# Royal Potcake Rescue v. Centers For Disease Control & Prevention

> District Court, M.D. Florida · September 30, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11157702

## Case

- **Full name:** Royal Potcake Rescue and Potcake Rescue, LLC v. Centers for Disease Control & Prevention; Mandy Cohen, Director of the Centers for Disease Control & Prevention; Department of Health and Human Services
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** September 30, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11157702

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that an agency satisfies the standard “when the agency’s explanation is clear enough that its ‘path may reasonably be discerned.’”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

ROYAL POTCAKE RESCUE,
and POTCAKE RESCUE, LLC,

Plaintiffs,

v. Case No.: 8:24-cv-1909-LSG

CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL
& PREVENTION; MANDY COHEN,
Director of the Centers for Disease
Control & Prevention; DEPARTMENT
OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES,

Defendants.
____________________________________/

ORDER

The plaintiffs sue under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701, et
seq., for review of a May 13, 2024, final rule governing the import of dogs into the
United States issued by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, which is
part of the United States Department of Health and Human Services. Doc. 1. The
plaintiffs move for summary judgment, and the defendants file a cross-motion for
summary judgment. Docs. 45, 61–62. After carefully reviewing the briefs and the
administrative record, and with the benefit of oral argument, I deny the plaintiffs’
motion, Doc. 45, and grant the defendants’ motion because the regulation is within
the CDC’s statutory authority and is not arbitrary and capricious as applied to the
Caribbean Islands.
I. BACKGROUND

Rabies is a viral disease that attacks a host’s central nervous system. Doc. 44-5
at 435. Rabies spreads through a bite or a scratch by an infected animal. Doc. 60, ¶ 8.
A rabies infection is nearly always fatal in both humans and animals after clinical
signs appear. Id. In the United States, rabies infects wild animals, such as bats,

raccoons, skunks, and foxes. Id. In many other countries, dogs carry rabies, and most
deaths from rabies in humans occur after a dog bite. Id.
This case challenges a CDC foreign quarantine regulation aimed at preventing
the spread of rabies through imported domestic dogs. The history of those
regulations, which first emerged shortly after Congress passed the Public Health

Service Act in 1944,1 provides a helpful starting point.
A. A brief history of CDC’s dog import regulations and dog admissions.
In 1956, the Public Health Service finalized regulations governing the import
of domestic dogs. 21 Fed. Reg. 9879 (Dec. 12, 1956). For a dog brought into a U.S.
port from “any foreign country other than Bermuda, Denmark, [Ireland], Norway,

Sweden, or the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,” the
regulations required both a physical inspection and a rabies immunization. Id. An
owner could satisfy the inspection requirement either (1) by submitting a sworn

1 Public Health Service Act, Pub. L. No. 410, 58 Stat. 682 (1944).
statement that the animal “was physically inspected within ten days prior to
departure for the United States and was found apparently free of demonstrable
diseases involving emaciation, lesions of the skin, nervous system disturbances,

jaundice, or diarrhea” or (2) by participating in an examination at a U.S. Port by a
quarantine officer, who found the animal “apparently free from any demonstrable
diseases” involving any of the same symptoms. Id. An owner could satisfy the
vaccination requirement (1) by submitting “a sworn statement that the animal has
been immunized with an approved rabies vaccine not more than six months prior to

the date of entry,” (2) by vaccinating the animal “with an approved rabies vaccine
following arrival . . . and prior to release from quarantine,” or (3) by submitting a
sworn statement that the animal is destined for a research institution and that
“immunization will seriously interfere with its use for such purposes.” Id. The 1956
regulations conclude that “[a] . . . dog . . . excluded from entry under the regulations

in this part shall be destroyed or deported.” Id.
An update to these regulations occurred in 1985. Doc. 60, ¶ 10; 50 Fed. Reg.
1516 (Jan. 11, 1985). Like the 1956 regulations, the updated regulations required an
inspection of all dogs arriving at a U.S. port. 50 Fed. Reg. at 1522. The regulations

permitted the CDC to admit “only those dogs . . . which show no signs of
communicable disease.” Id. If an inspection revealed symptoms of disease, such as
“emaciation, lesions of the skin, nervous system disturbances, jaundice, or diarrhea,”
the CDC could require “prompt confinement” pending a “determination of [the
dog’s] admissibility” and a veterinary examination. Id. The regulations also
contained a rabies vaccination requirement mandating “[a] valid rabies vaccination
certificate” unless the owner demonstrated that,
(i) If a dog is less than 6 months of age, it has been only in a country
determined by the Director to be rabies-free (a current list of rabies-free
countries may be obtained from the Division of Quarantine, Center for
Prevention Services, Centers for Disease Control, Atlanta, Georgia
30333); or

(ii) If a dog is 6 months of age or older, for the 6 months before arrival,
it has been only in a country determined by the Director to be rabies-
free; or

(iii) The dog is to be taken to a research facility to be used for research
purposes and vaccination would interfere with its use for such purposes.
Id. A “valid rabies vaccination certificate” is, among other things, one “issued for a
dog not less than 3 months of age” and signed by a licensed veterinarian. Id.
Outside of these circumstances, the CDC could admit a dog “less than three
months of age” but must confine the dog “until vaccinated against rabies at 3 months
of age and for at least 30 days after the date of vaccination.” Id. A dog admitted
under this section triggered a requirement to notify to the health department in the
destination jurisdiction “to facilitate surveillance and other appropriate action.” Id.
Similar to the 1956 regulations, the 1985 regulations provided that “[a] dog . . .
excluded from the United States under the regulations in this part shall be exported
or destroyed.” Id.
In 2007, the CDC declared the United States “rabies-free.” 89 Fed. Reg. 41726
(May 13, 2024). The CDC designates a country as “rabies-free” based on
international standards for the absence of dog-maintained rabies, the adequacy of
surveillance, and the efficacy of dog vaccination programs. Doc. 60, ¶¶ 4–6, 11. The
CDC estimates that approximately one million dogs are imported into the United
States each year and that 100,000 of those come from “high risk” countries. Doc. 60,

¶ 12. The CDC designates a country as high risk based on “the presence and
geographic distribution of the virus or low quality of or low confidence in the
country’s rabies surveillance systems or dog vaccination programs.” Doc. 60, ¶ 6. A
“low risk” country is not rabies-free, but the virus is “in a controlled status” with the
country progressing toward rabies-free status. Doc. 60, ¶ 5.

Between 2015 and 2021, four rabid dogs entered the United States. Doc. 60,
¶¶ 14–15. In each case, the dog arrived with an animal rescue group importing dogs
for pet adoption. Id. Three of the dogs came from Egypt, which is a high-risk
country, and arrived with confirmed or suspected false vaccination documents. Id.

