# TAYLOR v. TOWN OF SPENCER

> District Court, M.D. North Carolina · October 10, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11167208

## Case

- **Full name:** Mark Anthony Augustus Taylor, Jr. v. Town of Spencer, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. North Carolina
- **Decided:** October 10, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11167208

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that summons for state agency should list name of state agency followed by name and address of “Registered Agent” prefaced with notation of “c/o”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
MARK ANTHONY AUGUSTUS )
TAYLOR, JR., )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) 1:25CV581
)
TOWN OF SPENCER, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This case comes before the undersigned Magistrate Judge for
review of “[P]laintiff’s implicit requests [for the Clerk] to issue
summonses to the North Carolina Administrative Office of the Courts
and Rowan County” (Docket Entry 13 at 3 (internal citations
omitted) (citing Docket Entry 10-1)). (See id. (“referr[ing said
requests] to the Magistrate Judge”).) Because Plaintiff did not
submit properly completed summons forms for Defendants North
Carolina Administrative Office of the Courts (“NCAOC”) and Rowan
County, the Court should order the Clerk not to issue the requested
summonses. Furthermore, because Plaintiff’s claims against
Defendants NCAOC and Rowan County suffer from obvious, fatal, legal
defects, the Court should dismiss those claims as frivolous.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff commenced this action by filing in state court a pro
se “Petition for Constitutional Violation, Equitable Relief, and
Demand for Jury Trial” (Docket Entry 2 at 1),' against the Town of
Spencer and four of its police officers (see id.), asserting, inter
alia, claims “under 42 U.S.C. §$§ 1983 and 1985(3), to remedy
constitutional violations” (id. at 7-8), including (A) Plaintiff’s
“unlawful seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment” (id. at 9),
(B) “warrantless seizure of [his] commercial vehicle . . . without
judicial order, lawful complaint, or probable cause” (id. at 10),
in contravention of “the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause”
(id.), (C) “perversion of the criminal justice system, violating []
the Fourteenth Amendment” (id.) and “constitut[ing] a civil
conspiracy to deprive [him] of his rights under [Section] 1985(3)”
(id.), and (D) “retaliation for [his] exercise of rights, violating
the First and Fourteenth Amendments” (id. at 11; see also id. at l
(declaring that four named officers “are liable in both individual
and official capacities”), 11 (“[T]he Town of Spencer is liable
under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978),
for its failure to supervise, investigate, or remedy the unlawful
conduct of its officers, and for policies or customs that
affirmatively contributed to [his] injuries[.]”)).
After Defendants removed this action to this Court (see Docket
Entry 1) and moved to dismiss (see Docket Entry 6), Plaintiff filed
the First Amended Complaint, dropping the four officers as

* Quotations from Plaintiff’s filings omit all-caps and bold
font.
-2-

Defendants and adding Defendants Rowan County and NCAOC (see Docket
Entry 10 at 3-4 (listing only Plaintiff, Town of Spencer, Rowan
County, and NCAOC in section labeled “Parties” (italics omitted));
see also id. at 1 (same as to caption), 2 (“formally join[ing]
additional Defendants Rowan County . . . and [NCAOC]”); but see,
e.g., id. at 4-5 (discussing said four officers in “Factual
Background” section and describing each as “sued in his official
capacity” (italics omitted)). The First Amended Complaint does not
purport to hold Defendants NCAOC and Rowan County liable for
Plaintiff’s first four claims for relief. (See id. at 12-17
(omitting Defendants NCAOC and Rowan County from lists of those
“La]lgainst” whom Plaintiff asserted said claims) .)
The “Fifth Claim for Relief” (id. at 17), entitled
“Institutional Liability for Unconstitutional Detention and
Systemic Due Process Violations” (id. (italics omitted)), however,
does state that it lies “[a]gainst[ Defendant] Rowan County” (id.
at 18; see also id. at 18-19 (“[Defendant] Rowan County .. .
failed to ensure lawful processing of arrests, filings, and habeas
corpus petitions, resulting in prolonged and unlawful detention of
Plaintiff... . This prolonged detention without due process
violates the Fourth and Fifth Amendments ... .”)}). Additionally,
Plaintiff asserted the “Sixth Claim for Relief” (id. at 19), for
“Denial of Access to Court and [] Systemic Judicial Obstruction”
(id. (italics omitted)), “[a]lgainst[ Defendant NCAOC]” (id.; see

