# Rouse v. 876 Broadway LLC

> District Court, E.D. New York · September 8, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11166701

## Case

- **Full name:** Joseph Rouse v. 876 Broadway LLC and O & M Pizza Corp.
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. New York
- **Decided:** September 8, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11166701

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding that plaintiff’s stated future intention to return to a mall in the area where his family lived was sufficient to establish ADA standing

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
--------------------------------------------------------------------- x
JOSEPH ROUSE, :
:
Plaintiff, : REPORT AND
: RECOMMENDATION
-against- :
: No. 23-CV-6550-ENV-JRC
876 BROADWAY LLC and O & M PIZZA CORP., :
:
Defendants. :
:
--------------------------------------------------------------------- x

JAMES R. CHO, United States Magistrate Judge:
On August 31, 2023, plaintiff Joseph Rouse (“plaintiff”) commenced this action against
defendants 876 Broadway LLC and O & M Pizza Corp. (“defendants”), alleging violations of the
public accessibility requirements of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42
U.S.C. § 12181, et seq. See Compl. ¶ 1, Dkt. 1. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief and an award of
attorney’s fees and costs.
Currently pending before this Court, on referral from the Honorable Eric N. Vitaliano, is
plaintiff’s motion for default judgment against defendants. See Mot. for Default J., Dkt. 18. For
the reasons set forth below, this Court respectfully recommends granting plaintiff’s motion.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The following facts are drawn from the Complaint, which are accepted as true for
purposes of this motion.
Plaintiff suffers from T8 paraplegia, following an injury to his spine in 2010. See Compl.
¶ 2. As a result, he is constrained to ambulate in a wheelchair. See id. Plaintiff resides in
Brooklyn, and prior to filing this action, on July 17, 2023, and again on August 4, 2023, he
visited Little Italy Pizza, an establishment located at 876 Broadway, Brooklyn, New York 11206,
which is operated by defendant O & M Pizza Corp., at premises owned by 876 Broadway LLC.
See id. ¶¶ 3-5, 9. Plaintiff alleges that he was unable to access the main entrance to the premises
because there was a step and no ramp, and insufficient clearance, rendering the entrance
inaccessible. See id. ¶¶ 14(1)-(7). He further alleges that the service counter was inaccessible to

him because of its height, and the dining tables were inaccessible to him because of a lack of
knee clearance. See id. ¶¶ 14(8)- (12).
Plaintiff asserts that he “lives only several miles from [Little Italy Pizza], passes by
[Little Italy Pizza] at least once per week when he is doing errands, visiting family and friends
throughout the borough, and looking to eat out.” Id. ¶ 6. He further alleges that Little Italy Pizza
“is in a neighborhood that Plaintiff dines out two to three times per month,” and that he “has
dined at, and in, nearly all of the neighboring restaurants surrounding [Little Italy Pizza].” Id.
Further, plaintiff alleges that “he would dine at the Defendant’s restaurant and avail himself of
the goods and services offered to the public, were it not for the structural barriers inhibiting his
ability to enter” the restaurant. Id.

On August 31, 2023, plaintiff commenced this action. See Dkt. 1. On September 15,
2023, plaintiff served the corporate defendants through the New York Secretary of State. See
Summons Returned Executed, Dkt. 8; Summons Returned Executed, Dkt. 9. Plaintiff also
mailed the Summons and Complaint to defendants directly, and counsel made several attempts to
reach defendants by letter and telephone. See Decl. of Maria-Costanza Barducci (“Barducci
Decl.”) ¶¶ 3-4, Dkt. 18. Defendants have not answered or otherwise responded to the Complaint.
Following defendants’ failure to respond to the Complaint, plaintiff requested that a Certificate
of Default be entered against defendants, see Request for Certificate of Default, Dkts. 12, 13, and
the Clerk of Court thereafter noted their defaults, see Clerk’s Entry of Default, Dkts. 14, 15.
On May 30, 2024, plaintiff filed his first motion for default judgment. See Dkt. 16. On
September 26, 2024, then-magistrate judge Sanket J. Bulsara denied without prejudice plaintiff’s
motion for default judgment for failure to establish that he complied with Local Civil Rule

