# Hudson v. Data Mortgage, Inc.

> District Court, M.D. Florida · October 7, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11166709

## Case

- **Full name:** Nadorian Hudson v. Data Mortgage, Inc. d/b/a Essex Mortgage
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** October 7, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11166709

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that a district court’s inherent authority includes dismissing a complaint as a shotgun pleading but that a district court must “sua sponte allow a litigant one chance to remedy such deficiencies”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

NADORIAN HUDSON,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 8:25-cv-1234-KKM-TGW

DATA MORTGAGE, INC. d/b/a
ESSEX MORTGAGE,

Defendant.
___________________________________
ORDER
On May 13, 2025, Essex Mortgage removed this action, which includes
claims under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) and Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act (RESPA). (Doc. 1). The next day, NaDorian Hudson moved to
remand. Mot. to Remand (MTR) (Doc. 4). On May 15, 2025, Essex moved to
dismiss Hudson’s complaint. Mot. to Dismiss (MTD) (Doc. 8). For the below
reasons, I deny Hudson’s motion and grant Essex’s.
I. BACKGROUND
In May 2023, Hudson took out a mortgage on property located at 33355
Whisper Pointe Drive, Wesley Chapel, Florida (the Property). Am. Compl.
(Doc. 1-1) ¶¶ 5–6. Although GenHome Mortgage Corporation was the original
mortgagor, the mortgage is now serviced by Essex. Id. ¶ 5. Hudson did not
receive any loan funds directly into his account and, at closing, Essex failed to
provide, as required by law, the Notice of Right to Cancel. Id. ¶¶ 7–8. Hudson

alleges that, in February 2025, he exercised his right to rescission under TILA
by sending Essex written notice. Id. ¶ 9.
After receiving the rescission notice, Essex failed to release the lien,
failed to return any payments made within twenty calendar days made of

receipt of the notice, and continued collection activities. Id. ¶¶ 10–11. Essex
also failed to validate the alleged debt, to record any valid assignment of the
mortgage in Pasco County, and to produce the original wet-ink promissory
notice or otherwise demonstrate entitlement to enforce the instrument. Id. ¶¶

12–13. Finally, Hudson alleges that Essex has not proven that the transaction
qualifies as a Residential Mortgage Transaction exempt from rescission. Id.
¶ 15.
As a result, Hudson sued Essex in the Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial

Circuit, in and for Pasco County, on April 9, 2025. See State Ct. Docket Sheet
(Doc. 1-2). Hudson then amended his complaint on April 14, 2025. Am. Compl.
Hudson seeks enforcement of the rescission under TILA and statutory
damages and declaratory relief under RESPA. See id. ¶¶ 17–19, 22–24 (Counts

I and II). Among other relief, Hudson also seeks a declaration that: (1) Essex
lacks standing to enforce the alleged debt; (2) his rescission was valid and
effective; (3) the mortgage is void due to Essex’s failure to comply with TILA
rescission procedures; and (4) Hudson retains full and clear ownership of the
Property without further obligation to Essex. See id. ¶¶ 25–37 (Counts III, IV,

V, and Prayer for Relief).
Hudson served Essex with his amended complaint on April 16, 2025, and
Essex removed on May 13, 2025. Notice of Removal (Doc. 1) at 1–2. Essex
argues that removal jurisdiction exists because Hudson’s TILA and RESPA

claims arise under federal law and that supplemental jurisdiction exists over
Hudson’s state-law claims because they “derive from the same common nucleus
of operative fact” as the federal claims. Id. at 4–6; see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367,
1441(a).

The next day, Hudson moved to remand. MTR. Believing the case to
properly be in federal court, Essex Mortgage moved to dismiss. MTD. Each side
responds in opposition. Resp. to MTR (Doc. 10); Resp. to MTD (Doc. 12).1
Without seeking leave to do so, Hudson filed a reply in support of his motion

to remand (Doc. 13), four notices of supplemental evidence (Docs. 14, 15, 16,
17), and a “notice of payment under protest” (Doc. 18).

1 Hudson also responded to my order asking Hudson to “explain why the complaint
should not be dismissed as a shotgun pleading.” (Doc. 5); see (Doc. 11). I will discuss
Hudson’s response when addressing Essex’s motion to dismiss.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Removal

Except as otherwise provided by federal statute, a defendant may
remove any civil action in which a federal district court would have had
original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). A federal district court has “original
jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties

of the United States.” Id. § 1331. A federal district court also has supplemental
jurisdiction “over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action
within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or
controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” Id. § 1367(a).

