# Lewis

> District Court, M.D. Florida · October 14, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11170680

## Case

- **Full name:** James F. Lewis v. Brian Campbell and Robert S. Chausse
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** October 14, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11170680

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- reaffirming the constitutionality of section 856.021

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
OCALA DIVISION

JAMES F. LEWIS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 5:25-cv-209-JSS-PRL

BRIAN CAMPBELL and ROBERT S.
CHAUSSE,

Defendants.
___________________________________/
ORDER
Defendants, Brian Campbell and Robert Chausse, move to dismiss the
complaint. (Dkt. 10.) Plaintiff, James Lewis, opposes the motion. (Dkt. 18.) Upon
consideration, for the reasons outlined below, the motion is granted.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a self-described citizen journalist, activist, and YouTuber. (Dkt.
1 ¶ 6.) According to the complaint, he was filming storefronts while window shopping
when the manager of a local business asked him to stop. (Id. ¶¶ 5–7.) When Plaintiff
refused, she called the police. (Id. ¶ 8.) Defendants are two of the police officers who
were dispatched to the scene. (Id. ¶ 9.)
The entirety of events is captured in Plaintiff’s hour-long video, the recording of
the bank manager’s call to law enforcement, and the officers’ body camera footage.1
(See Dkts. 19, 20, 23.) Initially, Plaintiff’s video shows him strolling through a

shopping complex, pausing on several occasions to film storefront displays featuring
items such as lingerie and luxury women’s clothing. (Dkt. 20, Ex. E at 00:23:00–
00:28:40.) Twenty-five minutes into the video, Plaintiff arrives at a bank. (Id. at
00:24:59.)
As he had done before, Plaintiff approached the bank’s windows to film inside.

(Id. at 00:24:59–00:35:41.) Eventually, Plaintiff came upon a window with a view of
a banker’s computer monitor. (Id. at 00:26:27.) For several minutes, Plaintiff filmed
over the banker’s shoulder. (Id. at 0:26:27–0:28:40.) Eventually, Plaintiff was
discovered, and the bank’s manager came out to confront him. (Id. at 00:28:00–

00:29:00.) During their brief encounter, the bank’s manager asked Plaintiff not to film
through the windows, to protect client information. (Id. at 00:28:40–00:29:00.)
Plaintiff refused. (Id.) Then, the bank’s manager warned Plaintiff that she would call

1 When considering a motion to dismiss, the court “may properly consider a document
not . . . attached to a complaint under the incorporation-by-reference doctrine if the document is (1)
central to the plaintiff’s claims[] and (2) undisputed, meaning that its authenticity is not challenged.”
Johnson v. City of Atlanta, 107 F.4th 1292, 1300 (11th Cir. 2024). In the complaint, Plaintiff refers to
video footage of the relevant events captured on his cell phone and the responding officers’ body
cameras, as well as the 911 call to which the officers were responding. (Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 5, 8–9, 11, 21.)
Although Plaintiff did not provide copies of these materials in conjunction with his complaint, he did
so in responding to the motion to dismiss. (See Dkt. 20.) Defendants have similarly provided copies
to the court. (Dkt. 23.) All parties have asked the court to consider these materials in deciding the
motion. (See Dkt. 10 at 6–9; see also Dkt. 18 at 6.) The contents of the call and the videos are central
to Plaintiffs’ causes of action, and their authenticity is uncontested. (See Dkt. 19 at 4–5; see also Dkt.
20.) As a result, the court considers the bank manager’s call to law enforcement and the footage
captured by each of the parties as incorporated by reference in the amended complaint. See Johnson,
107 F.4th at 1300.
the police if he continued to film into the bank. (Id. at 00:29:04.) Plaintiff continued
to film. (Id. at 00:29:00–00:35:30, 00:38:32–00:39:00.)
The bank’s manager called the police. During the call, she told the dispatcher

that an unknown man was intentionally filming into her bankers’ offices, where
computer monitors displayed customer information. (Dkt 20, Ex. A at 00:00:08–
00:02:30.) She also told the dispatcher that she had confronted Plaintiff and asked him
to stop filming, but he had refused. (Id. at 00:00:08–00:00:20, 00:01:10–00:02:17.)

