# Sim

> District Court, D. Oregon · October 14, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11170596

## Case

- **Full name:** Angel S. v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
- **Court:** District Court, D. Oregon
- **Decided:** October 14, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11170596

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding that a claimant’s activities have “bearing on [his or her] credibility” if the reported “level of activity” is “inconsistent with [the claimant’s] claimed limitations”
- affirming the ALJ’s discounting of the claimant’s testimony, in part, because it conflicted with the objective evidence
- explaining that “[i]nconsistencies between a claimant’s testimony and the claimant’s reported activities provide a valid reason for an adverse credibility determination”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

ANGEL S.,1 Case No. 6:24-cv-00793-SB

Plaintiff, OPINION AND ORDER

v.

COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION,

Defendant.

BECKERMAN, U.S. Magistrate Judge.
Angel S. (“Plaintiff”) filed this appeal challenging the Commissioner of the Social
Security Administration’s (“Commissioner”) denial of her application for Supplemental Security
Income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. The Court has jurisdiction pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and the parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). For the reasons explained below, the Court reverses the
Commissioner’s decision and remands for further administrative proceedings.
///

1 In the interest of privacy, this opinion uses only the first name and the initial of the last
name of the non-governmental party.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“As with other agency decisions, federal court review of social security determinations is
limited.” Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1098 (9th Cir. 2014). That is
so because “[f]or highly fact-intensive individualized determinations like a claimant’s
entitlement to disability benefits, Congress places a premium upon agency expertise, and, for the

sake of uniformity, it is usually better to minimize the opportunity for reviewing courts to
substitute their discretion for that of the agency.” Id. (quoting Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n,
383 U.S. 607, 621 (1966)). Adhering to this principle, courts “follow three important rules” in
reviewing social security determinations. Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 492 (9th Cir.
2015).
First, courts “leave it to the [agency] to determine credibility, resolve conflicts in the
testimony, and resolve ambiguities in the record.” Id. (quoting Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1098).
Second, courts “will ‘disturb the Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits only if it is not
supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error.’” Id. (quoting Treichler, 775 F.3d at
1098). Third, if the agency “‘commits legal error, [courts] uphold the decision where that error is

harmless,’ meaning that ‘it is inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination,’ or
that, despite the legal error, ‘the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned, even if the agency
explains its decision with less than ideal clarity.’” Id. (quoting Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1098); see
also Smith v. Kijakazi, 14 F.4th 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2021) (“And even where this modest
[substantial evidence] burden is not met, [courts] will not reverse an [agency] decision where the
error was harmless.” (citing Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012), superseded
on other grounds by regulation as recognized in Farlow v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 485, 487 (9th Cir.
2022))).
///
BACKGROUND
I. PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION
Plaintiff was born in November 2003, making her eighteen years old on July 5, 2022, her
application date.2 (Tr. 15, 44.) Plaintiff is a high school graduate and has no relevant work
experience. (Id. at 21.) In her application for benefits, Plaintiff alleged disability due to
“specified neurodevelopment disorder, in utero cocaine and alcohol exposure, premature birth,

generalized anxiety disorder, panic attacks, social anxiety, separation anxiety disorder,
depression, [attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”), and] learning disorder with
impairment in reading.” (Id. at 44.)
The Commissioner denied Plaintiff’s application initially and upon reconsideration, and
on February 28, 2023, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”). (Id. at 50, 57, 78.) Plaintiff and a vocational expert (“VE”) testified at an administrative
hearing held on November 16, 2023. (Id. at 29-42.) On December 5, 2023, the ALJ issued a
written decision denying Plaintiff’s application. (Id. at 15-22.) On March 18, 2024, the Appeals
Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, making the ALJ’s written decision the final

decision of the Commissioner. (Id. at 1-6.) Plaintiff now seeks judicial review of the ALJ’s
decision.
II. THE SEQUENTIAL PROCESS
A claimant is considered disabled if he or she is unable to “engage in any substantial
gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment
which . . . has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12

2 “[T]he earliest an SSI claimant can obtain benefits is the month after which [s]he filed
h[er] application[.]” Schiller v. Colvin, No. 12-771-AA, 2013 WL 3874044, at *1 n.1 (D. Or.
July 23, 2013) (citation omitted).
months[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). “Social Security Regulations set out a five-step sequential
process for determining whether an applicant is disabled within the meaning of the Social
Security Act.” Keyser v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 648 F.3d 721, 724 (9th Cir. 2011). Those five
steps are: (1) whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the

claimant has a severe impairment; (3) whether the impairment meets or equals a listed
impairment; (4) whether the claimant can return to any past relevant work; and (5) whether the
claimant can perform other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. Id.
at 724-25.
The claimant bears the burden of proof for the first four steps. See Bustamante v.
Massanari, 262 F.3d 949, 953-54 (9th Cir. 2001). If the claimant fails to meet the burden at any
of those steps, the claimant is not disabled. See id. at 954. The Commissioner bears the burden of
proof at step five, where the Commissioner must show the claimant can perform other work that
exists in significant numbers in the national economy, “taking into consideration the claimant’s
residual functional capacity, age, education, and work experience.” Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d

