# TIMOTHY CLEVENGER v. STATE OF ARKANSAS

> Supreme Court of Arkansas · September 11, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11170077

## Case

- **Court:** Supreme Court of Arkansas
- **Decided:** September 11, 2025
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

Cite as 2025 Ark. 128
SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
No. CR-24-517

Opinion Delivered: September 11, 2025
TIMOTHY CLEVENGER
APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. 60CR-18-4503]
V.
HONORABLE LEON JOHNSON,
JUDGE
STATE OF ARKANSAS
APPELLEE AFFIRMED.

CODY HILAND, Associate Justice

Timothy Clevenger appeals his Pulaski County Circuit Court conviction for first-

degree murder. On appeal, he argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his

conviction; (2) the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained

under a search warrant; (3) the circuit court erred in admitting certain evidence; and (4) the

circuit court erred in admitting certain witness testimony. As his arguments are without

merit or are improperly preserved, we affirm.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

At 8:08 a.m. on September 3, 2018, Timothy Clevenger called 911 to report that his

wife, Margaret, was unresponsive and covered in blood in the hallway of their home. Three

officers responded and found Clevenger performing CPR on Margaret under the direction

of dispatch. One officer took over CPR while the others secured the scene. Margaret’s

body was cold, pulseless, and surrounded by extensive blood, as noted by all three officers.
EMS arrived shortly thereafter, confirmed that she had no vital signs, and transported her to

Baptist Hospital in Little Rock, where she was pronounced dead.

Margaret’s injuries were consistent with a violent assault. She had bruising on her

arms, a defensive cut on her left hand, and strands of her own hair clutched in her right

hand. Her face was bruised and lacerated, consistent with multiple blows or impacts against

a hard surface. She sustained three major blunt-force injuries to her skull, fracturing bones

near its base. The blows tore the protective membrane around her brain and caused

intercranial bleeding. The medical examiner concluded that Margaret died from multiple

blunt-force head injuries.

At the scene, Clevenger was wearing a white, bloodstained undershirt, shorts, and

sneakers. Bloody handprints appeared on the lower back of his shirt, consistent with one

grasping him during an assault. His socks and legs were bloodstained, and his shoes were

spattered with blood. His hands bore fresh cuts, and his knuckles were swollen. Officers

observed no signs of forced entry into the home and no missing valuables.

Officers also observed blood throughout the living room and the hallway, in the

laundry room, on the walls, and on the furniture. Blood was also found on the fireplace,

sink-light switch, hand towels, and even on the washing machine. DNA testing confirmed

that nearly all of the blood belonged to Margaret, except for a small amount of Clevenger’s

blood on the master bedroom door handle. Detectives later testified that the assault likely

began in the living room and continued into the hallway and that someone attempted to

clean parts of the scene before police arrived.

When EMS arrived, Clevenger claimed he was hyperventilating and might “throw

up.” Officers initially believed he was having a panic attack and transported him to the
2
hospital. They later concluded that he had feigned symptoms, noting he would “act out”

while being examined but return to a state of calmness when left alone. He was released

later that day and interviewed by detectives.

During his custodial interview, Clevenger emphasized his seldom-deviated-from

daily routines. He stated that he left for the gym promptly at 7:00 a.m. wearing the same

undershirt later collected by police and that he returned home at 8:00 a.m. to discover

Margaret. Video evidence contradicted his account. Gym security footage showed him

arriving at 7:22 a.m. and leaving at 8:00 a.m. A neighbor’s security camera captured him

taking an unusual, circuitous route to the gym that morning. Clevenger also claimed he let

the family dog out immediately upon returning home; however, detectives noted the

absence of bloody pawprints or blood on the dog—despite testimony that the dog ordinarily

stayed by Margaret’s side.

The investigation further revealed several possible motives. Clevenger informed

detectives that his marriage to Margaret had deteriorated as they were no longer intimate,

slept in separate bedrooms, and attended separate churches. The couple also faced significant

financial strain, including expensive home renovations, their daughter’s wedding expenses,

a new car for Margaret, and substantial credit card debt. Margaret had also lost her job

earlier that year. Detectives later learned that Clevenger was the sole beneficiary of a

$250,000 life insurance policy on Margaret.