According to the bank’s manager, Plaintiff was still walking around the exterior of the
bank and filming through windows, which had led the staff to lock the doors and close
the blinds. (Id. at 00:02:50–00:04:15.)
Several officers arrived shortly thereafter and engaged Plaintiff in a consensual
encounter. (Dkt. 18 at 14.) Plaintiff was aggressive from the start, often yelling at

officers and hurling explicatives, while demanding to know whether the officers were
responding to a call for assistance from the bank or another location in the shopping
plaza. (Dkt. 20, Ex. E at 00:51:10–01:01:00.) Plaintiff also refused to answer questions
or even identify himself. (Id. at 00:53:25–00:53:35, 01:03:25–01:06:48.)
While several officers engaged Plaintiff, Defendant Chausse departed to meet

the staff at the bank. (Dkt. 20, Ex. B at 00:08:35–00:11:00). During their meeting, the
bank’s staff asked that Plaintiff be cited for trespassing. (Id.) Meanwhile, Plaintiff was
detained so officers could determine whether he had committed a crime. (Dkt. 20, Ex.
E at 01:00:59–01:02:43.) Shortly thereafter, the bank’s security officer stepped outside
to tell Plaintiff that he had been trespassed from the bank. (Id. at 01:03:00–01:03:20.)
Plaintiff started to leave but was informed by Defendant Campbell that he was still
detained because the officers needed to investigate and document the trespass. (Id. at
01:03:20–01:06:48.)

Overall, Plaintiff was detained for just under six minutes. (Id. at 01:01:05–
01:06:48.) He now sues Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 22, 26, 29),
alleging that they violated his rights secured by the United States Constitution and
Florida law, (id. ¶¶ 22–31). In Count I, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his

Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures when
they briefly detained him. (See Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 15–18, 21–25.) In Count II, Plaintiff
seemingly claims that his brief detention constituted a false imprisonment, in violation
of the United States Constitution and Florida law. (Id. ¶¶ 18–21, 26–28.) In Count
III, Plaintiff asserts that his detention violated the First Amendment because the

impetus for the stop was not Defendants’ reasonable suspicion that Plaintiff had
engaged in criminal activity, but retaliation for a lawsuit that he had filed against two
other police officers. (Id. ¶¶ 16, 21, 29–31.)
APPLICABLE STANDARDS
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a court to dismiss a complaint

for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
When ruling on such a motion to dismiss, a court must accept all well-pleaded factual
allegations as true. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Lotierzo v. A Woman’s
World Med. Ctr., Inc., 278 F.3d 1180, 1182 (11th Cir. 2002). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6)
challenge, a plaintiff cannot put forth solely “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a
cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Instead, the “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (quotation omitted). “A complaint is plausible
on its face when it contains sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Gates v. Khokhar, 884 F.3d 1290, 1296
(11th Cir. 2018) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). To meet this standard, the facts alleged

in the complaint must show more than “a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556
(2007)).
The allegations of a pro se complaint are subject “to less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Campbell v. Air Jam. Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165,

1168 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). Courts
therefore “give liberal construction” to pro se filings. Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d
826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007). Nonetheless, the court may not serve as de facto counsel
for a pro se party or rewrite a deficient complaint to sustain a lawsuit. See Campbell,
760 F.3d at 1168–69.
ANALYSIS
Defendants move to dismiss each count. (See Dkt. 10.) Primarily, Defendants

contend that the complaint must be dismissed because they are entitled to qualified
immunity.2 (Id. at 2, 11–20.)
“Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability for civil
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established . . . constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Carruth v. Bentley, 942 F.3d

1047, 1053 (11th Cir. 2019) (quotations omitted). “The purpose of this immunity is to
allow government officials to carry out their discretionary duties without fear of
personal liability or harassing litigation, protecting from suit all but the plainly
incompetent or one who is knowingly violating the federal law.” Lee v. Ferraro, 284
F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002) (citation and quotation omitted), overruled in part on

other grounds by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009); accord Carruth, 942 F.3d at
1054. “To invoke the defense of qualified immunity, a government official must have
been acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful
acts occurred.” Spencer v. Benison, 5 F.4th 1222, 1230 (11th Cir. 2021) (quotation