1094, 1100 (9th Cir. 1999). If the Commissioner fails to meet this burden, the claimant is
disabled. See Bustamante, 262 F.3d at 954.
III. THE ALJ’S DECISION
The ALJ applied the five-step sequential evaluation process to determine if Plaintiff is
disabled. (Tr. 15-22.) At step one, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since July 5, 2022, her application date. (Id. at 17.) At step two, the
ALJ determined that Plaintiff suffered from the following severe, medically determinable
impairments: “generalized anxiety disorder; specified neurodevelopmental disorder (associated
with fetal exposure to amphetamine type substance); and ADHD[.]” (Id.) At step three, the ALJ
concluded that Plaintiff did not have an impairment that meets or medically equals a listed
impairment. (Id. at 18.)
The ALJ then found that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to
perform a full range of work at all exertional levels, subject to certain non-exertional limitations.

(Id. at 19.) Specifically, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is limited to “simple, routine, and repetitive
tasks in a work environment free of fast-paced production requirements, involving only simple
work-related decisions, few workplace changes, and only occasional interaction with the public,
co-workers, and supervisors.” (Id.) At step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had no past
relevant work. (Id. at 21.) At step five, the ALJ concluded that there are jobs that exist in
significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform, such as marker, marker
II, and floor waxer. (Id. at 21-22.)
DISCUSSION
In this appeal, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in three ways. First, Plaintiff argues that
the ALJ failed to evaluate the medical opinion of Christopher Corbett, Psy.D. (“Dr. Corbett”).
(Pl.’s Br. at 3-12, ECF No. 10.) Second, Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ failed to identify specific,

clear, and convincing reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record to discount
Plaintiff’s symptom testimony. (Id. at 12-16.) Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly
discounted the lay witness testimony of Monica S., Plaintiff’s mother, and did not evaluate the
lay witness testimony of Joyce Contreras-Leal, Plaintiff’s vocational rehabilitation (“VR”)
counselor. (Id. at 16-18.)
I. MEDICAL OPINION EVIDENCE
Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ erred by not evaluating Dr. Corbett medical opinion.
(Id. at 3.) Defendant acknowledges that the ALJ did not evaluate Dr. Corbett’s opinion, but
argues that (i) Dr. Corbett’s report was not a medical opinion as defined by current regulations;
and (ii) the ALJ cited Dr. Corbett’s clinical findings and addressed the part of his opinion that
was reproduced in the reports of Plaintiff’s therapist, Maria Sloan, LMFT (“Sloan”). (Def.’s Br.
at 2-4, ECF No. 15.)
A. Applicable Law
“In January 2017, the Social Security Administration issued revised regulations for

evaluating medical opinions relating to claims filed on or after March 27, 2017.” Cross v.
O’Malley, 89 F.4th 1211, 1214 (9th Cir. 2024) (citation omitted). The revised “regulations
provide that ALJs will no longer ‘defer or give any specific evidentiary weight’ to any medical
opinion.” Id. (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(a)). Instead, “ALJ[s] must assess the persuasiveness
of each medical opinion after considering specified factors.” Stiffler v. O’Malley, 102 F.4th 1102,
1106 (9th Cir. 2024) (first citing Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 791-92 (9th Cir. 2022); and
then citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a)-(c), 416.920c(a)-(b))).
Specifically, the revised “regulations require an ALJ to discuss the supportability and
consistency of medical evidence—the factors the agency has historically found to be the most
important in evaluating medical opinions—while allowing for discussion of other factors listed

in paragraphs (c)(3) through (c)(5), as appropriate.” Cross, 89 F.4th at 1215 (citing 20 C.F.R. §
416.920c(a)); see also Woods, 32 F.4th at 791 (“‘The most important factors’ that the agency
considers when evaluating the persuasiveness of medical opinions are ‘supportability’ and
‘consistency.’” (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a))). “Supportability focuses on whether ‘a
medical source supports a medical opinion by explaining the relevant objective medical
evidence.’” Stiffler, 102 F.4th at 1106 (quoting Woods, 32 F.4th at 791-92); see also Kitchen v.
Kijakazi, 82 F.4th 732, 740 (9th Cir. 2023) (“Supportability concerns how ‘a medical source
supports a medical opinion’ with relevant evidence[.]” (quoting Woods, 32 F.4th at 791-92)).
“Consistency means the extent to which a medical opinion is consistent with the evidence from
other medical sources and nonmedical sources[.]” Stiffler, 102 F.4th at 1106 (quoting Woods, 32
F.4th at 792).
In addition to supportability and consistency, “[a]n ALJ may discuss other factors [listed
in paragraphs (c)(3) through (c)(5)], such as the medical source’s ‘relationship with the claimant’