On November 21, 2018, Clevenger was charged with first-degree murder.

According to the State, when officers attempted to arrest at his daughter’s home, Clevenger

fled and was later found hiding in Margaret’s vehicle at their home.

3
Prior to trial, Clevenger moved to suppress the evidence seized from his home. The

detectives obtained a search warrant at 10:15 a.m. on the morning of the murder, relying

on his 911 call, the condition and nature of the scene, and information from their initial

canvass. The search began at 11:21 a.m. and continued over four days. Forensic officers

photographed the residence, collected blood samples, field-tested stains, and secured the

home each night to prevent tampering or contamination.

At the suppression hearing, Clevenger argued that the district judge who approved

the warrant abandoned his role as a neutral magistrate by issuing it within two minutes. He

further contended that the search violated Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 13.2(c),

pointing specifically to the detectives’ after-hours work past 8:00 p.m. without an express

nighttime authorization. He claimed all evidence obtained during those periods should have

been suppressed. The State responded that the warrant was amply supported by probable

cause and that the approving judge’s prompt issuance did not compromise his neutrality. It

argued that the after-hours search was either permissible under Moore v. State, 297 Ark. 296,

761 S.W.2d 894 (1984), or, at worst, a technical irregularity not requiring suppression under

Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 16.2(e).

The circuit court denied Clevenger’s motion, finding no evidence of judicial bias on

the part of the approving judge. It ruled that the first day’s after-hours search fell within the

Moore exception, and that the remaining late-night work was insubstantial, with the

evidence inevitably discoverable during the next day’s search.

At trial, Clevenger objected to testimony describing stains that had field-tested

positive for blood. The circuit court granted his motion in limine, limiting witnesses to

referring to “stains” unless confirmatory testing established the presence of blood. Later,
4
however, crime-scene specialist—and State lay witness—Megan Buchert testified about

apparent transfer and spatter stains on Clevenger’s clothing and shoes and throughout the

scene. Clevenger objected once, and the circuit court ruled that Ms. Buchert could use the

term “stain” only in reference to what she had witnessed at the scene and in the crime-

scene photographs in light of this court’s holding in Brenk v. State, 311 Ark. 579, 847 S.W.2d

1 (1993).

Through the Clevenger’s daughter, the State also introduced family photographs

depicting candlesticks on the living room mantle. Clevenger objected on grounds dissimilar

to his argument on appeal, and the court overruled the objection. Medical examiner Dr.

Frank Peretti testified that Margaret’s injuries were consistent with blows from a heavy

object of that type. The following day, Clevenger objected to Dr. Peretti’s testimony and

argued that, in discovery, the State had failed to disclose candlesticks as a potential murder-

weapon theory. The court rejected his argument, noting that the photographs had been

provided in due course of discovery and that, when cross-examined by Clevenger, Dr.

Peretti acknowledged the injuries could have been caused by various objects.

Clevenger’s sole argument was to shift blame to his son, citing a statement he made

at an Alcoholics Anonymous meeting after the murder. Clevenger’s son testified that his

remark had been figurative and misinterpreted and denied any involvement in his mother’s

death. The jury rejected Clevenger’s defense and convicted him of first-degree murder.

He was sentenced to life imprisonment. This appeal followed.

5
II. Law and Analysis

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Although Clevenger raises his sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge last, we address

it first in accordance with double-jeopardy principles. Bush v. State, 2024 Ark. 77, at 5, 687

S.W.3d 570, 573. Clevenger argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motion for

directed verdict because the evidence of his guilt was “scant and below the due process

minimum required to send the case to the jury.” We disagree. Substantial evidence supports

affirming Clevenger’s conviction and life sentence for first-degree murder.

On appeal, we treat a motion for directed verdict as a challenge to the sufficiency of

the evidence. Parker v. State, 2025 Ark. 55, at 4, 709 S.W.3d 807, 811. When reviewing

the appellant’s challenge, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the State and

consider only the evidence that supports the verdict. Id., 709 S.W.3d at 811. Accordingly,

we will affirm the verdict if substantial evidence supports it. Id., 709 S.W.3d at 811.

