# Costa Soares v. United States Department of State

> District Court, M.D. Florida · October 9, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11167318

## Case

- **Full name:** Andre Luiz Costa Soares v. United States Department of State, United States Consulate General in Sao Paulo, Brazil, Marco Rubio, and William Astillero
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** October 9, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION

ANDRE LUIZ COSTA SOARES,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 6:24-cv-2153-JSS-RMN

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT
OF STATE, UNITED STATES
CONSULATE GENERAL IN SAO
PAULO, BRAZIL, MARCO RUBIO,
and WILLIAM ASTILLERO,

Defendants.
___________________________________/
ORDER
Defendants, the United States Department of State, the United States Consulate
General in Sao Paulo, Brazil, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and American Citizen
Services Chief William Astillero, move to dismiss this case for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. (Dkt. 42.) Plaintiff, Andre Luiz Costa Soares, proceeding pro se, opposes
the motion, (Dkt. 45), and moves for preliminary injunctive relief, (Dkt. 46).
Defendants oppose Plaintiff’s motion. (Dkt. 47; see Dkts. 50, 50-1.) On October 1,
2025, the court held an evidentiary hearing on the motions over Zoom. (See Dkt. 63.)
Upon consideration, for the reasons outlined below, the court grants Defendants’
motion, denies Plaintiff’s motion, and dismisses this case without prejudice for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.
BACKGROUND
In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that although he was born and raised in Brazil,

he acquired United States citizenship at birth because his biological mother, Fawn
Clark Taylor, was a United States citizen born and raised in the United States. (Dkt.
1 at 5; see Dkts. 1-1, 1-2 (Ms. Taylor’s birth certificate and school records).) Plaintiff
further alleges that based on DNA results, a court in Brazil amended his birth
certificate in January 2022 to add Ms. Taylor as his biological mother. (Dkt. 1 at 5–6;

see Dkts. 1-4 to 1-7.) According to Plaintiff, his birth certificate still lists the woman
who raised him, Maria de Lourdes Costa Soares, as well, but it describes her as his
social-affective mother rather than his biological mother. (Dkt. 1 at 5, 8.) Plaintiff
claims that in April 2024, he visited the United States Consulate General in Sao Paulo,
Brazil, to apply for a United States passport based on his United States citizenship,

and in July 2024, the consulate denied his application because “Plaintiff did not
present satisfactory evidence of the required biological relationship between him and”
Ms. Taylor. (Id. at 6–7.) Plaintiff reports that his April 2024 DNA specimen had been
mislabeled “Alexandre” instead of “Andre.” (Id. at 7; see Dkt. 1-10 at 2.) The denial
of Plaintiff’s passport application purportedly prompted him to domesticate the

Brazilian decree through a Florida state court in October 2024. (Dkt. 1 at 6; see Dkt.
1-8.) In November 2024, Plaintiff claims, he returned to the consulate with the
domesticated decree to renew his passport application, and he interviewed with Mr.
Astillero. (Dkt. 1 at 7.) Reportedly, during the interview, Mr. Astillero exhibited
“rude and unprofessional conduct[]” and stated that he was “under no obligation” to
accept or obey the decree. (Id.) According to Plaintiff, Mr. Astillero also indicated
that the Board of Immigration Appeals had questioned a DNA result dated May 2,
2022, because Plaintiff did not look like the “person in the picture for the DNA test.”

(Id. at 8.)
Plaintiff initiated this case in November 2024 with three counts against
Defendants: violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) under 5 U.S.C.
§§ 701–706 (count one), writ of mandamus under 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (count two), and
preliminary injunctive relief (count three). (Dkt. 1 at 9–12.) Count one asserts that

under their own internal policies, Defendants cannot require Plaintiff to undergo
additional DNA testing and that Defendants’ actions inquiring into Plaintiff’s DNA
testing have been “arbitrary, capricious, in abuse of [their] discretionary powers,
and . . . not in accordance with” the Immigration and Nationality Act. (Id. at 9.)