55.2(c), which requires that the motion be mailed to defendants. See Order dated 9/26/2024.
Judge Bulsara further directed plaintiff to seek attorney’s fees and costs in any renewed motion,
or such relief would be deemed waived. Id.
On December 21, 2024, plaintiff re-filed the instant motion for default judgment. See
Dkt. 18. Since plaintiff again failed to include a request for attorney’s fees and costs with his
motion, this Court directed him to supplement his submissions and file his fee application. See
Order dated 6/20/2025.
DISCUSSION
I. Default Judgment Standard
Under Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, there are two steps to entering a

default judgment. See Enron Oil Corp. v. Diakuhara, 10 F.3d 90, 95-96 (2d Cir. 1993). First,
the Clerk of the Court enters the default pursuant to Rule 55(a) by notation of the party’s default
on the Clerk’s record of the case. See id.; see also Fed R. Civ. P. 55(a) (“When a party against
whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that
failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party’s default.”). This first
step is nondiscretionary. See United States v. Conolly, 694 F. App’x 10, 12 (2d Cir. 2017).
Second, after the Clerk of the Court enters a default against a party, if that party fails to appear or
otherwise move to set aside the default pursuant to Rule 55(c), the plaintiff may apply to the
court for a default judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2).
Plaintiff properly served defendants by delivering and leaving a copy of the Complaint
and Summons with the New York Secretary of State. See N.Y. Bus. Corp. L. § 306(b) (personal
service on corporations); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 311-a (personal service on limited liability
companies); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1)(B) (service on a corporation, partnership, or association).

After defendants failed to respond to the Complaint, the Clerk of the Court noted their default.
To date, defendants have not appeared or moved to vacate the entries of default.
When evaluating a plaintiff’s application for a default judgment, “a court is required to
accept all [] factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in [plaintiff’s] favor.”
Finkel v. Romanowicz, 577 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 2009); see City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn
Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 114, 137 (2d Cir. 2011). “Nevertheless, it remains for the court to consider
whether the unchallenged facts constitute a legitimate cause of action, since a party in default
does not admit conclusions of law.” Labarbera v. ASTC Lab’ys, Inc., 752 F. Supp. 2d 263, 270
(E.D.N.Y. 2010) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also TAGC Mgmt., LLC v.
Lehman, Lee & Xu Ltd., 536 F. App’x 45, 46 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[P]rior to entering default

judgment, a district court is required to determine whether the plaintiff’s allegations establish the
defendant’s liability as a matter of law.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). In addition,
a fact is not considered “well-pleaded, if it is inconsistent with [the] other allegations of the
complaint or with facts of which the court can take judicial notice, or is contrary to
uncontroverted material in the file of the case.” Hop Hing Produces Inc. v. Lin Zhang Trading
Co., Inc., No. 11-CV-3259, 2013 WL 3990761, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2013) (internal
quotations and citations omitted). Ultimately, whether to grant a motion for default judgment is
“left to the [court’s] sound discretion.” Shah v. New York State Dep’t of Civ. Serv., 168 F.3d
610, 615 (2d Cir. 1999); Div. 1181 Amalgamated Transit Union-New York Emps. Pension Fund
v. D & A Bus Co., 270 F. Supp. 3d 593, 606 (E.D.N.Y. 2017).
II. Standing
It is well established that standing is an “irreducible constitutional minimum[.]” Lujan v.

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). “Thus, even though defendant[s] ha[ve] not
appeared in this action and ha[ve] not challenged plaintiff’s standing to sue, the Court evaluates
whether plaintiff has standing.” Shariff v. Beach 90th St. Realty Corp., No. 11-CV-2551, 2013
WL 6835157, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2013); see Dunston v. Piotr & Lucyna LLC, No. 21-CV-
6402, 2023 WL 5806291, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. July 26, 2023), report and recommendation adopted,
2023 WL 5806253 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2023); Ross v. Royal Pizza Cafe Corp., No. 17-CV-6294,
2018 WL 6313208, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, 2018
WL 6313182 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2018).
“To establish [Article III] standing, a plaintiff must show (i) that he suffered an injury in
fact that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; (ii) that the injury was likely caused