Substantial evidence is evidence of a sufficient force and character that it will, with

reasonable certainty, compel a conclusion one way or the other without resorting to

speculation or conjecture. Id., 709 S.W.3d at 811. Circumstantial evidence may provide a

basis to support a conviction, but it must be consistent with the defendant’s guilt and

inconsistent with any other reasonable conclusion. Oliger v. State, 2025 Ark. 8, at 5, 704

S.W.3d 305, 308; Nelson v. State, 2024 Ark. 24, at 5, 683 S.W.3d 177, 185.

Furthermore, in resolving conflicting testimony and inconsistent evidence, it is the

jury’s role to assess witness credibility and resolve discrepancies in the evidence. Parker,

2025 Ark. 55, at 4–5, 709 S.W.3d at 811. The jury is entitled to accept the State’s version

of the facts over the defendant’s, resolve any inconsistent testimony, and accept or reject
6
any alternative theories. Id. at 4, 709 S.W.3d at 811. Lastly, the jury can consider evidence

of the accused’s flight to avoid arrest as probative of their guilt. Smith v. State, 2025 Ark.

26, at 20, 708 S.W.3d 336, 350.

At trial, the State bore the burden of proving that Clevenger, with the “purpose of

causing the death of another person,” caused the death of another person. Ark. Code Ann.

§ 5-10-102(a)(2) (Repl. 2013). Clevenger simply argues that he was not Margaret’s

murderer. The record, however, contains substantial evidence to the contrary. Margaret

was brutally beaten—sustaining facial bruising, defensive wounds, and skull fractures

consistent with blunt-force trauma. Clevenger’s own hands were cut, bruised, and swollen,

which are injuries consistent with repeatedly striking a person or an object. The jury was

entitled to connect Margaret’s fatal injuries with his. Although the State was not required

to produce a murder weapon, it introduced photographs of candlesticks in the Clevenger

home and medical testimony that such an object could have caused the fatal injuries. From

this, the jury could reasonably infer that Clevenger used a blunt household object—such as

one of the missing candlesticks—to violently murder his wife.

The jury was also entitled to consider the veracity of Clevenger’s statements. He

claimed to have left for the gym at 7:00 a.m. wearing the same undershirt later recovered

by police, yet video footage showed him arriving at 7:22 a.m. in a different shirt that was

never recovered. He also misrepresented his route to the gym, a claim contradicted by a

neighbor’s home security footage. The jury could further weigh his prior statements about

letting out the family dog—an explanation unsupported by the absence of bloody pawprints

in the house or blood on the pet itself. Likewise, his feigned panic attack at the crime scene

could reasonably be viewed as evidence of consciousness of guilt. The jury could further
7
infer guilt from evidence suggesting a cleanup effort: blood found in the kitchen sink, on a

light switch, on hand towels, and on the washing machine. And the jury could consider

motive evidence, including the Clevenger’s failing marriage, the lack of intimacy between

him and his wife, their mutual financial strain, and the $250,000 life insurance policy on

Margaret—of which he was the sole beneficiary. Finally, the jury could consider his attempt

to avoid arrest, which is probative of guilt.

Viewing the evidence in its entirety, the jury concluded that Clevenger’s guilt was

proved beyond a reasonable doubt, resolving any potential inconsistencies in the testimony,

and found Clevenger guilty of first-degree murder. Therefore, substantial evidence existed

at trial for the circuit court to properly deny Clevenger’s motion for directed verdict, and it

therefore did not err.

B. Motion to Suppress

Clevenger’s second claim on appeal consists of three separate challenges, which relate

to the validity of the search and the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained

under the search. First, he argues that the district judge who approved the search warrant

was not neutral and detached, requiring suppression of the evidence obtained under the

warrant. Second, he contends that certain searches conducted pursuant to the warrant were

unauthorized nighttime searches in violation of Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure

13.2(c). Third, he asserts that the overall duration of the search was unconstitutional. We

reject his first two arguments. His third claim was not preserved for appellate review, and

therefore, we do not address it.

