# Cavienss v. Alito

> District Court, E.D. New York · October 9, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11166766

## Case

- **Full name:** Stanley Aron Cavienss v. Justice Samuel Alito; Justice Clarence Thomas; Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson; Justice Neil Gorsuch; Justice Brett Kavanaugh; Justice Amy Coney Barrett; Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr.; Seth P. Waxman, Lead Counsel for Harvard University; Ryan Y. Park, Solicitor General of North Carolina; Edward Blum
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. New York
- **Decided:** October 9, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11166766

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that even after Twombly, courts “remain obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally”
- noting that even after Twombly, courts “remain obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally”
- noting that even after Twombly, courts “remain obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-------------------------------------------------------------------x
STANLEY ARON CAVIENSS,

Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
-against- 25-CV-04403 (OEM) (MMH)

JUSTICE SAMUEL ALITO; JUSTICE CLARENCE
THOMAS; JUSTICE KETANJI BROWN JACKSON;
JUSTICE NEIL GORSUCH; JUSTICE BRETT
KAVANAUGH; JUSTICE AMY CONEY BARRETT;
CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., SETH P.
WAXMAN, Lead Counsel for Harvard University;
RYAN Y. PARK, Solicitor General of North Carolina;
EDWARD BLUM,

Defendants.
--------------------------------------------------------------------x
ORELIA E. MERCHANT, United States District Judge:
Pro se plaintiff Stanley Aron Cavienss (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against sitting United
States Supreme Court Justices, Seth P Waxman, an attorney for Harvard University, Ryan Y. Park,
the Solicitor General of North Carolina, and Edward Blum, from Students for Fair Admissions.
Dkt. 1 (“Complaint”). Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Complaint, Dkt. 1, Motion to proceed in
forma pauperis (“IFP Motion”), Dkt. 2, and Motion to Appoint Counsel and Brief in Support of
IFP Motion, Dkt. 4.
Plaintiff’s IFP Motion is granted for the limited purpose of dismissing the Complaint. For
the reasons stated below, the Complaint is dismissed. Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of
Counsel, Dkt. 4, is denied as moot.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff’s Complaint is far from clear. He apparently seeks to file a class action lawsuit
regarding constitutional violations related to the implementation, interpretation, and execution of
affirmative action policies. Complaint at 1. Plaintiff seemingly disputes the Supreme Court’s

decision in Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard, 600 U.S. 181 (2023) and the revocation of
Executive Order 11246 by Executive Order 14173, Id. at 7; 9. Plaintiff claims that underlying
executive orders cannot be lawfully repealed, that all disputes related to these orders must be
referred to a military court, and that litigants and their attorneys who have filed cases in “civilian
court” have acted without standing and are violating federal law. Id. at 4. Plaintiff requests
declaratory and injunctive relief, including immediate federal review of Executive Order 14173,
reinstatement of Executive Order 11246, oversight into the misuse of disability and race
disclosures, investigation into corporate and union collusion, and public acknowledgment of the
harm caused by the loss of civil rights protections. Id. at 12.
LEGAL STANDARD

A complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible on its face “‘when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Matson v. Bd. of Educ. of the City School Dist.
of New York, 631 F.3d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
Even though all allegations contained in the complaint are accepted as true, this tenet is
“inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In reviewing a pro se complaint, the
Court is mindful that the plaintiff’s pleadings should be held “to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)
(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); see also Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d
Cir. 2009) (noting that even after Twombly, courts “remain obligated to construe a pro se complaint
liberally”).
In addition to requiring sufficient factual matter to state a plausible claim to relief, pursuant

to Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiff must provide a short, plain statement
of claim against each defendant named so that they have adequate notice of the claims against
them. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-
unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”). A pleading that only “tenders naked assertions devoid of
further factual enhancement” will not suffice. Id. (internal citations and alterations omitted). To
satisfy this standard, the complaint must at a minimum “disclose sufficient information to permit
the defendant to have a fair understanding of what the plaintiff is complaining about and to know
whether there is a legal basis for recovery.” Kittay v. Kornstein, 230 F.3d 531, 541 (2d Cir. 2000)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Nonetheless, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2 )(B), a district court shall dismiss an in forma