~3-

also id. at 20-21 (“[Defendant] NCAOC failed to modernize or
implement necessary safeguards to ensure timely assignment, review,
or disposition of habeas petitions and constitutional filings
submitted by detainees. . . . As a result, Plaintiff was . . .
denied access to court, legal review, or meaningful remedy for over
two months. . . . [Defendant] NCAOC’s archaic and ineffective
administrative regime functionally suspended habeas corpus rights
in violation of both federal constitutional mandates and the
public’s right to lawful remedy.”)). Plaintiff lodged his (final)
“Seventh Claim for Relief” (id. at 21), for “Constitutional Torts,
Fiduciary Breach, and Emotional Distress” (id. (italics omitted)),
“[a]gainst [Defendants] Town of Spencer, Rowan County, [and NCAOC]”
(id.; see also id. at 22 (alleging that “Defendants collectively
subjected Plaintiff to a sustained course of unconstitutional
conduct, including: [w]arrantless seizure of property and person;
[d]eprivation of court access and suppression of habeas relief;
[a]rbitrary confinement without hearing, counsel, or judicial
review; [m]alicious prosecution initiated without probable cause;
[and d]enial of business rights and destruction of commercial

viability” (internal bullet points omitted))).
Plaintiff attached to the First Amended Complaint two
incomplete summons forms. (See Docket Entry 10-1 at 1-2.) More
specifically, the first summons form denotes “NCAOC” in the
caption’s line for “Defendant(s)” (id. at 1), but – in the blank
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following the line “To: (Defendant’s name and address)” (id.) -
that summons form lists no name (see id.; see also id. (listing
address of “114 W. Edenton St.[,] Raleigh, NC, 27602-0629” in that
blank with words “Attorney General Office” written off to the
side)). In addition, Plaintiff failed to complete that summons
form’s blank intended for him to notify the recipient about where
and to whom the recipient “must serve on [ P]Jlaintiff an answer to
the attached complaint or a motion under Rule 12 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure” (id.). (See id. (providing no
information after prompt for identification of “[P]Jlaintiff or
[his] attorney, whose name and address are:”).) The second summons
form similarly references “Rowan County” in the caption’s line for
“Defendant(s)” (id. at 2), while again mentioning no name in the
blank for the recipient (see id.; see also id. (giving address of
“130 W. Innes Street[,] Salisbury, NC 28144” in that blank with
words “Rowan County County Manager” written off to the side)).
And, as with the first summons form, the second summons form
contains no “name and address” (id.) to whom and at which “[t]he
answer or [responsive] motion must be served” (id.). (See id.)
The Court (per Chief/Senior United States District Judge
Catherine C. Eagles) thereafter entered an Order (Docket Entry 13),
in which she noted that “[P]Jlaintiff ha[d] not responded to the
motion to dismiss” (id. at 1), but “ha[d] filed [the First A]mended
[C]omplaint as allowed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