In reviewing a circuit court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we make an independent

examination of the issue based on the totality of the circumstances. Scarbrough v. State, 2024
8
Ark. 71, at 12, 687 S.W.3d 557, 565; King v. State, 2019 Ark. 114, at 5, 571 S.W.3d 476,

479. We give due weight to the inferences drawn by the circuit court and proper deference

to its findings as it sits in a superior position to evaluate the credibility of witnesses at a

suppression hearing. Scarbrough, 2024 Ark. 71, at 12, 687 S.W.3d at 565. We also view the

evidence in the light most favorable to the State. King, 2019 Ark. 114, at 5, 571 S.W.3d at

479. We will reverse a denial of a motion to suppress only if the ruling is clearly against the

preponderance of the evidence. Nelson v. State, 2025 Ark. 22, at 4, 705 S.W.3d 876, 879;

Scarbrough, 2024 Ark. 71, at 12, 687 S.W.3d at 565; King, 2019 Ark. 114, at 6, 571 S.W.3d

at 479. A factual finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support

it, the appellate court, after reviewing the entire record, is left with the definite and firm

conviction that a mistake was made. White v. State, 2024 Ark. 11, at 2, 682 S.W.3d 7, 9.

1. Neutral and detached

The United States and Arkansas Constitutions both provide that no warrant shall

issue except upon probable cause, supported by an oath or affirmation. See U.S. Const.

amend. IV; see also Ark. Const. art. 2, § 15. Reviewing courts give “great deference” to a

judge’s determination of probable cause. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913–14 (1984).

Whether sufficient facts support such a finding must be determined by a “neutral and

detached magistrate.” Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). In Leon, the Court

emphasized that a judge must act independently and not serve as a mere “rubber stamp” for

the police. 468 U.S. at 914. Clevenger contends that the approving district judge did just

that. We disagree.

A prudent judge must make a “practical, common sense” determination as to

whether the search warrant application provides a “substantial basis” for finding probable
9
cause. Yancey v. State, 345 Ark. 103, 111, 44 S.W.3d 315, 320 (2001). Facts may be

established by direct or circumstantial evidence, so long as the application supports the

inferences drawn. Id., 44 S.W.3d at 320. We have also emphasized that search warrant

applications “‘should speak in factual and not merely conclusory language,’” because “‘[i]t

is the function of the judicial officer . . . to make an independent and neutral determination based

upon facts, not conclusions, justifying an intrusion into one’s home.’” Kelley v. State, 371

Ark. 599, 605, 269 S.W.3d 326, 330 (2007) (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Broadway,

269 Ark. 215, 218, 599 S.W.2d 721, 723 (1980)). Under the test articulated in Coggin v.

State, 356 Ark. 424, 156 S.W.3d 712 (2004), an approving judge must decide, based on the

totality of the circumstances, whether there is a fair chance that evidence of a crime will be

found at a particular place; our review is limited to ensuring the magistrate had a substantial

basis for so concluding. George v. State, 358 Ark. 269, 283, 189 S.W.3d 28, 36 (2004).

Clevenger argues that the two minutes the approving judge spent reviewing the

warrant application were insufficient for meaningful consideration. However, nothing in

the record persuades us that the approving judge failed to act neutrally or independently or

lacked a substantial basis for finding probable cause. As the State notes, an experienced

judge can prudently review a succinct, factually detailed application in a short time. Here,

the application recounted (1) Clevenger’s 911 call reporting his wife unresponsive and

covered in blood, and his CPR efforts; (2) the officers’ observation of blood throughout the

home and Margaret’s subsequent death; (3) discrepancies in Clevenger’s statements; (4)

Clevenger’s transport to the hospital for evaluation; and (5) the request to search the

Clevenger residence, curtilage, vehicles, and structures and collect forensic evidence. These

10
factual assertions, whether circumstantial or direct, established a substantial basis for the

conclusion that evidence would be found in the home, which was the scene of the crime.

The process was not rushed. The investigator alerted the district judge in advance

that an application was forthcoming and e-mailed the application and a template warrant at

10:13 a.m. At 10:15 a.m., the judge returned the approved warrant. Given the advance

notice, the straightforward nature of the application, and the judge’s experience, the two-

minute turnaround does not indicate bias or abandonment of judicial duty. Rather, it

reflects the “fair probability” determination on which “reasonable and prudent [people,] not

legal technicians, act.” Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 244 (2013).