2 In their motion to dismiss, Defendants also argue that the complaint is a shotgun pleading. (Id. at
2, 9–11.) They further contend that Count II fails to state a claim because violations of state criminal
law cannot support a cause of action under section 1983, and that Count III fails to plead sufficient
facts to state a claim. (Dkt. 10 at 20–25.) The court notes that state law violations cannot support
Plaintiff’s section 1983 claims. See Martes v. Chief Exec. Officer of S. Broward Hosp. Dist., 683 F.3d 1323,
1325 (11th Cir. 2012); Skinner v. City of Miami, 62 F.3d 344, 347 (11th Cir. 1995) (“To succeed, a
section 1983 plaintiff must show a violation of a right secured by federal law.”). Accordingly, the
court limits its consideration to whether Plaintiff has a cause of action under section 1983 for the
purported constitutional violation. In any event, because the court agrees that qualified immunity
applies, it does not address Defendants’ remaining arguments.
omitted). “After a government official establishes that he was acting within the scope
of his discretionary authority, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that the official’s
conduct (1) violated federal law (2) that was clearly established at the relevant time.”

Id.
Here, the parties agree that Defendants were exercising discretionary authority
as police officers when they detained Plaintiff to conduct an investigatory stop. (Dkt.
10 at 11, 23 n.6; Dkt. 18 at 4, 20.) See Jackson v. City of Atlanta, 97 F.4th 1343, 1356
(11th Cir. 2024) (“There is no dispute that in making an investigatory stop[,] an officer

is exercising a discretionary function.”). Each cause of action stems from Defendants’
conduct in relation to the investigatory stop. (See Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 22–31.) As a result, the
burden shifts to Plaintiff “to show that qualified immunity is not appropriate.” Carruth,
942 F.3d at 1054 (quotation omitted).

Qualified immunity is inappropriate if Plaintiff can show that “(1) the facts
alleged in his complaint constitute a violation of his constitutional rights[] and (2) the
constitutional rights were clearly established when . . . [D]efendant[s] committed the
act complained of.” Morris v. Town of Lexington, 748 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir. 2014)
(quotation omitted). Plaintiff must make these showings on “a claim-by-claim and

defendant-by-defendant basis.” Miller v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 129 F.4th 1329,
1333 (11th Cir. 2025). If Plaintiff fails to make either showing, Defendants are entitled
to qualified immunity for that cause of action. Jacoby v. Baldwin County, 835 F.3d 1338,
1344 (11th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). The court may therefore begin its analysis
with either prong. See Morris, 748 F.3d at 1322; see also Maddox v. Stephens, 727 F.3d
1109, 1121 (11th Cir. 2013) (noting that courts have “flexibility to determine that the
right allegedly violated was not clearly established without deciding whether a

constitutional violation occurred at all”).
A. Counts I and II

A section 1983 plaintiff “must show that he or she was deprived of a federal
right by a person acting under color of state law.” Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka, 261 F.3d
1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2001). In Count I, Plaintiff contends that Defendants violated
his rights secured by the Fourth Amendment when they detained him “without
reasonable suspicion of a crime being afoot.” (Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 15–24.) In Count II, he
contends that the same conduct resulted in his false imprisonment, in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. (Id. ¶¶ 26–27.)

“The Fourth Amendment guarantees individuals the right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures of their persons.” United States v. Solomon, No.
2:15-CR-142-FTM-38CM, 2016 WL 561420, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 12, 2016) (citing
U.S. Const. amend. IV). “Law enforcement officers violate this right if they commit
certain acts without [a] proper basis. A Terry stop is one such act.” Id. (citation

omitted). However, “[t]he law is clearly established that an officer’s brief,
investigatory stop of a suspect does not violate the Fourth Amendment when the
officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” Jackson,
97 F.4th at 1355-1356 (quotation omitted); accord Metz v. Bridges, No. 23-11275, 2024
WL 5088586, at *3 (11th Cir. Dec. 12, 2024) (“A brief, investigatory Terry stop does
not violate the Fourth Amendment when the officer has a reasonable suspicion that
the person has committed or is about to commit a crime.” (citing United States v. Jordan,

635 F.3d 1181, 1186 (11th Cir. 2011))). Defendants maintain that they are entitled to
qualified immunity on Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claims because a reasonable
officer could believe that Plaintiff either had committed, or was about to commit,
several criminal acts, thus providing arguable reasonable suspicion to detain Plaintiff.
(Dkt. 10 at 16–17.)

