# Bhargave

> District Court, M.D. Florida · October 14, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11170573

## Case

- **Full name:** Tapan Bhargave v. Genesee Regional Bank, WRM Holdings IV, LLC, as assignee of Genesee Regional Bank, and Federal National Mortgage Association, as Trustee
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** October 14, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11170573

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that if jurisdictional issues are present, “the court should dismiss only on the jurisdictional ground under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), without reaching the question of failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION

TAPAN BHARGAVE,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 2:25-cv-00258-JES-KCD

GENESEE REGIONAL BANK, WRM
HOLDINGS IV, LLC, as
assignee of GENESEE
REGIONAL BANK, and FEDERAL
NATIONAL MORTGAGE
ASSOCIATION, as Trustee,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Genesee Regional Bank
(GRB) and WRM Holdings IV, LLC’s (WRM) (collectively the
Defendants) Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss (Doc. #23)1 filed on
May 20, 2025.2 Plaintiff Tapan Bhargave (Bhargave or Plaintiff)

1 “A defendant can move to dismiss a complaint under Rule
12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction by either facial
or factual attack.” Stalley ex rel. U.S. v. Orlando Reg'l
Healthcare Sys., Inc., 524 F.3d 1229, 1232 (11th Cir. 2008)(citing
McElmurray v. Consol. Gov't of Augusta–Richmond County, 501 F.3d
1244, 1250 (11th Cir. 2007)). When, as here, the movants do “not
present any outside evidence challenging the facts underlying
[Plaintiff]'s complaint, the difference is largely academic” and
the Court “need not decide” under which to proceed. Efron v.
Candelario, 110 F.4th 1229, 1234 n.5 (11th Cir. 2024), cert.
denied, 145 S. Ct. 1958, 221 L. Ed. 2d 738 (2025).
2 Defendants, along with Fannie Mae, also moved to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6). (See Docs. ##23-24.) Since the Court questions
its jurisdiction—its very power to hear the case— for reasons other
than stated in the motion, the Rule 12(b)(6) issues are not
reached. Jones v. State of Ga., 725 F.2d 622, 623 (11th Cir.
filed a Response in Opposition (Doc. #29) on June 5, 2025. For the
reasons stated below, the motion is denied, but the complaint is
dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction and plaintiff is given leave to file an amended
complaint.
I.
Bhargave and Defendants are involved in a foreclosure action
in state court. (Doc. #20, ¶ 11.) Bhargave lost and the state court
granted foreclosure. (Id. ¶ 12.) The sale is pending. (Id.)
Bhargave now sues Defendants in this court, raising claims of fraud
(Count I), breach of contract (Count II), and wrongful foreclosure
(Count III) because GRB allegedly does not actually own the
promissory note at issue in the foreclosure and because GRB
allegedly denied Bhargave’s request to be given reinstatement
amounts after the foreclosure was ordered. (Id. ¶¶ 9, 11.)

Defendants move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), arguing the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine deprives this Court of subject-matter
jurisdiction.

1984)(stating that courts should determine their jurisdiction
before deciding Rule 12(b)(6) motions); Hitt v. City of Pasadena,
561 F.2d 606, 608 (5th Cir. 1977)(stating that if jurisdictional
issues are present, “the court should dismiss only on the
jurisdictional ground under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), without
reaching the question of failure to state a claim under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6).”).
II.
The “Rooker–Feldman [doctrine] raises a question about our
subject matter jurisdiction, an issue we are always obliged to

examine.” Target Media Partners v. Specialty Mktg. Corp., 881 F.3d
1279, 1284 (11th Cir. 2018). A relatively recent Supreme Court
decision changed how the Circuit applies the doctrine. Brown v.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 611 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir.
2010)(citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp.,
544 U.S. 280 (2005)). Exxon Mobil “clarified the scope of the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine by returning it to its roots, the facts of
the Rooker and Feldman cases.” Behr v. Campbell, 8 F.4th 1206,
1210 (11th Cir. 2021)(quoting Nicholson v. Shafe, 558 F.3d 1266,
1274 (11th Cir. 2009)). “In response, we abandoned the four-factor
test that had previously guided this Circuit's application of
Rooker-Feldman.” Id. “We chose instead to ‘adhere to the language

in Exxon Mobil, delineating the boundaries of the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine.’” Id. (quoting Nicholson at 1274).
Courts now “should follow a claim-by-claim approach” asking
one question: “[W]hether the [claim] has been ‘brought by state-
court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court
judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced
and inviting district court review and rejection of those
judgments.” Efron, 110 F.4th at 1235-36 (quoting Target, 881 F.3d
at 1285). Taken in parts, the reviewing court first asks whether
“the party against whom the doctrine is invoked” was the losing
“party to the underlying state-court proceeding.” Lance v. Dennis,
546 U.S. 459, 464 (2006). If so, the reviewing court next asks

