# Tulsi Sawlani, M.D. v. Lake County Assessor

> Indiana Supreme Court · October 7, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11158786

## Case

- **Court:** Indiana Supreme Court
- **Decided:** October 7, 2025
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion by Justice Goff
- **Judges:** Rush, Massa, Slaughter, Goff, Molter
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE

Indiana Supreme Court
Supreme Court Case No. 25S-TA-269

Tulsi Sawlani, M.D., and Kamini Sawlani,
FILED
Petitioners,
Oct 07 2025, 3:13 pm

CLERK
–v– Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court

Lake County Assessor,
Respondent.

Argued: June 26, 2025 | Decided: October 7, 2025

On Petition for Review from the Indiana Tax Court
No. 21T-TA-44
The Honorable Justin L. McAdam, Judge

Opinion by Justice Goff
Chief Justice Rush and Justices Massa, Slaughter, and Molter concur.
Goff, Justice.

The Indiana Constitution limits a taxpayer’s property-tax liability to a
certain percentage of the property’s gross assessed value depending on
the class of property. For “[t]angible property, including curtilage, used as
a principal place of residence,” a taxpayer’s liability “may not exceed one
percent” of the property’s gross assessed value. 1 In implementing this
constitutional tax cap, the Indiana Tax Code effectively limits a
homeowner’s property-tax liability for the “homestead” to one percent. 2
The Tax Code defines “homestead,” in pertinent part, as the dwelling and
real estate, “not exceeding one (1) acre,” immediately surrounding the
dwelling. 3

The taxpayers here, owners of a home situated on 3.981 acres of land,
argue that the one-acre size limit on the “homestead” is unconstitutional
as applied to them because their curtilage exceeds one acre. We hold that,
even if a person’s curtilage could extend beyond one acre for tax
purposes, the taxpayers here failed to show their excess property is
curtilage and, thus, they failed to carry the burden of proving their
constitutional claim. Accordingly, we reverse the Tax Court’s judgment
and remand with instructions to affirm the Indiana Board of Tax Review’s
determination in favor of the Lake County Assessor.

Facts and Procedural History
Tulsi and Kamini Sawlani (the Taxpayers) own a two-story home
situated on 3.981 acres of land in Crown Point, Indiana. The home is
located in a gated community with a security guard, and access to the
community is generally limited to residents and their guests. There is a
fence surrounding the entire community but no fence on the Taxpayers’
property. The Taxpayers have also retained trees on the property for

1 Ind. Const. art 10, §§ 1(c)(4), (f)(1) (emphasis added).
2 Ind. Code § 6-1.1-20.6-7.5(a)(1) (2019).
3 I.C. § 6-1.1-12-37(k)(1) (emphasis added).

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 25S-TA-269 | October 7, 2025 Page 2 of 11
privacy and to limit visibility from a neighboring subdivision, but the
trees do not form distinguishing boundaries around the entire lot. The
Taxpayers desire privacy and say they use the entire parcel to maintain
privacy. For the 2019 tax assessment, the Lake County Assessor (or just
Assessor) classified one acre as the “homestead” and applied a standard
deduction and supplemental credit, effectively taxing one acre at one
percent of the gross assessed value of the property. See Ind. Code § 6-1.1-
20.6-7.5(a)(1) (2019); I.C. § 6-1.1-12-37(k). But the Assessor classified the
other 2.981 acres as non-residential property and applied a three-percent
tax. See I.C. § 6-1.1-20.6-7.5(a)(5).

The Taxpayers petitioned the assessment to the Lake County Property
Tax Assessment Board of Appeals (the County Board). Though not
disputing the total assessed value of their property, the Taxpayers argued
that the one-acre size limit under code section 6-1.1-12-37(k) (or the
Homestead Statute) violates Article 10, Section 1 of the Indiana
Constitution. In their view, the additional 2.981 acres of property is
curtilage and is therefore also entitled to the one-percent tax cap under
Article 10, Section 1, making the Homestead Statute unconstitutional as
applied to them. The County Board rejected Taxpayers’ claims, and the
Indiana Board of Tax Review (the Board) affirmed. Though
acknowledging that Taxpayers “may be correct that their 2.981 acres of
excess residential acreage could be considered ‘curtilage,’” the Board
concluded that it has no authority to declare a statute unconstitutional and
is bound by the one-acre size limit in the Homestead Statute. App. Vol. 2,
p. 47. Taxpayers appealed to the Tax Court.

