# Metwalli v. Canadian Solar

> District Court, N.D. Texas · September 4, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11157459

## Case

- **Full name:** Deyadeldin Metwalli v. Canadian Solar
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Texas
- **Decided:** September 4, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11157459

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- affirming district court’s dismissal of TCHRA claims as time-barred when those claims accrued more than 180 days before the plaintiff filed her EEOC charge

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
DEYADELDIN METWALLI, §
§
Plaintiff, §
§
V. § No. 3:25-cv-1450-B-BN
§
CANADIAN SOLAR, §
§
Defendant. §

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Deyadeldin Metwalli filed a pro se complaint alleging wrongful
employment practices. See Dkt. No. 3. Metwalli paid the filing fee, and a summons
was issued. See Dkt. No. 5. A few days later, Metwalli filed an amended complaint.
See Dkt. No. 7. United States District Judge Jane J. Boyle then referred Metwalli’s
lawsuit to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial management
under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). See Dkt. No. 6.
Defendant Canadian Solar U.S. Module Manufacturing Corporation
(“Canadian Solar”) moved to dismiss Metwalli’s amended complaint under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Dkt. No. 11. Metwalli responded, and Canadian
Solar replied. See Dkt. Nos. 14, 16, & 17. And the undersigned recommends that, for
the reasons and to the extent set out below, the Court grant the Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
Legal Standards
Considering a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court “accepts all well-pleaded
facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” In re Katrina
Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205-06 (5th Cir. 2007).
Even so, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), and must

plead those facts with enough specificity “to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level,” id. at 555.
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); cf. Bryant v. Ditech
Fin., L.L.C., No. 23-10416, 2024 WL 890122, at *3 (5th Cir. Mar. 1, 2024) (“[J]ust as
plaintiffs cannot state a claim using speculation, defendants cannot defeat plausible

inferences using speculation.”).
“The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks
for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678.
So, “[w]here a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a
defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of

entitlement to relief.” Id. (cleaned up; quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557); see, e.g.,
Parker v. Landry, 935 F.3d 9, 17 (1st Cir. 2019) (Where “a complaint reveals random
puffs of smoke but nothing resembling real signs of fire, the plausibility standard is
not satisfied.”).
And, while Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) does not mandate detailed
factual allegations, it does require that a plaintiff allege more than labels and
conclusions, and, so, while a court must accept a plaintiff’s factual allegations as true,
it is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

Consequently, a threadbare or formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, will not suffice. See id.;
Armstrong v. Ashley, 60 F.4th 262, 269 (5th Cir. 2023) (“[T]he court does not ‘presume
true a number of categories of statements, including legal conclusions; mere labels;
threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action; conclusory statements; and
naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.’” (quoting Harmon v. City of
Arlington, Tex., 16 F.4th 1159, 1162-63 (5th Cir. 2021))).

And, so, “to survive a motion to dismiss” under Twombly and Iqbal, plaintiffs
must “plead facts sufficient to show” that the claims asserted have “substantive
plausibility” by stating “simply, concisely, and directly events” that they contend
entitle them to relief. Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., 574 U.S. 10, 12 (2014) (per
curiam) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)-(3), (d)(1), (e)); cf. Brown v. Tarrant Cnty., Tex.,
985 F.3d 489, 494 (5th Cir. 2021) (While “[p]ro se complaints receive a ‘liberal

construction,’” “mere conclusory allegations on a critical issue are insufficient.”
(cleaned up)).
Aside from “matters of which judicial notice may be taken under Federal Rule
of Evidence 201,” Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 920 F.3d
890, 900 (5th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted), a court cannot look beyond the pleadings
in deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, see Spivey v. Robertson, 197 F.3d 772, 774 (5th
Cir. 1999); see also Basic Capital Mgmt., Inc. v. Dynex Capital, Inc., 976 F.3d 585,
589 (5th Cir. 2020) (Federal Rule of Evidence 201(d) “expressly provides that a court
‘may take judicial notice at any stage of the proceeding,’ and our precedents confirm

judicially noticed facts may be considered in ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion.” (citations
omitted)).
But pleadings in the Rule 12(b)(6) context include attachments to the
complaint. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007); see
also Gill as Next Friend of K.C.R. v. Judd, 941 F.3d 504, 511 (11th Cir. 2019) (“The
Civil Rules provide that an attachment to a complaint generally becomes ‘part of the
pleading for all purposes,’ including for ruling on a motion to dismiss.” (quoting FED.