Though brief, the review period here does not leave us with the firm conviction that

an error occurred. Considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude the warrant

was properly issued. Accordingly, we find no error in the circuit court’s decision to deny

Clevenger’s motion to suppress on this point.

2. Unauthorized nighttime searches

Clevenger next contends that the evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant

should be excluded because the warrant did not authorize a nighttime search and a nighttime

search was nevertheless conducted. We disagree.

Clevenger is correct that the warrant contained no authorization for a nighttime

search and that illegal nighttime searches are “typically substantial violations” of the Arkansas

Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Ark. R. Crim. P. 13.2(c); Richardson v. State, 314 Ark.

512, 517, 863 S.W.2d 572, 575 (1993) (issuance of nighttime warrant at issue where the

search was executed—or began—at approximately 8:45 p.m. and continued until midnight);

State v. Martinez, 306 Ark. 353, 356, 811 S.W.2d 319, 321 (1991) (issuance of nighttime
11
warrant at issue where search began at 9:00 p.m. and continued for nineteen hours,

constituting a substantial violation of Rule 13.2(c)); Hall v. State, 302 Ark. 341, 342–43,

789 S.W.2d 456, 457–58 (1990) (nighttime warrant was unnecessary and should not have

been issued). But the facts of this case do not square with our precedent. First, no nighttime

warrant was issued, and second, no nighttime search occurred.

We have consistently held that “as long as a search is begun before 8:00 p.m. and is

concluded as soon thereafter as feasible, the search does not violate the ban against nighttime

searches.” Brenk v. State, 311 Ark. 579, 590, 847 S.W.2d 1, 7 (1993); see also Richardson,

314 Ark. at 517, 863 S.W.2d at 575 (“We refer to searches which occur after 8 p.m. as

‘nighttime’ searches in our case law. The search warrant at issue was executed at

approximately 8:45 p.m. and the search continued until around midnight.”); Brothers v. State,

261 Ark. 64, 67, 546 S.W.2d 715, 717 (1977) (“The record reflects the search was started

about 8 p.m. and completed as soon thereafter as possible. We do not find this to be a

material violation of Rule 13.2(c) . . . .”). Further, when law enforcement secures a scene

overnight to ensure that it remains undisturbed, the resulting search is deemed a single,

continuous search. Moore v. State, 244 Ark. 1197, 1201, 429 S.W.2d 122, 126 (1968).

No violation of Rule 13.2(c) occurred in the first instance. As the State correctly

notes, none of the searches pursuant to the warrant began anywhere near the 8:00 p.m.

cutoff. The four start times were 11:21 a.m., 10:35 a.m., 9:35 a.m., and 9:34 a.m.,

respectively, across the four-day search. Here, the warrant was commenced between 6:00

a.m. and 8:00 p.m., as Rule 13.2(c) requires. See Livingston v. State, 2013 Ark. 264, at 7,

428 S.W.3d 474, 478 (“In this case, the first search warrant was executed after 8 p.m. . . .

.”); State v. Tyson, 2012 Ark. 107, at 2, 388 S.W.3d 1, 3 (“Detective Harbor immediately
12
typed up a search warrant and included a nighttime clause because it would be after 8:00

p.m. when the search was executed.”); Richardson, 314 Ark. at 517, 863 S.W.2d at 575

(“The search warrant at issue was executed at approximately 8:45 p.m. . . . .”); Ark. R.

Crim. P. 13.2(c) (“[T]he search warrant shall provide that it be executed between the hours

of six a.m. and eight p.m. . . . .”). The fact that the search continued over consecutive days

and extended past the 8:00 p.m. cutoff for an aggregate of four hours and nineteen minutes

on two of the four days does not transform it into a nighttime search; when the forensic

team was absent, an officer maintained watch to preserve the scene. Accordingly, we reach

the same conclusion as the circuit court and find no error in its decision to deny Clevenger’s

motion to suppress on this point.