A defendant must file a notice of removal “in the district court of the
United States for the district and division within which such action is
pending,” no later than thirty days after receiving “a copy of the initial pleading
setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding is based.”

Id. § 1446(a), (b)(1).
B. Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” This

pleading standard “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it
demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and
conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will

not do.’ ” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Nor does a complaint suffice
if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’ ” Id.
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
“To survive a motion to dismiss” for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff

must plead sufficient facts to state a claim that is “plausible on its face.” Id.
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim is plausible on its face when a
“plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. When

considering the motion, courts accept the complaint’s factual allegations as
true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Pielage v.
McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008). Courts should limit their
“consideration to the well-pleaded factual allegations, documents central to or

referenced in the complaint, and matters judicially noticed.” La Grasta v. First
Union Sec., Inc., 358 F.3d 840, 845 (11th Cir. 2004), abrogated on other grounds
by Twombly, 550 U.S. 544.
III. ANALYSIS

I start with Hudson’s motion to remand. Concluding that the case is
properly in federal court, I then address, and grant, Essex’s motion to dismiss.
A. Hudson’s Motion to Remand is Denied
Hudson argues that Essex’s removal “constitutes gamesmanship and

causes significant prejudice to [Hudson],” as litigation was ongoing in state
court. MTR ¶ 6. Hudson also argues that the “federal claims are not
predominant” and that remand is “appropriate where removal results in
prejudice or undermines judicial economy.” Id. ¶¶ 8–9. Essex responds that it

timely and properly removed the action to federal court and that this Court
has federal question and supplemental jurisdiction. Resp. to MTR at 4–6.
I deny Hudson’s motion. First, Essex complied with § 1446’s procedural
requirements. Hudson served Essex with a copy of the complaint on April 16,

2025, and Essex filed its notice of removal on May 13, 2025. See Notice of
Removal at 2. Hudson’s state court action was pending “in the Circuit Court of
the Sixth Judicial Circuit, in and for Pasco County,” and Pasco County is
“located within the Tampa Division” of the Middle District of Florida. See id.

at 6–7; Am. Compl. Accordingly, Essex filed its notice of removal in “the district
court of the United States for the district and division within which such action
is pending” within “30 days after the receipt by the defendant, through service
or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief

upon which such action or proceeding is based.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a), (b)(1).
Second, a federal district court has original jurisdiction over Hudson’s
action. See id. § 1441(a). Hudson’s TILA and RESPA claims “aris[e] under”
federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 1331; see Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 565 U.S.
368, 378–79 (2012) (“[D]istrict courts possess federal-question jurisdiction

under § 1331” when “federal law creates a private right of action and furnishes
the substantive rules of decision.”). And supplemental jurisdiction exists over
Hudson’s state law claims because they “arise out of a common nucleus of
operative fact with a substantial federal claim.” Parker v. Scrap Metal

Processors, Inc., 468 F.3d 733, 743 (11th Cir. 2006); see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
Because Essex’s notice of removal is procedurally compliant and Hudson
could have originally brought this action in federal court, Essex has carried its
burden to establish removal jurisdiction. See Scimone v. Carnival Corp., 720

F.3d 876, 882 (11th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he burden of establishing removal
jurisdiction rests with the defendant seeking removal.”). Although a district
court retains discretion to remand a case after dismissing the federal claims,
see Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639–40 (2009), Hudson

presents no authority to support the request to remand this action in its
entirety, see In re City of Mobile, 75 F.3d 605, 607 (11th Cir. 1996) (“Section
1367(c) cannot be fairly read as bestowing on district courts the discretion to
remand to a state court a case that includes a properly removed federal

claim.”). And although a defendant may sometimes waive its right to remove a
case by “litigating on the merits” in state court, see Yusefzadeh v. Nelson,
Mullins, Riley & Scarborough, LLP, 365 F.3d 1244, 1246 (11th Cir. 2004) (per
curiam), Essex’s only action in state court was to move for an extension of time
to respond to Hudson’s complaint, see State Ct. Docket Sheet at 1; (Doc. 1-3) at

75–77. This sole motion does not present a basis for waiver. See 14C CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL. FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3721 (rev. 4th ed.
May 2025 update) (“[Federal courts] have refused to find a waiver . . . when
the defendant’s participation in the state action was not substantial or was

dictated by the rules of that court or a state-court judge.”); cf. Yusefzadeh, 365
F.3d at 1246 (“[T]he filing of a motion to dismiss in and of itself does not
necessarily constitute a waiver of the defendant’s right to proceed in the federal
forum.” (quotation omitted)).

