# Davis v. Village of Greenfield

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · October 9, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11166570

## Case

- **Full name:** Harold W. Davis, III v. Village of Greenfield, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** October 9, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11166570

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding that a “[p]olice [d]epartment is not an entity which may be sued”
- finding that a “[s]heriff’s [d]epartment is not a legal entity subject to suit”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION AT CINCINNATI

HAROLD W. DAVIS, III, : Case No. 1:25-cv-476
:
Plaintiff, :
: District Judge Susan J. Dlott
vs. :
Magistrate Judge Peter B. Silvain, Jr.
:
VILLAGE OF GREENFIELD, et al. :
:
Defendants. :
:

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION1

Plaintiff, a prisoner at the London Correctional Institution (LoCI), in London, Ohio, brings
this pro se civil rights action against multiple defendants stemming from his February 2024 arrest
in Highland County, Ohio. By separate Order, Plaintiff was granted leave to proceed in forma
pauperis.
This matter is before the Court for a sua sponte review of Plaintiff’s Complaint. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). For the following reasons, the undersigned RECOMMENDS the Complaint
be DISMISSED.
I. Screening Legal Standard
In enacting the original in forma pauperis statute, Congress recognized that a “litigant
whose filing fee and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an
economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.” Denton v.
Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992) (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To

1 Attached is a NOTICE to the parties regarding objections to this Report and Recommendation.
prevent such abusive litigation, Congress has authorized federal courts to dismiss an in forma
pauperis complaint if they are satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious. Id.; see also 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). A complaint may be dismissed as frivolous when the plaintiff cannot
make any claim with a rational or arguable basis in fact or law. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328-29;
Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196, 1198 (6th Cir. 1990). An action has no arguable legal basis

when the defendant is immune from suit or when the plaintiff claims a violation of a legal interest
which clearly does not exist. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. And an action has no arguable factual basis
when the allegations are delusional or rise to the level of the irrational or “wholly incredible.”
Denton, 504 U.S. at 32; Lawler, 898 F.2d at 1199. The Court need not accept as true factual
allegations that are “fantastic or delusional” in reviewing a complaint for frivolousness. Hill v.
Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2010).
Congress also has authorized the sua sponte dismissal of complaints that fail to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). A complaint filed by a pro
se plaintiff must be “liberally construed” and “held to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (citing
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Though by the same token, the complaint “must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Hill, 630 F.3d at 470–71 (“[D]ismissal standard articulated in Iqbal
and Twombly governs dismissals for failure to state a claim [under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)].”).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The Court must accept all well-pleaded
factual allegations as true but need not “accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).
Although a complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” it must provide “more than
an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Nor does
a complaint suffice if it tenders “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Id.
at 557. The complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds
upon which it rests.” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93 (citations omitted).
II. Allegations and Parties
In his Complaint, Plaintiff names eight Defendants:
1. Village of Greenfield
2. Village of Greenfield City Manager

3. Greenfield Police Department
4. Greenfield Police Chief
5. Officer J. Hamilton
6. Officer J. Beatty
7. Highland County
8. Highland County Commissioners
(Doc. 1-1, PageID 12).
The gist of Plaintiff’s Complaint is that he was unlawfully arrested by Officers Hamilton
and Beatty of the Greenfield Police Department in anticipation of an impending grand jury
indictment but prior to the issuance of a warrant for his arrest. (Doc. 1-1, PageID 16). Specifically,
Plaintiff alleges that on or about February 5, 2024, Officers Hamilton and Beatty arrived at his
residence and beat on his front door. When Plaintiff answered, the officers placed him in handcuffs
and informed him they had a warrant for his arrest for trafficking in methamphetamine in the
vicinity of a school. But Plaintiff contends no such warrant existed at the time, as the Grand Jury

had not yet convened. Id. at 16. Plaintiff was booked in the Greenfield jail. The next day, Plaintiff
appeared before the Highland County Court, which set a $75,000 bond on “purported pending
charges.” Id. Plaintiff claims his arrest prior to the grand jury indictment “amounts to legal
kidnapping” by Greenfield police and the Highland County Sherrif’s Department. Id.
Finally, Plaintiff challenges the investigation and use of a confidential informant in the
underlying criminal case. Id. at 17.
The Complaint and civil cover sheet fail to request any form of relief as required by Rule
8(a)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
III. Discussion