The fourth arrived from Azerbaijan with apparently valid vaccination documents. Id.
As a result of the four dogs’ importation, dozens of people required post-exposure
prophylaxis and dozens of dogs required a lengthy quarantine. Id. One of the rabid
dogs traveled with a group of animals from Egypt to the United States through the
Canadian border. Id. Despite arriving with a vaccination certificate and an adequate

rabies antibody titer,2 the dog tested positive for rabies three weeks after arrival and
placement in a home. Id. Because the CDC suspected that the vaccination
documents and test results were false, forty-four individuals received post-exposure

2 A titer is a test that determines the level of antibodies in the blood. Doc. 60, ¶ 15.c.
prophylaxis, and twenty-five dogs were re-vaccinated and required to quarantine.
Doc. 60, ¶ 15.c.
In 2019, the CDC temporarily suspended the import of dogs from Egypt.

Doc. 60, ¶ 19. In 2020, the CDC observed a fifty-two percent increase in the number
of dogs excluded from importation because of falsified or fraudulent documentation.
Doc. 60, ¶ 18. In 2021, the CDC temporarily suspended the import of dogs from all
high-risk countries. Doc. 60, ¶ 19.
B. CDC’s new dog import regulations.

In 2023, the CDC issued a notice of proposed rulemaking to revise the dog
import regulations to prevent “the reintroduction and spread of [dog] rabies virus
variant[] in the United States” and “the importation of dogs with falsified or
fraudulent rabies vaccine documentation.” Doc. 60, ¶ 20. The CDC finalized new

regulations on May 13, 2024. Doc. 60, ¶ 21; 89 Fed. Reg. at 41726.
Contemporaneously, the CDC announced that the import ban for dogs from high-
risk countries would expire on July 31, 2024. 89 Fed. Reg. at 41738.
To import a dog under the CDC’s new regulations, the dog must be at least six
months old and have a microchip implanted on or before the day of the dog’s current

rabies vaccine. 42 C.F.R. § 71.51(f)–(g), (v)(xiii). The importer must (1) submit a
CDC dog import form that describes the countries in which the dog has been
physically present within the previous six months and (2) consent upon arrival at a
U.S. port to an inspection of the animal for signs of communicable disease. 42
C.F.R. § 71.51(a), (i). An importer who refuses to consent to inspection “shall have
the animal denied admission and returned to its country of departure[.]” 42 C.F.R. §
71.51(i)(4), (v).
For dogs older than six months, the regulations distinguish between a dog

arriving from a high-risk country and a dog arriving from a low-risk or rabies-free
country. For example, a dog arriving from a high-risk country may enter only
through an airport with a quarantine station and a CDC-registered animal care
facility. 42 C.F.R. § 71.51(b)(4). A dog from a low-risk or rabies-free country with
documentation of having been only in such countries for the last six months may

arrive through any airport, land port, or seaport. 42 C.F.R. § 71.51(b)(2), (c)(2),
(d)(2). A dog from a high-risk country must arrive with a CDC vaccination
certificate, while a dog from a low-risk or rabies-free country may arrive with written
documentation showing that the dog has been only in a low-risk or rabies-free
country for the six months before arrival to the United States. 42 C.F.R. § 71.51(s),

(u). A dog from a rabies-free country need not provide proof of rabies vaccination. 42
C.F.R. § 71.51(u)(1).
C. The allegations and procedural posture of this case.
The plaintiffs in this case are Royal Potcake Rescue, a 501(c)(3) corporation,

and Potcake Rescue, LLC, a Florida limited liability company, both of which are
headquartered in Florida. Doc. 1, ¶ 12. The organizations help rescue, foster, and
facilitate adoption of “Potcakes,” which are dogs born on the streets of the Caribbean
Islands. Id. The plaintiffs allege that the CDC’s new dog import regulations
constitute an “import ban” on dogs younger than six months. Doc. 1, ¶ 1. According
to the plaintiffs, this “import ban” exceeds the CDC’s statutory authority “because
an import ban is not a measure authorized under [42 U.S.C. §] 264(a) and because
the import ban is not supported by the predicate findings required under [42 U.S.C.

§] 265.” Doc. 1, ¶ 69. The plaintiff further alleges that the “import ban” is arbitrary,
capricious, and an abuse of discretion as to the Caribbean Islands because “it is not
and cannot rationally be supported by any evidence, is contrary to the evidence that
the CDC acknowledged in its rulemaking, and is the product of factors that the CDC
lacked the authority to consider.” Doc. 1, ¶ 70.

The plaintiffs move for summary judgment on these claims. Docs. 45, 63. The
CDC responds in opposition and files a cross-motion for summary judgment. Docs.
61, 62, 64. The parties consented to my jurisdiction, Docs. 52–53, and I held oral
argument on August 27, 2025. The CDC filed supplemental citations to the record
on September 10, 2025, and the plaintiff responded. Docs. 69, 70.

II. JURISDICTION

Although neither party contests jurisdiction, I have an independent obligation
to examine whether the plaintiffs satisfy the jurisdictional prerequisite of standing.
Bischoff v. Osceola Cnty., Fla., 222 F.3d 874, 877-78 (11th Cir. 2000). To establish
standing under Article III of the U.S. Constitution, the plaintiffs must show an injury
in fact traceable to the defendant’s action and redressable by a favorable judicial
decision. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992); State v. Becerra, 544 F.
Supp. 3d 1241, 1251 (M.D. Fla. 2021) (“Article III of the United States Constitution
limits the jurisdiction of a federal court to an actual, perceptible, and existing case or
controversy.”) An injury in fact requires “‘an invasion of a legally protected interest’
that is ‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or

hypothetical.’” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 339 (2016) (quoting Lujan, 504
U.S. at 560); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734–35 (1972); see also Czyzewski v.
Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U.S. 451, 464 (2017) (“For standing purposes, a loss of even a
small amount of money is ordinarily an ‘injury.’”).

Here, the plaintiffs establish that they suffered an injury in fact. The plaintiffs
claim that the new dog import rule caused a “devastating financial impact” on their
business. Doc. 45 at 5 (citing Doc. 18-2, ¶ 11). The plaintiffs allege that compliance
with the rule’s six-month age requirement has caused longer and costlier foster
periods for rescue dogs; narrower windows during which rescued dogs can travel to

the United States; reductions in adoptions and donor funds; and reductions in
resources available for rescuing dogs. Doc. 46, ¶ 75. Thus, the plaintiffs demonstrate
an actual, concrete, and particularized injury. See Czyzewski, 580 U.S. at 464.
The plaintiffs’ injury is “fairly traceable” to the CDC’s action. The plaintiffs
argue that the CDC’s rule is the sole cause of their injury. Compliance with the six-

month age requirement has increased adoption times and costs while reducing
donations. Doc. 46, ¶ 75 (citing Doc. 18-2, ¶ 11). Enjoining or invalidating the
CDC’s rule would allow the plaintiffs to avoid the financial impact of the six-month
age requirement, Doc. 18-2, ¶¶ 7–10, and resume placing four-month-old dogs in
American “forever homes.” Doc. 18-2, ¶ 5. Accordingly, the plaintiffs establish
Article III standing. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61.
Standing further requires that a plaintiff “sue to vindicate an interest ‘protected

or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.’” Becerra, 544 F. at
1251. If the plaintiff’s interest is among those protected by the statute, the plaintiff
establishes prudential standing. Nat’l Credit Union Admin. Co., 522 U.S. at 492.
“[B]ecause Congress has enacted the APA to enable judicial review of agency action,

