled her,
which is best construed as a tort claim for invasion of privacy.
of the same state as any defendant.’” Lincoln Ben. Life, 800 F.3d at 104 (quoting Lincoln Prop.
Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 89 (2005) and Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co. v. Wood, 592 F.3d 412,
419 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal footnotes omitted)).
As an initial matter, Paciulete does not allege a sufficient amount in controversy. Even if

she had, she has not pleaded diversity of citizenship. In the Complaint in Paciulete I, Paciulete
does not allege her citizenship or those of any Defendants. In Paciulete II, she claims to be
“currently residing” in Pennsylvania (see id., ECF No. 2 at 2), but declares under the penalty of
perjury in her motion to proceed in forma pauperis that she is “a resident of New Jersey
resident.” (See id. ECF No. 1 at 1.) She also provides a New Jersey mailing address in
documents submitted in Paciulete I. (See Paciulete I, ECF No. 9-2 at 1.) She alleges in
Paciulete II that Defendant Fahn is also a resident of New Jersey. (See Paciulete II, ECF No. 2
at 2.) In any case, she has sued Defendants in Paciulete I that would appear to be citizens of
New Jersey and Pennsylvania, and her citizenship in either of those states destroys diversity.
Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the remaining state law claims for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction. This dismissal will be without prejudice, so Paciulete can file these claims in the
appropriate state court if she chooses to do so. The Court expresses no opinion on the merits of
any such lawsuit.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Paciulete leave to proceed in forma
pauperis in Paciulete II (ECF No. 1) and dismiss that case without prejudice because she filed an
earlier lawsuit pending in this Court and raising the same claims in Paciulete I. Any remaining
motions in that matter will be denied. The federal claims in Paciulete I will be dismissed as
frivolous and for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii). The
Court will dismiss the request for mandamus relief and any state law claims in Paciulete I
without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Court concludes that under the
circumstances of this case, Paciulete cannot cure the defects in her Complaint, so she will not be
given leave to amend. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108, 110 (3d Cir. 2002)

(“[D]ismissals of frivolous claims do not require leave to amend due to the long tradition of
denying leave to amend . . . when amendment is inequitable or futile.”). Because her Complaint
will be dismissed, her requests for injunctive relief13 will be denied. Her emergency motions in
Paciulete I for a temporary restraining order and for injunctive relief will also be denied since
she cannot demonstrate success on the merits of her claims. Winter v. NRDC, Inc., 555 U.S. 7,
20 (2008) (“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that [s]he is likely to
succeed on the merits, that [s]he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary
relief, that the balance of equities tips in h[er] favor, and that an injunction is in the public
interest.”).
Paciulete’s motions to seal proceedings in Paciulete I (ECF No. 5) and Paciulete II (ECF

No. 9) are denied, except that Paciulete I, ECF Nos. 9, 10, and 11, and all filings by the Plaintiff
in Paciulete II will be deemed restricted to Court Participants’ View Only because they contain
the name of a minor.

13 “‘[A] request for injunctive relief by itself does not state a cause of action. . . . An
injunction is a remedy, not a separate claim or cause of action. A pleading can . . . request
injunctive relief in connection with a substantive claim, but a separately pled claim or cause of
action for injunctive relief is inappropriate.’” Slemmer v. McGlaughlin Spray Foam Insulation,
Inc., 955 F. Supp. 2d 452, 465 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (quoting Jensen v. Quality Loan Serv. Corp., 702
F.Supp.2d 1183, 1201 (E.D. Cal. 2010)).
An appropriate Order dismissing these cases will be entered separately. See Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 58(a).
BY THE COURT:

/s/ Chad F. Kenney
__________________________________________
CHAD F. KENNEY, J.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11170695. Public record. Not legal advice.