For the reasons that follow, the undersigned RECOMMENDS the Complaint be
DISMISSED in its entirety.
A. Claims challenging Plaintiff’s conviction or sentence
A federal-court challenge to the validity of a state criminal conviction and sentence must
be raised in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Hill v. McDonough,
547 U.S. 573, 579 (2006); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499 (1973). Plaintiff’s allegations
challenging the methods of investigation and use of a confidential informant in his underlying
criminal case do just that. By asking this Court to agree that Defendants violated his constitutional
rights while investigating his case, Plaintiff is essentially challenging the validity of his conviction.
The Supreme Court of the United States has made clear that “habeas corpus is the exclusive
remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks
immediate or speedier release, even though such a claim may come within the literal terms of §
1983.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994) (citing Preiser, 411 U.S. at 488–90). Thus,
to the extent Plaintiff seeks relief in the form of an immediate or speedier release from

confinement, his sole federal remedy is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and after he has
exhausted his state remedies. Hadley v. Werner, 753 F.2d 514, 516 (6th Cir. 1985). Plaintiff
cannot seek or obtain such relief in this civil rights action, and this claim should be DISMISSED
without prejudice.
B. Village of Greenfield and Highland County, Ohio
To the extent Plaintiff alleges claims against the Village of Greenfield and Highland
County, Ohio, local governments “may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by
its employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom . . .
inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Monell v.

Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); see also J.H. v. Williamson Cty.,
Tennessee, 951 F.3d 709, 720 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Monell). A plaintiff may prove an
unconstitutional “policy” or “custom” by demonstrating one of the following: “(1) the existence
of an illegal official policy or legislative enactment; (2) that an official with final decision making
authority ratified illegal actions; (3) the existence of a policy of inadequate training or supervision;
or (4) the existence of a custom of tolerance or acquiescence of federal rights violations.” Burgess
v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Thomas v. City of Chattanooga, 398 F.3d
426, 429 (6th Cir. 2005)). Here, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged any such hallmarks of Monell
municipal liability. Conclusory claims unsupported by specific facts are insufficient to state a
plausible claim for relief. See High v. Silverdal Core Civic of Am., No. 1:19-cv-214, 2019 WL
4723803, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 26, 2019) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681). Thus,
Plaintiff’s claims against the Village of Greenfield and Highland County, Ohio, should be
DISMISSED for failure to state a claim.
C. Greenfield Police Department

Plaintiff names the Village of Greenfield Police Department as a Defendant, but only “a
person” acting under color of law is subject to suit or liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A municipal
police department is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983. See Matthew v. Jones, 35 F.3d
1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994) (finding that a “[p]olice [d]epartment is not an entity which may be
sued”); Rhodes v. McDaniel, 945 F.2d 117, 120 (6th Cir. 1991) (finding that a “[s]heriff’s
[d]epartment is not a legal entity subject to suit”). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against the
Greenfield Police Department should be DISMISSED with prejudice.
D. Lack of personal action
Plaintiff also names the Village of Greenfield City Manager, the Greenfield Chief of Police,

and the Highland County Commissioners as Defendants. To state a claim for relief under § 1983,
Plaintiff must allege that each defendant had “personal involvement” in the deprivation of his
rights. Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 575 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Here, Plaintiff does
not personally connect the City Manager, Police Chief, or the Highland County Commissioners to
any allegations set forth in the body of the Complaint, and the Complaint sets forth no allegations
about their personal involvement in this case. Further, § 1983 does not permit absolute respondeat
superior liability. Rather, a supervisor may be held liable only where he “encouraged the specific
incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it.” Combs v. Wilkinson, 315
F.3d 548, 558 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984)).
Plaintiff has not set forth any plausible allegations that these Defendants encouraged or in some
way participated in the alleged misconduct.
Additionally, the Highland County Commissioners do not have supervisory authority over
the Village of Greenfield Police Department. See, e.g., Hunter v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. Of
Commissioners, Ohio, No. 1:21-cv-544, 2022 WL 22626424, at *3 (S.D. Ohio June 15, 2022) and