pauperis action where it is satisfied that the action “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state
a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief.”
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff seeks to represent a class of similarly situated individuals, see Complaint at p. 2.
While “parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel” under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1654, the Second Circuit has established that a pro se plaintiff may not bring claims on behalf
of a proposed class of similarly situated people. See Kimber v. Tallon, 556 Fed. App'x 27, 28 (2d
Cir. 2014) (“Generally, it is inappropriate for a pro se litigant to represent the interests of a class.”);
Reynolds v. Mercy Inv. Services, Inc., No. 24-CV-02636, 2024 WL 1740870, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Apr.
23, 2024); Iannaccone v. Law, 142 F.3d 553, 558 (2d Cir. 1998) (“because pro se means to appear
for one’s self, a person may not appear on another person’s behalf in the other’s cause.”). For this
reason, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s class claims and construes the Complaint to assert only
individual claims.

“An action is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact—i.e., where it is ‘based
on an indisputably meritless legal theory’ or presents ‘factual contentions [which] are clearly
baseless.’” Scanlon v. Vermont, 423 Fed. Appx. 78, 79 (2d Cir. 2011) (summary order) (quoting
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989) (alteration in original)); see also Denton v.
Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992) (“[A] finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when
the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are
judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them.”). Plaintiff’s generalized objection to
policies regarding affirmative action, the assertion that the Supreme Court lacks authority to hear
such matters, and that jurisdiction properly lies with a military court, are frivolous. Even under
the most liberal construction of the Complaint, the Court does not find that Plaintiff has alleged a
cause of action.1 See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).

WARNING
“The district courts have the power and the obligation to protect the public and the efficient
administration of justice from individuals who have a history of litigation entailing vexation,
harassment and needless expense to other parties and an unnecessary burden on the courts and

1 Additionally, judges are immune from suit for damages for any actions taken within the scope of their
judicial responsibilities. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). Judicial immunity is not limited to
immunity from damages; it also extends to claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. Celli v. Bondi, No.
24 CIV. 7442, 2025 WL 903136, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2025); Fontil v. Abrams, No. 23 Civ. 4875,
2023 WL 3996664, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 2023).
their supporting personnel.” Lau v. Meddaugh, 229 F.3d 121, 123 (2d Cir. 2000) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted).
A review of the Public Access to Court Electronic Records (“PACER”) shows that Plaintiff
has filed fifteen civil actions in federal courts, including an action against Justices of the United

States Supreme Court, filed in the Northern District of Georgia, which is presently pending. See
Cavienss v. Alito et al., 25-CV-03282 (JPB) (N.D.Ga.). Plaintiff is warned that the future filing of
repetitive, vexatious, and frivolous litigation may result in the imposition of an injunction
prohibiting him from making future filings seeking in forma pauperis status without leave of the
Court. See Hong Mai Sa v. Doe, 406 F.3d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 2005) (“If a litigant has a history of
filing vexatious, harassing or duplicative lawsuits, courts may impose sanctions, including
restrictions on future access to the judicial system.” (internal quotations and citations omitted));
Gu v. Sher, 24-CV-6157, 2024 WL 4252034, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2024), appeal dismissed,
24-CV-2799, 2025 WL 1161964 (2d Cir. Apr. 2, 2025).
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s action is dismissed as frivolous and for failure to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Because it
would be futile to permit Plaintiff to file an amended complaint, leave to amend the complaint is
denied. See McCracken v. Verisma Systems, Inc., 91 F.4th 600, 609 (2d Cir. 2024). Additionally,
Plaintiff’s request for appointment of counsel is denied as moot.
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to enter judgment dismissing the action, mail a
copy of the judgment and this Memorandum and Order to the pro se plaintiff, note the mailing on
the docket, and close this case.
The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order
would not be taken in good faith, and therefore, in forma pauperis status is denied for purpose of
an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444–45 (1962).
SO ORDERED.

/s/
ORELIA E. MERCHANT
United States District Judge
October 9, 2025
Brooklyn, New York

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11166766. Public record. Not legal advice.