# Farrell

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · October 14, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11170433

## Case

- **Full name:** Edward Farrell v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** October 14, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11170433

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding medical opinions that are inconsistent with and unsupported by the medical evidence are not persuasive or controlling
- holding that substantial evidence standard is unmet when ALJ fails to resolve conflicts created by countervailing evidence

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
EDWARD FARRELL, : No. 1:28-CV-1916
Plaintiff : (Caraballo, M.J.)
Vv. :
FRANK BISIGNANO,! :
Commissioner of Social :
Security, :
Defendant :
MEMORANDUM
I. Introduction
Plaintiff Edward Farrell seeks judicial review of the final decision
of the Commissioner of Social Security (the “Commissioner”) denying
his application for disability benefits and supplement security income
under Titles II & XVI of the Social Security Act. The Court has
jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
This matter comes before the Court on Farrell’s claim that
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Michelle Wolfe erred when she

Frank Bisignano was confirmed as the Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration on May 6, 2025. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Frank Bisignano is substituted for Leland Dudek
as the defendant in this suit.

evaluated the medical opinion evidence of record. Doc. 13 at 6-10. The
matter is fully briefed and ripe for decision.
As explained below, the ALJ’s conclusions when addressing the
medical opinion evidence is supported by substantial evidence in the
record, coupled with sufficient reasoning to permit meaningful judicial
review. Accordingly, the Court will affirm the Commissioner’s decision
to deny Farrell’s claim for social security disability benefits and
supplement security income.
Il. Background
On October 28, 2021, Farrell applied for Title II social security
disability benefits and Title XVI supplement security income, alleging
complete disability from a myriad of impairments, including diabetes,
neuropathy, gout, hypertension, hypothyroidism, obesity, chronic pain,
and high cholesterol. Doc. 12 at 69, 217-84 (hereinafter referred to as
“Tr.”). The Social Security Administration initially denied Farrell’s
application in February 2022, and upon reconsideration in April 2021.
Tr. 103-18, 1238-388. Farrell thereafter requested a hearing before an
ALJ. Id. at 161.

On August 30, 2022, ALJ Wolfe presided over Farrell’s hearing.
The hearing concerned whether Farrell was disabled within the
meaning of the Social Security Act since June 26, 2020. Id. at 10. At the
hearing, ALJ Wolfe received various evidence of record, including
clinical records, medical history, medical expert reports, vocational
expert testimony, and Farrell’s own testimony. Jd. at 37-65.
On October 28, 2022, ALJ Wolfe issued a decision concluding that
Farrell was not disabled from June 26, 2020, to the date of the decision.
Id. at 7-9. ALJ Wolfe reached that conclusion by employing the five-
step analytical process required under the Social Security Act to
evaluate disability insurance and supplement security income claims.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).
The process requires sequential consideration of: (1) whether the
claimant is engaged in substantial gainful work activity; (2) the medical
severity of the claimant’s impairments; (3) whether the impairment
meets or equals a defined list of impairments; (4) a comparison between
the claimant’s past relevant work and residual functional capacity, 1.e.,
the most work that a claimant can perform despite his or her
limitations on a regular and continuing basis, see 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1545(a); and (5) an assessment of the claimant’s residual
functional capacity and his or her age, education, and work experience.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)G)-(v). Should a claimant proceed past the
first three steps of the analysis, the Commissioner will not find the
claimant disabled when he or she can perform past relevant work, or
adjust to other work, under the third and fourth steps, respectively. Id.
at § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv)—-(v), (f), (2).
Applying that analysis, ALJ Wolfe first determined that Farrell
met the insurance requirements of the Social Security Act, see 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.130, through December 31, 2025. Tr. 13. ALJ Wolfe also found
that Farrell had not engaged in substantial gainful activity between
June 26, 2020, through the date of the decision. Jd.
At the second step of the analysis, ALJ Wolfe found that Farrell
suffered from three severe impairments: diabetes, obesity, and
neuropathy. Jd. ALJ Wolfe also identified several non-severe
impairments, including syphilis; gout; hypertension; partial thickness
burn on fingers; hypothyroidism; hypercholesterolemia; alcohol abuse;
and a history of tobacco abuse. Jd. She found that Farrell either
suffered from these latter impairments for an insufficient duration, i.e.