In a for-publication opinion, the Tax Court reversed the Board’s
determination, concluding that “the Constitution does not permit a fixed
one-acre limitation on the amount of land eligible for the one percent tax
cap.” Sawlani v. Lake Cnty. Assessor, 240 N.E.3d 734, 736 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2024).
The Tax Court reasoned that, because Article 10, Section 1 imposes no size
limit on a property’s “curtilage,” the Homestead Statute’s one-acre limit
could be unconstitutional as applied to some homeowners who own more
than one acre. Id. at 750–51. The Tax Court endorsed a “case-by-case
evaluation” whereby taxpayers with more than one acre of land may
appeal their assessments to determine whether the excess acreage

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 25S-TA-269 | October 7, 2025 Page 3 of 11
qualifies as part of that taxpayer’s curtilage. Id. at 751. Because the Board
“did not make sufficient factual findings” to determine whether the
statute is unconstitutional as applied to Taxpayers, the Tax Court
remanded for further proceedings to determine whether Taxpayers’
excess acreage “is used as part of the [Taxpayers’] principal place of
residence, consistent with the statutory and constitutional frameworks.”
Id. at 752.

The Assessor sought review with this Court which we now grant
through a separate order. See Ind. Appellate Rule 63(A). 4

Standard of Review
This Court reviews the Tax Court’s decisions on the constitutionality of
a statute de novo. See State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs v. Town of St. John, 702
N.E.2d 1034, 1037, 1039 (Ind. 1998); Horner v. Curry, 125 N.E.3d 584, 588
(Ind. 2019).

Discussion and Decision
Under Article 10, Section 1 of the Indiana Constitution, “[t]he General
Assembly shall, by law, limit a taxpayer’s property tax liability” in one of
several ways, depending on the class of property involved. Ind. Const. art.
10, §§ 1(c)(4), (f)(1). For “[t]angible property, including curtilage, used as a
principal place of residence,” a taxpayer’s liability “may not exceed one
percent (1%) of the gross assessed value of the property that is the basis
for the determination of property taxes.” Id. (emphasis added). This
constitutional tax cap is implemented through the Indiana Code. The
Homestead Statute defines a homeowner’s “homestead,” in pertinent part,
as a “dwelling and the real estate, not exceeding one (1) acre, that

4Because the constitutionality of a state statute was called into question, we notified the State,
and the Attorney General intervened. See I.C. § 34-33.1-1-1(a) (2024). We also received amicus
briefs from the Association of Indiana Counties, the Indiana Association of Realtors, Matthew
Schiffler, and William Rainsberger. We thank them for their helpful submissions.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 25S-TA-269 | October 7, 2025 Page 4 of 11
immediately surrounds that dwelling” and is used as the “principal place
of residence” of the homeowner. I.C. §§ 6-1.1-12-37(k)(1), (2) (emphasis
added). A person is entitled to a credit against their homestead’s property-
tax liability in the amount by which the property tax exceeds one percent.
I.C. § 6-1.1-20.6-7.5(a). In other words, property taxes on a homeowner’s
“homestead” are effectively capped at one percent.

Taxpayers argue that, because the Constitution caps property taxes at
one percent for tangible property, “including curtilage,” used as a
principal place of residence, and because some taxpayers may use more
than one acre of their property as curtilage, the Homestead Statute’s one-
acre limit is unconstitutional as applied to them and others similarly
situated. 5 We ultimately conclude there is no need to determine if Article
10, Section 1 permits a one-acre limit given that Taxpayers presented
insufficient evidence that they use their excess property as “curtilage.” We
therefore reverse the Tax Court’s judgment and remand with instructions
to affirm the Board’s determination in favor of the Assessor.