establishing statutory standing for an APA claim is not ‘especially demanding.’”
Becerra, 544 F. Supp. 3d at 1257 (quoting Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 130).
Here, the plaintiffs facilitate the import of dogs into the United States.
Doc. 18-2, ¶¶ 7–11. Thus, their economic interest falls within the zone of interests
regulated by the CDC’s dog import regulations. Therefore, the plaintiffs have

statutory standing.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Administrative agencies are creatures of statute. They accordingly possess
only the authority that Congress has provided.” Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Dep’t of
Lab., Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 595 U.S. 109, 117 (2022). “Congress in
1946 enacted the APA ‘as a check upon administrators whose zeal might otherwise
have carried them to excesses not contemplated in legislation creating their offices.’”
Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 391 (2024) (quoting United States v.
Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 644 (1950)). Thus, the APA creates a statutory right to
judicial review of an agency action for “[a] person suffering legal wrong because of
agency action[] or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the
meaning of a relevant statute[.]” 5 U.S.C. § 702. The APA requires that, “[t]o the

extent necessary to decision and when presented,” a reviewing court must “decide all
relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and
determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action.” 5 U.S.C.
§ 706. Section 706(2) further requires that the reviewing court hold unlawful and
vacate an agency action (1) that exceeds an agency’s statutory authority or (2) that is

“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law[.]” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (C).
“Courts must exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an
agency has acted within its statutory authority[.]” Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 412.
Furthermore, an agency action must be “reasonable and reasonably explained.” Bidi

Vapor LLC v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 134 F.4th 1282, 1286 (11th Cir. 2025). The
“arbitrary and capricious” standard requires that the agency “examine the relevant
data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a ‘rational
connection between the facts found and the choice made.’” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n

of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
Rule 56, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, permits judgment as a matter of
law in the absence of a disputed, material fact. “‘The summary judgment procedure
is particularly appropriate in cases in which the court is asked to review . . . a
decision of a federal administrative agency.’” Fla. Fruit & Vegetable Ass’n v. Brock, 771
F.2d 1455, 1459 (11th Cir. 1985) (quoting 10A Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice and
Procedure § 2733 (2d. ed. 1983)). “The focal point for judicial review of an
administrative agency’s action should be the administrative record.” Pres. Endangered

Areas of Cobb’s Hist., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 87 F.3d 1242, 1246 (11th Cir.
1996) (citing Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973)); Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng’rs, 295 F.3d 1209, 1216 (11th Cir. 2002) (explaining that review under the APA
“requires the court to consider not only the final documents prepared by the agency,

but also the entire administrative record.”). “The reviewing court is not generally
empowered to conduct a de novo inquiry into the matter being reviewed and to reach
its own conclusions based on such an inquiry.” Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470
U.S. 729, 744 (1985). Rather, if the record “does not support the agency action,” if
the agency “has not considered all relevant factors,” or if the reviewing court “simply

cannot evaluate the challenged agency action on the basis of the record,” then “the
proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional
investigation or explanation.” Id. at 744; Cobb’s Hist., Inc., 87 F.3d at 1246.
IV. ANALYSIS

A. The CDC is authorized “to make and enforce” regulations providing for
the inspection of animals to prevent the spread of communicable disease.

“Amid disquiet about the spread of malaria, Congress in 1944 passed the
Public Health Service Act, the statute central to this action.” Becerra, 544 F. Supp. 3d
at 1262 (describing the history of CDC’s quarantine power). The Public Health
Service Act “largely organized, consolidated, and clarified the federal government’s
existing legal authority,” which included inspecting arriving vessels and passengers at
United States ports of entry for communicable disease and temporarily forbidding
entry or import of particular items. Id. at 1259, 1261–64 (describing the statute as

codifying “the limited regulatory power typical of preventing diseases caused by a
discrete item or person at a major port of entry.”); 42 U.S.C. Ch. 6A, Subch. II, Pt.
G. Section 264(a) of Title 42, United States Code, authorizes the Surgeon General
to make and enforce such regulations as in his judgment are necessary
to prevent the introduction, transmission, or spread of communicable
diseases from foreign countries into the States or possessions, or from
one State or possession into any other State or possession. For purposes
of carrying out and enforcing such regulations, the Surgeon General
may provide for such inspection, fumigation, disinfection, sanitation,
pest extermination, destruction of animals or articles found to be so
infected or contaminated as to be sources of dangerous infection to
human beings, and other measures, as in his judgment may be
necessary.

See 42 C.F.R. § 70.2 (delegating this authority to the CDC); Health Freedom Def. Fund,
Inc. v. Biden, 599 F. Supp. 3d 1144, 1156 (M.D. Fla. 2022); Becerra, 544 F. Supp. 3d
at 1264 n.28. The first sentence of Section 264(a) grants the CDC “broad authority to
implement regulations” that, in CDC’s judgment, are necessary to prevent the spread
of communicable disease. Becerra, 544 F. Supp. 3d at 1268. The second sentence
“informs the grant of authority by illustrating the kinds of measures that could be
necessary: inspection, fumigation, disinfection, sanitation, pest extermination, and
destruction of contaminated animals and articles.” Alabama Ass’n of Realtors v. Dep’t of
Health & Hum. Servs., 594 U.S. 758, 763 (2021); Becerra, 544 F. Supp. 3d at 1268
(“The second sentence of Section 264(a) discloses, illustrates, exemplifies, and limits
to measures similar in scope and character the measures contemplated and
authorized by Congress when enacting the statute.”). “These measures directly relate
to preventing the interstate spread of disease by identifying, isolating, and destroying

the disease itself.” Ala. Ass’n, 594 U.S. at 763. “Regulations under this authority have
generally been limited to quarantining infected individuals and prohibiting the
import or sale of animals known to transmit disease.” Id. at 761.
Accordingly, if Section 264 authorizes an import ban for dogs younger than
six months, “the enforcement measures must resemble or remain akin to ‘inspection,

fumigation, disinfection, sanitation, pest extermination, [or the] destruction of
infected animals or articles.’” Becerra, 544 F. Supp. 3d at 1268. The CDC argues that
the age requirement is an inspection measure. Doc. 62 at 14. Specifically, the CDC
argues that the requirement allows an inspector to more readily (1) determine a dog’s

age through inspection of the dog’s teeth; (2) evaluate a dog’s lack of coordination,
which is an apparent symptom of rabies but also a feature of young puppies; and
(3) ensure accurate test results on a serologic titer, which is unreliable until six
months of age. Id. The plaintiffs argue that CDC’s age requirement is not an
inspection measure because no inspection occurs, but rather the CDC dispenses

entirely with the task of identifying, isolating, and destroying disease. Doc. 45 at 14-
15. If the age requirement is an inspection measure, the plaintiffs contend that the
CDC could effectively label any import ban an inspection requirement and avoid the
requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 265. Doc. 63 at 4-5. Thus, the parties’ dispute over the
CDC’s age requirement presents a controlling question of statutory interpretation.
B. The CDC’s ban on dogs younger than six months falls with the CDC’s
inspection power.

i. The CDC’s inspection power under Section 264(a) includes the power to
establish conditions for inspection and to exclude animals that fail
inspection or that are not susceptible to inspection.