For these reasons, I deny Hudson’s motion to remand.
B. Essex’s Motion to Dismiss is Granted
Essex makes five arguments: (1) Hudson’s mortgage does not qualify for
rescission under TILA; (2) Hudson has failed to state a claim under RESPA;

(3) Hudson cannot plead a cause of action for a lack of standing; (4) Hudson
has failed to state a claim for declaratory judgment under Florida law; and
(5) Hudson’s complaint is a shotgun pleading. MTD at 5. Because I agree with
Essex that Hudson’s mortgage does not qualify for rescission under TILA,

Hudson has failed to state a claim under RESPA, and the complaint is a
shotgun pleading, I grant Essex’s motion to dismiss.
1. Hudson Lacks a Right to Rescission Under TILA
In Counts I, IV, and V, Hudson seeks duplicative relief related to his
attempted rescission. Hudson alleges that he “timely rescinded the mortgage

transaction under TILA.” Am. Compl. ¶ 18. He further alleges that Essex
“failed to provide the required Notice of Right to Cancel at closing,” thus
extending Hudson’s “right to rescind . . . to three years.” Id. ¶¶ 31–32. In Count
I, he “seeks enforcement of rescission, voiding of the mortgage lien, and full

return of all funds paid.” Id. ¶ 20. In Count IV, he “seeks declaratory judgment
confirming rescission was valid and effective.” Id. ¶ 34. In Count V, Hudson
seeks a declaratory judgment that “[t]he mortgage is void due to [Essex’s]
failure to comply with TILA rescission” and that he “retains full and clear

ownership of the [P]roperty without further obligation to [Essex]. Id. ¶ 37.
Essex moves to dismiss Counts I, IV, and V on the basis that the
mortgage was part of a residential mortgage transaction, which is exempted
from TILA’s right to rescission. MTD at 5–7, 11. As to Count I, Hudson argues

that there is a lack of “sufficient information to determine[] whether the loan
at issue qualifies as a ‘residential mortgage transaction.’ ” Resp. to MTD at 2.
In defense of Count IV, Hudson argues that “failure to provide the right-to-
cancel notice is itself a predicate violation that supports the extension of

rescission rights and independently entitles [Hudson] to relief.” Id. at 7.
Hudson provides no legal authority that circumvents the exemption for
residential mortgage transactions and supports his position concerning Count
IV. Hudson does not respond to Essex’s residential mortgage transaction
exemption argument regarding Count V. See id. at 7–8. Essex is correct that

the mortgage transaction is exempted from the right to rescission. Because
amendment would be futile, I dismiss Counts I, IV, and V with prejudice.
Under TILA, “private litigants with loans secured by real property used
as a principal dwelling may seek the [remedy] of rescission.” Christ v.

Beneficial Corp., 547 F.3d 1292, 1297 (11th Cir. 2008); see 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a);
12 C.F.R. § 1026.23(a)–(b). When an obligor exercises this right, “he is not
liable for any finance or other charge, and any security interest given by the
obligor, including any such interest arising by operation of law, becomes void

upon such a rescission.” 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b). Exempted from this right to
rescission, though, is “a residential mortgage transaction.” Id. § 1635(e)(1); 12
C.F.R. § 1026.23(f)(1). A “residential mortgage transaction” is “a transaction in
which a mortgage, deed of trust, purchase money security interest arising

under an installment sales contract, or equivalent consensual security interest
is created or retained against the consumer’s dwelling to finance the
acquisition or initial construction of such dwelling.” 15 U.S.C. § 1602(x). And a
“dwelling” is defined as “a residential structure or mobile home which contains

one to four family housing units, or individual units of condominiums or
cooperatives.” Id. § 1602(w).
A plaintiff fails to state a claim for rescission if the “complaint and the
documents it incorporates” reveal that the loan at issue constitutes a

residential mortgage transaction. Cooper v. Countrywide Home Loans, 724 F.
App’x 741, 743 (11th Cir. 2018) (per curiam); see, e.g., Marquis v. Deutsche
Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. For Long Beach Mortg. Loan Tr. 2006-WL3, 710 F. App’x
437, 438 (11th Cir. 2018) (per curiam); Infante v. Bank of Am. Corp., 468 F.