~5-

15(a) (1) (B)” (id. (citing Docket Entry 10)). That Order explains
that (A) “[t]he evidence submitted by the [officer] defendants
named in the original complaint . . . shows that they ha[d] never
been served with process” (id.) and (B) “nothing on the docket
reflect[ed] that [ P]laintiff ever requested that summonses be
issued to those defendants . . . [or that he filed] proof of
service” (id.). After observing, inter alia, that “[t]he [officer]
defendants are no longer listed as defendants in the caption of the
[First A]mended [C]omplaint” (id. at 2 (citing Docket Entry 10 at
1)) and that “neither” (id.) of the “summons[ forms attached] to
[the First A]mended [C]omplaint .. . is directed to any [officer]
defendant” (id. (citing Docket Entry 10-1)), Chief/Senior Judge
Fagles concluded that “dismissal without prejudice as to the
[officer] defendants [wa]s appropriate” (id. at 3). “As to
[D]efendant Town of Spencer, the motion to dismiss [wa]s otherwise
denied as moot, without prejudice to renewed motions to dismiss if
warranted.” (Id. (all-caps and bold font omitted); see also id.
(“[P]laintiff has filed [the First A]mended [C]lomplaint as of
right. Therefore, the motion to dismiss the original complaint for
failure to state a claim will be denied as moot... .” (internal
citation omitted)).) Lastly, “[{P]laintiff’s implicit requests
[for] issulance of] summonses to [Defendants NCAOC] and Rowan
County [we]lre referred to the [undersigned] Magistrate Judge.”
(Id. (internal citations omitted) .)

-~6-

DISCUSSION
To obtain service of process on a defendant, “[a] summons must
be served with a copy of the complaint.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(1).
“The plaintiff is responsible for having the summons and complaint
served within the time allowed by [Federal] Rule [of Civil
Procedure] 4(m) . . . .” Id. Accordingly, “[o]n or after filing
[a] complaint, the plaintiff may present a summons to the clerk for
signature and seal. If the summons is properly completed, the
clerk must sign, seal, and issue it to the plaintiff for service on
the defendant.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(b) (emphasis added). Among
other things, to qualify as “properly completed,” id., “[a] summons
must . . . be directed to the defendant[ and ] state the name and
address of the plaintiff’s attorney or – if unrepresented – of the
plaintiff,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(a)(1). Here, as documented in the
Introduction, Plaintiff submitted summons forms along with the
First Amended Complaint, “but he only partially completed them,”
Stewart v. Bishop, No. 0:24CV3606, 2024 WL 5290907, at *5 (D.S.C.
Aug. 29, 2024) (unpublished), recommendation adopted, 2024 WL
5054919 (D.S.C. Dec. 9, 2024) (unpublished).

“[Federal] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 4(b) . . . states that
the Clerk is not required to sign, seal or issue a summons unless
it is ‘properly completed.’” Martinez v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr.
Co., No. 5:11CV580, 2012 WL 140496, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 18, 2012)
(unpublished) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(b)). In this case, “the
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[C]lerk cannot sign, seal, and issue the [proposed] summonses
because Plaintiff has not included [1] Defendants’ names ... or
[2] his name and address.” Stewart, 2024 WL 5290907, at *5. Nor,
as concerns the first of those two defects, i.e., Plaintiff’s
failure to comply with the requirement that “[a] proper summons
[must] contain[] the correct name of the defendant [so that it can
be] directed to the defendant,” Newton v. BBVA, No. 4:21CV574, 2022
WL 18141394, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 30, 2022) (unpublished),
recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 114216 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 5, 2023)
(unpublished), could the Court deem the summons forms submitted by
Plaintiff “properly completed,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(b), simply
because their captions include the names of Defendants NCAOC and
Rowan County (see Docket Entry 10-1 at 1-2). To the contrary,
service on such entities, i.e., “state-created governmental
organization[s],” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(4) (2),° requires “delivering a
copy of the summons and of the complaint to [the governmental
organization’s] chief executive officer; or [] serving a copy of
each in the manner prescribed by that state’s law for serving a
summons or like process on such a defendant,” id. (emphasis added).

