# Suarez v. Royal Coach FMHC, LLC

> District Court, S.D. Texas · September 9, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11159602

## Case

- **Full name:** Antonio Hernandez Suarez and Sanjuana Botella Aldama v. Royal Coach FMHC, LLC; Cirrus Group, LLC; Fairfax Home Holdings Company, LLC; and Shamira Navarro
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Texas
- **Decided:** September 9, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT September 09, 2025
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
HOUSTON DIVISION
§
Antonio Hernandez Suarez and §
Sanjuana Botella Aldama, §
§
Plaintiffs, § Civil Action No. 4:25-cv-00905
§
v. §
§
Royal Coach FMHC, LLC; Cirrus §
Group, LLC; Fairfax Home §
Holdings Company, LLC; and §
Shamira Navarro, §
§
Defendants. §

MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
In this personal injury suit, Plaintiffs Antonio Hernandez Suarez and
Sanjuana Botella Aldama filed a motion to remand, asserting that their
inclusion of Sharmia Navarro as a defendant defeats complete diversity under
28 U.S.C. § 1332. See Dkt. 17; see also Dkt. 20 (referral order). After carefully
considering the motion, the response from Defendants Royal Coach FMHC,
LLC, Cirrus Group, LLC, Fairfax Home Holding Company, LLC, and Navarro
(collectively, “Defendants”), Dkt. 18, Plaintiffs’ reply, Dkt. 19, the record, and
the applicable law, it is recommended that the motion to remand be denied,
and that Plaintiffs’ claims against Navarro be dismissed without prejudice.
Background
On June 21, 2023, Suarez was tragically injured when a tree fell through

the roof of his home. See Dkt. 1-1 at 5. The accident left him paralyzed. See
id. Saurez lived at a mobile home park owned by Royal Coach FMHC, LLC.
See id. Royal Coach employed Navarro as a property manager. See id.
Suarez and co-plaintiff Sanjuana Botello Aldama1 filed this suit in state

court, asserting negligence and premises liability claims against Royal Coach,
Fairfax Home Holdings Company, LLC, Cirrus Group, LLC, and Navarro. Id.
at 6-7. Botello Aldama is a citizen of Mexico, Dkt. 22, whereas Royal Coach,
Fairfax Home, and Cirrus Group are citizens of Nevada, Utah, and Delaware

(based on the citizenships of their respective members). See Dkt. 6 at 5-6. But
Suarez maintains that he is a citizen of Texas, see Dkt. 22, the same state
where Navarro is domiciled, Dkt. 6 at 2.
Royal Coach and Fairfax removed the case to this Court based on

diversity jurisdiction, alleging that Navarro was improperly joined. Dkt. 1 at
2-5; see also Dkt. 6 at 2-5 (amended notice of removal). Plaintiffs filed an
amended complaint, Dkt. 7, and then moved to remand, Dkt. 17. In the
interim, Cirrus Group and Navarro were served and joined the other

1 The pleadings do not explain the nature of Suarez and Botello Aldama’s
relationship.
defendants in responding to the motion to remand. See Dkt. 18. Plaintiffs also
filed a reply in support of remand. Dkt. 19. The motion is ripe for resolution.

Legal standard
A defendant can remove to federal court an action that was filed in state
court if the action could originally have been filed in federal court. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(a). Federal courts, in turn, are authorized to hear cases that either

(1) involve questions of federal law, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or (2) “where the matter
in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and
costs, and is between ... citizens of different States,” id. § 1332(a)(1).
The removal statute must “be strictly construed and any doubt as to the

propriety of removal should be resolved in favor of remand.” In re Hot-Hed
Inc., 477 F.3d 320, 323 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam). “The jurisdictional facts
that support removal must be judged at the time of the removal.” Gebbia v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 233 F.3d 880, 883 (5th Cir. 2000). The party invoking

federal jurisdiction bears the burden to establish that the case is properly
removable. Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 231 F.3d 165, 178 n.25 (5th Cir. 2000).
Any doubts about the propriety of removal are resolved in favor of remand.
Manguno v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins., 276 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir. 2002).
Analysis
According to the parties’ submissions, both Plaintiff Suarez and

Defendant Navarro are citizens of Texas for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.2
See Dkt. 1 at 2 (notice of removal); Dkt. 22 (Plaintiffs’ disclosure of their
domiciles). Plaintiffs thus assert that the lack of complete diversity defeats
subject-matter jurisdiction and necessitates remand. See Dkt. 17 at 11-13.