less than a year, that they failed to “cause any functional limitations],]”
or that treatment had all but resolved the conditions. Jd. ALJ Wolfe
therefore concluded that the record established “these impairments
have [no] more than a minimal effect on the claimant’s ability to
perform basic work activities.” Id.
Moving to the third step of the analysis, ALJ Wolfe determined
that Farrell’s severe impairments failed to meet or medically equal one
of those listed in the Social Security Administration’s regulations. Id. at
14. Farrell thus did not automatically qualify as disabled. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii) (Tf you have an impairment(s) that meets or equals
one of our listings in appendix 1 of this subpart and meets the duration
requirement, we will find that you are disabled.”).
Accordingly, ALJ Wolfe proceeded to determine Farrell’s residual
functional capacity, before addressing the final two steps in the
sequential analysis. Based on the evidence of record, ALJ Wolfe
concluded that Farrell could perform sedentary work, subject to
additional limitations:
The claimant is limited to no more than occasional balancing;
stooping; crouching; crawling; kneeling; and climbing of
ramps and stairs, but may never climb on ladders, ropes, or
scaffolds. Additionally, the claimant is unable to push or pull

with the lower extremities including foot controls. Further,
the claimant is limited to frequent exposure to temperature
extremes of cold, wetness, vibrations, and hazards including
- moving machinery and unprotected heights.
Tr. 15.
In reaching that conclusion, ALJ Wolfe analyzed one area in
particular that is germane to this opinion. Specifically, ALJ Wolfe
evaluated several medical opinions in determining the limitations
imposed by Farrell’s physical impairments. In doing so, the ALJ
identified which aspects of the opinions she found consistent or
inconsistent with the medical evidence of record:
The undersigned considered the state agency opinions of Dr.
Angela Teresa Walker and Dr. Crescenzo G. Calise and found
them partially persuasive (Exhibits 3A, 4A, 5A, 6A). The
doctors indicate the claimant is able to lift and carry in the
light exertional range, but standing and walking is limited to
2 hours, with a handheld assistive device being necessary for
ambulation. They also note that the claimant could frequently
stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl, occasionally climb ramps and
stairs and balance, but may never climb ladders, ropes, or
scaffolds. Lastly, they indicate the claimant is to avoid
concentrated exposure to extreme cold, vibration, and
hazards. To the extent the reduced walking and standing
lower the claimant to sedentary work, and they indicate that
the claimant requires postural and environmental
limitations, their opinions are consistent with the
longitudinal record. However, the lifting and carrying in the
light exertional class is an overestimate of the claimant’s
capabilities when the longitudinal record is examined.
Supporting a limitation to sedentary, is the claimant’s