by the defendant; and (iii) that the injury would likely be redressed by judicial relief.”
TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 423 (2021). In the ADA context, “a disabled
individual claiming discrimination must satisfy the case or controversy requirement of Article III
by demonstrating his [or her] standing to sue at each stage of the litigation.” Brown v. Mermaid
Plaza Assocs. LLC, No. 13-CV-760, 2018 WL 2722454, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2018) (quoting
Chapman v. Pier I Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 946 (9th Cir. 2011)).
“In ADA cases, a broad view of constitutional standing is appropriate because private
enforcement suits are the primary method of obtaining compliance with the Act.” Hashimi v.
Conandy Realty LLC, No. 23-CV-2300, 2024 WL 1006833, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2024)
(citation omitted), report and recommendation adopted, Order (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2024); see
Brown, 2018 WL 2722454, at *6 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
In ADA suits seeking injunctive relief to remedy lack of access to a public
accommodation, courts have found standing where:

(1) the plaintiff alleged past injury under the ADA; (2) it was reasonable to infer
that the discriminatory treatment would continue; and (3) it was reasonable to
infer, based on the past frequency of plaintiff’s visits and the proximity of
defendants’ [services] to plaintiff’s home, that plaintiff intended to return to the
subject location.

Bernstein v. City of New York, 621 F. App’x 56, 57 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Kreisler v. Second
Ave. Diner Corp., 731 F.3d 184, 187-88 (2d Cir. 2013)) (brackets added in Bernstein); see Harty
v. Simon Prop. Grp., L.P., 428 F. App’x 69, 71 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Camarillo v. Carrols
Corp., 518 F.3d 153, 158 (2d Cir. 2008)). “Courts considering ADA claims have found that
disabled plaintiffs who had encountered barriers at [restaurants or] stores . . . prior to filing their
complaints have standing to bring claims for injunctive relief if they show a plausible intention
or desire to return to the place but for the barriers to access.” Ross, 2018 WL 6313208, at *2
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see Adams v. 8618-8620 Third Ave. Realty
Corp., No. 22-CV-5722, 2023 WL 5279355, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. July 28, 2023), report and
recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 5278483 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2023); Chavez v. L2 Liu Inc.,
No. 20-CV-1388, 2021 WL 1146561, at *3-4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2021), report and
recommendation adopted as modified, 2021 WL 1146040 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2021).
Here, the allegations in plaintiff’s Complaint are sufficient to establish his standing to
seek injunctive relief under Title III of the ADA. Plaintiff alleges that he visited the restaurant
twice prior to filing suit and encountered barriers to access. See Compl. ¶¶ 5, 9. Plaintiff
represents that he intends to return to the restaurant to “avail himself of the goods and services
offered to the public,” but will continue to be denied access in the future unless the architectural
barriers to access are removed. See id. ¶ 5. Given the number and nature of the barriers
described by plaintiff, including barriers to access the entrance, it is reasonable to infer that,
absent a court order requiring remediation, the barriers will remain. Plaintiff alleges that he

resides within a few miles of the subject restaurant in Brooklyn, passes by there at least once per
week, and dines out at restaurants on the same street about once or twice per month. See id. ¶ 6.
These allegations are sufficient to establish plaintiff’s standing to seek injunctive relief under
Title III of the ADA. See Simon Prop. Grp., 428 F. App’x at 71 (finding that plaintiff’s stated
future intention to return to a mall in the area where his family lived was sufficient to establish
ADA standing); Conandy Realty, 2024 WL 100683, at *4 (finding standing based on similar
allegations); Adams, 2023 WL 5279355, at *3 (finding standing where plaintiff “reside[d] less
than six miles from the Facility, passes the Facility at least once per week, dine[d] in the
neighborhood several times per month, and alleged that he plan[ned] to return to the Facility”);
L2 Liu Inc., 2021 WL 1146561, at *4 (finding that it was “reasonably plausible that plaintiff has

an intent to return to the Website and the Hotel” while “question[ing] why plaintiff would want
to stay in a hotel so close to his home”).
III. Liability
This Court concludes that plaintiff has established defendants’ liability under Title III of
the ADA. The applicable section of the statute provides that “[n]o individual shall be
discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public
accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public
accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). To demonstrate liability under this provision, a
plaintiff must allege: “(1) [that] he or she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) that
the defendants own, lease, or operate a place of public accommodation; and (3) that the
defendants discriminated against the plaintiff within the meaning of the ADA.” Roberts v. Royal
Atl. Corp., 542 F.3d 363, 368 (2d Cir. 2008).