R. CIV. P. 10(c); citations omitted)).
And, “[w]hen an allegation is contradicted by the contents of an exhibit
attached to the pleading,” “the exhibit and not the allegation controls.” Rogers v. City
of Yoakrum, 660 F. App’x 279, 285 n.6 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (cleaned up;
quoting United States ex rel. Riley v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 355 F.3d 370, 377
(5th Cir. 2004) (citing Simmons v. Peavy-Welsh Lumber Co., 113 F.2d 812, 813 (5th

Cir. 1940))).
Documents “attache[d] to a motion to dismiss are considered to be part of the
pleadings, if they are referred to in the plaintiff’s complaint and are central to her
claim.” Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498-99 (5th Cir. 2000)
(quoting Venture Assocs. Corp. v. Zenith Data Sys. Corp., 987 F.2d 429, 431 (7th Cir.
1993)). And, while the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit “has not
articulated a test for determining when a document is central to a plaintiff’s claims,
the case law suggests that documents are central when they are necessary to
establish an element of one of the plaintiff’s claims. Thus, when a plaintiff’s claim is

based on the terms of a contract, the documents constituting the contract are central
to the plaintiff’s claim.” Kaye v. Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P., 453 B.R. 645, 662 (N.D.
Tex. 2011). But, “if a document referenced in the plaintiff’s complaint is merely
evidence of an element of the plaintiff’s claim, then the court may not incorporate it
into the complaint.” Id.
And a plaintiff may not amend his allegations through a response to a motion
to dismiss. “[A] claim for relief” must be made through a pleading, FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a),

and a response to a motion is not among the “pleadings [that] are allowed” under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, FED. R. CIV. P. 7(a); see, e.g., Klaizner v.
Countrywide Fin., No. 2:14-CV-1543 JCM (PAL), 2015 WL 627927, at *10 (D. Nev.
Feb. 12, 2015) (“All claims for relief must be contained in a pleading. A response to a
motion is not a pleading and it is improper for the court to consider causes of action
not contained in the pleadings.” (citations omitted)).

Analysis
Relying in large part on the charge of discrimination attached to the amended
complaint, Canadian Solar moves to dismiss Metwalli’s claims as time barred and
unexhausted, and, to the extent that Metwalli presents timely claims and has
exhausted administrative remedies, Canadian Solar urges dismissal because those
claims are not plausibly pleaded.
First off, it’s not clear whether Metwalli alleges wrongful employment claims
just under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or also under Chapter 21 of the
Texas Labor Code.

And, in general, “[c]ourts apply the same standards when analyzing claims
under Title VII and Chapter 21.” Mott v. Schneider Elec. Sys., USA, Inc., No. 4:24-cv-
3084, 2025 WL 1549461, at *2 (S.D. Tex. May 30, 2025) (citing Pineda v. United Parcel
Serv., Inc., 360 F.3d 483, 487 (5th Cir. 2004)).
But different standards can apply when courts consider whether such claims
have been timely exhausted:
In Texas, which has a state fair employment agency (the Texas
Workforce Commission – “TWC”) that has a work-sharing agreement
with the EEOC, a Title VII plaintiff must file a charge of discrimination
with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory act. Fort
Bend Cnty., Tex. v. Davis, 587 U.S. 541, 544 (2019). “The time period
generally begins to run when the employee receives notice of the
allegedly discriminatory decision, not when the employment actually
ceases.” Conaway v. Control Data Corp., 955 F.2d 358, 362 (5th Cir.
1992). Failure to file a charge with the EEOC and exhaust
administrative remedies before filing a Title VII action will result in
dismissal. Dao v. Auchan Hypermarket, 96 F.3d 787, 788-89 (5th Cir.
1996). The TCHRA also requires a plaintiff to exhaust administrative
remedies, and the relevant time period is shorter: 180 days rather than
300. TEX. LAB. CODE § 21.202(a); see also Hinkley v. Envoy Air, Inc., 968
F.3d 544, 552-53 (5th Cir. 2020). Filing a charge with the EEOC satisfies
the complaint-filing requirement for the TCHRA, but the 180-day time
limit under the TCHRA still applies. Griffin v. City of Dall., 26 F.3d 610,
612-13 (5th Cir. 1994); see also Adams v. DaimlerChrysler Servs. NA
LLC, 252 F. App’x 681, 683 (5th Cir. 2007) (affirming district court’s
dismissal of TCHRA claims as time-barred when those claims accrued
more than 180 days before the plaintiff filed her EEOC charge).
Doe v. Univ. of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 653 F. Supp. 3d 359, 371 (S.D. Tex.
2023) (cleaned up); accord Trevino v. Mouser Elecs., No. 4:22-cv-610-P, 2023 WL
3984668, at *3 (N.D. Tex. May 11, 2023), rec. accepted, 2023 WL 3984840 (N.D. Tex.
June 13, 2023).
The purpose of exhaustion “is to facilitate the administrative agency’s
investigation and conciliatory functions and to recognize its role as primary enforcer