diabetes, obesity, and neuropathy. Specifically physical
examination findings of edema in his legs and loss of
sensation in his feet, an elevated AlC throughout the relevant
time, and the claimant’s reports of numbness and tingling in
his feet support the same. In regards to their indication that
the claimant needs a cane to ambulate, the record, does not
support the same. Specifically, the only examination the
claimant presented to with a cane was the consultative
examination. Notably, all of the claimant’s examinations note
no atrophy, cyanosis, or clubbing, and the only examination
that noted an abnormal gait was when the claimant presented
to his primary care physician for a disability evaluation. That
said, his primary care physician did not recommend or
prescribe a cane after that examination. Thus, while a lower
extremity limitation is necessary, having the claimant limited
to jobs that do not involve pushing or pulling with the lower
extremities, or operate foot pedals, adequately protects the
claimant. Accordingly, the record does not support the need
for a cane or assistive device. Moreover, the mentioned
findings relative to the claimant’s diabetes, neuropathy, and
obesity support limiting the claimant to no more than
occasional postural maneuvers, except climbing of ladders,
ropes, or scaffolds, and frequent exposure to extremes of cold,
wetness, vibrations, and hazards. For these reasons, the
doctor’s opinions are partially persuasive.
The undersigned considered the opinion of CRNP Cywinski
from January 14, 2022 and did not find it persuasive (Exhibit
3F). CRNP Cywinski indicates the claimant is able to lift and
carry up to 20 pounds occasionally, and can sit for a half hour,
stand for 15 minutes, and walk 10-15 during an 8-hour
workday. She also indicates that the claimant requires the
use of a cane to ambulate. Further, she notes that the
claimant can use both of his hands frequently to handle,
finger, and feel, and occasionally to reach in all directions, and
push and pull. Also, she indicates the claimant is able to use
both of his feet occasionally to operate foot controls.
Environmentally, she indicates the claimant can occasionally

climb ramps and balance, but may never climb ladders or
scaffolds, stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl. Furthermore, she
notes that the claimant is limited to loud heavy traffic. Lastly,
she indicates that the claimant is unable to walk a block at a
reasonable pace on rough or uneven surfaces or climb a few
steps at a reasonable pace with the use of a single handrail.
CRNP Cywinski’s opinion is not consistent with the
longitudinal record, nor is it supported by her own
examination. Here, while the claimant has diabetes and his
BMI classifies him as obese throughout the relevant time, and
his examinations noted findings consistent with neuropathy
. as of December 2021, and he has edema in his legs and loss of
sensation in his feet, as there is no atrophy, ulcers, or wounds,
no slow healing infections, no diabetic retinopathy, no cardiac
arrhythmia or heart failure, and no cognitive impairments,
the limitations outlined by CRNP Cywinski are not consistent
with the longitudinal record. These mentioned findings
support a limitation to sedentary, but the sit, stand, and walk
limitations outlined by CRNP Cywinski would eliminate
sedentary work, as they result in the claimant only being able
to work for one hour a day. Relative to the same, the
instructions on the form advise the provider that if the sit,
stand, and walk limitations do not total 8 hours, that they are
to indicate what the claimant would be doing for the
remaining time, but CRNP Cywinski does not address the
same. The undersigned also notes that this reasoning applies
to a finding that the limitations that the claimant is unable to
walk a block on rough or uneven surfaces or climb a few steps
at a reasonable pace with the use of a single handrail are not
supported. In regards to her indication that the claimant
needs a cane to ambulate, the record, and her own
examination findings do not support the same. Specifically,
the only examination the claimant presented to with a cane
was the consultative examination. Notably, the examinations
before the consultative examination and after, note no
atrophy, cyanosis, or clubbing, and the only examination that
noted an abnormal gait was when the claimant presented to
his primary care physician for a disability evaluation. That

said, his primary care physician did not recommend or
prescribe a cane after that examination. Thus, while a lower
extremity limitation is necessary, having the claimant limited
to jobs that do not involve pushing or pulling with the lower
extremities, or operate foot pedals, adequately protects the
claimant. Furthermore, the reach, finger, handle, feel, and
push/pull limitations outlined by CRNP Cywinski relative to
her upper extremity are not supported by her own
examination which notes no upper extremity strength deficit
or sensation loss. Also, the only examination that reflected
any upper extremity weakness was done after her
consultative examination was performed, when the claimant
presented to her primary care physician for a disability
evaluation in July of 2022. Even so, this one examination does
not support these limitations. Moreover, the mentioned
findings relative to the claimant’s diabetes, neuropathy, and
obesity support limiting the claimant to no more than
occasional postural maneuvers, except climbing of ladders,
ropes, or scaffolds, and frequent exposure to extremes of cold,
wetness, vibrations, and hazards, but do not support the
extremely limited postural maneuvers outlined by CRNP
Cywinski, or the additional environmental limitations,
especially the noise limitation.
Id. at 19-20. In consideration of these findings, the objective medical
evidence, and Farrell’s statements concerning his symptoms, ALJ Wolfe
concluded that:
Overall, the objective evidence does not support the alleged
intensity and persistence of symptoms. Therefore, the
undersigned finds that the claimant is capable of performing
work in accordance with the residual functional capacity
described above.
Id. at 20-21.