A. Disabled
Plaintiff has adequately alleged that he has a disability within the meaning of the ADA.
The ADA defines a statutorily protected disability as, among other things, “a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of [the] individual . . .
includ[ing] . . . walking.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A), (2)(A) (emphasis added); see 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(i)(1)(i) (same). Here, plaintiff adequately alleges that, as a result of a spinal injury, he
is “bound to ambulate in a wheelchair.” Compl. ¶ 2. Thus, plaintiff is a disabled individual for
the purposes of the ADA, as he is substantially limited in the major life activity of walking. See
Pierre v. Smith St. Bagels Inc., No. 23-CV-7901, 2025 WL 2371077, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. July 3,
2025), report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 2371020 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2025);

Volman v. Peri Peri 2 LLC, No. 21-CV-4449, 2022 WL 21842356, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 16,
2022) (“Since Plaintiff is bound to ambulate in a wheelchair and suffers from medical conditions
that inhibit walking and restrict body motion, Plaintiff is clearly a disabled individual under the
ADA.”).
B. Public Accommodation
Next, plaintiff has adequately alleged that defendants own, lease or operate a place of
public accommodation. The ADA defines a public accommodation to include “a restaurant, bar,
or other establishment serving food or drink.” 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(B). Here, plaintiff
describes the subject premises, as a “public accommodation and service establishment” and a
“restaurant.” Compl. ¶¶ 6, 7. Plaintiff further alleges that the restaurant is operated by defendant
O & M Pizza Corp. and that the real property is owned by 876 Broadway LLC. See id. ¶¶ 3-4.
Accordingly, the restaurant falls within the scope of the ADA, and defendants are subject to the
ADA’s prohibition of discrimination “on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of

the goods, services, [and] facilities” offered to the public. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a); see Smith St.
Bagels, 2025 WL 2371077, at *3.
C. Discrimination
Finally, plaintiff has adequately alleged that he has been discriminated against within the
meaning of the ADA. The ADA defines discrimination to include “a failure to remove
architectural barriers . . . in existing facilities . . . where such removal is readily achievable[.]”
42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv); see Roberts, 542 F.3d at 367. Under the ADA, the term “readily
achievable” means “easily accomplishable and able to be carried out without much difficulty or
expense.” 42 U.S.C. § 12181(9). Plaintiff alleges, and the Court accepts as true, that plaintiff
was unable to access the property due to several physical barriers and defendants have failed to

remove architectural barriers where such removal is readily achievable and would not impose an
undue hardship on defendants. See Compl. ¶ 16.
Further, “[a] plaintiff can establish discrimination in violation of the ADA by showing
that the defendant violated the applicable accessibility standards set forth in the ADA
Accessibility Guidelines (‘ADAAG’).” Harty v. Spring Valley Marketplace LLC, No. 15-CV-
8190, 2017 WL 108062, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2017) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted); see Conandy Realty, 2024 WL 1006833, at *5; Grinblat v. Apna Food & Oil Corp.,
No. 19-CV-6746, 2020 WL 7481508, at *4-5 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2020), report and
recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 7481327 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2020).
Here, plaintiff alleges that he had difficulties accessing the restaurant due to multiple
architectural barriers to accessibility, including accessing the entrance, the service counter and
the dining tables, in violation of the provisions of the ADAAG. See Compl. ¶ 14. The
allegations in the Complaint thus establish defendants’ ADA liability. See Smith St. Bagels,

2025 WL 2371077, at *3. Accordingly, the Court recommends entering judgment against
defendants.
IV. Injunction
Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief requiring defendants to make the property accessible.
Having found that plaintiff has established defendants’ liability, a plaintiff must also establish his
entitlement to injunctive relief. See Chavez v. 25 Jay St. LLC, No. 20-CV-845, 2021 WL
982865, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 980257
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2021). “A court may issue an injunction on a motion for default judgment
provided that the moving party shows that (1) it is entitled to injunctive relief under the
applicable statute and (2) it meets the prerequisites for the issuance of an injunction.” Shakuff