* North Carolina law has “established a State office to be
known as the Administrative Office of the Courts,” N.C. Gen. Stat.
S 7A-340, as well as “100 counties,” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A-10,
including “Rowan,” id.; see also Davidson Cnty. v. City of High
Point, 321 N.C. 252, 257, 362 S.E.2d 553, 557 (1987) (“Counties
. . exist solely as political subdivisions of the State and are
creatures of statute.”).
-~g-

Under North Carolina law, all authorized means for service
“~Tu]pon an agency of the State,” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule
4(5) (4) (a), like Defendant NCAOC, mandate the direction of the
summons (whether for personal delivery or via approved mail/common
carrier method) “to the process agent appointed by the agency,” id.
(emphasis added). See, e.g., Gaddy v. University of N.C. Health
Care Sys., No. 23CV938, 2024 WL 4950173, at *3 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 3,
2024) (unpublished) (Schroeder, J.) (“North Carolina law instructs
that an agency of the state must be served by directing the summons
and complaint to its process agent.”); see also N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 1A-1, Rule 4(j) (4) (6) (“Every agency of the State shall appoint
a process agent by filing with the Attorney General the name and
address of an agent upon whom process may be served.”).° As to
service “[u]pon a county,” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 4(34) (5) (b),
North Carolina law limits the direction of all permitted forms of
service to the “county manager or to the chairman, clerk or any
member of [its] board of commissioners,” id. See, e.g., Fuller v.
Dixon, No. 7:21CV40, 2022 WL 3328877, at *4 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 11,
2022) (unpublished) (observing that, for counties, “North Carolina
permits service of process on the county manager or to the
chairman, clerk or any member of the board of commissioners for

> Defendant NCAOC has appointed a process agent and has filed
the required notice with the North Carolina Attorney General. See
https://ncedoj.gov/legal-services/legal-resources/process-agent-
directory (last visited Oct. 7, 2025).
□□□

such county” (internal quotation marks omitted)), aff’d, No. 22-
2231, 2024 WL 2874281 (4th Cir. June 7, 2024) (unpublished).
Plainly stated, service on an entity (such as Defendants NCAOC
and Rowan County) must go to an agent of such entity “and[,] when
the defendant is being served through its agent, the summons should
state the agent’s name and address.” Newton, 2022 WL 18141394, at
*4 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
RPR & Assocs., Inc. v. State, 139 N.C. App. 525, 531, 534 S.E.2d
247, 252 (2000) (explaining that summons for state agency should
list name of state agency followed by name and address of
“Registered Agent” prefaced with notation of “c/o”), aff’d, 353
N.C. 362, 543 S.E.2d 480 (2001). The summons forms tendered by
Plaintiff do not comply with that requirement because (as the
Introduction documents) they do not direct service to (A) Defendant
NCAOC along with the name and address of its “chief executive
officer,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(j)(2), or “the process agent appointed
by [Defendant NCAOC],” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 4(j)(4)(a), or
(B) Defendant Rowan County along with the name and address of its
“chief executive officer,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(j)(2), “its county

manager[,] or [] the chairman, clerk or any member of [its] board
of commissioners,” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 4(j)(5)(b). See
Styles v. McDonalds Rest., No. 4:17CV791, 2019 WL 2266636, at *4
(E.D. Tex. Jan. 28, 2019) (unpublished) (“[I]t is [the p]laintiff’s
responsibility to find and to provide [the d]efendant’s agent for
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service and correct address for preparing summons, so that . . .
summons may issue; it is not the clerk’s office[’s] responsibility
to research and supply this information.”), recommendation adopted,
2019 WL 1219117 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 15, 2019) (unpublished); see also
Kenyatta v. Chalmers-Judd Land Enters., LLC, No. 1:25CV323, 2025 WL
2378989, at *3 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 15, 2025) (unpublished) (Eagles,
C./S.J.) (ruling attempted service “not valid” where the plaintiff
failed to show “that service was [directed to] one of the
designated persons” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(j)(2)).
Ordinarily, given Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court might
grant him another chance to submit properly completed summons forms
for Defendants NCAOC and Rowan County, in order to obtain summonses
for and to make service on them, but “the Court [should] find[]
that granting Plaintiff[] additional time for service[-related
activities] would be futile because the[ First Amended] Complaint
is [as to Defendants NCAOC and Rowan County] fatally defective in
that it sets forth frivolous claims [against them] which cannot be
remedied by amendment.” Gonzalez v. Ocwen Home Loan Servicing, 74
F. Supp. 3d 504, 521 (D. Conn. 2015) (internal quotation marks