Count one further asserts that “Plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer a legal
wrong as a result of [the Department of State]’s unreasonable delay in approving [his]
United States passport application [by] requiring him to undergo DNA tests again.”
(Id. at 10.) Count two alleges that the Department of State owes Plaintiff a duty to
issue him a United States passport given his automatic acquisition of United States

citizenship at birth through Ms. Taylor. (Id. at 10–11.) Count two asks the court to
exercise its mandamus authority to compel the Department of State to fulfill this duty.
(Id.) Count three seeks a temporary restraining order (TRO) or preliminary injunction
to “prohibit Defendants from asking again for a DNA test” and to require Defendants
to immediately issue Plaintiff an emergency United States passport. (Id. at 11.) In a
prayer for relief after the counts, Plaintiff repeats the request for preliminary injunctive
relief asserted in count three and asks that the court “[p]ermanently enjoin Defendants
from causing [him] further harm . . . by ordering [the Department of State] to approve

[his] application for a United States passport.” (Id. at 13.)
In June 2025, Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss. (Dkt. 42.) In the
motion, Defendants state that “[i]n 2023, Plaintiff filed petitions with the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals, alleging that he acquired citizenship through [Ms.] Taylor.” (Id. at
4.) Defendants report that the Ninth Circuit consolidated these proceedings and

transferred the action to the Central District of California (Soares v. Bondi, Case No:
5:24-cv-1276-TJH-PVC) for a de novo determination of Plaintiff’s citizenship. (Id.) A
review of the docket shows that the California action is ongoing. Defendants also state
that Plaintiff entered the United States in December 2014, failed to leave by his

December 25, 2015 deadline, was taken into the custody of United States Immigration
and Customs Enforcement in May 2019, and was removed from the United States to
Brazil in September 2023. (Id. at 3, 5.) In response to Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff
filed the instant motion for preliminary injunctive relief. (Dkt. 46.) In the motion,
Plaintiff largely reiterates the allegations in his complaint and seeks the relief requested

through count three. (See id.)
During the October 1, 2025 hearing on the motions, the parties made
preliminary remarks, Plaintiff testified as the only witness, and the parties presented
argument. The court permitted Plaintiff to testify in a narrative form given his pro se
status. Plaintiff testified remotely from Brazil. During his testimony, he admitted
twenty-one exhibits into evidence, including Ms. Taylor’s birth certificate and school
records, the Brazilian decree and Florida domestication order, Plaintiff’s amended
birth certificate, letters from Defendants regarding his citizenship claim, his father’s

marriage and death certificates, documents describing Defendants’ internal policies on
DNA testing, Plaintiff’s new Brazilian identification and passport, Department of
State regulation 22 C.F.R. § 51.60 on the denial and restriction of passports, and
webpages from Defendants about authentication and United States citizenship and
passports. (See Dkts. 57-1, 64.) Defendants objected to five proffered exhibits—four

affidavits, as well as an email from the DNA testing laboratory—on hearsay and
authentication grounds. The court admitted the unobjected-to exhibits and invited
Plaintiff to discuss the objected-to exhibits further, but Plaintiff did not argue against
Defendants’ objections. Defendants admitted seven exhibits: Plaintiff’s entire Alien
File (under seal), photographs of Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s removal documents (including

the warrant of removal and the warning regarding the removal), letters from the
Department of State denying Plaintiff’s passport applications and requesting DNA
evidence of the biological relationship between Plaintiff and Ms. Taylor, and a court
order in the California action requiring Plaintiff to submit to additional DNA testing.
(See Dkts. 65 to 67.) Plaintiff did not object to these exhibits when they were offered

into evidence.
APPLICABLE STANDARDS
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins.
Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). The party invoking federal jurisdiction must
establish subject matter jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. See Smith v.
United States, 14 F.4th 1228, 1230 (11th Cir. 2021) (“The burden of establishing that a
claim falls within [the court’s] jurisdiction ‘rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.’”