LLC v. Shakuff Custom Glass Lighting Inc., No. 23-CV-123, 2025 WL 977725, at *10 (E.D.N.Y.
Mar. 7, 2025) (citation omitted), report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 974642
(E.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2025); Grp. One Ltd. v. GTE GmbH, 625 F. Supp. 3d 28, 70 (E.D.N.Y. 2022)
(citation omitted).
First, the ADA explicitly provides that “[i]n the case of violations of sections
12182(b)(2)(A)(iv) and section 12183(a) . . . , injunctive relief shall include an order to alter
facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with
disabilities[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). Thus, the first prong is satisfied. See Sumlin v. N.Y.
Beer Co., LLC, No. 24-CV-8448, 2025 WL 1703067, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2025).
With respect to the prerequisites for the issuance of an injunction, first, plaintiff has
established success on the merits because, as discussed above, plaintiff’s allegations, which are
assumed to be true due to defendants’ default, establish defendants’ liability pursuant to section
12182(b)(2)(A)(iv). In addition, plaintiff has established that he continues to suffer irreparable

harm because his continued inability to access the restaurant cannot be remedied by monetary
damages. See Sumlin, 2025 WL 1703067, at *5.
“[T]he often-used method in this district for awarding injunctive relief in ADA cases is to
require defendants to submit a compliance plan within a prescribed period of time.” Conandy
Realty, 2024 WL 1006833, at *6 (quoting Apna Food & Oil Corp., 2020 WL 7481508, at *6).
Having reviewed plaintiff’s proposed order, see [Proposed] Final Default Judgment (“Proposed
Judgment”), Dkt. 18-2,1 the nature of the violations claimed by plaintiff, the nature of the relief
required to afford redress, and the common practice in this District for awarding injunctive relief
in ADA cases, the Court recommends the issuance of an injunction requiring defendants to
prepare architectural plans remedying the violations of the ADAAG described in the Complaint,

and to provide plaintiff’s counsel with those plans for review within 60 days of any order
adopting this Report and Recommendation. See, e.g., Conandy Realty, 2024 WL 1006833, at *6;
Adams, 2023 WL 5279355, at *5; Apna Food & Oil Corp., 2020 WL 7481508, at *6; O’Rourke
v. Drunken Chicken in NY Corp., No. 19-CV-3942, 2020 WL 4013187, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. July 16,
2020); accord Cox v. Anjin LLC, No. 19-CV-4315, 2020 WL 5027864, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 24,
2020), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 5018255 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2020).

1 Plaintiff’s proposed judgment includes a typographical error naming entities that are not parties
to this case. See Dkt. 18-2.
The Court further recommends that the injunction afford plaintiff 30 days to file a motion
seeking relief on the basis that defendants’ proposed architectural plans are inadequate to remedy
the ADAAG violations specified in the Complaint. See Conandy Realty, 2024 WL 1006833, at
*6; Drunken Chicken in NY, 2020 WL 4013187, at *5.

Finally, the Court recommends that the injunction require defendants to implement the
architectural plans and remedy the violations within 60 days of either plaintiff’s agreement or a
ruling by the Court that the plans are adequate. See id.
V. Attorney’s Fees and Costs
A prevailing plaintiff in an ADA case is entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees and
costs. See 42 U.S.C. § 12205. In his motion for default judgment, plaintiff requested that he be
permitted to file a motion for attorney’s fees within 180 days of entry of judgment. See Barducci
Decl. ¶ 11. By Order dated June 20, 2025, the Court directed plaintiff to file his application for
an award of attorney’s fees in conjunction with the motion for default judgment, rather than
deferring the issue. See Order dated 6/20/2025. Plaintiff, thereafter, sought attorney’s fees in the
amount of $9,030 and costs totaling $2,878.79.2 See Attorney’s Fee Aff. ¶ 13, Dkt. 23;

Attorney’s Fees & Costs Statement (“Billing Records”), Dkt. 23-1.
Plaintiff bears the burden of proving the reasonableness of the fees sought. See Savoie v.
Merchs. Bank, 166 F.3d 456, 463 (2d Cir. 1999). In considering an application for attorney’s
fees, the Court must first determine the presumptively reasonable fee. See Arbor Hill Concerned
Citizens Neighborhood Ass’n v. Cty. of Albany, 522 F.3d 182, 183-84 (2d Cir. 2008). This
presumptively reasonable fee -- or lodestar -- is essentially “‘what a reasonable, paying client