or ‘specialization,’ but generally has no obligation to do so.” Cross, 89 F.4th at 1214 (citing 20
C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(2)). If, however, an “ALJ finds two or more contradictory medical
opinions ‘both equally well-supported . . . and consistent with the record[,]’ . . . the regulations
mandate discussion of these other factors.” Id. at 1214-15 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(3),
(c)(3)-(5)).
A district court reviews the ALJ’s evaluation of a medical opinion for substantial
evidence. See Woods, 32 F.4th at 787 (“Now, [under the new regulations,] an ALJ’s decision,
including the decision to discredit any medical opinion, must simply be supported by substantial
evidence.”); id. at 792 (“Even under the new regulations, an ALJ cannot reject an examining or
treating doctor’s opinion as unsupported or inconsistent without providing an explanation

supported by substantial evidence.”); Metcalf v. Kijakazi, No. 22-35201, 2022 WL 17592194, at
*1 (9th Cir. Dec. 13, 2022) (observing that “under the revised regulations . . . , the ALJ’s
evaluation of a medical opinion is reviewed for substantial evidence” (citing Woods, 32 F.4th at
789)).
B. Analysis
The Court concludes that the ALJ committed harmful err by failing to evaluate Dr.
Corbett’s medical opinion.
In June 2021, the Benton County Developmental Diversity Program referred Plaintiff to
Dr. Corbett for a neuropsychological evaluation. (Tr. 541.) Dr. Corbett formed his opinion based
on a clinical interview and results from several psychometric tests including: the Montreal
Cognitive Assessment, the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – Fourth Edition, the Woodcock-
Johnson IV Tests of Achievement, the Conners’ Continuous Performance Test Third Edition,
and the Adaptive Behavior Assessment System – Third Edition. (Id.)
At the evaluation, Dr. Corbett observed that Plaintiff became anxious when the

evaluation started, but she seemed to “warm up” as the evaluation progressed and gradually
appeared more comfortable with the process. (Id. at 543.) Dr. Corbett noted that Plaintiff
appeared easily distracted and was looking around the room a lot during the evaluation. (Id.)
When prompted to talk about her social, emotional, and academic struggles, Plaintiff became
“easily tearful.” (Id. at 542.) The results of Plaintiff’s tests were considered to be a valid and
reliable representation of Plaintiff’s ability, despite her appearing to be hesitant and unsure of
herself during the testing. (Id. at 544.)
Dr. Corbett concluded that Plaintiff experiences overwhelming feelings of anxiety which
make her unable to function independently in most situations. (Id. at 549.) Dr Corbett explained
that Plaintiff relies heavily on her parents to meet her daily needs and she feels helpless to make

changes. (Id.) Dr. Corbett recommended that Plaintiff participate in frequent mental health
therapy to help her understand her anxiety and learn positive coping techniques. (Id.) Dr. Corbett
also recommended that Plaintiff seek treatment from a psychiatrist to help her find a “medication
regime that takes into account her in utero exposure to drugs.” (Id.) Dr. Corbett concluded that
Plaintiff was unable to function independently at the time of the evaluation as the result of
deficits in social skills and adaptive functioning:
[Plaintiff] has struggled to function independently and she relies on her parents to
care for her daily needs. The results of the Adaptive functioning test showed that
she requires constant support and that she is unable to function independently at
this time. She struggles with social skills and she does not feel capable to make
plans or care for her own daily needs. Her deficits in adaptive functioning appear
to be caused and exacerbated by her overwhelming anxiety, limited attention and
poor self-worth. It is very likely that her anxiety and limited adaptive functioning
skills are directly associated with her in utero exposure to methamphetamine and
cocaine. She is unable to perform substantial and gainful employment activities
without a highly supported environment at this time. She seems to have the
intelligence and skills to function independently but her overwhelming anxiety
causes her to feel helpless and severely limits her functional abilities. It is my
professional opinion that she will not be able to work or live independently for the
next few years.

(Id. at 548-49.)

The ALJ did not directly discuss Dr. Corbett’s opinion when evaluating the medical
opinion evidence. (See id. at 20, discussing only the state agency psychological consultants’ and
Sloan’s opinions).
Defendant argues that Dr. Corbett’s neuropsychological evaluation did not qualify as a
“medical opinion” under 20 C.F.R. § 416.913(a)(2), because he did not opine on Plaintiff’s
specific, work-related abilities. (Def.’s Br. at 2-4, citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.913(a)(2), which
provides that “[m]edical opinions in adult claims are about impairment-related limitations and
restrictions in: (A) Your ability to perform physical demands of work activities, . . . (B) Your
ability to perform mental demands of work activities, . . . (C) Your ability to perform other
demands of work, . . . and (D) Your ability to adapt to environmental conditions . . . .”). The
Court finds that because Dr. Corbett’s report included his opinion of Plaintiff’s impairment-
related limitations and restrictions (see Tr. 539-50), it qualified as a medical opinion which the
ALJ was required to evaluate.3 Accordingly, the ALJ erred by not evaluating Dr. Corbett’s
medical opinion. See Jason R. T. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 1:24-cv-00446-DKG, 2025
WL 2306039, at *4 (D. Idaho Aug. 11, 2025) (rejecting the Commissioner’s argument that a