(quoting Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377)); Caron v. NCL (Bah.), Ltd., 910 F.3d 1359, 1363–
64 (11th Cir. 2018) (“The party seeking federal jurisdiction must prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, facts supporting the exercise of jurisdiction.”).
Challenges to subject matter jurisdiction can be facial or factual. Kennedy v. Floridian

Hotel, Inc., 998 F.3d 1221, 1230 (11th Cir. 2021). Facial challenges require the court
to accept the complaint’s well-pleaded factual allegations as true when determining
whether subject matter jurisdiction exists. Id. In contrast, factual challenges require
the court to look beyond the pleadings and to weigh evidence to decide the
jurisdictional issue. Id.; see Kurimski v. Shell Oil Co., 570 F. Supp. 3d 1228, 1238 (S.D.

Fla. 2021) (“When considering a facial attack, the court ‘must consider the allegations
of the complaint to be true,’ whereas when considering a factual attack, ‘no
presumptive truthfulness attaches to [the] plaintiff’s allegations, and the existence of
disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the
merits of jurisdictional claims.’” (quoting Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1529

(11th Cir. 1990))). If the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it must dismiss the
case without prejudice. See McIntosh v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 5 F.4th 1309, 1313
(11th Cir. 2021) (“If subject[ ]matter jurisdiction does not exist, dismissal must be
without prejudice.”).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 governs preliminary injunctive relief: TROs
and preliminary injunctions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65. Whereas TROs may issue
without notice to the adverse party, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1), “[t]he court may issue
a preliminary injunction only on notice to the adverse party,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(1).

“Every order granting an injunction and every [TRO] must . . . state the reasons why
it issued[,] . . . state its terms specifically[,] and . . . describe in reasonable detail—and
not by referring to the complaint or other document—the act or acts restrained or
required.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(1). “A TRO or preliminary injunction is appropriate
where the movant” satisfies four requirements: (1) “there is a substantial likelihood of

success on the merits,” (2) “the TRO or preliminary injunction is necessary to prevent
irreparable injury,” (3) “the threatened injury outweighs the harm that the TRO or
preliminary injunction would cause to the non[]movant,” and (4) “the TRO or
preliminary injunction would not be averse to the public interest.” Parker v. State Bd.

of Pardons & Paroles, 275 F.3d 1032, 1034 (11th Cir. 2001); accord M.D. Fla. R. 6.01(b),
6.02(a)(1). Preliminary injunctive relief “is an extraordinary and drastic remedy not
to be granted unless the movant clearly establishes the burden of persuasion as to each
of the four prerequisites.” Wall v. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, 543 F. Supp. 3d
1290, 1292 (M.D. Fla. 2021) (alteration adopted and quotations omitted).

Although courts “give liberal construction” to documents filed by pro se
plaintiffs, Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007), pro se plaintiffs are
still “required . . . to conform to procedural rules,” Loren v. Sasser, 309 F.3d 1296, 1304
(11th Cir. 2002). See Cummings v. Dep’t of Corr., 757 F.3d 1228, 1234 n.10 (11th Cir.
2014) (“The right of self-representation does not exempt a party from compliance with
relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” (quoting Birl v. Estelle, 660 F.2d 592,
593 (5th Cir. 1981))). Further, the leniency with which courts treat pro se plaintiffs
does not permit courts to “serve as de facto counsel” or “rewrite an otherwise deficient

pleading.” GJR Invs., Inc. v. County of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998).
ANALYSIS
According to Defendants, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over counts
one and two because Plaintiff has adequate alternative remedies to these counts, and

count three does not advance an independent cause of action. (Dkt. 42 at 8–13, 15–
16.) The court agrees; therefore, it grants Defendants’ motion, denies Plaintiff’s
motion, and dismisses this case without prejudice for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
“The APA only permits judicial review of an adverse agency decision where no

other adequate remedy is available.” Hogan v. Kerry, 208 F. Supp. 3d 1288, 1290 (S.D.
Fla. 2016); see 5 U.S.C. § 704 (“Agency action made reviewable by statute and final
agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial
review.” (emphasis added)); U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., 578 U.S. 590, 600
(2016) (“[A]n agency action is reviewable under the APA only if there are no adequate