2 In plaintiff’s counsel’s affirmation, plaintiff requests costs of $2,878.79. See Attorney’s Fees
Aff. ¶ 13, Dkt. 23. However, in the “Attorney’s Fees & Costs Statement” attached to counsel’s
affirmation, Dkt. 23-1, counsel identifies costs of only $2,480.91, not $2,878.79.
would be willing to pay,’ given that such a party wishes ‘to spend the minimum necessary to
litigate the case effectively.’” Simmons v. New York City Transit Auth., 575 F.3d 170, 174 (2d
Cir. 2009) (quoting Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass’n v. Cnty. of Albany, 493
F.3d 110, 112, 118 (2d Cir. 2007)).

The method for determining reasonable attorney’s fees in this Circuit is based on a
number of factors, such as the labor and skill required, the difficulty of the issues, the attorney’s
customary hourly rate, the experience, reputation and ability of the attorney, and awards in
similar cases. See Arbor Hill, 522 F.3d at 186 n.3, 190. Once the Court determines the
reasonable hourly rate, it must multiply that rate by the number of hours reasonably expended, in
order to determine the presumptively reasonable fee. See id. at 190. In a fee application, the
“burden is on the fee applicant to produce satisfactory evidence -- in addition to the attorney’s
own affidavits -- that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for
similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation.” Blum v.
Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 n.11 (1984).

Plaintiff seeks to recover for attorney’s fees incurred in this matter at the rate of $525 per
hour for legal work and $125 per hour for administrative tasks, for his counsel Maria-Costanza
Barducci. See Billing Records, Dkt. 23-1. Ms. Barducci has “over 8 years of litigation
experience” and has “handled approximately 32 ADA cases on behalf of Mr. Rouse and several
other plaintiffs in the Eastern and Southern Districts of New York.” Attorney’s Fees Aff. ¶ 11.
However, the requested hourly rate of $525 is significantly higher than that which is
typically awarded in this District on a default judgment for legal work performed in a “non-
complex” ADA case. See, e.g., Rouse v. Broadway & Cooper LLC, No. 23-CV-7849, 2025 WL
1249605, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2025); Hashimi v. Conandy Realty LLC, No. 23-CV-2300,
2025 WL 914697, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2025); 25 Jay St. LLC, 2021 WL 982865, at *8-9 (in
default judgment context, recommending a fee award of $300 per hour for attorney admitted in
1985); Grinblat v. H & 6 Assocs. Inc., No. 19-CV-2034, 2020 WL 7000347, at *3 (E.D.N.Y.
July 10, 2020) (recommending $300 hourly rate for counsel with 19 years of ADA-litigation

experience), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 6110826 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2020).
Neither Ms. Barducci’s background and experience, nor the straightforward nature of this case,
justify an hourly rate of $525. In fact, several courts in this District, have commented on Ms.
Barducci’s boilerplate pleadings and motion papers in similar cases.3 See, e.g., Broadway &
Cooper, 2025 WL 1249605, at *2; Conandy Realty, 2025 WL 914697, at *3. Courts in this
District typically award experienced attorneys in similar cases hourly rates of $300 to $400. Id.
Similarly, $125 per hour is an unreasonable rate for administrative tasks. Courts in this
District regularly award $75 per hour for administrative tasks, including in cases where Ms.
Barducci appeared as counsel for plaintiff. See Broadway & Cooper, 2025 WL 1249605, at *3;
Conandy Realty, 2025 WL 914697, at *3; see also Treyger v. First Class Furniture & Rugs Inc.,

No. 21-CV-2902, 2022 WL 543026, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2022) (recommending reducing
hourly rate for paralegal/secretarial tasks to $75), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL
541795 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2022). Accordingly, this Court recommends awarding attorney’s
fees at an hourly rate of $300 for legal work and $75 for administrative tasks performed. See