omitted), aff’d sub nom., Gonzalez v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co.,
632 F. App’x 32 (2d Cir. 2016); see also Faison v. Vickers, No.
2:23CV1437, 2025 WL 346520, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 30, 2025)
(unpublished) (directing “[c]lerk of [c]ourt not to issue a signed,
sealed summons to [the plaintiff] until the [c]ourt finds that [he]
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has... stated a claim on which relief may be granted”); Stern v.
Epps, No. 2:08CV33, 2008 WL 4793720, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Oct. 29,
2008) (unpublished) (denying “request . . . for summons,” where
“[the pllaintiff ha[d] failed to allege facts that would entitle
him to relief against such parties”). To that end, apart from any
statutory provision requiring federal courts to dismiss frivolous
claims sua sponte in certain contexts, see, e.g., 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915 (2) (B) (1), “there is little doubt they would have power to
do so even in the absence of [such a] statutory provision,” Mallard
v. United States Dist. Ct. for S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 308
(1989); see also, e.g., Ross v. Baron, 493 F. App’x 405, 406 (4th
Cir. 2012) (“[F]rivolous complaints are subject to dismissal
pursuant to the inherent authority of the court... .”); Brown v.
Maynard, Civ. No. 11-619, 2011 WL 883917, at *1 (D. Md. Mar. 11,
2011) (unpublished) (“[I]t is well established that a court has
broad inherent power sua sponte to dismiss an action, or part of an
action, which is frivolous... .” (italics omitted)).
“In addition, because [the C]lourt lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over an obviously frivolous complaint, dismissal prior
to service of process is permitted.” Ross, 493 F. App’x at 406
(citing Ricketts v. Midwest Nat’1] Bank, 874 F.2d 1177, 1181-83 (7th
Cir. 1989), and Franklin v. Oregon, State Welfare Div., 662 F.2d
1337, 1342-43 (9th Cir. 1981)); accord Yi v. Social Sec. Admin.,
554 F. App’x 247, 248 (4th Cir. 2014); see also, e.g., Constantine

-12-

v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 480 (4th
Cir. 2005) (“A federal court has an independent obligation to
assess its subject-matter jurisdiction, and it will raise a lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction on its own motion.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)). Indeed, “[o]ver the years [the Supreme] Court has
repeatedly held that the federal courts are without power to
entertain claims otherwise within their jurisdiction if they are so
attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit,
wholly insubstantial, obviously frivolous, plainly unsubstantial,
or no longer open to discussion.” Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528,
536-37 (1974) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Put another way, “where a claim is obviously without merit, Hagans
precludes a federal district court from exercising its
jurisdiction.” Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir.
1999); see also Davis v. Pak, 856 F.2d 648, 651 (4th Cir. 1988)
(“Hagans stands for the proposition that federal courts are without
jurisdiction to hear frivolous constitutional claims.”).