Defendants, however, argue that Navarro was improperly joined, such that her
citizenship should be disregarded for jurisdictional purposes.
As explained below, the undersigned concludes that Plaintiffs have no
possibility of recovering on their claims against Navarro. Because Navarro

was improperly joined, Plaintiffs’ motion to remand should be denied.3

2 Defendants now suggest that Plaintiff Suarez may be domiciled in Mexico, rather
than Texas (as he maintains). See Dkt. 23 (disputing Dkt. 22). If so, then both he
and co-Plaintiff Botello Aldama could be citizens of a foreign state, thereby satisfying
the diversity requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2). This issue, while an
appropriate subject for discovery, is unnecessary to resolve at this time.
3 Plaintiffs included an extensive foray into “snap removal” under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
See Dkt. 17 at 16-22. Those arguments have nothing to do with the propriety of
removal here. Snap removal merely permits non-forum defendants—here, Royal
Coach and Fairfax—to remove a case on the basis of diversity jurisdiction before a
forum defendant—like Navarro—has been served. See Tex. Brine Co. L.L.C. v. Am.
Arb. Ass’n, Inc., 955 F.3d 482, 485 (5th Cir. 2020) (construing 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2)
to require a forum defendant to be both joined and served to render the case non-
removable on the basis of diversity jurisdiction). It also eliminates the need to obtain
consent from defendants who have yet to be served. See Dkt. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A)
(consent necessary from “all defendants who have been properly joined and served”)
(emphasis added). Here, Royal Coach and Fairfax removed this case before Navarro
and Cirrus were served. See Dkt. 1 at 8 (February 28, 2025 notice of removal); Dkt.
17-1 at 2 (March 12, 2025 service on Navarro).
I. Legal standard: Improper joinder
Federal courts have jurisdiction over actions between citizens of different

states that involve an amount in controversy exceeding $75,000. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332. Because Section 1332 requires complete diversity, no plaintiff can
share the same state of citizenship as any defendant. See generally
Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267 (1806); Flagg v. Stryker Corp., 819 F.3d 132,

136 (5th Cir. 2016). But there is a narrow exception to the complete diversity
requirement: if a “plaintiff improperly joins a non-diverse defendant, then the
court may disregard the citizenship of that defendant, dismiss the non-diverse
defendant from the case, and exercise subject matter jurisdiction over the

remaining diverse defendant.” Flagg, 819 F.3d at 136.
There are two ways to establish that a non-diverse defendant was
improperly joined: “(1) actual fraud in the pleading of jurisdictional facts, or
(2) inability of the plaintiff to establish a cause of action against the non-

diverse party in state court.” Smallwood v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 385 F.3d 568, 573
(5th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). Defendants
invoke the second theory, which requires them to “demonstrat[e] that there is

But as Defendants acknowledge, see Dkt. 18 at 3, snap removal does not override the
requirement that complete diversity of citizenship exist, even between the plaintiffs
and a defendant who has yet to be served. See In re Levy, 52 F.4th 244, 246-47 (5th
Cir. 2022) (per curiam). That is where the improper joinder doctrine comes in. The
dispositive question is whether Navarro, the non-diverse defendant, was improperly
joined, such that her citizenship can be disregarded for jurisdictional purposes.
no possibility of recovery by the plaintiff against [the] in-state defendant ....”
Id.; see also Gasch v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 491 F.3d 278, 281 (5th Cir.

2007) (removing party bears burden of proof).
Because Defendants have not submitted any extrinsic evidence, the
Court will conduct a “Rule 12(b)(6)-type analysis, looking initially at the
allegations of the complaint to determine whether the complaint states a claim

under state law against the in-state defendant,” Navarro. See Smallwood, 385
F.3d at 573; see also Int'l Energy Ventures Mgmt., LLC v. United Energy Grp.,
Ltd., 818 F.3d 193, 208 (5th Cir. 2016) (when evaluating improper joinder, “[a]
federal court must apply the federal pleading standard”). Under this test, if

the claims against Navarro “can survive a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge, there is no
improper joinder.” Smallwood, 385 F.3d at 573. Given the “significant
federalism concerns” involved, “all contested factual issues and ambiguities of
state law” must be resolved “in favor of the plaintiff,” and “any doubt about the