3 Plaintiff correctly points out in her reply that the ALJ evaluated Dr. Corbett’s opinion
(albeit misattributed to Sloan) in the medical opinion section and made no finding that Dr.
Corbett’s opinion did not qualify as a medical opinion. (See Pl.’s Reply at 2, ECF No. 16.)
psychologist’s “assessment was not a ‘medical opinion’ of Plaintiff’s work-related functional
limitations and, therefore, the ALJ was not required to evaluate it as an opinion” and finding that
“the ALJ harmfully erred in failing to evaluate the persuasiveness of [the psychologist’s]
assessment as a medical opinion, or, at the very least, failing to provide a legitimate reason for

not doing so”); Anna C. v. O’Malley, 734 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1132 (D. Or. 2024) (rejecting the
same argument that the Commissioner presents here and finding that “the detail in which [the
neuropsychologist] documented Plaintiff’s mental impairments in relation to her functioning in
various areas of life warrant her [neuropsychological] evaluation to be analyzed as a medical
opinion”); Alexa G. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. C24-5301-BAT, 2024 WL 4249532, at *4
(W.D. Wash. Sept. 20, 2024) (“The Commissioner also argues the ALJ did not err because the
ALJ is not even required to provide ‘any analysis about how we considered such evidence in our
determination or decision.’ The ALJ is required to assess all relevant medical opinions. [The]
neuropsychological examination and opinion is a medical opinion, and clearly relevant to
Plaintiff’s mental functional abilities.” (first citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(3); then citing 20 C.F.R.

§ 416.920(c)(b); and then citing Danielle K. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. C22-5063-BAT, 2022
WL 4244865, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 15, 2022))).
The Commissioner next asserts that the ALJ discussed Dr. Corbett’s clinical findings in
the ALJ’s opinion. (See Def.’s Br. at 3, citing Tr. 17-18.) The Commissioner is correct that the
ALJ cited the standardized test results from Dr. Corbett’s report, as well as Dr. Corbett’s report
of Plaintiff’s demeanor during her clinical interview and testing, when evaluating the severity of
Plaintiff’s impairments at steps two and three. (See Tr. 17-18, citing “Exhibit 2F.”) However, the
ALJ did not evaluate the persuasiveness of these findings, nor address the remainder of Dr.
Corbett’s report. (See id.)
The Commissioner also argues that the ALJ “effectively” evaluated Dr. Corbett’s opinion
by evaluating the persuasiveness of Sloan’s opinion, which included “many” of Dr. Corbett’s
findings. (Def.’s Br. at 3.) Sloan’s report included the entirety of Dr. Corbett’s “summary” (see
Tr. 640-41, citing the “summary of neuropsychological [e]valuation done by Chris Corbett,

PsyD”), but the excerpt in Sloan’s report included only one page of Dr. Corbett’s eleven-page
report (see Tr. 539-50). Although the ALJ also cited Dr. Corbett’s findings in earlier pages of his
opinion, it is impossible for the Court to determine whether the ALJ evaluated Dr. Corbett’s
opinion in its entirety or whether he would have evaluated the summary of Dr. Corbett’s opinion
differently its full context or if he had not misattributed the summary to Plaintiff’s therapist.
For these reasons, the Court concludes that the ALJ’s failure to address Dr. Corbett’s
medical opinion was not harmless error, and that remand is necessary to allow the ALJ to
evaluate Dr. Corbett’s report.
II. SUBJECTIVE SYMPTOM TESTIMONY
Plaintiff argues that ALJ erred by failing to provide specific, clear, and convincing
reasons for discounting mental health symptom testimony. (Pl.’s Br. at 12-16; see also id. at 14,

asserting (incorrectly) that “the ALJ did not articulate any reasons to reject [her] testimony.”)
The Commissioner responds that the ALJ agreed that Plaintiff had significant mental health
symptoms and therefore restricted her to simple, routine, and repetitive tasks involving only
simple work-related decisions, few workplace changes, no fast-paced production, and only
occasional and casual contact with coworkers and the public. (Def.’s Br. at 5.) The
Commissioner further argues that the ALJ “reasonably concluded that Plaintiff’s more extreme
allegations were contradicted by Plaintiff’s clinical findings, activities, improved functioning
with medication, and test scores.” (Id. at 5-8, citing Tr. 18-20.)
///
A. Applicable Law
The Ninth Circuit has “established a two-step analysis for determining the extent to
which a claimant’s symptom testimony must be credited[.]” Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664,
678 (9th Cir. 2017). “First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has presented objective
medical evidence of an underlying impairment ‘which could reasonably be expected to produce