3. Duration of the search

Clevenger finally argues that the four-day search of his home was unconstitutional.

This argument, however, is introduced for the first time on appeal. We have long held that

an appellant “cannot raise issues, even constitutional ones, for the first time on appeal.”

Kellensworth v. State, 2021 Ark. 5, at 7 n.1, 614 S.W.3d 804, 809 n.1.

In his motions below, Clevenger argued that the warrant was unsupported by

probable cause and was executed in a substantially unreasonable manner. He made no

mention of the duration of the search in his motion to suppress. At the suppression hearing,

Clevenger’s trial counsel argued the “lack of particularity in the warrant,” the “rubber

stamping” by the approving judge, and the “blatant violation of the state procedural rule

against nighttime searches in Arkansas.” The sole reference to length was a single remark

that the search amounted to a “four day free-for-all for the LRPD.” This passing comment

13
does not preserve a challenge to the length of the search for appellate review. Thus, as this

argument is not preserved, we will not address it.

C. Admissibility of Evidence

Clevenger argues that the State’s examination of two witnesses regarding the

potential murder weapon violated Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 17.1. His

objection, however, came the following day—not contemporaneously—and he admitted as

much at trial and on appeal. We have repeatedly held that “to preserve an issue [for] appeal,

a defendant must object at the first opportunity.” Scarbrough, 2024 Ark. 71, at 15, 687

S.W.3d at 566–67. Attempting to avoid this rule, Clevenger argues that his previous written

motions and oral argument concerning discovery issues and the State’s obligation to

supplement discovery excused his duty to timely object. He offers no convincing argument

or supporting authority for this proposition, and we decline to address it. See Mann v. Pierce,

2016 Ark. 418, at 8, 505 S.W.3d 150, 155.

Clevenger also argues, for the first time on appeal, that Dr. Peretti’s expert testimony,

which was offered in response to a hypothetical question about the murder weapon, was

improper. As we have made clear, arguments made for the first time on appeal are barred.

Kellensworth, 2021 Ark. 5, at 7 n.1, 614 S.W.3d at 809 n.1. Though he concedes that no

contemporaneous objection was made, Clevenger now claims that his earlier objection to

the introduction of photographs preserved the issue. This, too, is unsupported by a

convincing argument or sufficient law or authority, and we will not consider it. Mann,

2016 Ark. 418, at 8, 505 S.W.3d at 155.

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D. Admissibility of Witness Testimony

Clevenger raises two arguments concerning the testimony of crime-scene specialist

Megan Buchert. First, he contends her testimony violated the circuit court’s order in limine

prohibiting the use of certain verbiage to describe bloodstains at the crime scene. Second,

he asserts the circuit court erred by admitting multiple photographs during Ms. Buchert’s

testimony that were, in his view, needlessly cumulative under Rule 403 of the Arkansas

Rules of Evidence and unduly prejudicial. His arguments are unpersuasive.

On the first point, Clevenger argues that the circuit court abused its discretion by

failing to sua sponte prohibit Ms. Buchert from testifying about presumptive bloodstains and

referring to them as “stains,” “spatter,” or “splatter.” He contends that these terms violated

the circuit court’s ruling on his motion in limine, 1 which relied on this court’s holding in

Brenk v. State, 311 Ark. 579, 847 S.W.2d 1 (1993). Evidentiary rulings lie within the broad

discretion of the circuit court, and we will not reverse absent a manifest abuse of discretion

unless the defendant was prejudiced. De la Garza v. State, 2025 Ark. 10, at 8, 704 S.W.3d

627, 633; Bragg v. State, 2023 Ark. 66, at 7, 663 S.W.3d 375, 380; Bishop v. State, 2023 Ark.