propriety of removal must be resolved in favor of remand.” Gasch, 491 F.3d at
281-82 (quotation and footnotes omitted).
II. Navarro was improperly joined because Plaintiffs cannot show
that she owed them a duty of care.
In their notice of removal and in response to the motion to remand,
Defendants contend that Plaintiffs cannot recover on their negligence-based
claims against Navarro because Navarro owed no duty of care apart from her
role as Royal Coach’s employee. See Dkt. 1 at 2-5; Dkt. 18 at 5-8. Plaintiffs
dispute that position, arguing that they have sued Navarro for “her own

personal acts and omissions that proximately caused Plaintiffs’ injuries.” Dkt.
19 at 8. Whether Navarro owed a duty of care presents a question of law. See
Tri v. J.T.T., 162 S.W.3d 552, 563 & n.25 (Tex. 2005) (citing Humble Sand &
Gravel, Inc. v. Gomez, 146 S.W.3d 170 (Tex. 2004)).

In Texas, an individual officer or agent is not categorically immunized
from liability for negligence merely because she was performing work for an
employer. See Leitch v. Hornsby, 935 S.W.2d 114, 117 (Tex. 1996). But such
“individual liability arises only when the officer or agent owes an independent

duty of reasonable care to the injured party apart from the employer’s duty.”
Id. (emphasis added). This limitation applies equally to premises liability
claims. See Tri, 162 S.W.3d at 562.
Many courts within this Circuit have rejected claims against non-diverse

defendant employees absent allegations that they “personally directed or
participated in any of the allegedly negligent acts.” See Byars v. Walmart Inc.,
2023 WL 4485934, at *4 (N.D. Tex. July 10, 2023) (rejecting claims against
store manager); see also, e.g., Monreal v. Walmart Inc., 2022 WL 500588 (S.D.

Tex. Feb. 18, 2022) (denying motion to remand because the plaintiff failed to
state a viable claim against a store manager based solely on the manager's
employment); Gipson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2008 WL 4844206, at *2, 5 (S.D.
Tex. Nov. 3, 2008) (plaintiff who was arrested at a store that allegedly failed to
conduct a proper investigation could not bring a negligence claim against the

employee who accused plaintiff of presenting fake money orders); Bourne v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 F. Supp. 2d 828, 838 (E.D. Tex. 2008) (rejecting
contention that store manager owed the plaintiff a duty of care independent
from the store’s duty). This case is no exception.

Plaintiff’s amended complaint asserts that, before the accident, other
tenants had told Navarro about the dangers posed by the tree and asked her
to remove it, but Navarro “failed to take corrective action ....”4 Dkt. 7 at 4, 7.
There is no allegation that that Navarro “personally create[d] a dangerous

situation” that caused injury. In re Butt, 495 S.W.3d 455, 466 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi 2016, no pet.). Nor is there any indication that Navarro took
actions that caused the tree to fall. Although Plaintiffs tout Navarro’s role as
“property manager with property maintenance and safety oversight

responsibilities,” Dkt. 19 at 8, that underscores why Navarro’s duties are not
independent from but instead derive solely from her employment. See
Schaeffer v. Albertson’s LLC, 2021 WL 4822159, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 15, 2021)

4 The Court may consider the allegations in the amended complaint, at least to the
extent they merely “‘clarify’ [Plaintiff’s] already averred jurisdictional allegations
after removal for purposes of an improper joinder analysis.” See Palmquist v. Hain
Celestial Grp., Inc., 103 F.4th 294, 304 (5th Cir. 2024). As noted infra, however, the
Court will disregard Plaintiffs’ addition of new claims after removal. See id. at 302.
(store supervisor’s responsibility to ensure proper maintenance of the systems
that caused injury arose solely from the supervisor’s “capacity as an employee”

of that store); Dougay v. Dolgencorp of Tex. Inc., 2019 WL 13141530, at *3 (E.D.
Tex. Nov. 21, 2019) (store manager’s failures to properly staff and oversee
employees fell within the scope of employment).
Plaintiffs’ characterization of Navarro as “directly involved” with and