“whether the substance—if not the form—of a plaintiff's claim
requires a district court to ‘review’ and ‘reject’ a state court
judgment.” Efron, 110 F.4th at 1238 (quoting Behr, 8 F.4th at
1211). If “a plaintiff's claim requires a federal district court
to review and reject a state court decision,” then Rooker-Feldman
bars plaintiff’s claim, regardless of how he styles it. Id. at
1236 n. 7.
“That, though, is as far as Rooker-Feldman goes.” Behr, 8
F.4th at 1210. Because Rooker-Feldman is so “limited” and “narrow”,
it “will almost never apply.” Efron, 110 F.4th at 1235 (quoting
Behr, 8 F.4th at 1211-12). “It does not prevent a ‘district court
from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction simply because a party

attempts to litigate in federal court a matter previously litigated
in state court.’” Id. (quoting Nicholson, 558 F.3d at 1274). “Nor
does Rooker-Feldman ‘block claims that require some
reconsideration of a decision of a state court if the plaintiff
presents some independent claim, albeit one that denies a legal
conclusion that a state court has reached in a case to which he
was a party.’” Id. (quoting Behr, 8 F.4th at 1212)(citation
modified). See also Mignott v. State Bar of Georgia Found., Inc.,
146 F.4th 1095, 1098 (11th Cir. 2025).
While Bhargave lost in state court, the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine does not apply here because none of his claims require
this Court to review and reject that state court’s judgments.

Count I seeks monetary damages for alleged fraud caused by
Defendants upon their false ownership representation of the
promissory note and failure to provide reinstatement amounts.
(Doc. #20, ¶¶ 14-16.) Count II seeks monetary damages for
Defendants’ alleged breach of the mortgage agreement by failing to
properly endorse or notify Bhargave of any note transfer. (Id. ¶¶
17-18.) Count III seeks monetary damages for an alleged wrongful
foreclosure due to Defendants’ lack of ownership of the promissory
note and their failure to provide reinstatement amounts. (Id. ¶¶
19-20.)
Bhargave’s claims do not require review and rejection of the
state court’s foreclosure judgment because they “seek[] damages

for some independent source of injury.” Efron, 110 F.4th at 1235.
All the claims seek monetary damages for injuries caused by
independent sources - the promissory note and the request for
reinstatement amounts. Thus, the claims fall outside the
boundaries of Rooker-Feldman. Id.; Behr, 8 F.4th at 1214 (“[C]laims
that seek only damages for . . . violations [by] third parties—
not relief from the judgment of the state court—are permitted” by
Rooker-Feldman.).
In Behr, a claim was similarly raised that defendants’ “use
of falsified . . . information as a basis for the [state court]
proceedings and decisions” injured the plaintiff. Id., 8 F.4th at

1213. The Eleventh Circuit held that alleged injuries “during the
proceedings and whether [a plaintiff] [is] entitled to damages for
those [injuries] . . . . [f]alls outside Rooker-Feldman’s
boundaries.” Id. That holding applies here, where Bhargave alleges
that he suffered damages because Defendants falsely asserted
ownership of the promissory note in the state proceedings.
Even if Bhargave “attempts to litigate in federal court a
matter previously litigated in state court” or “denies a legal
conclusion that a state court has reached,” Rooker-Feldman does
not impede such action. Efron, 110 F.4th at 1235. “To be sure,
other doctrines of preclusion, abstention, or comity may still bar
a plaintiff's claims—but they are separate and distinct from

Rooker-Feldman’s jurisdictional prohibition on appellate review of
state court decisions in federal district courts.” Behr, 8 F.4th
at 1210 (citing Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 292). Defendants’ Rule
12(b)(1) motion is denied.
While Defendants’ Rooker-Feldman challenge is denied, the
Court will sua sponte dismiss the Complaint for failure to properly
allege subject-matter jurisdiction based upon complete diversity
of citizenship. DeRoy v. Carnival Corp., 963 F.3d 1302, 1311 (11th
Cir. 2020)(“Federal courts have an obligation to examine sua sponte
their own jurisdiction over a case, notwithstanding the
contentions of the parties.” (citing Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am.
Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir. 1999))). The Complaint

identifies GRB as a corporation with New York as its principal
place of business, but it does not identify where it was
incorporated. (Doc. #20, ¶ 5.) This is deficient because, “[f]or
diversity purposes, a corporation is a citizen of both the state
where it is incorporated and the state where it has its principal
place of business.” MacGinnitie v. Hobbs Grp., LLC, 420 F.3d 1234,
1239 (11th Cir. 2005). The Complaint identifies WRM as a limited
liability company but fails to identify any of its members’
citizenship. (Doc. #20, ¶ 6.) This is deficient because, “[f]or
the purpose of determining diversity jurisdiction, ‘a limited
liability company is a citizen of any state of which a member of
the company is a citizen.’” Flintlock Const. Servs., LLC v. Well-

Come Holdings, LLC, 710 F.3d 1221, 1224 (11th Cir. 2013)(quoting
Rolling Greens MHP, L.P. v. Comcast SCH Holdings L.L.C., 374 F.3d
1020, 1022 (11th Cir. 2004). Given these defects, the Court cannot
determine if diversity jurisdiction is present.
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED:
1. Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(1) motion in Doc. #23 is DENIED.
2. Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. #20) is DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE. Within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS of this Opinion and
Order, Plaintiff may file an amended complaint.
3. Defendants’ Rule 12(b) (6) motion in Doc. #23 is DENIED AS
MOOT.
4. Fannie Mae’s Rule 12(b) (6) motion (Doc. #24) is DENIED AS
MOOT.
DONE and ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this 14th day of
October 2025.

= Pe
JGH E. STEELE
5 IOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies:
Counsel of Record

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11170573. Public record. Not legal advice.