Section 264(a) authorizes the CDC to “make and enforce” regulations
necessary to prevent “the introduction, transmission, or spread of communicable
disease” from foreign countries. Those regulations may provide for an inspection, or
“other measures” similar to an inspection, “as in [the CDC’s] judgment may be
necessary.” The question here is whether the CDC can categorically exclude dogs
younger than six months old from entering the United States through the CDC’s
inspection authority in Section 264(a). As the plaintiffs correctly argue, an inspection
is a close and critical examination. By prohibiting the youngest dogs altogether, the
CDC dispenses entirely with the inspection. Although seemingly problematic, this
may fall within the CDC’s inspection authority. If the CDC cannot adequately
inspect a dog under six months for rabies or rabies immunity, imposing an age
requirement to facilitate a rabies inspection falls within the inspection power in
Section 264(a).
The interpretation of a statute must begin with its language. Republic of Sudan
v. Harrison, 587 U.S. 1, 8 (2019). As explained above, Section 264(a) emerged as part

of the Public Health Service Act of 1944 and, through delegation by the Surgeon
General, grants the CDC authority to “make and enforce” regulations governing the
inspection of items arriving at U.S. ports from foreign countries. The statute nowhere
defines the term “inspection,” which means that “inspection” conveys its ordinary
meaning. Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 584 U.S. 79, 85 (2018); Consol. Bank, N.A.,
Hialeah, Fla. v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Off. of Comptroller of Currency, 118 F.3d 1461,

1464 (11th Cir. 1997) (“In the absence of a statutory definition of a term, we look to
the common usage of words for their meaning.”). A dictionary definition
contemporaneous with the statute’s enactment aids in determining ordinary
meaning. See id. One such definition describes “inspect” as “to view closely and

critically, esp. so as to ascertain quality or state, to detect errors, etc.” Webster’s New
Int’l Dictionary 1286 (William Allan Neilson, et al. eds., 2d ed. 1942). “Inspection”
means “a strict or prying examination” and, in the legal sense, “[t]he examination of
articles of commerce (under laws called inspection laws) to determine their fitness for
transportation or sale.” Id.; Black’s Law Dictionary 984 (3d ed. 1933) (“‘Inspection’

means more than perusal, and means a critical examination, close or careful
scrutiny, a strict or prying examination, or an investigation.”). An example is the
“examination or testing of food, fluids, or other articles made subject by law to such
examination, to ascertain their fitness for use or commerce.” Black’s, supra, at 984;
Acosta v. Loc. Union 26, UNITE HERE, 895 F.3d 141, 143–44 (1st Cir. 2018).

The authority to inspect includes those acts necessary to accomplishing the
inspection because authorization for an act “implicitly authorizes whatever is a
necessary predicate of that act.” Antonin Scalia & Bryan Garner, Reading Law: The
Interpretation of Legal Texts, 96, 192–93 (2012) (“‘[W]henever a power is given by a
statute, everything necessary to making it effectual or requisite to attaining the end is
implied.”).3 For example, the authority to inspect an animal arriving from a foreign
country necessarily includes setting conditions for the inspection, such as viewing,
touching, and testing of the animal and confirming the provenance of the animal.

See, e.g., Friends of Boundary Waters Wilderness v. Bosworth, 437 F.3d 815, 823 (8th Cir.
2006) (“Agencies given the authority to promulgate a quota are presumed to have the
authority to adjust that quota.”); Sullivan v. Lincoln Cnty. Water Dist., 542 P.3d 411,
424 (Nev. 2024) (statutes requiring state engineer to determine the amount of water
in a proposed source of supply include implied authority to determine the boundaries

of the water source); Vickers v. Lowe, 247 P.3d 666, 670 (Idaho 2011) (“The power to
determine when and how a developer may build an encroachment is implied from
the ITD’s authority to regulate the design of public highways.”). Thus, the power to
inspect includes the power to establish the means and manner of the inspection.

“[S]tatutory language cannot be construed in a vacuum. It is a fundamental
canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their
context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” Davis v. Mich.
Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989). Section 264(a) falls within the CDC’s
“quarantine and inspection” powers, 42 U.S.C. §§ 264–272, and authorizes

regulations “necessary to prevent the introduction” of communicable disease. This

3 “‘The implication under this rule . . . must be a necessary, not a conjectural or argumentative
one,’” and if “‘the means for the exercise of a grant of power are given, no other or different means
can be implied, as being more effectual or convenient.’” A. Scalia & B. Garner, supra, at 193
(quoting Field v. People ex rel. McClernand, 3 Ill. 79, 83 (1839) to explain that this cannon “must be
applied with caution, lest the tail of what is implied wag the dog of what is expressly conferred.”).
language conveys the power to exclude from entry an animal if necessary to prevent
the introduction of a disease into the United States. Similarly, Section 265 authorizes
a categorical prohibition of “persons or property” from a particular foreign country

if, “by reason of the existence of any communicable disease” in that country, a
“serious danger of the introduction of such disease into the United States” exists. 42
U.S.C. § 265 (explaining that the President of the United States must approve such
regulations). In other words, Section 265 authorizes a categorical ban on dogs from
Egypt, for example, based on a serious danger that a dog from that country would

introduce rabies. Section 264(a), on the other hand, permits exclusion deriving from
one of Section 264(a)’s enumerated powers, such as the power to inspect.
The history of the CDC’s quarantine power further supports an interpretation
of Section 264(a) that grants the CDC broad authority to establish inspection
conditions necessary to protect the public health and to exclude animals or articles

failing those conditions. The Public Health Service Act codified the federal
government’s existing quarantine power, which at the time involved inspecting
vessels, passengers, and items at United States ports of entry and temporarily
forbidding entry or import of a person or item posing a risk of spreading
communicable disease. Becerra, 544 F. Supp. 3d at 1258–64. Establishing conditions

for entry and excluding an animal as necessary to prevent the spread of
communicable disease falls squarely within the federal government’s quarantine
power as it existed at the time of the Public Health Service Act. See id.
Furthermore, “interpretations issued contemporaneously with the statute at
issue, and which have remained consistent over time, may be especially useful in
determining the statute’s meaning.” Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 394; Bondi v.
VanDerStok, 145 S.Ct. 857, 874 (2025). Both the 1956 regulations, which occurred a

decade after the statute’s passage, and subsequent interpretations of Section 264(a)
show that the CDC’s exclusion can be categorical. See Bruno Project Rescue, Inc. v.
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 24-cv-11552-DJC, 2025 WL 1712912, *5 (D.
Mass. June 18, 2025); State of La. v. Mathews, 427 F. Supp. 174, 176 (E.D. La. 1977)

(upholding a small turtle ban under Section 264(a) and explaining that “the law does
not require the adoption of an onerous testing scheme under which every turtle, or
lot of turtles, is to be tested every week so as to find that percent which becomes
reinfected. Such a testing alternative is patently unreasonable, and a total ban is
permissible as necessary to prevent the spread of communicable disease.”); 21 Fed.