Having determined Farrell’s residual functional capacity to
perform sedentary work subject to limitations, and rejected several
grounds for further limitation, including the use of a cane, ALJ Wolfe
proceeded to the fourth step of the analysis to determine whether
Farrell was disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act.
Here, with assistance from a vocational expert’s testimony, ALJ Wolfe
compared Farrell’s past relevant work and residual functional capacity,
finding that Farrell was able to perform his prior employment as an
adjustment clerk, night auditor, and produce buyer. Id. at 21. Moreover,
the ALJ found that, even if she had incorporated more extensive
limitations into Farrell’s residual functional capacity, such as the
aforementioned use of a cane, the vocational expert testified that
Farrell would still be able to perform those three jobs. Id. at 22.
In accordance with her step four finding that Farrell could
perform his past relevant work, ALJ Wolfe concluded that Farrell was
not disabled and denied his application for disability benefits. Jd. The
evaluation thus did not proceed to the fifth step of the sequential
analysis. Farrell unsuccessfully appealed the decision to the Social
Security Administration’s Appeals Council, which denied his request to

10

on August 31, 2023. Id. at 1. Having exhausted his administrative
remedies, Farrell’s instant appeal to the district court followed.
Farrell initiated this action with the Court on November 17, 2028.
Doc. 1. The Commissioner filed an answer denying Farrell’s claim of

error and provided the operative transcripts from the disability
proceedings on January 8, 2024. Docs. 11, 12. The parties filed their
respective briefs on February 6, 2024, and February 22, 2024. Docs. 18,
15. The matter is thus ripe for decision.
In his brief, Farrell alleges two interrelated errors that warrant
reversal or remand. Doc. 13 at 6-10. Specifically, Farrell alleges that
ALJ Wolfe’s evaluation of the medical opinion evidence was contrary to
regulation, and that her evaluation of the opinion of consultative
examiner CRNP Tara Cywinski was not supported by substantial
evidence. Id.
III. Discussion -

A. Standard of Review
Review of the Commissioner’s decision denying a claimant’s
application for social security disability benefits is limited to
determining whether the factual findings of the final decisionmaker are

11

supported by substantial evidence in the record. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);
Johnson v. Comm’ of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 200 (8d Cir. 2008).
Substantial in this context is “more than a mere scintilla of evidence
but may be less than a preponderance.” Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211,
1213 (8d Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). Put more pointedly, it is “such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988)
(quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). In an
adequately developed record, this can mean “something less than the
weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent
conclusions from the evidence does not prevent [an ALJ’s decision] from
being supported by substantial evidence.” Consolo v. Fed. Mar.
Comm 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966) (citations omitted).
Under this deferential standard, “[f]actual findings which are
supported by substantial evidence must be upheld.” Ficca v. Astrue, 901
F. Supp. 2d 533, 536 (M.D. Pa. 2012) (citations omitted); 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(¢). This Court’s role is not to reweigh the evidence and make
factual determinations, but to simply review the record and ensure that
the ALJ provided “a discussion of the evidence and an explanation of