alternatives to APA review in court.”); Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 903 (1988)
(“[Section] 704 does not provide additional judicial remedies in situations
where . . . Congress has provided special and adequate review procedures.” (quotation
omitted)). Similarly, “[a] writ of mandamus will not be granted if alternative remedies
are available.” Hollywood Mobile Estates Ltd. v. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 641 F.3d 1259,
1268 (11th Cir. 2011); see Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 616 (1984) (“The common-
law writ of mandamus, as codified in 28 U. S. C. § 1361, is intended to provide a

remedy for a plaintiff only if he has exhausted all other avenues of relief . . . .”); Cash
v. Barnhart, 327 F.3d 1252, 1258 (11th Cir. 2003) (“Mandamus relief is only
appropriate when . . . ‘no other adequate remedy is available.’” (alteration adopted)
(quoting Jones v. Alexander, 609 F.2d 778, 781 (5th Cir. 1980))). If an adequate

alternative remedy exists, a court must dismiss APA and mandamus claims without
prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Mafundu v. Mayorkas, 699 F. Supp.
3d 1310, 1314 (S.D. Fla. 2023) (dismissing a mandamus claim without prejudice for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction because other claims “provide[d] an adequate
remedy to [the p]laintiffs”); Hogan, 208 F. Supp. 3d at 1291 (“[T]he [c]ourt lacks

jurisdiction over [the p]laintiff’s claim under the APA[] because she has another
adequate remedy available.”).
Plaintiff has adequate alternative remedies. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1503(b), if two
conditions are met, a person not located in the United States may apply for a certificate
of identity to “travel[] to a port of entry in the United States . . . for admission” into

the country. Id. As to the first condition, the applicant either must be “under sixteen
years of age [and] born abroad of a United States citizen parent” or must have “been
physically present in the United States” “at some time prior to” applying for the
certificate. Id. As to the second condition, the applicant must “claim[] a right or
privilege as a national of the United States” that is denied by an official of a department
or independent agency on “the ground that [the applicant] is not a national of the
United States.” Id. If these conditions are satisfied, the applicant may request a
certificate of identity from “a diplomatic or consular officer of the United States in the

foreign country in which [the applicant] is residing.” Id. If the certificate is denied,
section 1503(b) entitles the applicant to “an appeal to the Secretary of State, who, if he
approves the denial, [must] state in writing his reasons for” doing so. Id. If the
certificate is granted, section 1503(c) allows the certificate holder to seek “admission

to the United States at any port of entry.” 8 U.S.C. § 1503(c). Section 1503(c) also
states: “A final determination by the Attorney General that [a certificate holder] is not
entitled to admission to the United States shall be subject to review by any court of
competent jurisdiction in habeas corpus proceedings and not otherwise.” Id.
Section 1503(b) applies to Plaintiff on the face of the complaint. (See Dkt. 1.)

Plaintiff alleges that he is not located within the United States. (See id. at 12 (claiming
that the denial of preliminary injunctive relief will result in his “prolonged stay
outside” the United States).) He also alleges that he “ha[s] been a resident of Orlando,
Florida[,] for at least [six] months prior to the filing of this case.” (Id. at 3.) Thus,
according to the complaint, Plaintiff has been physically present in the United States

in the past. (Id.) Additionally, he claims that Defendants refused to issue him a United
States passport on the ground that he did not sufficiently establish his United States
citizenship. (See id. at 6–13.) In other words, Plaintiff claims a right as a United States
citizen that was denied by department officials on the ground that he is not a United
States citizen. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(21) (defining “national of the United States” to
include a United States citizen for purposes of section 1503).
Evidence admitted during the October 1, 2025 hearing supports the same
conclusion. During the hearing, Plaintiff testified remotely from Brazil—showing that

he is outside the United States—and he stated that he first came to the United States
in December 2014—showing that he was present in the United States in the past.
Plaintiff’s removal documents corroborate these points. The warrant of removal
indicates that Plaintiff entered the United States at Miami, Florida, on December 26,
2014, and the warning regarding the removal indicates that Plaintiff left the United