2024 WL 1374800 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2024) (noting that “[c]ase law from and within the Sixth
Circuit overwhelmingly supports the conclusion that Ohio law does not grant the Board [of County
Commissioners] power or authority over the” sheriff’s office or local jail).
Plaintiff’s claims against the Greenfield City Manager, the Greenfield Police Chief, and
the Highland County Commissioners should be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim.
E. Officers Hamilton and Beatty
The only remaining Defendants are Officers Hamilton and Beatty. Plaintiff alleges that
these Defendants personally subjected him to an unreasonable arrest. But the Complaint fails to
set forth any demand for relief in violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(3).

District Courts within the Sixth Circuit and Courts in other Circuits have held that a
plaintiff’s failure to demand any form of relief and thus comport with Rule 8(a)(3), even when
proceeding pro se, justifies dismissal of the complaint without prejudice under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). See Adams v. A E Door and Windows, No. 1:17cv602, 2018 WL 1322240, at *2 (S.D.
Ohio Mar. 13, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:17cv602, 2018 WL 2735527
(S.D. Ohio June 7, 2018) (and noting that “Rule 8(a)(3) ‘does not require a party to frame the
demand for judgment according to a prescribed form or set of particular words; any concise
statement identifying the remedies and the parties against whom relief is sought will be
sufficient.’”) (quoting 5 Charles Alan Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1255 (3d ed.
2010)). See also Whitmore v. Mallory, No. 2:15-cv-2838, 2015 WL 6125360, at *4 (S.D. Ohio
Oct. 19, 2015) (“in neglecting to articulate the relief he seeks, plaintiff has failed to satisfy Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)”), adopted, 2015 WL 6955184 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 10, 2015); Peel v.
Woods, No. 5:15-cv-8, 2015 WL 1223695, at *3-4 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 17, 2015) (dismissing pro se
plaintiff’s complaint without prejudice because it failed to state the type of relief, equitable or

otherwise, which he was seeking “so as to give adequate notice to the opposing parties”) (collecting
cases within the Western and Eastern Districts of Kentucky).
For this reason, it is RECOMMENDED that the Complaint be DISMISSED without
prejudice.
IV. Conclusion
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT:
1. Plaintiff’s Complaint be DISMISSED because Plaintiff fails
to demand any form of relief in violation of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 8(a)(3).

2. The Court DISMISS for failure to state a claim on which
relief may be granted all claims against the Village of
Greenfield; the Greenfield City Manager; the Greenfield
Police Department; the Greenfield Police Chief; Highland
County, Ohio; and the Highland County Commissioners.

3. The Court DISMISS Plaintiff’s claims challenging the
validity of his criminal judgment.

October 9, 2025 s/Peter B. Silvain, Jr.
Peter B. Silvain, Jr.
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE REGARDING OBJECTIONS

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written objections
to the proposed findings and recommendations within FOURTEEN days after being served with
this Report and Recommendation. Such objections shall specify the portions of the Report
objected to and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of the objections. If
the Report and Recommendation is based in whole or in part upon matters occurring of record at
an oral hearing, the objecting party shall promptly arrange for the transcription of the record, or
such portions of it as all parties may agree upon or the Magistrate Judge deems sufficient, unless
the assigned District Judge otherwise directs. A party may respond to another party’s objections
within FOURTEEN days after being served with a copy thereof.
Failure to make objections in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal.
See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947, 949-50 (6th Cir.
1981).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11166570. Public record. Not legal advice.