12

reasoning for his conclusion sufficient to enable meaningful judicial
review.” Diaz v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 577 F.3d 500, 504 (8d Cir. 2009)
(citations and quotations omitted). An ALJ meets that standard by
stating “in his decision which evidence he has rejected and which he is
relying on as the basis for his finding.” Schaudeck v. Comm’ of SSA,
181 F.3d 429, 483 (8d Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). Moreover, when
there is countervailing evidence, an ALJ must “give some reason for
discounting the evidence she rejects.” Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422,
429 (8d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted); Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058,
1064 (8d Cir. 1993) (holding that substantial evidence standard is
unmet when ALJ fails to resolve conflicts created by countervailing
evidence).
Here, ALJ Wolfe’s factual findings were supported by substantial
evidence in the record, and the reasoning underlying those conclusions

was sufficient to enable judicial review.
B. The ALJ’s Evaluation of the Medical Opinions
Farrell challenges ALJ Wolfe’s determination that CRNP
Cywinski’s opinion was unpersuasive, because ALJ Wolfe failed to
recontact Cywinski for clarifying information. Doc. 13 at 6—7. Farrell

13

also contends that ALJ Wolfe generally erred in evaluating the opinions
of Dr. Angela Walker, Dr. Crescenzo Calise, and CRNP Cywinski
because, instead of assessing the supportability and consistency of these
opinions, the ALJ allegedly and “impermissibly inserted her own lay
opinion” to discard their limitation findings. Id. at 9-10. But Farrell’s
disagreement with the ALJ’s assessment of those opinions does not
warrant remand where, as here, those evaluations are supported by
substantial evidence and comported with all applicable regulatory
requirements.
On January 14, 2022, CRNP Cywinski examined Farrell and
completed a medical source statement form. Tr. 488-54. Of relevance,
she described Farrell as being obese and suffering from diabetes,
hypertension, hypothyroidism, high cholesterol, unstable gait, edema
from the ankles to the mid-calves, and with a past history of gout, but
also presenting with normal skin, no muscle atrophy, healthy eyes, and

a regular heart rhythm. Id. at 440—42. In consideration of these
findings, CRNP Cywinski opined that Farrell could sit for one-half-
hour, stand for 15 minutes, and walk for 10-15 minutes during an eight-
hour workday, although she failed to indicate what activities Farrell

14

would do in lieu of these three things for the remaining workday. Jd. at
444, Additionally, CRNP Cywinski opined that Farrell required the use
of a cane to ambulate, that he was unable to walk a block ata
reasonable pace on rough or uneven surfaces, and that he was unable to
climb a few steps at a reasonable pace even with the assistance of a
handrail. Id. at 448.
On January 26, 2022, Dr. Walker evaluated the medical evidence

- pertaining to Farrell’s conditions and found that Farrell could
frequently lift and carry 10 lbs., occasionally lift and carry 20 lbs., sit
for six hours of an eight-hour workday, and walk or stand for two hours
of an eight-hour workday with the use of an assistive device. Jd. at 71—
72. The doctor also found that Farrell was limited to frequently
stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling; occasionally balancing and
climbing ramps or stairs; never climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds;
and that he should avoid concentrated exposure to extreme cold,
vibration, and hazards. Id. at 72. On April 28, 2022, Dr. Calise likewise
reviewed the medical evidence pertaining to Farrell’s conditions and
made identical findings to those of Dr. Walker. Tr. 83-84.

15

Under the current regulations, medical opinions are not entitled
to any specific weighting, and are instead evaluated based on their
persuasiveness. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a), 404.1520c(b). An ALJ
determines the persuasiveness of a prior medical finding or medical
opinion by assessing five factors: (1) supportability; (2) consistency; (8)
relationship with the claimant; (4) specialization; and (5) other factors.
20 C.F. R. § 404.1520c(a)—(c). The factors related to the substance of
medical opinions—supportability and consistency—are the “most
important factors” for consideration. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2).
Examining supportability entails a review of the opinion’s basis in
relevant “objective medical evidence and supporting explanations
presented by a medical source”; consistency is assessed based on how
consistent a finding or opinion is “with the evidence from other medical

sources and nonmedical sources in the claim|[.]” 20 C.F-.R.
§ 404.1520c(c)(1)—-(2).
The Court of Appeals explained in Cotter v. Harris that when
weighing the record, an ALJ “cannot reject evidence for no reason or the

wrong reason” and must explain “why probative evidence has been
rejected ... so that a reviewing court can determine whether the