150, at 10, 675 S.W.3d 869, 876. “Abuse of discretion is a high threshold that does not

simply require error in the circuit court’s decision, but requires that the circuit court act

improvidently, thoughtlessly, or without due consideration.” De la Garza, 2025 Ark. 10,

at 8, 704 S.W.3d at 633. And a violation of an evidentiary order by a party does not, by

1
Prior to trial, Clevenger filed a motion in limine to prohibit the testimony of
“apparent blood” and the introduction of blood-related evidence that was not scientifically
tested at the state crime lab. Later, the circuit granted this motion and ruled that the State
could only refer to non-scientifically tested blood evidence as a “stain,” and specifically
prohibited the use of the terms “possible blood” or “splatter.”
15
itself, amount to an abuse of its discretion. Harlan v. State, 2024 Ark. 69, at 5 n.1, 686

S.W.3d 810, 813 n.1. Considering Harlan, as well as the analysis below, the circuit court

did not abuse its discretion.

1. Prohibited terms

Below, the circuit court afforded Clevenger more protection than our precedent

required when it evaluated Ms. Buchert’s testimony through the lens of Brenk. Brenk does

not control here for three reasons. First, the State did not attempt to introduce luminol

testing results into evidence through Ms. Buchert’s testimony. See generally Brenk, 311 Ark.

at 590–95, 847 S.W.2d at 7–10. Second, Brenk applies exclusively to expert testimony

concerning luminol results, and the State never qualified Ms. Buchert as an expert witness.

See generally id. Third, Dunn clarifies that Brenk governs only when no confirmatory testing

is performed; where confirmatory testing establishes the presence of human blood—as

occurred here—evidence that a sample initially field-tested positive for blood is admissible.

See Dunn v. State, 371 Ark. 140, 149–51, 264 S.W.3d 504, 510–11 (2007).

Although the circuit court relied on Brenk in its reasoning, it did so cautiously and

in a manner that extended Clevenger greater protection than necessary under our case law.

In fact, the circuit court and counsel for the parties discussed this issue for a considerable

amount of time in open court and in bench conferences, and the circuit court recessed to

solidify its stance. That exercise of caution reflects prudent and thoughtful consideration,

and therefore, was not an abuse of discretion. Indeed, the circuit court’s ruling benefited

Clevenger rather than prejudiced him, and he cannot prevail on this claim.

16
2. Violative photographs

On the second point, Clevenger argues that the circuit court abused its discretion by

admitting crime-scene photographs depicting what he characterizes as “presumptive blood.”

He contends, as he did below, that the photographs were needlessly cumulative, highly

prejudicial, and lacking in probative value, and that their admission posed a significant risk

of misleading or confusing the jury.

As stated above, evidentiary rulings—such as the admission of photographs—lie

within the broad discretion of the circuit court, and we will not reverse absent a manifest

abuse of discretion unless the defendant was prejudiced. Haynie v. State, 2025 Ark. 46, at

4, 709 S.W.3d 46, 48. Under Rule 403, relevant evidence may be excluded only if its

probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion,

misleading the jury, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Ark. R. Evid. 403.

We have long held that photographs, even those that may be graphic in nature, are

admissible if they assist the jury in understanding witness testimony, depict the crime scene,

or corroborate the State’s theory of the case. Haynie, 2025 Ark. 46, at 4, 709 S.W.3d at 48;

Cone v. State, 2022 Ark. 201, at 17, 654 S.W.3d 648, 660–61; Williams v. State, 2017 Ark.

287, at 8, 528 S.W.3d 839, 844. The State sought to introduce the photographs to illustrate

the crime scene and support Ms. Buchert’s forensic testimony. They were neither so

numerous as to be cumulative nor so inflammatory as to outweigh their probative value.

The circuit court therefore acted well within its broad discretion, and the admission of these

photographs provides no basis for reversal.

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III. Conclusion

In light of our well-set precedent governing sufficiency challenges, our de novo

review of the circuit court’s denial of the motion to suppress, and our review of the

evidentiary rulings at issue, we conclude that Clevenger’s arguments are without merit. His

claims concerning the length of the search and the admissibility of certain evidence and

testimony were not preserved for our review and are therefore not addressed. Accordingly,

we affirm.

IV. Rule 4-3(a) Review

Because Clevenger received a life sentence, the record has been examined for all

objections, motions, and requests made by either party that were decided adversely to him

in compliance with Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 4-3(a). No prejudicial error was found.

Affirmed.

Brent P. Gasper, Arkansas Public Defender Commission, for appellant.

Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Christian Harris, Sr. Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11170077. Public record. Not legal advice.