Reasonable suspicion is a “low bar.” United States v. Black, No. 8:24-CR-113-
KKM-AAS, 2025 WL 2418485, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 2025); accord United States
v. Jean-Charles, No. 15-60309-CR, 2016 WL 828830, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 3, 2016)
(“The reasonable suspicion required to conduct an investigatory stop is not a high

hurdle.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). To meet this low bar, an officer needs
only “a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop.” Jackson v. Sauls,
206 F.3d 1156, 1165 (11th Cir. 2000) (quotation omitted).
When an officer asserts qualified immunity in the context of an investigatory
stop, that low bar drops even further, as the issue “is not whether reasonable suspicion

existed in fact, but whether the officer had arguable reasonable suspicion to support
an investigatory stop.” Id. at 1166 (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Webb v.
English, No. 3:19-CV-975-MMH-JBT, 2021 WL 4340426, at *12 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 23,
2021) (explaining that qualified immunity will insulate officers from liability if they
had “an arguably reasonable suspicion that [a person has] violated Florida law, as
opposed to an actual violation”).
Whether an officer has arguable reasonable suspicion to support an

investigatory stop is viewed objectively “‘from the standpoint of a reasonable official
at the scene’ . . . based on the totality of the circumstances.” Young v. Brady, 793 F.
App’x 905, 909 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Hicks v. Moore, 422 F.3d 1246, 1252 (11th
Cir. 2005)). Thus, an officer’s “motive in making the [investigatory] stop does not
invalidate what is otherwise objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth

Amendment.” Jenkins v. Gaither, 543 F. App’x 894, 897 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting
United States v. Harris, 526 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2008)).
In this case, a hypothetical, reasonable officer would have had arguable
reasonable suspicion to believe that Plaintiff had engaged in criminal activity. See

Young, 793 F. App’x at 909. The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. Torres-
Bonilla illustrates the presence of arguable reasonable suspicion in this case. See 556
F. App’x 875, 879–80 (11th Cir. 2014). In Torres-Bonilla, officers observed Torres-
Bonilla inserting several cards into a series of ATMs and withdrawing cash. Id. at 877.
The officers thought this conduct was suspicious, so they tried to speak with Torres-

Bonilla, but he ran away. Id. When the officers finally caught up to him, they sought
to determine who he was and what he had been doing, but Torres-Bonilla refused to
identify himself. Id. Consequently, officers arrested him for, among other things,
loitering and prowling in violation of section 856.021, Florida Statutes. Id. Having
arrested Torres-Bonilla, officers then searched him and his vehicle, uncovering further
evidence of criminal activity. Id. at 877–78. At trial, Torres-Bonilla moved to suppress
this evidence, contending officers neither had reasonable suspicion to detain nor

probable cause to arrest him. See id. at 878. The court denied the motion, and Torres-
Bonilla was ultimately convicted of several offenses. Id. On appeal, Torres-Bonilla
argued that the district judge erred in denying his motion to suppress. Id. The Eleventh
Circuit upheld the validity of the search, finding that officers had probable cause to

arrest Torres-Bonilla under section 856.021. Id. at 879. In reaching this decision, the
court concluded that officers had probable cause to believe Torres-Bonilla was engaged
in criminal activity when they observed him “loitering at several ATMs in a manner
not usual for law-abiding individuals.” Id. at 880 (quotation and citation omitted).
The court also determined that the circumstances warranted “a justifiable and

reasonable alarm or immediate concern” that the property of others was at risk based
on the man’s suspicious activities and his refusal to identify himself. Id. (quotation
omitted).
Like Torres-Bonilla, Plaintiff was observed acting suspiciously in a place where
financial transactions occur and personal identification information is exchanged.