16

reasons for rejection were improper.” 642 F.2d 700, 706—07 (8d Cir.
1981). This does not mean, however, that the ALJ must undertake an
exhaustive discussion of all of the evidence. See, e.g., Fargnoli, 247 F.3d
at 42; Hur, 94 F. App’x at 1383 (‘There is no requirement that the ALJ
discuss in her opinion every tidbit of evidence included in the record.”).
Here, ALJ Wolfe found Dr. Walker’s and Dr. Calise’s opinions
partly persuasive. She explained that their sitting, walking, standing,
and postural limitations, to the extent they limited Farrell to sedentary
work, were consistent with and supported by the longitudinal evidence
of record, including Farrell’s symptoms of edema, loss of sensation and
tingling in the feet, and elevated blood sugar levels caused by his
diabetes, obesity, and neuropathy. Tr. 19. By contrast, the ALJ found
that the physicians’ lifting, carrying, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and
crawling limitations were inconsistent with and unsupported by the
record, because they overestimated Farrell’s capabilities in light of his
symptoms and impairments. Id.
Moreover, ALJ Wolfe concluded that the physicians’ findings that
Farrell required the use of a cane to walk or stand was not supported by
the record, because he was never prescribed a cane, he presented to a

17

medical source with a cane only once, and he did not have symptoms
usually associated with use of a cane, like atrophy, clubbing, or
cyanosis. Id. Instead, based on the evidence, ALJ Wolfe concluded that
Farrell was limited to no pushing or pulling with the lower extremities
and no operating foot pedals. Id. Accordingly, the ALJ found the two
physicians’ opinions partly persuasive. Jd.
In comparison, ALJ Wolfe found the opinion of CRNP Cywinski
unpersuasive. The ALJ first explained that although the evidence
showed Farrell was obese, had diabetes, and suffered from neuropathy
and edema, this evidence did not support the severe limitations found
by Cywinski; particularly, limitations of sitting, standing, and walking
for one hour out of an eight-hour workday, and restrictions on walking a
block on rough or uneven surfaces or climbing stairs at a reasonable

pace. Id. at 20. In fact, ALJ Wolfe found that the severe limitations
suggested by Cywinski were wholly inconsistent with record evidence,
including Cywinski’s own examination of Farrell, which showed he had
healthy eyes, normal skin, a regular heart rhythm, and that he had no
muscle atrophy or cognitive impairments. Tr. 20, 440—42.

18

Moreover, the ALJ took issue with Cywinski’s failure to explain
what activities Farrell would do for those seven hours of the workday he
could not sit, stand, or walk, as required by the medical source

statement form. Id. at 20, 444. Likewise, for the same reason that ALJ
Wolfe rejected Dr. Walker’s and Dr. Calise’s suggestion that Farrell
needed a cane, she rebuffed CRNP Cywinski’s parallel recommendation.
Id. at 20. Finally, the ALJ dismissed Cywinski’s finding that Farrell
had upper extremity limitations, given that Cywinski’s own
examination of Farrell showed he had no strength deficits or loss of
sensation. Id. Thus, based on the medical evidence surrounding
Farrell’s impairments and symptoms, ALJ Wolfe rejected Cywinski’s
“extremely limited postural maneuver[]” limitations and additional
environmental limitations in favor of her own more moderate
limitations in those areas. Id. Taken together, ALJ Wolfe found CRNP
Cywinski’s opinion unpersuasive. Id.
In light of the above, Farrell’s contention that ALJ Wolfe
“impermissibly inserted her own lay opinion” instead of sufficiently
evaluating the medical opinions under the factors of supportability and
consistency (Doc. 13 at 9-10), is without merit. First, as the