3 Indeed, plaintiff’s motion for default judgment lists defendants from other cases and provides
an incorrect address for the premises. See Dkt. 18 at ECF page 1 (“Plaintiff’s Verified Motion
for Default Judgment Final Judgment against Defendants Conandy Realty LLC and Roma Crew
Inc.”) (emphasis added); id. at ECF page 3 (“located at the subject property 165 Wilson Ave,
Brooklyn, NY 11237.”) (emphasis added); Dkt. 18-2 at ECF page 1 (“Final Judgment against
Defendants Conandy Realty LLC and Roma Crew Inc.”) (emphasis added).
Broadway & Cooper, 2025 WL 1249605, at *3; Conandy Realty, 2025 WL 914697, at *3;
Treyger, 2022 WL 543026, at *8-9.
Next, this Court must determine whether the hours billed were also reasonable. Courts
award fees only for hours that are “reasonably expended.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,

433 (1983). “When considering an application for attorneys’ fees, the Court should exclude
‘excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary’ hours.” Dominic Schindler Holding, AG v.
Moore, No. 20-CV-4407, 2022 WL 987428, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2022) (quoting Hensley,
461 U.S. at 434). “[I]n dealing with such surplusage, the court has discretion simply to deduct a
reasonable percentage of the number of hours claimed ‘as a practical means of trimming fat from
a fee application[.]’” Kirsch v. Fleet St., Ltd., 148 F.3d 149, 173 (2d Cir. 1998) (citation
omitted); see Raja v. Burns, 43 F.4th 80, 87 (2d Cir. 2022); Ortiz v. City of N.Y., 843 F. App’x
355, 360 (2d Cir. 2021); Rosen v. LJ Ross Assocs., Inc., No. 19-CV-5516, 2022 WL 493728, at
*6 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 493274 (E.D.N.Y.
Feb. 17, 2022).

Plaintiff seeks attorney’s fees based on 20.5 total hours, including 3.3 hours of
“administrative hours” and 17.2 of “legal hours.” Dkt. 23-1 at ECF page4 2. The hours set forth
in these contemporaneous time records are largely reasonable, albeit at the high end of the range
of reasonableness. However, some of the time entries attributed to “legal work,” actually reflect
time spent on “administrative work.” Counsel billed 1.4 hours at her “legal” rate for mailing
motion papers to defendant. See Dkt. 23-1 (entries dated 1/18/2024 and 6/24/2025). These are
administrative tasks that could have been completed by legal support staff. See Tenecora v. Ba-

4 References to the page numbers generated by the Court’s electronic case filing system appear
as “ECF page.”
kal Rest. Corp., No. 18-CV-7311, 2020 WL 8771256, at *31-32 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2020),
report and recommendation adopted in part, 2021 WL 424364 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2021).
Accordingly, this Court recommends awarding attorney’s fees to plaintiff for 4.7 hours of
administrative work (3.3 + 1.4) and 15.8 hours for legal work (17.2 – 1.4).

For the reasons discussed above, the Court recommends awarding attorney’s fees, based
on the hourly rates recommended above, in the amount of $5,092.50 ($300 x 15.8 hours + $75 x
4.7 hours).
Plaintiff has identified costs of $2,480.91. See Dkt. 23-1 at ECF page 2. According to
plaintiff’s counsel’s billing records, this amount is comprised of an “ADA Consultant Report”
for $1,500.00, the $402.00 court filing fee, $500.00 in process server fees, and $78.91 in postage
costs. See id.
“A [plaintiff] awarded attorney’s fees is also entitled to compensation for ‘those
reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred by attorneys and ordinarily charged to their clients.’”
H & 6 Assoc. Inc., 2020 WL 7000347, at *5 (quoting LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 143 F.3d

748, 763 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). Such expenses
ordinarily include “[c]osts relating to filing fees, process servers, postage, and photocopying[.]”
Teamsters Local 814 Welfare Fund v. Dahill Moving & Storage Co., Inc., 545 F. Supp. 2d 260,
269 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). “The fee applicant bears the burden of adequately documenting and
itemizing the costs requested[,]” Monge v. Glen Cove Mansion Hosp., LLC, No. 18-CV-7229,
2020 WL 1666460, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2020) (citation omitted), except for the filing fee,
which may be recovered without supporting documentation if verified by the court’s docket, see
Feltzin v. Union Mall, LLC, 393 F. Supp. 3d 204, 219 (E.D.N.Y. 2019).
Regarding the ADA consultant fee, “[t]he court in its discretion may award a prevailing
party its reasonable expert fees as a litigation expense pursuant to the ADA.” Feltzin, 393 F.
Supp. 3d at 217; see Conandy Realty, 2025 WL 914697, at *4. Courts consider the following
factors in determining the reasonableness of an expert fee: “(1) the witness’s area of expertise;
(2) the education and training that is required to provide the expert insight which is sought; (3)