App’x 918, 921 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam).
The mortgage that Hudson seeks to rescind is part of a residential
mortgage transaction. While Hudson did not attach the mortgage to his
complaint, Essex attached it to the motion to dismiss. MTD Ex. 1. (Doc. 8-1).

Where “the plaintiff refers to certain documents in the complaint and those
documents are central to the plaintiff’s claim, then the Court may consider the
documents part of the pleadings for purposes of Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal”
without converting “the motion into a motion for summary judgment.” Brooks

v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1369 (11th Cir. 1997)
(per curiam); see also La Grasta, 358 F.3d at 845. The mortgage is central to
Hudson’s suit, which seeks to enforce obligations and rights of the parties
stemming from the mortgage transaction—such as his attempted rescission.

See Graveling v. Castle Mortg. Co., 631 F. App’x 690, 693–94 (11th Cir. 2015)
(per curiam). Indeed, Hudson’s complaint repeatedly references the mortgage.
See, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶¶ 5, 10, 13, 15, 18. According to the complaint, at issue
is “a mortgage transaction . . . concerning the [Property].” Id. ¶ 5. Further,
Hudson “is the rightful owner of the [Property] as evidenced by a recorded

warranty deed.” Id. ¶ 6.
A review of the mortgage and warranty deed reveal that Hudson took
out the mortgage on his residence to acquire or construct it. In the mortgage,
which is dated May 16, 2023, Hudson covenanted to “occupy, establish, and use

the Property as [Hudson’s] principal residence within 60 days after the
execution of this Security Instrument.” MTD Ex. 1 at 5. The mortgage
incorporates a “Planned Unit Development Rider,” which covers the Property
and relieves Hudson of certain insurance requirements under the mortgage if

“the Owners Association[,] . . . acting as trustee for the homeowners,” maintains
a satisfactory insurance policy. Id. at 12 (emphasis added). The warranty deed,
which Hudson filed as an exhibit to his original complaint,2 and which is
referenced in the complaint and is central to his claims, conveyed the Property

to Hudson and his wife on May 15, 2023. See State Ct. Docket Sheet; (Doc. 1-
3) at 64–66. Hudson’s “complaint and the documents it incorporates” expose
the loan as constituting a residential mortgage transaction. See Cooper, 724 F.

2 Even though Hudson did not attach any exhibits to his amended complaint, I
consider the attachments to the original complaint. See Day v. Taylor, 400 F.3d 1272,
1276 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[A] document need not be physically attached to a pleading to
be incorporated by reference into it.”); Gross v. White, 340 F. App’x 527, 535 (11th Cir.
2009) (per curiam) (“A district court ruling on a motion to dismiss is not required to
disregard documents that the plaintiff himself filed with his original complaint.”).
App’x at 743 (holding that a warranty deed transferring the property to the
plaintiff and a security instrument used to secure the purchase, which

identifies the property as the plaintiff’s residence, were sufficient to conclude
that the loan was a residential mortgage transaction). Because the transaction
that Hudson seeks to rescind is a residential mortgage transaction, he fails to
state a claim for rescission in Count I.

Counts IV and V fail for the same reason. Hudson does not identify a
basis for the declaratory judgment he seeks in Count IV and brings his
declaratory judgment claim in Count V under Florida’s Declaratory Judgment
Act, which is “a procedural mechanism that confers subject matter jurisdiction

on Florida’s circuit and county courts; it does not confer any substantive
rights.” Coccaro v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co., 648 F. App’x 876, 881 (11th Cir. 2016)
(per curiam). Thus, I must apply the federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2201, and construe Counts IV and V as attempting to make claims

under it.3 See McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1294 (11th Cir. 2004)
(“[F]ederal law governs procedural issues.”); Manuel v. Convergys Corp., 430
F.3d 1132, 1138 n.3 (11th Cir. 2005) (“There is little doubt . . . that the district
court had to apply the [federal] Declaratory Judgment Act . . . rather than the

state declaratory judgment act, in this action.”); Coccaro, 648 F. App’x at 881

3 For this reason, I disregard Essex’s arguments regarding Hudson’s failure to state
a claim under Florida’s Declaratory Judgment Act. See MTD at 10–11.
(affirming a district court which construed a claim under the Florida
Declaratory Judgment Act as a claim under the federal Declaratory Judgment