19

Commissioner correctly notes (Doc. 15 at 14-15, 21-22), Farrell's
challenge that ALJ Wolfe failed to match her own limitation findings to
those of the medical opinions yields no relief. “The ALJ is not bound to

accept the opinion or theory of any medical expert, but may weigh the
medical evidence and draw its own inferences.” Kertesz v. Crescent Hills
Coal Co., 788 F.2d 158, 163 (3d Cir. 1986). Importantly, “[t]here is no
legal requirement that a physician have made the particular findings
that an ALJ adopts in the course of determining an RFC.” Titterington

v. Barnhart, 174 F. App’x 6, 11 (8d Cir. 2006). As such, the mere fact
that ALJ Wolfe’s findings are not identical to those in the medical
opinion evidence cannot be error.
Farrell also seeks to leverage Metzger v. Berryhill, 2017 WL
1483328, at *5 (M.D. Pa. 2017), for the proposition that when an ALJ
finds less restrictive limitations than those set forth in the medical
opinions, that specific finding is subject to greater scrutiny. Doc. 16 at 4.
However, as the Commissioner correctly notes (Doc. 15 at 20 n.4),
except for a cane-related limitation, the ALJ’s own limitation findings
either matched those of Dr. Walker and Dr. Calise, or were more robust.
Compare Tr. 15 with Tr. 71-78, 83-86.

20

Additionally, although ALJ Wolfe did not include a cane-related
limitation in Farrell’s residual functional capacity, the vocational expert
testified that sufficient jobs in the national economy remained for
Farrell, even with a cane-related limitation. Jd. at 22. Thus, even if ALJ
Wolfe’s exclusion of a cane-related limitation from Farrell’s residual
functional capacity was in error, it was harmless. See Rutherford v.
Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 553 (8d Cir. 2005) (“[R]emand is not required
here because it would not affect the outcome of the case.”).
Second, Farrell’s contention that ALJ Wolfe made “speculative
inferences” while evaluating the medical opinions, and thus inserted
her own lay opinion rather than assessing supportability and
consistency (Doc. 13 at 9-10), does not jibe with the record. ALJ Wolfe’s
evaluation of the medical opinion evidence, as described supra,
exhaustively compared the objective medical evidence with those
opinions in determining their consistency and support, ultimately
finding the opinions’ respective persuasive values.
Specifically, Farrell charges that ALJ Wolfe made speculative
inferences when evaluating CRNP Cywinski’s opinion by concluding
that Farrell had no “atrophy, ulcers, or wounds, no slow healing

21

infections, no diabetic retinopathy, no cardiac arrhythmia or heart
failure, and no cognitive impairments.” Doc. 13 at 9. That
determination, however, was not premised on mere speculation, but
rather on CRNP Cywinski’s own examination. In particular, ALJ Wolfe
highlighted CRNP Cywinski’s findings that showed Farrell had healthy
eyes, normal skin, a regular heart rhythm, and that he had no muscle
atrophy or noted cognitive impairments. Compare Tr. 20 (“there is no
atrophy, ulcers, or wounds, no slow healing infections, no diabetic
retinopathy, no cardiac arrhythmia or heart failure, and no cognitive
impairments,”) with Tr. 440-42 “Skin exam within normal limits”;
“Tflundi normal’; “[r]egular [heart] rhythm”; “[nJo muscle atrophy
evident.”); see also Tr. 424, 438, 464, 494-95, 620, 624, 628-29.
It was well within ALJ Wolfe’s authority to “weigh the medical
evidence and draw [her] own inferences.” Kertesz, 788 F.2d at 163.
Indeed, in combination with the other objective medical evidence of
record, several conclusions are readily apparent, including that: a
finding of normal skin necessarily means having no wounds, no slow
healing infections, and no ulcers; a finding of healthy eyes necessarily
means no diabetic retinopathy; a finding of a regular heart rhythm