Starting with Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Rowan
County, the Court should reject those claims because they rest on
a frivolously false foundation, i.e., that “Defendant Rowan County
. . . oversee[s] the Rowan County Sheriff’s Office, Rowan County
Jail, and Rowan County Clerk of Superior Court.” (Docket Entry 10
at 5; see also id. at 19 (errantly alleging that “[Defendant] Rowan
County is responsible for overseeing the Rowan County Detention
-13-
Center, Clerk of Court operations, and Sheriff’s Office all of
which contributed to the unlawful detention of Plaintiff” and that
“[t]hese offices and departments operated under [Defendant Rowan]
County’s direct authority and policy control”).) Even a cursory
review of applicable law reveals the patent falsity of Plaintiff’s
premise; for example, precedent dating back more than a quarter
century recognizes that, under North Carolina law, “[s]heriffs run
the county jails in North Carolina.” Knight v. Vernon, 214 F.3d
544, 545 (4th Cir. 2000); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 162-22 (“The
sheriff shall have the care and custody of the jail in his [or her]
county; and shall be, or appoint, the keeper thereof.”). Further,
Defendant Rowan County does not hire the sheriff who runs the jail
in Rowan County; “[c]ounty residents hire the sheriff (through
election) . . . .” Harter v. Vernon, 101 F.3d 334, 341 (4th Cir.
1996). Moreover, under North Carolina law, “the sheriff has
freedom ‘to hire, discharge and supervise the employees in his [or
her] office.’” Id. (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A-103(1)). In
fact, the governing statute grants the sheriff “the exclusive right
to hire, discharge, and supervise the employees in his [or her]

office.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A-103(1) (emphasis added).
Consistent with the foregoing, controlling authority, members
of this Court and other federal courts in North Carolina repeatedly
have held that, where (as here) claims brought against a county
depend on “allegations that implicate [the actions of a c]ounty
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[s]heriff’s [o]ffice,” Lewis v. Hoke Cnty., No. 1:17CV964, 2024 WL
4988917, at *8 (M.D.N.C. June 12, 2024) (unpublished) (Webster,
M.J.), recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 4850413 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 21,
2024) (Osteen, J.), “[the c]ounty is not the proper party to bring
suit against,” id. (collecting cases), and “[the cJounty is
entitled to dismissal as a matter of law,” id.; accord, e.g., Jones
v. Forsyth Cnty., No. 1:25CV78, 2025 WL 1184167, at *2 (M.D.N.C.
Mar. 5, 2025) (unpublished), recommendation adopted, 2025 WL
1180277 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 23, 2025) (unpublished) (Schroeder, J.);
Evans v. Guilford Cnty. Det. Ctr., No. 1:13CV499, 2014 WL 4641150,
at *2 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 16, 2014) (unpublished) (Peake, M.J.),
recommendation adopted, slip op. (M.D.N.C. Sept. 16, 2015) (Tilley,
S.J.), appeal dismissed, 616 F. App’x 84 (4th Cir. 2015); Wiley v.
Buncombe Cnty., 846 F. Supp. 2d 480, 486-87 (W.D.N.C.), affi’d, 474
F. App’x 285 (4th Cir. 2012); Gorham v. County of Onslow, No.
4:07CV114, 2008 WL 11381868, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 19, 2008)
(unpublished); Blair v. County of Davidson, No. 1:05CV11, 2006 WL
1367420, at *7 (M.D.N.C. May 10, 2006) (unpublished) (Beaty, J.).
“To the extent that Plaintiff argues that [Rowan] County is
responsible for the actions of [the Rowan County] Clerk[’s Office],
this claim must also fail.” Wiley, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 487. In the
well-chosen words of that decision:
Pursuant to Article IV, § 9 of the North Carolina
Constitution, the Clerk of Superior Court is also an
elected office. Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-102,
the Clerk appoints the assistants, deputies and other
-15-