the pain or other symptoms alleged.’” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014 (9th Cir. 2014)
(quoting Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2007)). Second, “[i]f the
claimant meets the first test and there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ can only reject the
claimant’s testimony about the severity of the symptoms if she gives specific, clear and
convincing reasons for the rejection.” Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1163 (9th Cir. 2014)
(citation omitted).
B. Analysis
There is no evidence of malingering here and the ALJ determined that Plaintiff provided
objective medical evidence of underlying impairments which might reasonably produce the
symptoms alleged. (See Tr. 20, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s “medically determinable

impairments could reasonably be expected to cause some of the alleged symptoms”). The ALJ
was therefore required to provide clear and convincing reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s
symptom testimony. See Ghanim, 763 F.3d at 1163. The Court concludes that the ALJ met that
standard here.
1. Activities of Daily Living
The ALJ discounted Plaintiff’s testimony about her debilitating anxiety based in part on
her daily activities, including her ability to attend classes at a local community college and to
attend a car show. (See Tr. 20, “[T]he claimant continues to attend classes at a local community
college—suggesting she can tolerate occasional social interaction with the public.”; see also id.,
“At hearing, the claimant acknowledged she could function appropriately in public venues that
were not overly crowded. She specifically cited attending a car show where there were no ‘giant’
crowds of people.”)
An ALJ may discount a claimant’s symptom testimony based on activities that are

incompatible with the claimant’s testimony regarding the severity of her symptoms. See Burrell
v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133, 1137-38 (9th Cir. 2014) (explaining that “[i]nconsistencies between a
claimant’s testimony and the claimant’s reported activities provide a valid reason for an adverse
credibility determination”); Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1016 (finding that a claimant’s activities have
“bearing on [his or her] credibility” if the reported “level of activity” is “inconsistent with [the
claimant’s] claimed limitations”). Notably, however, there must be a meaningful inconsistency
between the claimant’s daily activities and symptom testimony. See Harris v. Kijakazi, No. 21-
35136, 2022 WL 1262011, at *1 (9th Cir. Apr. 28, 2022) (holding that the ALJ committed
harmful error in discounting the claimant’s symptom testimony, and explaining that the
claimant’s “limited daily activities were not meaningfully inconsistent with her symptom

testimony”).
The Court finds that Plaintiff’s ability to attend community college was a clear and
convincing reason to discount her allegations of extreme anxiety, social anxiety, and learning
disorders. See, e.g., Kimberly S. v. Berryhill, No. 3:17-cv-1788-JR, 2018 WL 6424765, at *1 (D.
Or. Nov. 19, 2018) (“The ALJ appropriately determined that [the] plaintiff’s community college
attendance provided a clear and convincing reason to discount her symptom testimony.” (citing
Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2008))), report and
recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 21778328 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2022); Jackson v. Berryhill,
No. C17-5719 RAJ, 2018 WL 3344740, at *2 (W.D. Wash. July 6, 2018) (“The Court concludes
the ALJ did not err in discounting [the] plaintiff’s testimony on the ground that it was
inconsistent with her [ability to attend community college].” (citing Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d
676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005))); Clough v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 6:15-cv-00140-MA, 2015
WL 8751857, at *5 (D. Or. Dec. 14, 2015) (“In the decision, the ALJ discounted [the] plaintiff’s

credibility because she was able to attend classes at community college for two terms . . . . The
ALJ found [the] plaintiff’s ability to perform well, despite her stress and anxiety, undermines her
allegations that she is unable to work in any capacity. I agree. As the ALJ discussed, [the]
plaintiff’s ability to attend school is inconsistent with her allegations of disabling social phobia.”)
(simplified).
The Court also finds that Plaintiff’s ability to attend car shows was a clear and
convincing reason to discount her allegations of feeling overwhelmed by large groups of people
and unfamiliar places. See, e.g., Laurie R. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. C19-6126-MLP, 2020
WL 5988495, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 9, 2020) (finding that a “[c]onflict with Plaintiff’s
activities was a clear and convincing reason to discount testimony of social limitations” where

the claimant testified she is “not good with big crowds” because she gets “very nervous” but the
claimant attended a venue with large crowds (citing Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 639 (9th Cir.
2007))); Elizabeth D. v. Kijakazi, No. 6:20-cv-2079-SI, 2022 WL 986482, at *7 (D. Or. Apr. 1,
2022) (“[Plaintiff’s] activities contradict Plaintiff’s claims that her anxiety when interacting with
others or among crowds was debilitating, and thus constitute a clear and convincing reason to
discount Plaintiff’s testimony as to her mental limitations.”).
These specific, clear, and convincing reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s symptom
testimony were supported by substantial evidence in the record. (See, e.g., Tr. 34, Plaintiff
testified at her hearing that she was attending a local community college, to which she drives
herself and takes general education and art classes and attends math club; id. at 36, Plaintiff
testified that she attends car shows in the summer).
The Court finds that the inconsistencies between Plaintiff’s allegations of extreme
limitations and her activities of daily living was a clear and convincing reason to discount her