I. Even if “curtilage” has no size limit, the Taxpayers
fail to show how the Homestead Statute’s one-acre
limit is unconstitutional as applied to them.
Statutes are “clothed with the presumption of constitutionality until
clearly overcome by a contrary showing.” Whistle Stop Inn, Inc. v. City of
Indianapolis, 51 N.E.3d 195, 199 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Paul Stieler Enters., Inc.
v. City of Evansville, 2 N.E.3d 1269, 1272–73 (Ind. 2014)). “The party
challenging the constitutionality of the statute bears the burden of proof,

5The median lot size in Indiana is less than one acre. See How Lot Sizes Have Changed, Build
Indiana Roots (Aug. 6, 2021), http://bit.ly/44GWPoR [https://perma.cc/52LD-XRTC]. So, for
most Hoosier homeowners, their entire property is taxed at one percent, and the Homestead
Statute poses no constitutional issue. And because there’s “at least one circumstance under
which the statute can be constitutionally applied,” a facial challenge to the statute would
necessarily fail. See Members of Med. Licensing Bd. of Ind. v. Planned Parenthood of Great Nw.,
Haw., Alaska, Ind., Ky., Inc., 211 N.E.3d 957, 975 (Ind. 2023) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 25S-TA-269 | October 7, 2025 Page 5 of 11
and all doubts are resolved against that party.” State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs,
702 N.E.2d at 1037. When “two reasonable interpretations of a statute are
available, one of which is constitutional and the other not, we will choose
that path which permits upholding the statute.” Id.

“When a question arises under our Constitution, this Court must
examine ‘the language of the text in the context of the history surrounding
its drafting and ratification, the purpose and structure of our Constitution,
and case law interpreting the specific provisions.’” Holcomb v. Bray, 187
N.E.3d 1268, 1277 (Ind. 2022) (quoting Hoagland v. Franklin Twp. Cmty. Sch.
Corp., 27 N.E.3d 737, 741 (Ind. 2015)). This Court approaches the words of
the Constitution with “particular deference, as though every word had
been hammered into place.” Meredith v. Pence, 984 N.E.2d 1213, 1218 (Ind.
2013) (quoting Embry v. O’Bannon, 798 N.E.2d 157, 160 (Ind. 2003)).
Constitutional interpretation requires a search for “the common
understanding of both those who framed it and those who ratified it.” Paul
Stieler Enters., Inc., 2 N.E.3d at 1273 (quoting City Chapel v. South Bend, 744
N.E.2d 443, 447 (Ind. 2001)) (emphasis added).

A. The Taxpayers argue that the plain meaning of
“curtilage” has no size limit.
To discern the “common understanding” of the framers and ratifiers of
the constitutional provision, Taxpayers argue that we should look to the
plain meaning of “curtilage.” The ordinary definition of “curtilage” is “a
yard, courtyard, or other piece of ground included within a fence
surrounding a dwelling house.” Curtilage, Webster’s Third New Int’l
Dictionary 558 (2002 ed.). “Curtilage” also means “the area around a
house that includes grounds, outbuildings, and fencing intimately
associated with domestic life in the house,” and has “no standard limits as
to square footage or size or nature of what is put on the ground.” Curtilage,
Mellinkoff’s Dictionary of American Legal Usage 145 (1992) (emphasis
added). From these definitions, Taxpayers argue that the framers and
ratifiers understood “curtilage” to have no size limit.

Taxpayers also look at how other jurisdictions describe “curtilage” for
property-tax-assessment purposes. In Bullis School, Inc. v. Appeal Tax Court

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 25S-TA-269 | October 7, 2025 Page 6 of 11
for Montgomery County, the property-tax exemption for farm buildings and
curtilage extended to thirty-four acres of a 285-acre farm. 114 A.2d 41, 42
(Md. 1955). In McTague v. Monroe Township, two acres of a forty-acre
parcel were exempt as curtilage because the area was reasonably required
for the “full enjoyment and occupancy of [the] dwelling.” 1 N.J. Tax 66, 68,
72 (N.J. Tax Ct. 1980). And in Solebury Township Board of Supervisors v.
Bucks County Board of Assessment and Revision of Taxes, twenty-five acres of
a 71.68-acre parcel constituted reasonable curtilage. 1966 WL 226518, at *1
(Pa. Commw. Ct. Aug. 29, 1966). Based on this precedent from other
jurisdictions, Taxpayers argue “curtilage” can extend beyond one acre.