Reg. 9870, 9878 (Dec. 12, 1956) (“Psittacine birds shall not be brought into the
United States for the purpose of sale or trade”); 21 Fed. Reg. at 9879 (“A person
shall not import into any place under the control of the United States . . . any
etiological agent or insect, animal or plant vector of human disease or any exotic
living insect, animal or plant capable of being a vector of human disease unless

accompanied by a permit issued by the Surgeon General”); 21 Fed. Reg. at 9879
(“The remains of a person dead from a quarantinable disease shall not be brought
into a port . . . unless it is (a) properly embalmed and placed in a hermetically sealed
casket, or (b) cremated.”).
An interpretation of Section 264(a) that permits a categorical exclusion based
on the CDC’s inspection power does not, as the plaintiffs argue, violate the canon
against surplusage. Doc. 45 at 16. Sections 264(a) and 265 serve different purposes.
As explained above, an exclusion under Section 264(a) must derive from an

inspection, a measure similar to an inspection, or another enumerated power. For
example, since 1956, the CDC’s dog import regulations have prohibited the import
of a dog whose owner refuses to submit the dog for an inspection or examination. 12
Fed. Reg. at 9879, 42 C.F.R. § 71.154(a)-(b);4 50 Fed. Reg. at 1522, 42 C.F.R. §
71.51(b); 42 C.F.R. § 71.51(i)(4) (an importer who refuses “to consent to inspection,

examination, disease surveillance screening, or diagnostic testing of the animal upon
arrival shall have the animal denied admission and returned to its country of
departure[.]”). The CDC imposes an inspection as a condition of entry, and the CDC
categorically excludes a dog whose owner refuses to consent to an inspection. If a
dog is not susceptible to inspection for some other reason, that too may support a

categorical exclusion. See Mathews, 427 F. Supp. at 175–76 (explaining that studies
about the re-contamination of organism-free small turtles supported a total ban).
The CDC’s authority under Section 265 is different. Section 265 authorizes
the “suspension of entries and imports from designated places,” that is, a foreign
country with a communicable disease, based on a serious danger that such entries

will introduce that disease. A suspension may extend “for such period of time as [the

4 The 1956 regulations excepted from this requirement dogs from certain countries, including
Bermuda, Denmark, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
CDC] may deem necessary for such purpose.” Thus, a suspension under Section 265
(1) must derive from a country-specific finding and have a country-specific target,
(2) may endure for a period deemed “necessary” to avert a serious danger, and (3) is

untethered to the quarantine and inspection powers specified in Section 264(a). By
contrast, Section 264(a) limits the CDC’s power to measures falling within its
specific language and necessary to prevent the introduction of communicable
disease. The CDC could not, as the plaintiffs argue, deem any age an inspection
measure under Section 264(a), because the CDC would have to tie that age to the

CDC’s ability to inspect (fumigate, disinfect, sanitize, etc.) and prevent the
introduction of communicable disease. Doc. 45 at 16.
Accordingly, the text and context of Section 264(a) demonstrate (1) that the
power to inspect includes the power to establish conditions for inspection and to
exclude from entry an animal that either fails inspection or is not susceptible to

inspection and (2) that the exclusion may be categorical as long as the exclusion
derives from a power delineated in Section 264(a).
ii. Is a dog under six months old susceptible to inspection for rabies?
As explained above, the CDC distinguishes between high-risk, low-risk, and
rabies-free countries and adopts different import requirements based on those

classifications. As to the age requirement, however, the CDC imposes that import
restriction on all countries
[t]o address concerns about importations of puppies that are too young
to be properly vaccinated against rabies . . . . Dogs cannot be vaccinated
effectively against rabies before 12 weeks of age and are not considered
fully vaccinated until 28 days after vaccination. Establishing a six-
month age requirement for the import of dogs . . . will better protect the
public’s health from rabies.

89 Fed. Reg. at 41727. The CDC explains further that requiring dogs from rabies-free
or low-risk countries to be at least six months old “prevent[s] importers from trying
to circumvent CDC’s requirements by moving dogs from [rabies] high-risk countries
through [rabies]-free or [rabies] low-risk countries.” Id. at 41765. The next section of
this order will discuss whether extending the age requirement to the rabies-free
Caribbean Islands is arbitrary and capricious as applied to those countries. For the
purpose of determining whether a six-month age requirement is within the scope of
the CDC’s statutory authority in Section 264(a), this section considers solely whether
a dog’s age impacts the CDC’s ability to inspect for rabies.
According to the CDC, “[s]creening for rabies can be difficult in puppies
because they can often exhibit dyskinetic or uncoordinated movement as part of their

normal growth and development.” Id. at 41766; Doc. 44-6 at 1. “These awkward
movements can also be seen in rabid dogs and may be mistaken in young puppies for
normal movement patterns.” 89 Fed. Reg. at 41766. The incubation period for rabies
in dogs is “typically [four to eight] weeks after infection . . . but can be as long as

[six] months.” Doc. 60, ¶ 17. According to scientific literature in the record, a dog
cannot be vaccinated effectively for rabies until twelve weeks old. Doc. 44-5 at 108–
19; 89 Fed. Reg. at 41727, 41765–66. A dog is not considered fully vaccinated until
twenty-eight days after initial vaccination, when “a peak rabies virus antibody titer is
expected.” Doc. 44-5 at 111. In other words, a dog is not considered fully vaccinated
until approximately four months of age.
The “World Organization for Animal Health” (WOAH) recommends waiting

an additional three months after the titer results for the absence of clinical signs of
rabies.5 89 Fed. Reg. at 41759-60, 41765-66; Doc. 44-5 at 434; Doc. 44-6 at 347. This
additional waiting period mitigates the risk of importing a dog infected with rabies
before vaccination by permitting a period of observation for clinical signs of the
disease. Id. The CDC concluded that waiting thirty days between titer collection and

travel “is sufficient for monitoring the dog to ensure it does not develop signs of
rabies.” 89 Fed. Reg. at 41765. The CDC relied on scientific literature suggesting
that the WOAH’s three-month waiting period for a dog from a high-risk country is
“not supported by current evidence” and is “unnecessarily restrictive.” Doc. 44-5 at
434-35; 89 Fed. Reg. at 41760. Rather, a thirty-day waiting period after the titer

result “is more than sufficient to mitigate” the rabies risk. Doc. 44-5 at 435; 89 Fed.
Reg. at 41765. An analysis of historical data shows that a dog “with detectable rabies
virus serum antibody will either succumb to rabies within two weeks or will remain
healthy[.]” Doc. 44-5 at 437. Accordingly, “[a] 30-day waiting period represents over
a two-fold increase in the maximum time necessary to properly assess dogs and