(Dkt. 20, Ex. E at 00:24:59–00:39:00.) In her call to police, the bank manager reported
that an unknown man, matching Plaintiff’s description, was walking around the
building’s exterior, looking into offices, and intentionally filming computers that
displayed customer information. (See Dkt 20, Ex. A.) This sort of behavior is not
usual for law-abiding individuals. See Torres-Bonilla, 556 F. App’x at 880. Although
Defendants did not witness Plaintiff loitering or filming client information through the
bank’s windows, they had constructive knowledge of his suspicious behavior under
Florida’s fellow officer rule. See State v. Maynard, 783 So. 2d 226, 229 (Fla. 2001)

(imputing knowledge from a dispatcher to the officer who ultimately responded to the
call); see also Terrell v. Smith, 668 F.3d 1244, 1252 (11th Cir. 2012) (“[B]oth the United
States Supreme Court and the Florida Supreme Court have allowed the collective
knowledge of the investigating officers to be imputed to each participating officer.”);
Joseph v. Chronister, No. 8:16-CV-274-T-35CPT, 2020 WL 13657218, at *21 (M.D. Fla.

Feb. 21, 2020) (finding an officer was entitled to qualified immunity under the fellow
officer rule for causes of action emanating from an arrest made upon information
supplied by a fellow deputy). Based on the information relayed by the bank’s manager,
Defendants had arguable reasonable suspicion to believe that Plaintiff was loitering or

prowling “in a place, at a time[,] or in a manner not usual for [a] law-abiding
individual[]” in violation of section 856.021. See Fla. Stat. § 856.021(1). Defendants
also had arguable reasonable suspicion to believe that the circumstances “warrant[ed]
a justifiable and reasonable alarm or immediate concern for the safety of . . . property
in the vicinity,” as required under that statute, because Plaintiff refused to identify

himself. See id.; see also Torres-Bonilla, 556 F. App’x at 880 (“Alarm is presumed under
the second element of § 856.021 if, when law enforcement appears, the
defendant . . . refuses to identify himself.”). Further, Defendants “were entitled to be
reasonably and justifiably concerned that the property of others was at risk,” having
received a report that Plaintiff was filming computer monitors that displayed personal
identification information—such as bank account and payment card numbers—
belonging to the bank’s clients in violation of Florida law. (Dkt 20, Ex. A at 00:00:08–

00:04:15.) This information also provided Defendants with arguable reasonable
suspicion to believe that Plaintiff may have violated section 817.5685, Florida Statutes,
which prohibits “intentionally or knowingly possess[ing], without authorization, the
personal identification information of another person.” See Fla. Stat. § 817.5685(1)–
(2) (defining “personal identification information” to include a person’s “social

security number, . . . bank account number, [and] credit or debit card number”). (See
Dkt 20, Ex. A.)
Under the totality of the circumstances, Defendants had arguable reasonable
suspicion to believe that Plaintiff had engaged in criminal activity. Any subjective

reason that they may have had for detaining him is immaterial. See Jenkins, 543 F.
App’x at 897. Further, because Defendants had arguable reasonable suspicion to
believe criminal activity was afoot, Plaintiff cannot show that Defendants violated his
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Metz,
2024 WL 5088586, at *3 (citing Jordan, 635 F.3d at 1186). Defendants are therefore

entitled to qualified immunity on Counts I and II.
Even if Defendants did not have arguable reasonable suspicion to detain
Plaintiff consistent with the Fourth Amendment, they are still entitled to qualified
immunity because Plaintiff has not shown that his right not to be detained in this case
was sufficiently well-established that “every reasonable [officer] would have
understood” that Defendants’ conduct violated the Fourth Amendment. Gates, 884
F.3d at 1296 (quoting Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)). “In other words,
‘existing precedent must have placed the . . . constitutional question beyond debate,’”

thereby giving Defendants fair warning that their conduct violated the law. Id.
(quoting Reichle, 566 U.S. at 664).
A right can be clearly established in one of three ways:
First, the plaintiff can point to a materially similar case decided at the
time of the relevant conduct by the Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit,
or the relevant state supreme court. This first method looks at the relevant
[caselaw] at the time of the alleged violation that would have made it
obvious to the officer that his actions violated federal law. The prior
[caselaw] need not be directly on point, but an existing precedent must
have placed the . . . constitutional question beyond debate. Second, the
plaintiff can identify a broader, clearly established principle that should
govern the novel facts of the situation. Third, the plaintiff can show that
the conduct at issue so obviously violated the Constitution that prior
[caselaw] is unnecessary. For this third route, the plaintiff must establish
that the conduct lies so obviously at the core of what the alleged
constitutional amendment prohibits that the unlawfulness of the conduct
was readily apparent to the officer, notwithstanding the lack of fact-
specific [caselaw]. This third method, often referred to as the obvious
clarity scenario, is a narrow exception to the normal rule that only
[caselaw] and specific factual scenarios can clearly establish a violation.