the prevailing rates of other comparably respected available experts; (4) the nature, quality, and
complexity of the discovery responses provided; (5) the cost of living in the particular
geographical area; (6) any other factor likely to be of assistance to the court in balancing the
interests implicated by Rule 26; (7) the fee being charged by the expert to the party who retained
him; and (8) fees traditionally charged by the expert on related matters[.]” Conandy Realty,
2025 WL 914697, at *4 (quoting Indep. Project, Inc. v. Ventresca Bros. Constr. Co., 397 F.
Supp. 3d 482, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)).
Here, plaintiff has failed to provide sufficient information for the court to find that
plaintiff’s requested expert fee is reasonable. Plaintiff has not submitted a paid invoice, provided
the consultant’s name, or offered any evidence for the Court to evaluate the expert’s

qualifications, billing rate or areas of expertise. In the absence of any supporting documentation
or receipts concerning these costs, the Court would be justified in denying an award for expert
fees altogether. See Isakov v. Parched Hosp. Grp., Inc., No. 25-CV-1407, 2025 WL 1569991, at
*1 (S.D.N.Y. June 3, 2025) (denying request for expert fees); Feltzin, 393 F. Supp. 3d at 219-20
(collecting cases). However, even in the absence of an adequate explanation, a court “may
exercise its discretion to determine a reasonable fee.” Conandy Realty, 2025 WL 914697, at *5.
Having reviewed plaintiff’s submissions, including plaintiff’s detailing of the violations of the
applicable accessibility standards set forth in the ADA Accessibility Guidelines, this Court finds
that some award of expert fees is reasonable. Id. Under the circumstances, the Court
recommends awarding plaintiff $500 for expert fees. See Sarwar v. 3108 Linden Hotel, Inc., No.
20-CV-10608, 2022 WL 1645652, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 24, 2022) (awarding requested expert
fee of $650 for ADA inspection); Sarwar v. Expert Hosp. LLC, No. 20-CV-10529, 2021 WL
11646301, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2021) (reducing award of expert fee to $325 or 50 percent of

amount requested), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 11646302 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
23, 2021).
As to the remaining costs incurred, court filing fees, service of process fees and postage
costs are routinely compensable. See Finkel v. O.H. & M. Elec., Corp., No. 23-CV-1076, 2024
WL 4648136, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2024); Malletier v. Artex Creative Int’l Corp., 687 F.
Supp. 2d 347, 365 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (awarding costs for photocopies, filing fees, court reporter
fees, Westlaw research, postage, faxes, and transportation). Accordingly, the Court further
recommends awarding costs in the amount of $1,480.91 ($500 + $402 + $500 + $78.91).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court respectfully recommends granting plaintiff’s motion

for default judgment as follows: (1) entering judgment against defendants under the ADA; (2)
issuing an injunction requiring defendants to prepare architectural plans remedying the violations
of the ADAAG described in the Complaint, and to provide plaintiff’s counsel with the plans
within 60 days of any order adopting this Report and Recommendation; and (3) awarding
plaintiff $5,092.50 in attorney’s fees, and $1,480.91 in costs.
A copy of this Report and Recommendation is being electronically served on counsel.
Further, the Court directs plaintiff’s counsel to serve a copy of this Report and Recommendation
by overnight mail and first-class mail to defendants at their last known address and to file proof
of service on ECF by September 11, 2025. Any objections to the recommendations made in this
Report must be filed with the Honorable Eric N. Vitaliano within 14 days after the filing of this
Report and Recommendation and, in any event, on or before September 22, 2025. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections may waive the right to
appeal the District Court’s order. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(d), 72; Small

v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15, 16 (2d Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (discussing
waiver under the former ten-day limit).
SO ORDERED
Dated: Brooklyn, New York
September 8, 2025

s/ James R. Cho
James R. Cho
United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11166701. Public record. Not legal advice.