symptom testimony, and was supported by substantial evidence in the record. Accordingly, the
Court concludes that the ALJ did not err in evaluating Plaintiff’s symptom testimony.
2. Objective Medical Evidence
The ALJ also concluded that Plaintiff’s allegations of debilitating anxiety, ADHD, and
learning disorders were inconsistent with her presentation in clinical settings, including her
performance on standardized tests. (See Tr. 20, “In a work setting involving limited social
requirements, it is likely the claimant would be able to maintain her composure. For instance, in
a clinical setting with a familiar treatment provider, the claimant was reportedly ‘friendly’ and
attentive with no observable impairment of thought for or content.”; see also id., “[Plaintiff’s]
treatment provider acknowledged the claimant could comprehend written material and write
sentences appropriately, as well as demonstrate ‘good’ basic math skills. Her performance on

standardized testing was ‘a little below grade level’—but not indicative of a specific learning
disorder.”, citing Tr. 725.)
An ALJ may consider the lack of corroborating objective medical evidence as a “relevant
factor in determining the severity of the claimant’s” alleged symptoms. Rollins v. Massanari,
261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001). The ALJ may not, however, “discredit the claimant’s
testimony as to subjective symptoms merely because they are unsupported by objective
evidence.” Berry v. Astrue, 622 F.3d 1228, 1234 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Lester v. Chater, 81
F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995)); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2) (noting that the
Commissioner “will not reject your statements about the intensity and persistence of your pain or
other symptoms or about the effect your symptoms have on your ability to work solely because
the available objective medical evidence does not substantiate your statements”). Nevertheless,
an ALJ may discount a claimant’s testimony where it is inconsistent with the objective medical
evidence. See Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1227 (9th Cir. 2009)

(affirming the ALJ’s discounting of the claimant’s testimony, in part, because it conflicted with
the objective evidence); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(4) (explaining that ALJs “consider whether
there are any inconsistencies in the evidence and the extent to which there are conflicts between
[a claimant’s] statements and the rest of the evidence, including your history, the [medical] signs
and laboratory findings, and statements by [] medical sources”); id. § 416.929(c)(4) (same).
The Court finds that the ALJ properly considered Plaintiff’s clinical presentations and
test scores to discount Plaintiff’s testimony about her extreme anxiety, ADHD, and learning
disorders. See, e.g., Muntz v. Kijakazi, No. 22-35174, 2022 WL 17484332, at *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 7,
2022) (finding that “the ALJ gave specific, clear, and convincing reasons for discounting [the
claimant’s] subjective testimony[,]” including discounting the claimant’s “alleged cognitive

impairment” by “permissibly observ[ing] that none of [the claimant]’s ‘providers reported any
impairment in memory, attention, or concentration during visits, and when other providers tested
these areas, they were found to be normal’” and the claimant “also appeared oriented and alert at
visits”) (citations omitted); Grace G. v. Kijakazi, No. 20-cv-1233-AJB-DEB, 2021 WL 6126396,
at *7 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2021) (“The ALJ, therefore, properly considered Plaintiff’s
‘presentation and clinical observations at appointments’ to discount Plaintiff’s subjective
symptom testimony.” (simplified) (citing Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1161)).
The Court further finds that the ALJ’s analysis was supported by substantial evidence in
the record. (See, e.g., Tr. 655, “[Plaintiff] presents as [f]riendly with a [c]ongruent affect. Overall
attentiveness to today’s topic was [g]ood. . . . Impairment in thought form and content was
[a]bsent.”; id. at 701, noting that Plaintiff’s mood, behavior, thought content, and judgment were
normal; see also id. at 548, 613, 640, 714, 725, 741, 752, reporting that Plaintiff’s “performance
on [i]ntellectual testing showed that she has good verbal and spatial reasoning skills[, . . . ]

understand situations [q]uickly[,] and she solves problems well through trial and error”; id. at
543, 548, 613, 640, 714, 725, “Her performance on the [a]chievement testing showed that her
academic skills are mostly in the [a]verage range. . . . She comprehends written material and
writes sentences appropriately. She showed good basic math skills but she avoided trying most
of the more complex math equations and she made simple calculation errors on math equations
with multiple steps. She applied math skills well to situations. Her overall performance on the
Broad Achievement Clusters showed her performing academically a little below grade level, but
within the range expected from her measured intelligence and is not indicative of a Specific
Learning Disorder.”)
For these reasons, the Court concludes that the ALJ provided specific, clear, and

convincing reasons, supported by substantial evidence, to discount Plaintiff’s subjective
symptom testimony.
III. LAY WITNESS TESTIMONY
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by discounting the lay witness testimony provided by
Plaintiff’s mother, Monica S., and by failing to address the lay witness testimony of Plaintiff’s
VR counselor. (Pl.’s Br. at 17-18.) The Commissioner responds that ALJs are not required to
address lay witness testimony under the new regulations. (Def.’s Br. at 8-9.) The Commissioner
further argues that even if the ALJ was required to articulate how he evaluated the lay witness
testimony, the ALJ properly discounted the testimony from Plaintiff’s mother and was not
required to discuss the VR counselor’s testimony because it “includes terms that are too vague to
be vocationally useful, as well as Plaintiff’s own preferences.” (Id. at 9-10.)
A. Applicable Law
It remains “unsettled whether an ALJ is still required to consider lay witness evidence
under the revised regulations.” Apple v. Bisignano, No. 24-307, 2025 WL 1525314, at *3 (9th