Stalley v. Cumbie, 124 F.4th 1273, 1284 (11th Cir. 2024) (alterations adopted and
quotations omitted).
When a plaintiff attempts to show that the defendant violated a clearly
established right by pointing to a materially similar case, the court must consider
“whether the factual scenario that the official faced [in the present case] is fairly
distinguishable from the circumstances facing [the] government official in [the]
previous case.” Gaines v. Wardynski, 871 F.3d 1203, 1209 (11th Cir. 2017) (quotations
omitted). If caselaw “has not staked out a bright line, qualified immunity almost
always protects the defendant.” Oliver v. Fiorino, 586 F.3d 898, 907 (11th Cir. 2009)

(quotations omitted).
In opposing Defendant’s entitlement to qualified immunity, Plaintiff directs the
court to several decisions, each of which is inapposite. To begin, the decisions in
Gestewitz v. State of Florida, 34 So. 3d 832 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010), S.N.J. v. State of

Florida, 17 So. 3d 1258 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009), and Rodriguez v. State of Florida, 29
So. 3d 310 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009), could not have placed the constitutionality of
Plaintiff’s detention beyond debate because they were not authored by the United
States Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit, or the Florida Supreme Court. See Stalley,
124 F.4th at 1284. (See also Dkt. 18 at 9, 12, 14, 15.)

Turning to the authoritative decisions in Plaintiff’s brief, the court finds that the
decisions in State of Florida v. J.P., 907 So. 2d 1101 (Fla. 2004), and Papachristou v. City
of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972), are too dissimilar to have placed the constitutional
question beyond debate, as neither decision considered the constitutionality of an
investigatory stop. See Gaines, 871 F.3d at 1209. (See also Dkt. 18 at 9, 11, 17.) In J.P.,

the Florida Supreme Court struck down a pair of ordinances imposing curfews on
minors because they were unconstitutionally overbroad, 907 So. 2d at 1112–13, while
the United States Supreme Court in Papachristou held that a traditional vagrancy
ordinance criminalizing activities such as “common night walk[ing],” “wandering or
strolling . . . without any lawful purpose or object,” “habitual loaf[ing],” and
“habitually living upon the earnings” of one’s wife or minor children was
unconstitutionally vague, 405 U.S. at 158 n.1, 162; Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nev.,
Humboldt Cnty., 542 U.S. 177, 184 (2004) (“In Papachristou . . ., the Court held that a

traditional vagrancy law was void for vagueness. Its broad scope and imprecise terms
denied proper notice to potential offenders and permitted police officers to exercise
unfettered discretion in the enforcement of the law.”). Plaintiff is not challenging an
ordinance that criminalized his status as a vagrant or that prevented him from being
out after a certain hour. (See Dkt. 1.) See Watts v. State, 463 So. 2d 205, 206–07 (Fla.

1985) (reaffirming the constitutionality of section 856.021); State v. Ecker, 311 So. 2d
104, 107 (Fla. 1975) (distinguishing section 856.021 from the ordinance at issue in
Papachristou because section 856.021 does not broadly proscribe loitering or idling, but
only such conduct “that threatens public safety or a breach of the peace”). Thus, the

decisions in J.P. and Papachristou are too factually attenuated to have given Defendants
fair warning that their conduct violated the Fourth Amendment. See Gates, 884 F.3d
at 1296.
Plaintiff also relies upon Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979) to support his
arguments against the application of qualified immunity. (See Dkt. 18 at 10-11.) In

Brown, the United States Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a Terry
stop in which officers detained a man without suspecting him of any “specific
misconduct.” 443 U.S. at 49. Instead, the officers detained him solely “to ascertain
his identity.” Id. at 52. As the Court held, the stop “violated the Fourth Amendment
because the officers lacked any reasonable suspicion to believe [that the man] was engaged
or had engaged in criminal conduct.” Id. at 53 (emphasis added). That is not what
happened here. While Defendant Campbell may have asked Plaintiff to identify

himself during the investigatory stop, that was not the only reason for Plaintiff’s
detention. As discussed, Plaintiff was detained for just under six minutes following a
report that a man matching his description was walking around a bank while videoing
computer monitors that displayed other people’s personal information. (Dkt 20, Ex.