5 This is the requirement for a high-risk country, because the WOAH standards distinguish between
high risk and rabies-free countries. For a dog from a rabies-free country, WOAH recommends
requiring an international veterinary certificate attesting (1) that the animal showed no clinical signs
of rabies the day before or on the day of shipment and (2) that the animal was either kept “since
birth or at least six months prior to shipment in a [rabies]-free country or zone” or was imported in
accord with the requirements for animals from high-risk countries. Doc. 44-6 at 347-48.
prevent importation when considering [the] risk [of a pre-vaccination infection].”
Doc. 44-5 at 435.
Thus, in terms of rabies immunity, the record shows that a dog is susceptible

to inspection for rabies or rabies immunity at five months old. Given the importance
of age to confirming a dog’s rabies immunity, the CDC requires some method to
verify the dog’s age. The CDC explains and the record contains evidence showing
that veterinarians rely on dental patterns. Doc. 62 at 8; 89 Fed. Reg. at 41765-66;
Doc. 44-4 at 144–54; Doc. 44-5 at 205; Doc. 44-6 at 1, 34–38. A dental analysis of a

dog’s teeth is most reliable six months after birth when a dog has lost all of its puppy
teeth. Id. Accordingly, the record demonstrates that, to reliably assess a dog of
unknown provenance for rabies, that dog must be at least five months old and that,
to reliably determine a dog’s age, that dog must be at least six months old.
Based on the evidence in the administrative record, the CDC’s six-month age

requirement appears “directly related” to “identifying, isolating, and destroying”
rabies, Ala. Ass’n, 594 U.S. at 763, and within the CDC’s authority under Section
264(a).
C. The six-month age requirement is not arbitrary and capricious as applied
to the rabies-free Caribbean Islands.

i. The standard of review is deferential and narrow.

The APA’s “arbitrary and capricious” standard is deferential and narrow,
which means that a court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Gray
Television, Inc. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 130 F.4th 1201, 1212 (11th Cir. 2025). The
standard requires an agency to articulate a “satisfactory explanation for its action,”
including a “‘rational connection between the facts found and the choices made.’”
State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S.

156, 168 (1962)); Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 579 U.S. 211, 221, (2016)
(explaining that an agency satisfies the standard “when the agency’s explanation is
clear enough that its ‘path may reasonably be discerned.’”). “[T]he agency must
make findings that support its decision, and those findings must be supported by
substantial evidence.” Burlington, 371 U.S. at 168.

An agency may change an existing policy as long as the agency provides “a
reasoned explanation for the change.” Navarro, 579 U.S. at 221. In other words, the
agency must at least “‘display awareness that it is changing position’ and ‘show that
there are good reasons for the new policy.’” Id. (quoting FCC v. Fox Television Stations,

Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009)). “[I]t suffices that the new policy is permissible under
the statute, that there are good reasons for it, and that the agency believes it to be
better, which the conscious change of course adequately indicates.” Fox Television,
556 U.S. at 515.
Here, the plaintiffs argue that the six-month age requirement, as applied to the

“rabies-free Caribbean Islands,”6 is arbitrary and capricious because the record

6 The plaintiffs describe the rabies-free Caribbean Islands as Anguilla, Antigua, Aruba, Bahamas,
Barbados, Barbuda, Cayman Islands, Dominica, Guadeloupe (including St. Bart and St. Martin),
Jamaica, Martinique, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Turks and
Caicos, Trinidad and Tobago, and the Virgin Islands (U.S. and U.K.). Doc. 45 at 6 n.6; see CDC’s
Rabies Status by Country, available at https://www.cdc.gov/rabies/country-data/index.html (last
visited Sept. 2, 2025).
contains no rational justification for this requirement as a rabies prevention measure
for those countries. Docs. 45, 63. The CDC responds that the age requirement is not
overly broad but “rationally related to CDC’s goal of reducing fraud by ensuring

reliable inspections” and is based on both “scientific and historical evidence” and a
careful consideration of the potential impact on dog import organizations like the
plaintiffs. Doc. 62 at 20–25, Doc. 64, Doc. 69.
ii. The record demonstrates a rational connection between the facts found
and the choices made by the CDC.

Since the CDC began regulating dog imports in 1956, the CDC has either
relaxed or heightened the import requirements based on a dog’s country of origin.
The 1956 regulations imposed a rabies vaccine requirement on all dogs except those
from Australia, Bermuda, Denmark, Ireland, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, or the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. 21 Fed. Reg. at 9879, 42
C.F.R. § 71.154(b)(2). Presumably, the CDC concluded that dogs from the excepted
countries presented little risk of introducing the disease.7 The 1985 regulations

required a valid rabies vaccination certificate unless the owner certified that the dog
had only been in a rabies-free country since birth or for six months before arrival. 50
Fed. Reg. at 1522, 42 C.F.R. § 71.51(c)(i)–(ii). This too derived from a risk
assessment about the dog’s country of origin. 50 Fed. Reg. at 1522. Between 1956

7 According to an article on the CDC’s website, the CDC has conducted surveillance of animal and
human rabies since 1961. See Gregory L. Parham, Rabies in the United States, 1981, CDC,
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00014696.htm#:~:text=Human%20rabies%20is
%20a%20preventable,to%20a%20public%20health%20laboratory (last visited Sept. 3, 2025).
and 2024, the CDC permitted dogs of any age from certain rabies-free countries to
enter the United States without proof of rabies immunity.
Today, the CDC designates 126 countries as rabies-free based on

“internationally accepted standards.” Doc. 60, ¶ 4, ¶ 7; 89 Fed. Reg. at 41739;
Doc. 44-6 at 345, 351. According to the CDC, seventy-one percent of the 126 rabies-
free countries have dog import requirements that “me[e]t or exceed[] WOAH
standards” which the CDC describes as “the best practices” for dog importation.
Doc. 44-11 at 19; 89 Fed. Reg. at 41759. An estimated one million dogs seek entry

into the United States each year, the vast majority of which come from low-risk or
rabies-free countries. 89 Fed. Reg. at 41805; Doc. 60, ¶ 12. The 2024 final
rulemaking confirms that the CDC has not observed any rabies infections among
dogs imported from rabies-free countries. 89 Fed. Reg. at 41805. The CDC “has
confidence” in rabies-free countries that have declared themselves rabies free using

WOAH’s “self-declared validation process.” 89 Fed. Reg. at 41739 (explaining that
this resulted in the CDC’s “finalizing as proposed the ability of importers of cats and
dogs from [rabies]-free and low-risk countries to be admitted through any U.S.
port.”); Doc. 45 at 22 n.9.
Thus, like the 1956 and 1985 regulations, the CDC’s new dog import rule

requires no proof of rabies vaccination for a dog from a rabies-free country. Doc. 67
at 1:04:40-1:05:10; Doc. 45 at 24.8 Rather, dogs from rabies-free countries “may be
admitted into the United States . . . if the importer submits written documentation
satisfactory to the director that for the six months before arrival, the dog has been

only in [] low-risk or [rabies]-free countries.” 42 C.F.R. §§ 71.51(f), (g), (u)(1).9
According to the CDC’s website, “[s]tarting on August 1, 2024, the only required
documentation for dogs entering or returning to the United States that have been
only in dog rabies-free or low-risk countries in the past 6 months is the CDC Dog
Import Form.”10 The form requires the importer to provide some demographic

information about the dog and importer and to click “yes” or “no” in response to the
question “Has the dog been in a country that is considered a high-risk country for
dog rabies in the last six months?” Thus, the CDC’s confidence in rabies-free
countries remains high enough that the CDC continues to dispense with the
vaccination requirement for rabies-free countries.