Act).
The transaction that Hudson sought to rescind in Count I, and now seeks
in Count IV to have the Court declare validly rescinded, is a residential
mortgage transaction. Thus, Hudson has no right to rescind and cannot be

entitled to declaratory judgment in Count IV. Hudson’s request in Count V
that the Court declare that (1) the mortgage is void because of Essex’s failure
to comply with Hudson’s rescission under TILA, and (2) Hudson retains full
and clear ownership of the Property without further obligation to Essex also

fails. There can be no basis to provide such a declaratory judgment for Hudson
when he has no right to rescind the mortgage.
A pro se plaintiff “must be given at least one chance to amend the
complaint before the district court dismisses the action with prejudice,” unless

amendment would be futile. See McCree v. Griffin, No. 19-14646-A, 2020 WL
2632329, at *1 (11th Cir. May 20, 2020) (per curiam) (quoting Bank v. Pitt, 928
F.2d 1108, 1112 (11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam)). No amendment could remove
the transaction from the exemption for residential mortgage transactions.

Amending Counts I, IV, and V would be futile; I dismiss them with prejudice.
2. Hudson Fails to State a Claim Under RESPA
Hudson alleges that Essex “failed to validate the alleged debt as required

under 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e) of RESPA . . . including failure to supply a complete
life of loan history, proof of loan disbursement, and a valid chain of title.” Am.
Compl. ¶ 12. Because of Essex’s “[failure] to validate the alleged debt,” he seeks
“statutory damages and declaratory relief under RESPA” in Count II. Id.

¶¶ 23–24. Hudson also incorporates his earlier conclusory claim for “actual
damages.” See id. ¶¶ 16, 22. For the reasons explained below, these allegations
are insufficient to state a claim under RESPA. I dismiss Count II without
prejudice.

Essex argues that Hudson fails to state a claim because RESPA
“contains absolutely no provision requiring [Essex] to validate a debt,” much
less provide loan history, proof of disbursement, and valid chain of title. MTD
at 8. According to Essex, even if Hudson’s various letters to Essex were

construed as Qualified Written Requests under 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e), Essex
complied with its obligations, as shown by the communications Hudson
attached to his original complaint. Id. Further, Essex asserts, Hudson’s claim
is insufficient because he does not plead that he has suffered actual or

statutory damages from Essex’s failure to validate the debt. Id. at 9. Finally,
Essex contends that Hudson does not plead that Essex has a pattern or practice
of noncompliance with the requirements of 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e), which he must
to receive statutory damages. Id.

In response, Hudson proclaims that Count II is a claim under both
RESPA and the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act (FCCPA). Resp. to
MTD at 4–5. He also argues that Essex “failed to respond meaningfully to
[Qualified Written Requests]” and that he suffered concrete harms as a result.

Id. Hudson lists the harms in a conclusory manner: “Prolonged wrongful
collection efforts[.] Damage to credit[.] Emotional distress and anxiety[.]” Id.
at 4.
RESPA imposes a duty on loan servicers to respond to borrower

inquiries.4 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e); see 12 C.F.R. § 1024.36(a). When a “servicer of
a federally related mortgage loan receives a qualified written request from the
borrower . . . for information relating to the servicing of such loan, the servicer
shall provide a written response acknowledging receipt of the correspondence

within 5 days (excluding legal public holidays, Saturdays, and Sundays) unless
the action requested is taken within such period.” 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(1)(A). A
qualified written request is “a written correspondence” that “includes, or
otherwise enables the servicer to identify” the borrower’s name and account.

4 The duty to respond is limited. See 12 C.F.R. § 1024.36(f); Baez v. Specialized Loan
Servicing, LLC, 709 F. App’x 979, 981 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (recognizing that
12 C.F.R. § 1024.36(f) enumerates “situations in which a servicer is not required to
provide the information requested”).
Id. § 2605(e)(1)(B)(i). Further, a qualified written request must include “a
statement of the reasons for the belief of the borrower, to the extent applicable,

that the account is in error or provides sufficient detail to the servicer
regarding other information sought by the borrower.” Id. § 2605(e)(1)(B)(ii).
After receiving a qualified written request, a servicer has thirty business
days to “make appropriate corrections in the account of the borrower” and

notify the borrower of such corrections in writing. Id. § 2605(e)(2).
Alternatively, the servicer has thirty business days to investigate and provide
the borrower with a written explanation of why the servicer believes the
borrower’s account is correct or provide the borrower with the information

sought or explain why the information is unavailable. Id. § 2605(e)(2)(B)(i)–
(C)(i). Regardless of the response, the servicer must provide contact
information for individuals or offices that can assist the borrower. See id.
§ 2605(e)(2)(A)–(C).

