# Prince v. State Of Ohio

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · October 2, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11157534

## Case

- **Full name:** Davonte Prince v. State of Ohio, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** October 2, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11157534

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION (CINCINNATI)

DAVONTE PRINCE, : Case No. 1:25-cv-567
:
Plaintiff, : District Judge Jeffery P. Hopkins
: Magistrate Judge Caroline H. Gentry
vs. :

:

STATE OF OHIO, et al., :
:
Defendants. :

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, a prisoner at the Warren Correctional Institution, filed this pro se civil
rights lawsuit against Defendants State of Ohio and Annette Chambers-Smith.
(Complaint, Doc. 4). By separate Order, Plaintiff was granted leave to proceed in
forma pauperis. This matter is before the Court for an initial screen of the Complaint to
determine whether it, or any portion of it, should be dismissed because it is frivolous,
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See Prison Litigation Reform
Act of 1995 § 804, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); § 805, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
A. Legal Standard
Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, to
“lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31
(1992). However, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs
are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain
from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included the

following provision in the statute:
(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been
paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that—

* * *

(B) the action or appeal—

(i) is frivolous or malicious;

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or

(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also § 1915A(b). Thus, the Court must sua sponte
dismiss this lawsuit if it determines that the action is frivolous or malicious, or upon
determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
To state a claim upon which relief may be granted, Plaintiff must satisfy the basic
federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). Hill v.
Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under
Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes
legal and factual demands on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P’Ship
v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013).
Although a complaint need not include “‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . [a]
pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of

a cause of action’” is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A complaint will not “suffice
if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Instead, to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at

570). Facial plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility of an inference depends on a host of
considerations, including common sense and the strength of competing explanations for
the defendant’s conduct.” Flagstar Bank, 727 F.3d at 504 (citations omitted).

Further, the Court holds pro se complaints “‘to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Garrett v. Belmont Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t., No. 08-3978,
2010 WL 1252923, at *2 (6th Cir. April 1, 2010) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519, 520 (1972)). This lenient treatment, however, has limits; “‘courts should not have to
guess at the nature of the claim asserted.’” Frengler v. Gen. Motors, 482 F. App’x 975,

976–77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989)).
B. Allegations in the Complaint
The allegations in the Complaint are extremely sparse. Plaintiff describes his claim
as follows:
Notice claiming civil negligence for failure to maintain and convey personal
medical files involving injuries . . .

(Doc. 4 at PageID 26). Plaintiff seeks punitive damages “for failure to cure back and neck
including my ankle having 6 pins-rods also a dislocated shoulder” and for medical
negligence, based on “not properly conferring my injuries on file by appropriate records
and maintaining such notices as a caution and red flag.” (Id. at PageID 27). Plaintiff also
states that he was assaulted while having his injuries and was not provided with medical
attention. (Id.).
C. Analysis

The Court should dismiss all claims against the State of Ohio because it is
immune from suit. Absent an express waiver, the Eleventh Amendment to the United
States Constitution bars suit against a State or one of its agencies or departments in
federal court regardless of the nature of the relief sought. Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 58 (1996); Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89,
100 (1984); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651, 663 (1974). Congress has not “explicitly and by clear language” expressed its

intent to “abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the States” when enacting
Section 1983. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341-43, 345 (1979). The State of
Ohio has neither constitutionally nor statutorily waived its Eleventh Amendment rights.
See Mixon v. State of Ohio, 193 F.3d 389, 397 (6th Cir. 1999); State of Ohio v.
Madeline Marie Nursing Homes, 694 F.2d 449, 460 (6th Cir. 1982); Ohio Inns, Inc. v.

Nye, 542 F.2d 673, 681 (6th Cir. 1976). And Plaintiff has not sued a state official to
obtain injunctive relief against future constitutional violations. Ex Parte Young, 209
U.S. 123 (1908). Therefore, the State of Ohio is immune from suit in this case and the

undersigned RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s claims against it be DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE.
In addition, the Court should dismiss all claims against Defendant Chambers-
Smith because she is not alleged to have had any involvement with the events at issue.
Plaintiff refers to a failure to cure his back and neck, states that he was assaulted, and
asserts “medical negligence” based on an asserted failure to maintain his medical

records. (Doc. 4, PageID 27). But Plaintiff does not allege any facts to suggest that
Chambers-Smith was aware of his medical condition, denied him medical care, or was
involved in any act or omission that allegedly violated Plaintiff’s rights. “[N]aked
assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement” fail to meet the basic pleading
standard under Twombly. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557)

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Miller v. Ohio Dep’t. Rehab. & Corr., Case
No. 1:20-cv-597, 2020 WL 5369059, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 5, 2020) (“Without any
allegations of wrongdoing on the part of the named defendants the complaint is subject
to dismissal.”) (Report & Recommendation), adopted, 2020 WL 5230886 (S.D. Ohio
Sept. 2, 2020). Because Plaintiff’s Complaint, as it is currently pled, fails to state a

claim against Defendant Chambers-Smith upon which relief can be granted, the
undersigned RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s claims against this Defendant be
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Finally, the undersigned notes that if Plaintiff wishes to hold Defendants liable
for negligence, he cannot do so in a federal civil rights lawsuit. Mere negligence is

insufficient to state a claim of constitutional dimension in federal court under Section
1983. See, e.g., Warren v. Doe, 28 F. App’x 463, 464 (6th Cir. 2002) (district court
properly dismissed case because the “allegations involved mere negligence that is not
actionable under § 1983”). And because all parties are citizens of Ohio, this Court
would lack diversity jurisdiction over a negligence action under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
Accordingly, because Plaintiff has failed to state an actionable claim against the

named Defendants, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court dismiss the
Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b).
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT:
1. The Court DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE all claims against Defendant State of
Ohio.

2. The Court DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE all claims against Defendant
Chambers-Smith.
3. The Court certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that for the foregoing reasons
an appeal of any Order adopting this Report and Recommendation would not be
taken in good faith. See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997).

Date: October 2, 2025 /s/ Caroline H. Gentry
Caroline H. Gentry
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE REGARDING OBJECTIONS
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written

objections to this Report & Recommendation (“R&R”) within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS
after being served with a copy thereof. That period may be extended further by the Court
on timely motion by either side for an extension of time. All objections shall specify the
portion(s) of the R&R objected to, and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in
support of the objections. A party shall respond to an opponent’s objections within
FOURTEEN DAYS after being served with a copy of those objections. Failure to make

objections in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See Thomas v.
Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11157534. Public record. Not legal advice.