Cir. May 29, 2025) (quoting Crummett v. King, No. 23-3668, 2025 WL 470890, at *2 (9th Cir.
Feb. 12, 2025)); see also Wilson v. O’Malley, No. 23-35463, 2024 WL 2103268, at *2 (9th Cir.
May 10, 2024) (recognizing that the Ninth Circuit has “not yet addressed whether an ALJ is
required to provide germane reasons for discounting lay witnesses under the new regulations”).
“[A]ssuming that an ALJ must consider such evidence, ‘[a]n ALJ need only give germane
reasons for discrediting the testimony of lay witnesses.’” Apple, 2025 WL 1525314, at *3
(quoting Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th Cir. 2005)).
B. Analysis
The Court finds that if the ALJ was required to provide germane reasons for rejecting
the lay witness testimony, the ALJ provided germane reasons to discount the mother’s testimony

and his failure to address the VR counselor’s testimony was harmless error.
Plaintiff’s mother reported that Plaintiff had impaired social skills, severe social anxiety,
and a limited ability for reading, writing, and mathematics. (Tr. 194, 198.) She explained that
Plaintiff does not understand time or time management, and has a random sleep pattern. (Id. at
194-95.) Plaintiff’s mother reported that Plaintiff does not prepare meals or do household chores,
and needs reminders to attend to her personal care including bathing, changing her clothes, and
brushing her teeth. (Id. at 195-96.) Plaintiff’s mother reported that Plaintiff’s mental health
conditions cause her to lose focus and not finish things she starts. (Tr. 199.) Plaintiff’s mother
explained that Plaintiff often cries and “shuts down” in response to stress, changes in her routine
cause stress, and she has problems getting along with others and talking to authority figures. (Id.
at 199-200.)
Plaintiff’s VR counselor reported that Plaintiff requires workplace accommodations:
Based on the information provided regarding [Plaintiff’s] impairments, she will
need to work in a calm, non-hostile environment with supportive and patient
employees and managers. She would like to be able to have flexibility and
accommodations, such as having repetitive tasks, checklists, and while learning
time-management skills. [Plaintiff] will need customized job placement services,
initial job coaching, and help with interviewing.

(Tr. 321.)

The ALJ addressed the lay witness testimony by stating that he “reviewed the lay witness
observations reported by [Plaintiff’s] mother” and her “observations generally mirror [Plaintiff’s]
own allegations – which are not entirely consistent with the clinical observations.” (Tr. 20.) The
ALJ did not address the lay witness testimony from Plaintiff’s VR counselor.
The Court concluded above that the ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons to
discount Plaintiff’s symptom testimony, and finds that the ALJ’s reasons for discounting the
similar testimony of Plaintiff’s mother were germane. See Smith v. Bisignano, No. 24-5118, 2025
WL 2452374, at *2 (9th Cir. Aug. 26, 2025) (“We need not address whether the ALJ was
required to explain how he evaluated lay witness testimony because any error would be
harmless. The testimony of these lay witnesses was similar to [the claimant’s] own testimony,
and so the ALJ’s reasonable decision to discount [the claimant’s] testimony ‘appl[ied] equally
well’ to the testimony of these lay witnesses.” (citing Molina, 674 F.3d at 1117)); Apple, 2025
WL 1525314, at *3 (“[B]ecause the ALJ ‘provided clear and convincing reasons for rejecting
[the claimant’s] own subjective complaints, and because [the lay witness] testimony was similar
to such complaints, it follows that the ALJ also gave germane reasons for rejecting [the lay
witness] testimony.’” (quoting Valentine v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 694 (9th
Cir. 2009))); Burns v. Bisignano, No. 24-4199, 2025 WL 1937448, at *2 (9th Cir. July 15, 2025)
(“Because the ALJ gave clear and convincing reasons for discounting [the claimant’s] subjective
symptom claims, those reasons apply with equal force to discounting the lay witness testimony,
which contained similar claims regarding [the claimant’s] symptoms.” (first citing Valentine, 574