A.) As a result, Plaintiff has not cited a decision of the United States Supreme Court,
Eleventh Circuit, or Florida Supreme Court applying the Fourth Amendment right
against unreasonable searches and seizures to a sufficiently similar factual scenario
such that it would have put the unconstitutionality of Plaintiff’s detention beyond
debate. See Gaines, 871 F.3d at 1209–10.

Nor has Plaintiff identified a broad, yet clearly established, principle in the
Constitution or an authoritative decision that is “specific enough to establish clearly
the law applicable to” Defendants’ conduct and the circumstances of this case such
that Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity. See Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d
1340, 1350 (11th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff cites the Fourth Amendment as the source of his

right, but the Amendment’s language is too broad to place the constitutionality of
Plaintiff’s detention beyond debate. See City [and] County of San Francisco v. Sheehan,
575 U.S. 600, 613 (2015) (“Qualified immunity is no immunity at all if clearly
established law can simply be defined as the right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559
(1979) (“The test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of
precise definition or mechanical application. In each case it requires a balancing of the need
for the particular search [or seizure] against the invasion of personal rights that [it]

entails.” (emphasis added)); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 59 (1967) (“[W]hether a
search and seizure is unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. . .” (citations omitted)).
Because the Fourth Amendment’s broad prohibition against unreasonable searches

and seizures does not place the constitutionality of Plaintiff’s detention beyond debate,
it could not have provided Defendants with fair warning that their conduct violated
the law. See Gates, 884 F.3d at 1296. Thus, Plaintiff needed to identify an authoritative
decision that was sufficiently specific to provide Defendants with fair warning that
their conduct was unlawful. See Vinyard, 311 F.3d at 1350.

Broad statements of principle in authoritative judicial decisions can show that
a constitutional right was clearly established when they “are not tied to [the]
particularized facts” of the case and can thus establish a clear, broad principle that can
be applied to “different sets of detailed facts.” Id. at 1351. Still, there is a presumption
that judge-made law does not create “wide principles of law.” Id. Thus, “if a broad

principle in [caselaw] is to establish clearly the law applicable to a specific set of facts
facing a governmental official, it must do so with obvious clarity to the point that every
objectively reasonable government official facing the circumstances would know that
the official’s conduct did violate federal law when the official acted.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). “[G]eneral, conclusory allegations or broad legal truisms”
will not do. Post v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 7 F.3d 1552, 1557 (11th Cir. 1993)
(quotations omitted).
Plaintiff quotes several broad passages from Brown, J.P., Papachristou, and

Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991), none of which clearly establish a principle that
would have given Defendants “fair warning . . . that the conduct at issue violated a
constitutional right.” Gaines, 871 F.3d at 1208. For instance, Plaintiff derives the
principle that “[a]ll Florida citizens have a right under the Florida Constitution to chat

on a public street, stroll aimlessly, and saunter down a sidewalk” from the Florida
Supreme Court’s decision in J.P. (See Dkt. 18 at 9 (quotation omitted).) He further
cites Papachristou for the premise that “[h]ailing a cab or a friend, chatting on a public
street, and simply strolling aimlessly are time-honored pastimes in our society and are
clearly protected under Florida as well as federal law.” (Id. at 11.) Finally, Plaintiff

points to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Bostick for the rule that police
must have reasonable, articulable suspicion to detain a citizen and the Court’s earlier
opinion in Brown for the rule that “detaining a person for the purpose of requiring him
to identify himself constitutes a seizure requiring a reasonable, articulable suspicion
that a crime had just been, was being, or was about to be committed.” (Id. at 10–11,