A servicer who “fails to comply with any provision” of RESPA shall be
liable to individual borrowers for “any actual damages to the borrower as a
result of the failure” and “additional damages,” “not to exceed $2,000,” when
there is “a pattern or practice of noncompliance with the requirements” of

RESPA. Id. § 2605(f)(1).
“[T]o prevail on a RESPA claim, a plaintiff must show (1) a failure to
comply with a RESPA obligation and (2) actual damages sustained as a result
of the failure to comply.” Baez, 709 F. App’x at 982 (citing Renfroe v. Nationstar
Mortg., LLC, 822 F.3d 1241, 1244 (11th Cir. 2016)). “[D]amages are an

essential element in pleading a RESPA claim.” Renfroe, 822 F.3d at 1246. “For
actual damages to be ‘a result of ’ a servicer’s noncompliance, the ‘plaintiff
must present evidence to establish a causal link between the [servicer’s]
noncompliance and [her] damages.’ ” Baez, 709 F. App’x at 982 (alteration in

original) (quoting Turner v. Beneficial Corp., 242 F.3d 1023, 1027–28 (11th Cir.
2001) (en banc) (interpreting TILA, which similarly allows for recovery of
damages sustained for noncompliance)). A plaintiff fails to state a RESPA
claim when he does not allege facts supporting either actual damage caused by

the failure to comply or a pattern or practice of such violations by the defendant
that warrant statutory damages. See, e.g., Renfroe, 822 F.3d at 1246–48;
Thomas v. US Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 675 F. App’x 892, 899–900 (11th Cir. 2017)
(per curiam); Frazile v. EMC Mortg. Corp., 382 F. App’x 833, 836 (11th Cir.

2010) (per curiam).
Hudson’s amended complaint does not sufficiently allege that he suffered
damages caused by Essex’s failure to comply with its obligations under RESPA.
In Count II, Hudson realleges that he “suffered actual damages, including but

not limited to financial losses totaling approximately $159,436 in payments,
emotional distress, time spent pursuing legal remedies, and related harms.”
Am. Compl. ¶¶ 16, 22. He also “seeks statutory damages and declaratory relief
under RESPA.” Id. ¶ 24. Missing from the allegations is any “causal link
between [Essex’s] noncompliance and [Hudson’s] damages.” See Baez, 709 F.

App’x at 982 (internal quotation omitted). Hudson merely alleges that he was
damaged, and that Essex failed to “validate the alleged debt” by not producing
the information he requested. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 16, 22–23. Further, there are no
allegations of a pattern or practice of RESPA violations, much less facts that

support statutory damages.
Hudson’s arguments in response to the motion to dismiss are
unpersuasive. They are, in effect, attempts to amend the complaint rather than
contend that the complaint sufficiently alleges a RESPA claim. In his response,

Hudson expands Count II, adding the FCCPA as a basis, and lists new
allegations of “concrete harm[s].” Resp. to MTD at 4–5. Hudson may not raise
new claims or allegations in a response to a motion to dismiss. See Grossman
v. Nationsbank, N.A., 225 F.3d 1228, 1231 (11th Cir. 2000) (“When considering

a motion to dismiss . . . the court limits its consideration to the pleadings and
exhibits attached thereto.”); Burgess v. Religious Tech. Ctr., Inc., 600 F. App’x
657, 665 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (“We repeatedly have held that plaintiffs
cannot amend their complaint through a response to a motion to dismiss.”