F.3d at 694; and then citing Molina, 674 F.3d at 1117)); Finnegan v. Bisignano, No. 24-3131,
2025 WL 1911155, at *2 (9th Cir. July 11, 2025) (“[S]ince [the lay witness] testimony was
consistent with [the claimant]’s own testimony, the ALJ did not err in discounting it.” (citing
Molina, 674 F.3d at 1117)).
For the same reasons, the Court finds that even if the ALJ erred by failing to address the
VR counselor’s opinion, any error was harmless because the counselor’s opinion was based on
Plaintiff’s input regarding her limitations. (See Tr. 315, noting that the VR counselor’s report
was based on an intake appointment with Plaintiff and her parents; id. at 321, noting that the VR
counselor’s opinion was “[b]ased on the information provided”); see also Neal v. Astrue, No.
1:11-3073-AA, 2012 WL 3779028, at *5 (D. Or. Aug. 29, 2012) (“Here, the ALJ’s reasons for

discounting [the] plaintiff’s credibility are equally applicable to the testimony and statements of[,
inter alia, a vocational rehabilitation specialist]” (citing Valentine, 574 F.3d at 694)); see also
Oberg v. Colvin, No. 6:13-cv-01004-SI, 2014 WL 3695609, at *7 (D. Or. July 24, 2014)
(holding that “the ALJ’s failure to specifically address [the vocational rehabilitation counselor’s]
testimony as to [the claimant’s] physical limitations was harmless”).
The Court also agrees with the Commissioner that the ALJ was not required to address
the VR counselor’s opinion to the extent it was vague and conclusory. Cf. Briceno v. Berryhill,
No. 6:16-cv-00737-MC, 2017 WL 6388958, at *4 (D. Or. Dec. 14, 2017) (“[The claimant]
alleges that the ALJ failed to offer germane reasons for rejecting [a vocational rehabilitation
counselor’s] testimony. . . .The ALJ assigned ‘little weight’ to [the vocational rehabilitation
counselor’s] opinion because it was a ‘conclusory statement on an issue reserved to the
Commissioner.’ This is a reasonable description and germane reason for discrediting [the
vocational rehabilitation counselor]’s opinion.”) (simplified).

For these reasons, the Court finds that the ALJ did not commit harmful error in
evaluating the lay witness testimony.
IV. REMEDY
Plaintiff asks the Court to remand for an immediate award of benefits. (Pl.’s Br. at 19;
Pl.’s Reply at 6.) The Commissioner responds that Plaintiff has not demonstrated harmful error
and that, in any event, the Court should reject Plaintiff’s request to remand for an award of
benefits. (Def.’s Br. at 12.)
A. Applicable Law
“Generally when a court of appeals reverses an administrative determination, ‘the proper
course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional investigation or
explanation.’” Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 595 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). In

several cases, however, the Ninth Circuit has “stated or implied that it would be an abuse of
discretion for a district court not to remand for an award of benefits when [the three-part credit-
as-true standard is] met.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1020 (citations omitted).
The credit-as-true standard is met if three conditions are satisfied: “(1) the record has
been fully developed and further administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose; (2)
the ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, whether claimant
testimony or medical opinion; and (3) if the improperly discredited evidence were credited as
true, the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled on remand.” Id. (citations
omitted). Even when the credit-as-true standard is met, the court retains the “flexibility to
remand for further proceedings when the record as a whole creates serious doubt as to whether
the claimant is, in fact, disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act.” Id. at 1021.
B. Analysis
The Court finds that remand for further administrative proceedings is necessary to allow
the ALJ to evaluate Dr. Corbett’s medical opinion and resolve ambiguities in the record.

Specifically, Plaintiff did not challenge the ALJ’s evaluation of the state agency
psychological consultants’ opinions, and those consultants “reviewed all available evidence in
September 2022 and February 2023 before concluding the claimant could reasonably sustain
‘simple routine tasks’ in a setting involving ‘occasional and casual contact’ with co-workers and
the public.” (Tr. 20, finding the assessments to be “persuasive” and “reasonably consistent with
the clinical observations”). The state agency psychological consultants’ opinions were consistent
with the ALJ’s RFC, but contradicted by Dr. Corbett’s medical opinion. Further administrative
proceedings are necessary to allow the ALJ to evaluate Dr. Corbett’s medical opinion, and revisit
the other medical opinions and Plaintiff’s RFC, if necessary. See Harvey v. Kijakazi, No. 22-
15116, 2023 WL 21462, at *1 (9th Cir. Jan. 3, 2023) (“[B]ecause the ALJ overlooked the

medical opinion at issue in the initial proceeding, remanding for further proceedings is
appropriate to allow the ALJ to properly consider the evidence in the first instance.”); Megyesi v.
Saul, 773 F. App’x 914, 915 (9th Cir. 2019) (“Accordingly, we vacate and remand with
instructions to the district court to remand to the ALJ for further proceedings. The ALJ should
reassess the medical opinions, including addressing [the medical] opinion that was previously
ignored and revisiting [the other medical] opinions.”).
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the Court REVERSES the Commissioner’s decision and
REMANDS this case for further administrative proceedings.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 14th day of October, 2025.

HON. STACIE F. BECKERMAN
United States Magistrate Judge

PAGE 23 —- OPINION AND ORDER

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11170596. Public record. Not legal advice.