States from Mesa, Arizona, on September 15, 2023. (Dkt. 67-2 at 3–4.) Plaintiff also
testified that the Department of State denied his application for a United States
passport because he did not establish the biological relationship necessary for United
States citizenship. Letters in evidence corroborate this testimony. An official from the
Department of State told Plaintiff in a March 13, 2023 letter that because Plaintiff

“previously applied for a passport on March 8, 2022[,] but did not provide sufficient
evidence of United States citizenship,” the Department needs “additional
documentation” in the form of DNA test results “to further establish [Plaintiff’s]
United States citizenship.” (Dkt. 67-3 at 2.) Later, in a letter dated July 12, 2024, Mr.
Astillero denied Plaintiff’s application for citizenship services “for lack of acquisition

of [United States] citizenship.” (Dkt. 67-4 at 2.) Accordingly, both facially and
factually, section 1503(b) applies to Plaintiff.
The processes set out in subsections (b) and (c) of section 1503 thus present an
adequate alternative to Plaintiff’s APA and mandamus claims. See Hinojosa v. Horn,
896 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2018) (explaining that section 1503 “establishes an
adequate alternative remedy in court” by “provid[ing] a direct and guaranteed path to
judicial review”); Hogan, 208 F. Supp. 3d at 1291 (concluding that subsections (b) and

(c) provide an adequate alternative remedy). In his response brief to Defendants’
motion, Plaintiff argues that his removal from the United States renders section 1503
inadequate as to him because “if [he] is granted a certificate of identity instead of a
[United States] passport, he will be detained upon arrival in a port of entry in the
[United States] and then pursue his claim while detained.” (Dkt. 45 at 2–3.) For this

argument, Plaintiff relies entirely on Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367 (1962), abrogated in part
by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977), and on the Fifth Circuit’s discussion of Rusk
in Hinojosa, 896 F.3d 305. (See Dkt. 45 at 2–3.) However, Plaintiff does not mention
Hinojosa’s “[t]wo preliminary points” about Rusk: (1) “it is unclear to what

degree . . . Rusk remains good law” and (2) Rusk “never explicitly discusses the
adequacy” of alternative remedies and “has rarely been relied on by either the Supreme
Court” or the Fifth Circuit in that context. Hinojosa, 896 F.3d at 313. (See Dkt. 45 at
2–3.) Nor does Plaintiff address Hinojosa’s conclusion, (see id.), that because the
plaintiffs in Hinojosa sought entry into the United States “on the basis of a claim of

[United States] citizenship,” they were “precisely the sort of persons that Congress,
according to Rusk, was concerned to regulate” under subsections (b) and (c), and their
“cases present[ed] the exact facts that the Rusk Court held would
implicate . . . jurisdictional restrictions,” Hinojosa, 896 F.3d at 314 (emphasis omitted);
see Rusk, 369 U.S. at 379 (first explaining that the subsections serve to eliminate an
alien’s opportunity “to gain fraudulent entry to the United States” through the
prosecution of a “spurious citizenship claim[]” and then contrasting this purpose with

the facts presented by the Rusk plaintiff, “who d[id] not try to gain entry to the United
States before prevailing in [his] claim[] to citizenship”). The court finds Hinojosa
persuasive and rejects Plaintiff’s argument.
Further, as Defendants explain, the ongoing federal action in California

supplies “another adequate avenue for Plaintiff to address issues regarding his claimed
citizenship.” (Dkt. 42 at 12.) Plaintiff testified that the court in that case is determining
whether he is a United States citizen—an issue entangled with this case. As Plaintiff’s
injury in this case, the lack of a United States passport, stems from his reported failure
to prove his United States citizenship, the California court can remedy the injury with

its determination. Plaintiff has not persuasively explained why the California action
does not present an adequate alternative remedy to his APA and mandamus claims,
and the court concludes that it does. See Washington Legal Found. v. Alexander, 984 F.2d
483, 486 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (explaining that a plaintiff cannot pursue an APA claim if
the plaintiff’s “injury may be remedied in another action, even if that remedy would