(citing Rosenberg v. Gould, 554 F.3d 962, 967 (11th Cir. 2009))).
Because “damages are an essential element” of a RESPA claim that is
missing from Hudson’s amended complaint, I need not consider whether
Hudson’s letters to Essex constituted Qualified Written Requests or if Essex’s
responses complied with its obligations under RESPA. See Renfroe, 822 F.3d

at 1246. Count II fails to state a claim and is dismissed without prejudice.
3. Hudson’s Complaint is a Shotgun Pleading
Hudson’s complaint is also an impermissible shotgun pleading. In
particular, Count III suffers from the “unifying characteristic of all types of

shotgun pleadings,” which is that “they fail to . . . give the defendants adequate
notice of the claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim
rests.” See Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1323
(11th Cir. 2015). I dismiss Count III without prejudice.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint include
“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief.” Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(b) provides that “[a] party must
state its claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as

practicable to a single set of circumstances” and that “[i]f doing so would
promote clarity, each claim founded on a separate transaction or
occurrence . . . must be stated in a separate count.” “Complaints that violate
either Rule 8(a)(2) or Rule 10(b), or both, are often disparagingly referred to as

‘shotgun pleadings.’ ” Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1320. A shotgun pleading exacts
“an intolerable toll on the trial court’s docket.” Cramer v. Florida, 117 F.3d
1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d
1291, 1295 (11th Cir. 2018) (explaining that a district court’s inherent
authority includes dismissing a complaint as a shotgun pleading but that a

district court must “sua sponte allow a litigant one chance to remedy such
deficiencies”); Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989) (“[O]nce
a pro se . . . litigant is in court, he is subject to the relevant law and rules of
court, including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”).

“The most common [shotgun pleading]—by a long shot—is a complaint
containing multiple counts where each count adopts the allegations of all
preceding counts, causing each successive count to carry all that came before
and the last count to be a combination of the entire complaint.” Weiland, 792

F.3d at 1321. Complaints that are “replete with conclusory, vague, and
immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular cause of action” are
“the next most common” form of shotgun pleading. Id. at 1321–22.
Count III suffers from both afflictions. In Count III, Hudson alleges a

claim for “Lack of Standing Under UCC §§ 3-301, 3-305, 3-309.” In doing so, he
“realleges all preceding paragraphs”—as he does in each Count in the
complaint.5 Am. Compl. ¶¶ 17, 22, 25, 30, 35. Further, “lack of standing” under
the Uniform Commercial Code is not a cause of action, as Essex correctly

5 In Hudson’s response to the order (Doc. 5) asking him to explain why the amended
complaint should not be dismissed as a shotgun pleading, Hudson claims that the
counts do not reallege the allegations of the preceding counts. Resp. to Shotgun
Pleading (Doc. 11) at 2. They plainly do.
identifies in its motion to dismiss. MTD at 10. Hudson muddies the waters as
to the nature of the claim by alleging, without further elucidation, that he

seeks “declaratory judgment barring [Essex] from enforcing the alleged debt.”
Id. ¶ 28. He then rounds out Count III with references to multiple Florida
statutes without connecting them to any particular cause of action. Id. ¶ 29.
In response to Essex’s argument in the motion to dismiss that Count III

does not allege a valid cause of action, Hudson announces that Count III is a
claim for declaratory relief “to determine whether [Essex] qualifies as a ‘person
entitled to enforce’ the promissory note under Florida’s Uniform Commercial
Code.” Resp. to MTD at 5. Hudson’s amended complaint does not provide any

notice, much less adequate notice, of such a claim or the grounds on which it
rests. Count III is dismissed without prejudice as an impermissible shotgun
pleading.
IV. CONCLUSION

Essex has carried its burden to establish removal jurisdiction. Hudson’s
claims in Counts I, IV, and V all hinge on whether he has a right to rescind the
mortgage under TILA. He does not. Hudson fails to sufficiently allege his
RESPA claim in Count II and alleges an impermissible shotgun pleading in

Count III. Accordingly, the following is ORDERED:
1. Hudson’s motion to remand (Doc. 4) is DENIED.
2. Essex’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 8) is GRANTED.
3. Counts I, IV, and V are DISMISSED with prejudice.
4. Counts II and III are DISMISSED without prejudice.
5. Hudson may file an amended complaint that addresses this order’s

concerns no later than October 21, 2025. Should he choose to do

so, he must title it “Second Amended Complaint.” Further, most of
the exhibits to the original complaint are partially or entirely
illegible and should be rescanned and refiled in a legible state. See,
e.g., (Doc. 1-3) at 15, 23-389, 42-58. Hudson should ensure any new
exhibits that he may file with an amended complaint are legible.
ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on October 7, 2025.

fahren Kimball Mizell
Kathryn’Kimball Mizelle
United States District Judge

23

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11166709. Public record. Not legal advice.