employees in the clerk’s office to serve at his [or her]
pleasure. [Rowan] County has no authority to make policy
for the Clerk of Court and/or his [or her] assistants.
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against [Rowan]
County for [the Rowan County Clerk’s Office’s] actions.
Id.; see also, e.g., Morris-Wilkins v. Joyner, No. 5:24CV462, 2025
WL 2399241, at *12 (E.D.N.C. July 7, 2025) (unpublished)
(recommending dismissal of claims against county for acts of
clerk’s office as such “clerks are state officials under [] North
Carolina law, not county officials”), recommendation adopted, 2025
WL 2798504 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 30, 2025) (unpublished); Mack v. Fox,
No. 1:07CV760, 2008 WL 4832995, at *6 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 4, 2008)
(unpublished) (Dixon, M.J.) (recommending dismissal of claims
against county where “[c]omplaint allege[d] constitutional
violations as a result of the policy . . . and the actions of
[state] judicial officials,” because any such “violations did not
arise out of an official policy or custom of [the c]ounty”),
recommendation adopted, 2008 WL 7674789 (Dec. 10, 2008)
(unpublished) (Tilley, J.).
In sum, Plaintiff cannot proceed against Defendant Rowan
County on his Fifth and Seventh Claims for Relief because, as a
consequence of the above-discussed, well-established law, he cannot
show that Defendant Rowan County bears responsibility for (A) any
alleged “failure to ensure ministerial compliance with habeas
corpus filing protocols, detention review procedures, and
jurisdictional hearings [which] created a foreseeable and direct
-16-
constitutional injury” (Docket Entry 10 at 19), or (B) any alleged
“fail[ure] to train, supervise, or discipline agents whose conduct
predictably led to [any constitutional harm and/or] . . . to
remediate the harm” (id. at 22), respectively.
Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant NCAOC (i.e., the Sixth
and Seventh Claims for Relief) fare no better. North Carolina law
“established [the NCAOC as] a State office,” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-
340, and “in the absence of consent a suit in which [a] State or
one of its agencies or departments is named as the defendant is
proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment,” Pennhurst State Sch, & Hosp.
v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). Plaintiff’s claims against
Defendant NCAOC do not allege facts showing that North Carolina
waived its immunity under the Eleventh Amendment for such claims.
(See Docket Entry 10 at 19-23.) “Under the Eleventh Amendment,
therefore, the [C]ourt has no jurisdiction to entertain Plaintiff’s
[Section] 1983 and 1985 claims against the State of North Carolina
[or any of] its agencies.” D’Alessandro v. North Carolina, No.
5:14CV16, 2014 WL 2535222, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 27, 2014)
(unpublished) (recommending dismissal of “claims against the State

of North Carolina . . . and the North Carolina Administrative
Office of the Courts”), recommendation adopted, 2014 WL 2547696
(E.D.N.C. June 5, 2014) (unpublished); accord Olavarria v. North
Carolina Admin. Off. of the Cts., No. 5:15CV577, 2015 WL 10477546,
at *2 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 3, 2015) (unpublished), recommendation
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adopted, 2016 WL 1060238 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 14, 2016) (unpublished);
see also Sullivan v. Cannady, No. 7:12CV69, 2012 WL 4829616, at *5
(E.D.N.C. Oct. 10, 2012) (unpublished) (dismissing “claims against
the State of North Carolina by and through . . . [NC]AOC Director”
as barred by Eleventh Amendment) .*
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff did not properly complete summons forms’ for
Defendants NCAOC and Rowan County. Even more importantly, obvious,
fatal, legal deficiencies make his claims against them frivolous.
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Court (A) direct the
Clerk not to issue the requested summonses (Docket Entry 10-1), and
(B) dismiss any claim(s) against Defendants NCAOC and Rowan County
in the First Amended Complaint (Docket Entry 10).

/s/_L. Patrick Auld
L. Patrick Auld
United States Magistrate Judge
October 10, 2025

“The First Amended Complaint notes that the “Ex [P]arte Young
[doctrine] permits suits against state officials in their official
capacity for injunctive relief to halt ongoing constitutional
violations” (id. at 20), but Plaintiff’s detention ended long ago
(upon dismissal of the charges against him) (see id. at 11). Asa
result, “Plaintiff’s requests for declaratory and injunctive relief
appear to be moot because [he] is no longer in [] custody.” Torres
v. North Carolina Dep’t of Pub. Safety, No. 1:24CV112, 2024 WL
4683300, at *2 (W.D.N.C. Nov. 5, 2024) (unpublished); accord
Sullivan, 2012 WL 4829616, at *5 n.5.
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11167208. Public record. Not legal advice.