“voluntar[ily] undertaking” actions regarding the tree does not change the
result. See Dkt. 7 at 9-10; Dkt. 17 at 26. Those contentions relate to a new
negligent undertaking claim, which was raised post-removal in Plaintiffs’
amended complaint. Compare Dkt. 1-1 at 6-7 (alleging only negligence,

premises liability, and gross negligence against Defendants collectively), with
Dkt. 7 at 8 (asserting new negligent undertaking claim against Navarro).
Under Fifth Circuit law, this Court “will not consider the negligent-
undertaking claim, a theory not raised in state court, in [its] analysis of

whether [Navarro] was improperly joined.” Palmquist v. Hain Celestial Grp.
Inc., 103 F.4th 294, 302 (5th Cir. 2024) (citing Griggs v. State Farm Lloyds, 181
F.3d 694, 700 (5th Cir. 1999)).
Moreover, the negligent undertaking claim is not tenable even if it were

considered.5 A negligent-undertaking duty “is only implicated when the

5 Specifically, Texas has adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323, which
states:
complained-of undertaking is an affirmative course of action; liability for a
negligent undertaking cannot be predicated on an omission.” In re First Rsrv.

Mgmt., L.P., 671 S.W.3d 653, 660 (Tex. 2023) (orig. proceeding); see also, e.g.,
Torres v. Pasadena Ref. Sys., Inc., 695 S.W.3d 392, 412 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2023, no pet.) (defendant’s failures to control placement of
scaffolding and to follow its own policies and procedures did not constitute

“affirmative undertakings”). “Nor can liability for negligent undertaking be
predicated on a promise to render a service that is not accompanied by either
performance or reliance on the promise by the injured party.” In re First Rsrv.
Mgmt., L.P., 671 S.W.3d at 660.

According to Plaintiffs, Navarro gave “verbal assurances” to other
tenants and neighbors that the tree would be addressed. See Dkt. 7 at 9. But
Plaintiffs base their claim on Navarro’s failure to follow through by removing
the tree. Such an omission does not qualify as an affirmative undertaking.

One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render
services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the
protection of the other's person or things, is subject to liability to the
other for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable
care to perform his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm,
or
(b) the harm is suffered because of the other’s reliance upon the
undertaking.
Torrington Co. v. Stutzman, 46 S.W.3d 829, 838 (Tex. 2001) (quoting Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 323 (1965)).
See, e.g., In re First Rsrv. Mgmt., L.P., 671 S.W.3d at 662 (explaining that “an
undertaking duty cannot be predicated on an omission” like defendants’ refusal

to authorize certain actions).
Plaintiffs also allude to Navarro’s prior actions repairing or directing
other unrelated repairs of the property. See Dkt. 7 at 9. Those previous
undertakings did not obligate Navarro to take future actions with respect to

this tree. See Ft. Bend Cnty. Drainage Dist. v. Sbrusch, 818 S.W.2d 392, 397
(Tex. 1991) (“A person’s duty to exercise reasonable care in performing a
voluntarily assumed undertaking is limited to that undertaking, and will not
normally give rise to an obligation to perform additional acts of assistance in

the future.”). In addition, the complaint concedes that Navarro gave
assurances about the tree to individuals other than Plaintiffs, see Dkt. 7 at 9,
which negates the possibility of reliance. See, e.g. In re First Rsrv. Mgmt., L.P.,
671 S.W.3d at 660 (requiring that the “injured party” rely on the defendant’s

“promise to render a service”); Sbrusch, 818 S.W.2d at 396-97 (defendant’s
promise to repair a bridge did not constitute an affirmative undertaking and
was not communicated to plaintiff, which negated reliance).
As a matter of law, Plaintiffs’ allegations do not show that Navarro owed

a duty of care. This forecloses their negligence-based claims against Navarro,
as a matter of law. Plaintiffs’ failure to show a possibility of recovery means
that Navarro was improperly joined in this suit. This Court should deny
Plaintiffs’ motion to remand and dismiss without prejudice all claims against
Navarro. See Intl Energy Ventures Mgmt., L.L.C. v. United Energy Grp., Ltd.,
818 F.3d 198, 209 (5th Cir. 2016) (an improperly joined nondiverse party “must
be dismissed without prejudice’).
Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiffs
Antonio Hernandez Suarez’s and Sanjuana Botello Aldama’s motion to remand
(Dkt. 17) be DENIED, and that their claims against Defendant Shamira
Navarro be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for want of jurisdiction.
The parties have fourteen days from service of this Report and
Recommendation to file written objections. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.
R. Civ. P. 72(b). Failure to file timely objections will preclude
appellate review of factual findings and legal conclusions, except for
plain error. Ortiz v. City of San Antonio Fire Dep’t, 806 F.3d 822, 825
(5th Cir. 2015).
Signed on September 9, 2025, at Houston, Texas.

of Y. 5
hited States Magistrate Judge

12

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11159602. Public record. Not legal advice.