Instead of size, Taxpayers look to the four-factor test in United States v.
Dunn as a way to determine whether an area is curtilage. 480 U.S. 294, 301
(1987). In Dunn, the United States Supreme Court held that the curtilage of
the home is protected against warrantless searches under the Fourth
Amendment because an “individual reasonably may expect that the area
in question should be treated as the home itself.” Id. at 300. Whether an
area is “curtilage” for purposes of a search depends on (1) the proximity
of the area to the home, (2) whether the area falls within an enclosure
surrounding the home, (3) the nature of the uses to which the area is put,
and (4) the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation
by passersby. Id. at 301. Therefore, according to Taxpayers, whether an
area is curtilage generally depends on the use of the property.

Looking at the plain meaning of “curtilage,” and the application of
“curtilage” in the tax-assessment and Fourth Amendment contexts,
Taxpayers argue that curtilage has no fixed size limit. Therefore,
according to Taxpayers, the Homestead Statute’s one-acre limit is
unconstitutional as applied to homeowners who use more than one acre
as curtilage.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 25S-TA-269 | October 7, 2025 Page 7 of 11
B. The Assessor argues the framers and ratifiers of Article
10, Section 1 understood the one-percent tax cap could
be limited to one acre.
To amend the Indiana Constitution, the General Assembly must pass
the same resolution in two consecutive legislative sessions separated by
an intervening general election. Ind. Const. art. 16, § 1(a); I.C. § 2-2.1-1-1(2)
(2024). The proposed amendment is then submitted to the voters at the
next general election who can then ratify the amendment with a majority
vote. Ind. Const. art. 16, §§ 1(b), (c). The Assessor argues that the framers
and ratifiers understood Article 10, Section 1 as codifying the existing
statutory tax cap on the “homestead,” including its one-acre size limit,
into the Constitution.

In 2008, the General Assembly passed Senate Joint Resolution 1 to
amend the Indiana Constitution with the current language of Article 10,
Section 1(f). The digest of the resolution said the amendment would limit
a taxpayer’s property-tax liability on “homestead property” to one
percent. Digest of S.J. Res. 1, 115th Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Ind.
2008), http://bit.ly/4nONrG0 [https://perma.cc/2UDB-CQMW]. Almost
simultaneously, the General Assembly enacted Indiana Code section 6-1.1-
20.6-7.5(a)(1) (effective Jan. 1, 2009) which capped a person’s property-tax
liability for the “homestead” at one percent. See Pub. L. No. 146-2008, §
223, 2008 Ind. Acts 2307, 2538. In the statute, the General Assembly
defined “homestead” as an individual’s principal place of residence
consisting of “a dwelling and the real estate, not exceeding one (1) acre, that
immediately surrounds that dwelling.” Id. § 115, 2008 Ind. Acts at 2414
(emphasis added). In 2010, the next General Assembly adopted the same
resolution from 2008 to amend the constitution. The 2010 resolution’s
digest also said the amendment would cap property taxes at one percent
for the “homestead.” See Digest of H.J. Res. 1, 116th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg.
Sess. (Ind. 2010), http://bit.ly/3KEbjOe [https://perma.cc/Y8SF-WP64].
After the resolution was passed through two consecutive General
Assemblies, the amendment was ratified by voters in the 2010 general
election. But when voting to ratify the amendments, voters never saw the
word “curtilage.” Instead, the public question on the ballot asked voters if

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 25S-TA-269 | October 7, 2025 Page 8 of 11
property taxes should be limited to “1% for an owner-occupied primary
residence (homestead).” Pub. L. No. 113-2010, § 185, 2010 Ind. Acts. 1342,
1554 (emphasis added).