8 “For dogs that have not been in any of the listed high-risk countries or political units during the past
6 months, CDC strongly recommends vaccination against rabies, but the additional requirements for
dogs from high-risk countries to enter the United States do not apply.” See CDC, HIGH-RISK
COUNTRIES FOR DOG RABIES (2024), https://www.cdc.gov/importation/dogs/high-risk-
countries.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2025).
9 Satisfactory documentation as described in the regulation includes (1) a valid certification of
foreign rabies vaccination and microchip form, (2) a valid certification of U.S.-issued rabies
vaccination form, (3) a valid USDA export certificate, (4) a valid foreign export certificate
accompanied by veterinary records, (5) a certification of dog arriving from a rabies-free or low-risk
country form accompanied by veterinary records, or (6) other records that the CDC deems
satisfactory. 41 C.F.R. § 71.51(u)(2).
10 CDC, ENTRY REQUIREMENTS FOR DOGS FROM DOG-RABIES FREE OR LOW-RISK COUNTRIES,
(2024), https://www.cdc.gov/importation/dogs/rabies-free-low-risk-countries.html (last visited
Sept. 4, 2025).
Despite the CDC’s continued confidence, the CDC extended the six-month
age requirement to rabies-free and low-risk countries “to prevent importers from
trying to circumvent CDC’s requirements by moving dogs from [rabies] high-risk

countries through [rabies]-free or []low-risk countries.” 89 Fed. Reg. at 41765–66,
417804. The CDC cites evidence of fraud involving high-risk, low-risk, and rabies-
free countries. Doc. 69 at 3–6. The CDC cites four rabid dog imports by animal
rescue groups between 2015 and 2021 involving dogs from Egypt and Azerbaijan.
Doc. 62 at 5–6. None of these imports involved fraud or suspected fraud in the dog’s

country of origin; they all involved purported vaccination paperwork fraud.
Nonetheless, these imports demonstrate the scale and severity of the problem as well
as the risk of harm that fraud in the importation of dogs poses to the United States.
See, e.g., Doc. 44-7 at 112–58.
For example, a CDC presentation details the 2015 rabid dog importation,

which involved a dog rescued from the streets of Egypt and presented with
fraudulent vaccine paperwork. The importer admitted to falsifying the rabid dog’s
vaccination record and said, “If we had not gotten this dog on the plane to the US, it
would have been killed here in Egypt.” Id. at 120. Such examples demonstrate the

forces driving the illegal import of dogs into the United States and the significant
public health consequences of importers evading CDC requirements. See Doc. 44-7 at
8–9, 14, 112–54. As the record notes, many of the dogs imported by rescue groups
are free roaming “street” dogs, which have a greater risk for rabies infection and
transmission. Doc. 44-7 at 25. The record contains examples from both the United
States and abroad showing the human and economic toll of rabies importation. See
89 Fed. Reg. 41754; Doc. 44-4 at 138–43. The record also documents the growth in
demand for puppies from international supply chains. See Doc. 44-5 at 204–06; 89

Fed. Reg. at 41759 n.132–n.145; Doc. 44-15 at 568.
The CDC documented a fifty-two percent increase in the number of dogs
denied entry to the United States between 2018 and 2020. Doc. 44-5 at 204–07. Most
of the dogs came from three high-risk countries and had falsified age and rabies
vaccine documentation. Id. The CDC’s final rulemaking repeatedly mentions

documented instances of importers moving dogs under six months old from high-risk
countries to low-risk or rabies-free countries to avoid the CDC’s entry requirements.
89 Fed. Reg. at 41766, 41784–85, 41798. In a supplemental brief, the CDC identifies
suspected cases of importer fraud at the U.S.-Mexico and U.S.-Canada borders

involving dogs from high-risk countries. Doc. 69 at 5–6.
A review of the record reveals additional data about border crossings from
low-risk or rabies-free countries in which border agents express concern about dogs
arriving without proper paperwork, with suspected forged paperwork, and with
dubious claims about the dog’s country of origin. In one instance, an importer

traveled through Mexico and apparently acknowledged that the dog was from
Ecuador, a high-risk country, but claimed that his dogs required no import
paperwork. See Doc. 44-11 at 587. In other instances, border agents strongly
suspected that a dog coming from Mexico did not originate in Mexico, but agents
lacked sufficient evidence to deny the dog’s entry. See Doc. 44-11 at 652, 781, 786,
789. In one such case, the paperwork suggested the dogs were three months old, but
“the age reported didn’t match the appearance of the dogs.” Id. at 789. The record
reveals numerous concerns about missing or fraudulent paperwork for dogs from

Mexico. Doc. 44-11 at 388, 478, 509, 528, 555, 684. The record also shows that the
CDC denied entry to numerous dogs from Mexico, and many (if not most) were
younger than six months old. Doc. 44-11 at 33-279. Finally, the record shows that
many dogs imported to the United States from Mexico and Canada were not yet old
enough to be effectively vaccinated (i.e., under three months old) before arrival. Id.

The record also contains several reports detailing both the growth in the demand for
young dogs and in the illegal puppy trade. Doc. 44-4 at 364, Doc. 44-5 at 204, Doc.
44-9 at 21; 89 Fed. Reg. at 41755 n.81–n.93.
The CDC identifies no suspected fraud specifically involving the rabies-free
Caribbean Islands. Based on this absence of evidence, the plaintiffs assert that the

CDC lacked sufficient data to support its expansion of the age requirement to those
countries. In other words, the plaintiffs’ claim that, as to the rabies-free Caribbean
Islands, the CDC is solving a “non-existent problem.” Doc. 67 at 4:05-4:52. The
plaintiffs rely on Sustainable Fisheries Coal. v. Raimondo, 589 F. Supp. 3d 162 (D.

Mass. 2022), and Nat’l Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. FERC, 468 F.3d 831 (D.C. Cir. 2006),
both of which determined that an agency action was arbitrary and capricious because
the agency had no evidence supporting the alleged problem that the action aimed to
resolve. Sustainable Fisheries Coal., 589 F. Supp. 3d at 169; FERC, 468 F.3d at 841–44.
Unlike the agencies in Sustainable Fisheries Coal. and FERC, the CDC’s record
contains substantial evidence of an ongoing and increasing problem with fraud
involving imported dogs from high-risk countries and dogs routed through rabies-free

or low-risk countries. Although none of this evidence directly implicates the rabies-
free Caribbean Islands, the plaintiffs identify no controlling precedent suggesting
that, even with substantial evidence of an industry problem, the CDC must await the
expansion of that problem to each industry participant before imposing tighter
restrictions. The CDC has evidence of fraud involving dogs routed through rabies-

free and low-risk countries and evidence of fraud involving rabies vaccination. The
substantial risk harm posed by importing a rabies-infected dog, “the underlying
evidence of vaccination fraud,” and “the incentive that would [otherwise] exist to
divert dogs from high-risk countries through low-risk or rabies-free countries,”
support the CDC’s decision to impose an across-the-board age requirement “without