have no effect upon the challenged agency action” (cleaned up)); Zadoorian v. Gwinnett
Tech. Coll., No. 1:22-cv-00922-LMM, 2022 WL 22671506, at *6, 2022 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 250399, at *18 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 8, 2022) (citing Washington Legal Found., 984
F.2d at 486), aff’d, No. 22-14206, 2024 WL 1554362, at *8, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS
8634, at *24 (11th Cir. Apr. 10, 2024).
Because Plaintiff has adequate alternative remedies available to him, the court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction over his APA and mandamus claims. See Mafundu,
699 F. Supp. 3d at 1314; Hogan, 208 F. Supp. 3d at 1291. The only other cause of

action in the complaint, count three, asserts a claim for preliminary injunctive relief.
(Dkt. 1 at 11–12.) However, “[a]ny motion or suit for an injunction must be based
upon a cause of action; an injunction is a type of relief rather than an independent
cause of action.” Spearman v. Wyndham Vacation Resorts, Inc., 69 F. Supp. 3d 1273,

1292 (N.D. Ala. 2014) (citing Alabama v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 424 F.3d 1117, 1127
(11th Cir. 2005)). Count three is based upon counts one and two, which fail for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction; consequently, count three also fails. See Ass’n of Surgical
Assistants v. Nat’l Bd. of Surgical Tech. & Surgical Assisting, 127 F.4th 178, 191 n.12 (10th
Cir. 2025) (noting that counts for injunctive relief “predicated on [the plaintiff]’s

federal and state antitrust claims” rose and fell “with those claims”); Blackburn v.
McPhail, No. 5:23-cv-923-CLM, 2024 WL 2303734, at *4, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
90947, at *10 (N.D. Ala. May 21, 2024) (“[The plaintiff]’s request for injunctive relief
is not an independent claim but rises and falls with the substantive counts.”). To the
extent that Plaintiff attempts to amend his complaint to add a count under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1503, he does so only by requesting amendment in, and attaching a defective
proposed amended complaint to, his response brief. (See Dkt. 45 at 3, 6–7.) Such
actions do not suffice. See Davis-Harrison v. Chief U.S. Prob. Officer Middle Dist. of Fla.,
No. 22-14334, 2024 WL 2874046, at *2, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 13921, at *5 (11th
Cir. June 7, 2024) (“[A] plaintiff cannot amend [a] complaint through a response to a
motion to dismiss, even if [the plaintiff] is ‘proceeding pro se.’” (quoting Dorman v.
Aronofsky, 36 F.4th 1306, 1317 (11th Cir. 2022))).
Given the court’s conclusion that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this

case, Plaintiff cannot demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on the merits for
his motion for preliminary injunctive relief (Dkt. 46). See Gibson v. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, Civil Action No. 1:19-cv-01014-WMR, 2019 WL 5698679, at *2, 2019 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 195250, at *4 (N.D. Ga. May 8, 2019) (“[T]he [c]ourt concludes that it

lacks subject[ ]matter jurisdiction over this case, and, accordingly, that [the p]laintiff
cannot show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits.” (citing Hill v. Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n, 825 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2016))), aff’d, 795 F. App’x 753 (11th Cir.
2019), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1125 (2021). “[W]hen a plaintiff fails to establish a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits, a court does not need to even consider

the remaining . . . prerequisites” for preliminary injunctive relief. Pittman v. Cole, 267
F.3d 1269, 1292 (11th Cir. 2001). Consequently, the court denies Plaintiff’s motion.
See Digit. Props., Inc. v. City of Plantation, 121 F.3d 586, 591 n.5 (11th Cir. 1997) (“Given
its lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the district court . . . properly denied [the]
motion for a preliminary injunction.”).

CONCLUSION
Accordingly:
1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Dkt. 42) is GRANTED.
2. Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunctive relief (Dkt. 46) is DENIED.
3. This case is DISMISSED without prejudice for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
4, The Clerk is DIRECTED to terminate any pending motions and deadlines and
to close this case.
ORDERED in Orlando, Florida, on October 9, 2025.

rhe Le
JUFIE S. SNEED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies furnished to:
Unrepresented Parties
Counsel of Record

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11167318. Public record. Not legal advice.