According to the Assessor, the word “homestead” in the public
question and the near simultaneous enactment of the statutory tax cap and
resolution mean voters understood the amendment as codifying the
statutory tax cap, including the one-acre limit, into the Constitution. See
Eric Bradner, Property Tax Caps Decision Now Officially Up to Voters,
Evansville Courier & Press (Jan. 19, 2010, at 11:06 a.m.),
http://bit.ly/4nHROCS [https://perma.cc/D5EF-UU63] (“The
[constitutional] caps would limit property tax bills to 1 percent of assessed
value for homeowners. … Those caps became state law in 2008, but
lawmakers also sought to make them permanent by amending them into
the constitution as well.”). And given that it is reasonable to interpret the
Homestead Statute as constitutional, the Assessor contends the statute
should be upheld. See State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 702 N.E.2d at 1037.

C. Even if “curtilage” has no size limit, the Taxpayers fail
to prove they use more than one acre as curtilage.
But we need not decide if Article 10, Section 1 permits limiting
“curtilage” to one acre because, even if a size limit is impermissible,
Taxpayers fail to show they use more than one acre as curtilage. “The
party challenging the constitutionality of [a] statute bears the burden of
proof,” and Taxpayers failed to meet their burden of proving the
Homestead Statute’s one-acre limit is unconstitutional as applied to them.
See State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 702 N.E.2d at 1037. The Taxpayers offered
Dunn as an example of one way to determine curtilage, but even applying
the Dunn factors, they failed to show how their excess land is curtilage.
The Taxpayers say they desire privacy, but there is no fence on the
property, the trees do not form a distinguishable boundary around the lot,
and the Taxpayers presented no evidence to the Board that they use the
entire plot in such a way that it should be treated as the home itself. And
the fact that the Taxpayers’ home is in a gated community with a security
guard does not itself establish that the entire plot of land is curtilage. See

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 25S-TA-269 | October 7, 2025 Page 9 of 11
United States v. Powell, 943 F. Supp. 2d 759, 786 (E.D. Mich. 2013)
(analyzing whether an area is curtilage even within a gated community).
Because Taxpayers presented insufficient evidence that they use more
than one acre as curtilage, even under Dunn, Taxpayers failed to meet
their burden of proving the Homestead Statute’s one-acre limit is
unconstitutional as applied to them.

Conclusion
Those challenging the constitutionality of a statute face a high burden
of proof, and the Taxpayers failed to meet their burden here. Even if
Article 10, Section 1 does not permit limiting curtilage to one acre,
Taxpayers failed to prove they use more than one acre of their property as
curtilage, so we express no view on the merits of Taxpayers’ constitutional
claim. Because the Taxpayers failed to prove the Homestead Statute is
unconstitutional as applied to them, we reverse the Tax Court’s decision
and remand with instructions to affirm the Board’s determination in favor
of the Assessor.

Rush, C.J., and Massa, Slaughter, and Molter, JJ., concur.

ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONERS
Gerold L. Stout
Stout Law Firm
Lowell, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT
Ayn K. Engle
Indianapolis, Indiana

Ricardo A. Hall
Quintairos, Prieto, Wood & Boyer, P.A.
Merrillville, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR INTERVENOR—STATE OF INDIANA

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 25S-TA-269 | October 7, 2025 Page 10 of 11
Theodore E. Rokita
Attorney General of Indiana

James A. Barta
Solicitor General

Jenna M. Lorence
Angela Sanchez
Deputy Attorneys General
Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNE YS F O R AMICUS CURIAE—ASS OCI AT I ON OF INDIA NA
COUNT IE S
Marilyn S. Meighen
Brian A. Cusimano
Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNE YS FO R AMICUS CURIAE—INDI ANA ASS OCI AT ION OF
REALTORS , IN C .
Benjamin A. Blair
Brent A. Auberry
Jane Dall Wilson
Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP
Indianapolis, Indiana

AMI CUS CU RI AE PRO S E
William Rainsberger
Indianapolis, Indiana

AMI CUS CU RI AE PRO S E
Matthew Schiffler
Indianapolis, Indiana

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 25S-TA-269 | October 7, 2025 Page 11 of 11

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11158786. Public record. Not legal advice.