12 (quotations omitted).) These legal propositions are too broad to provide a
hypothetical, reasonable officer with fair warning that detaining Plaintiff would violate
the Fourth Amendment, as Plaintiff was not detained while chatting on a public street,
strolling aimlessly, or hailing a friend. See Post, 7 F.3d at 1557 (“To show the law is
clearly established, a plaintiff cannot rely on general, conclusory allegations or broad
legal truisms.” (quotations omitted)). Further, the decisions in Bostick and Brown
cannot provide the clear, broad principle that Plaintiff needs to overcome Defendants’

entitlement to qualified immunity, because their rules are tied to the particular facts of
those cases. Vinyard, 311 F.3d at 1351. As discussed, Brown turned on the officers’
utter lack of reasonable suspicion. See 443 U.S. at 49. Bostick is similarly confined to
its particular facts because the state had previously conceded that the officers “lacked

the reasonable suspicion required to justify a seizure.” 501 U.S. at 433–34. Thus, the
sole issue on appeal was “whether a police encounter on a bus of the type described [in the
briefing] constitute[d] a ‘seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Id.
at 433 (emphasis added). Still, even if the decisions in Bostick and Brown were not so
confined, they do not state principles that would have given Defendants fair warning

that Plaintiff’s detention violated the Fourth Amendment, as Defendants had arguable
reasonable suspicion to detain Plaintiff. See Gates, 884 F.3d at 1296. At bottom, the
principles that Plaintiff extracts from Bostick, Brown, J.P., and Papachristou do not
establish clear legal principles that would have led every objectively reasonable officer
to conclude that Defendants’ conduct violated the Fourth Amendment.

Finally, Plaintiff has not shown that this case fits within the “narrow exception
to the normal rule that only [caselaw] and specific factual scenarios can clearly
establish a violation.” Stalley, 124 F.4th at 1284 (quotations omitted). This final
method for demonstrating that a right is clearly established is “reserved for extreme
circumstances presenting particularly egregious facts that would have put any
reasonable officer on notice that his actions offended the Constitution.” Demarcus v.
Univ. of S. Ala., 133 F.4th 1305, 1319 (11th Cir. 2025) (quotations omitted). Cases

falling within this category “are few and far between[] and . . . invariably deal with
conduct that is beyond any reasonable pale.” Id. Plaintiff does not allege such
conduct.
Plaintiff has not met his burden to show that Defendants violated his Fourth
Amendment rights or that his purported constitutional right not to be detained in this

case was sufficiently well-established that “every reasonable [officer] would have
understood” that Defendants’ conduct violated the Constitution. See Gates, 884 F.3d
at 1296. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Counts I and
II.
B. Count III

Count III is a section 1983 claim asserting that Defendants deprived Plaintiff of
his First Amendment rights when they detained him in retaliation for suing two other
police officers. (Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 29–30.) Thus, the viability of Plaintiff’s First Amendment
claim turns on the legality of his detention. See Gates, 884 F.3d at 1298 (“[W]hen an
officer has arguable probable cause to arrest, he is entitled to qualified immunity both

from Fourth Amendment claims for false arrest and from First Amendment claims
stemming from the arrest.”); Redd v. City of Enterprise, 140 F.3d 1378, 1383 (11th Cir.
1998) (“Because . . . the officers had arguable probable cause to arrest [the
plaintiff,] . . . the officers are also entitled to qualified immunity from the . . . First
Amendment claims.” (citation omitted)). Because Defendants had arguable
reasonable suspicion to detain Plaintiff and are entitled to qualified immunity on his
Fourth Amendment claims arising from the detention, they are also entitled to
qualified immunity with respect to Plaintiff's First Amendment claim. See Bannister v.
Conway, No. 1:12-CV-1487-TWT, 2013 WL 5770802, at *7 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 23, 2013)
(“A plaintiff may not sustain a First Amendment retaliation claim based on acts
protected by qualified immunity.”).
CONCLUSION
Accordingly:
1. Plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss (Dkt. 10) is GRANTED.
2. The complaint (Dkt. 1) is DISMISSED with PREJUDICE.
3. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly, terminate any
pending motions, and close this case.
ORDERED in Ocala, Florida, on October 14, 2025.

JUVIE S. SNEED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies furnished to:
Counsel of Record
Unrepresented Party

~22-

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11170680. Public record. Not legal advice.