22

necessarily means no cardiac arrhythmia and suggests no heart failure;

a finding of no muscle atrophy necessarily means no atrophy; and a
diagnosis of no cognitive disorders necessarily means no cognitive
impairments. Tr. 20. In other words, ALJ Wolfe did not displace the
objective medical evidence with her own opinion to draw speculative
inferences; rather, she largely drew from the objective medical findings
in CRNP Cywinski’s own examination of Farrell to help evaluate the
consistency and supportability of Cywinski’s recommended limitations.
Farrell’s contention that the ALJ erred by not recontacting CRNP
Cywinski is similarly flawed. As the Commissioner correctly notes (Doc.
18 at 23-26), ALJ Wolfe was under no obligation to recontact CRNP
Cywinski. For one, the regulations only provide for re-soliciting a
medical source when there is insufficient evidence for an ALJ to
determine disability status, or the medical evidence as a whole is
inconsistent. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520b(b)(2), 416.920b(b)(2). Given the
breadth of evidence here, and the relative consistency of the evidence in
establishing that Farrell is diabetic, obese, and that he suffers from
neuropathy and edema (see Tr. 424, 440-42, 464, 494-95, 620, 624,
628-29), that standard is not met.

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Moreover, the regulations make clear that, in the event the
evidence of record is inconsistent or insufficient, an ALJ may recontact

a medical source, not that they must. See 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520b(b)(2)G), 416.920b(b)(2)(i) (‘we may re-contact your medical
source”); 404.1520b(b)(2) Gv), 416.920b(b)(2)(iv) (“[w]le may ask you or
others for more information”). As such, ALJ Wolfe had no regulatory
duty to recontact CRNP Cywinski, and there is no respective error.?
Finally, Farrell’s contention that ALJ Wolfe’s evaluation of CRNP
Cywinski’s opinion is not supported by substantial evidence
misapprehends the evaluation process. Rather than require an ALJ to
elaborately evaluate a medical opinion, the regulations only require
that an ALJ analyze an opinion’s supportability and consistency against
the objective medical evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2). Here, as
discussed at length, the ALJ comprehensively evaluated the consistency
and supportability of Cywinski’s opinion against the objective medical
evidence (Tr. 19-20, 424, 440-42, 464, 494-95, 620, 624, 628-29), and

2 Farrell cites Johnson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d 198 (8d Cir. 2008) and
Hariman v. Colvin, 2014 WL 1784084 (W.D. Pa. 2014) in support of his position.
But, as explicitly recognized in Hartman, both those cases involved claims lodged
prior to March 26, 2012, when the regulation’s recontact provision was amended to
change the language from mandatory to permissive. 2014 WL at *9 n.3. Thus,
neither case applies here, as Farrell’s claim was filed in 2021.
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therefore her conclusion that the opinion did not merit persuasive
weight satisfied her regulatory duty. See, e.g., Jones v. Sullivan, 954
F.2d 125, 129 (8d Cir. 1991) (holding medical opinions that are
inconsistent with and unsupported by the medical evidence are not
persuasive or controlling); Wright v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 675, 683 (8d Cir.
1990) (same). As ALJ Wolfe, at a minimum, relied on “such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusionJ,|” Pierce, 487 U.S. at 565 (quoting Consol. Edison Co., 305
U.S. at 229), her finding that CRNP Cywinski’s opinion was not
persuasive is supported by substantial evidence.
To be clear, this Court’s role is not to reweigh the evidence to
make its own factual determinations. Diaz, 577 F.3d at 504. Rather, it
is simply to review the record and ensure that the ALJ provided “a
discussion of the evidence and an explanation of reasoning for his
conclusion sufficient to enable meaningful judicial review.” Id.
Consequently, because ALJ Wolfe evaluated the relevant opinion
evidence pursuant to her regulatory duty to assess persuasiveness, and
her findings are supported by substantial evidence, they will not be
disturbed.

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IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, the Court will affirm the decision of the
Commissioner and deny the Plaintiff's request for relief. A separate
order shall be issued.

Date: October 14, 2025 s/ Phillip J. Caraballo
Phillip J. Caraballo
United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11170433. Public record. Not legal advice.