such specific documentary evidence.” Bruno Project, 2025 WL 1712912, at *7 (citing
Stilwell v. Off. Of Thrift Supervision, 569 F.3d 514, 519 (D.C. Cir. 2009)).
Furthermore, Sustainable Fisheries Coal. and FERC involved distinct statutory
authorizations. Here, Congress granted the CDC broad authority to implement

necessary inspection measures to prevent the introduction of communicable disease
into the United States from foreign countries. The CDC can reasonably decide that
relying entirely on another country’s rabies vaccination and surveillance regimes is
insufficient and that some additional requirement is necessary, particularly given the
massive influx of dogs from foreign countries and repeated instances of fraud or
suspected fraud in rabies vaccination. See Doc. 44-7 at 112–55. Substantial evidence
(1) of fraud in the import of dogs, (2) of many dogs arriving too young to be
vaccinated, and (3) of a deadly, communicable disease entering the United States as

a result of that fraud is enough to support the CDC’s decision and demonstrate a
“rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” State Farm, 463
U.S. at 43.
The plaintiffs argue that the age requirement is inconsistent with the lack of a
vaccine or meaningful rabies inspection requirement. Doc. 67 at 14:42-15:39. The

CDC explains that the justification for this distinction is the CDC’s confidence in the
rabies-free countries’ rabies vaccination and surveillance infrastructure. Doc. 67 at
1:04:40-1:06:20. In other words, the new dog import rule imposes a lesser burden on
low-risk and rabies-free countries—as it always has—precisely because these
countries have public health regimes that successfully reduced or eliminated dog-

maintained rabies and that vigilantly seek to avoid re-introduction of that disease
through dog imports. Although the CDC’s final rulemaking does not describe this
analysis with particular clarity, a court must “‘uphold a decision of less than ideal
clarity if the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.’” State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43

(quoting Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 419 U.S. 281, 286 (1974)).
Here, one can reasonably conclude from the record that the CDC perceived
enough risk in the import of puppies to require that all dogs entering the United
States reach six months of age before entry. The CDC determined that the age
requirement would both mitigate the risk of fraud and improve visual inspection by
permitting a more accurate determination of a dog’s age and a more accurate visual
assessment for disease. Although the record demonstrates that confirming
vaccination status through blood titers, etc., is far superior to a visual inspection

(which, as the plaintiffs argue, could miss rabies entirely because of the lengthy
incubation period), the CDC can rationally decide based on the provenance of a dog
to ease the inspection requirements. Indeed, the plaintiffs admit that the confidence
in a dog from a rabies-free country, such as a Caribbean Island, should be
exceptionally high—high enough to bet your house. Doc. 67 at 32:22-33:00.

Therefore, the CDC’s imposing only an age requirement and a dog import form is
not an arbitrary or capricious inconsistency but a rational and reasonably tailored
risk assessment.
At oral argument, counsel for the plaintiffs claimed that the plaintiffs may not
have sued if the new rule required all imported dogs—regardless of origin—to have

proof of vaccination. Doc. 67 at 14:42-15:39. But because the CDC dispensed with
the vaccination requirement for rabies-free countries, the new regulation is
“irrationally inconsistent.” Id. To the contrary, based on the record before me, this
would be a much stronger case for the plaintiffs if the CDC had imposed the same
requirements on rabies-free countries and high-risk countries. The country of origin

clearly matters (and has mattered since 1956). If the CDC completely disregarded the
country of origin with nothing more than the evidence in this record, the CDC would
have acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.
The plaintiffs argue that the CDC failed to consider the burden on dog rescue
organizations like theirs, and also failed to consider available alternatives, such as a
narrower age requirement. Doc. 45 at 18–19, 25. The CDC responds (1) that

different age requirements for different countries would incentivize fraud and (2) that
the CDC considered the burden by adopting a lower age standard than the WOAH
regulations. Doc. 62 at 23–24. The administrative record contains sufficient evidence
of a problem with fraud in the import of dogs and the import requirements (as well as
consumer demand) driving that fraud. The record shows that the CDC considered

adopting WOAH’s more stringent standards but instead identified several areas in
which the CDC “could reduce the burden on importers while protecting the public
health.” 89 Fed. Reg. at 41759-60. The CDC also considered differentiating between
certain types of importers and allowing a limited exemption for dogs arriving on U.S.
land borders. 89 Fed. Reg. at 41760-61, 41766. The CDC determined that these

distinctions would prove less useful in evaluating the risk of rabies, more difficult to
reliably confirm, and fraught with potential for fraud based on the CDC’s recent
experience. 89 Fed. Reg. at 41760–61. As explained in Fox Television, because “the
new policy is permissible under the statute, . . . there are good reasons for it, and . . .
the agency believes it to be better,” the record supports the CDC’s change in policy for

rabies-free and low-risk countries. 556 U.S. at 515.
Finally, the CDC justifies the new regulation based on instances of importer
fraud involving the reason for the import. 89 Fed. Reg. at 41727; Doc. 62 at 9.
According to the CDC, the United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”)
already imposes a six-month age requirement on dogs imported for resale. Doc. 62 at
9; 9 C.F.R. § 2.150-.153. The record contains evidence of importers misrepresenting
dogs as not for re-sale to avoid the USDA’s age requirement. Doc. 69 at 6–9. The

CDC ties this to rabies risk by explaining that such importers are often unfamiliar
with the dog’s health history, as seen in the case of a dog imported from Egypt in
2017. 89 Fed. Reg. at 41727, 41760; Doc. 44-5 at 86–89. Although animal welfare is
outside the CDC’s purview as delineated by Congress in Section 264(a),11 instances
of importers engaging in fraud to avoid a USDA six-month age requirement—which

led to the import of a rabid dog—lend further support for the conclusion that CDC’s
imposition of an age requirement on rabies-free and low-risk countries is not
arbitrary and capricious.
V. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, based on my finding that the age requirement in 42 C.F.R.
§ 71.51 is both within the CDC’s statutory authority in 42 U.S.C. § 264(a) and not
arbitrary and capricious as applied to the rabies-free Caribbean Islands, the plaintiffs’
motion for summary judgment, Doc. 45, is DENIED, and the defendants’ cross-
motion for summary judgment, Doc. 61, is GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to

11 At oral argument and in supplemental briefing, the CDC argues that the age requirement assures
the general health and well-being of dogs during travel. Doc. 67 at 1:15:20–1:17:25; Doc. 69 at 11,
Ex. 3. This may be true, but this was not the stated purpose of CDC’s revising the dog import
regulation (i.e., “to prevent the reintroduction and spread of dog-maintained rabies virus variant”).
89 Fed. Reg. at 41726.
enter a judgment against the plaintiffs and in favor of the defendants, to terminate
any pending motion, and to close the case.
ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on this 30th day of September, 2025.
( 4 Ze gf
NDSAY S. GRIBF
United States Magistrate Judge

37

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11157702. Public record. Not legal advice.