of anti-discrimination laws.” Davis v. Fort Bend Cnty., 893 F.3d 300, 307 (5th Cir.
2019) (quoting Filer v. Donley, 690 F.3d 643, 647 (5th Cir. 2012)).
Administrative exhaustion therefore “provides an opportunity for voluntary
compliance before a civil action is instituted.” Id.; c.f., e.g., Ernst v. Methodist Hosp.
Sys., 1 F.4th 333, 337 (5th Cir. 2021) (“To exhaust, a plaintiff must file a timely charge
with the EEOC and then receive a notice of the right to sue.” (citation omitted)).
But these “charge-filing instruction[s are] not jurisdictional…. [Instead,] they

are properly ranked among the array of claim-processing rules that must be timely
raised to come into play.” Davis, 587 U.S. at 543-44; see also Hinkley, 968 F.3d at 554
(concluding that “Texas Labor Code § 21.202’s 180-day filing requirement is
mandatory but not jurisdictional”).
That is, “[f]ailure to exhaust is an affirmative defense that should be pleaded.”
Davis, 893 F.3d at 307 (citations omitted).

Limitations is too. See Clemmer v. Irving Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 3:13-cv-4997-
D, 2015 WL 1757358, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 17, 2015) (citing Adams v. Cedar Hill
Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 3:13-cv-2598-D, 2014 WL 66488, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2014)).
And, “[t]o obtain a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal based on an affirmative defense, the
successful affirmative defense must appear clearly on the face of the pleadings.”
Taylor v. Lear Corp., No. 3:16-cv-3341-D, 2017 WL 6209031, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 8,
2017) (cleaned up).
“Stated another way, the defendant is not entitled to dismissal under [either
Rule 12(b)(6) or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 12(c) unless the plaintiff has pleaded

herself out of court by admitting to all of the elements of the defense.” Clemmer, 2015
WL 1757358, at *2 (cleaned up).
Here, Metwalli attaches the charge to his amended complaint, so it’s been
made part of the pleadings. See Katrina, 495 F.3d at 205; Gill, 941 F.3d at 511.
And, if it wasn’t, the Court could still “take judicial notice of [it] as a public
record.” E.g., West v. R&K Enters. Solutions, No. 3:23-cv-1371-G-BN, 2024 WL
3891533, at *5 (N.D. Tex. July 19, 2024) (“[E]ven if not referenced in the complaint

and central to West’s claims, the Court can take judicial notice of the EEOC charge
as a public record.” (citing King v. Life School, 809 F. Supp. 2d 572, 579 n.1 (N.D. Tex.
2011))), rec. accepted, 2024 WL 3891838 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 21, 2024).
So, to the extent that Canadian Solar moves to dismiss the amended complaint
because Metwalli failed to timely exhaust, the Court may examine the charge itself
to determine whether, on the face of the pleadings, Metwalli has admitted to all

elements of either affirmative defense.
The charge, filed on March 11, 2025, reflects that it is based on retaliation that
took place (at the earliest and at the latest) on May 21, 2024 but that Metwalli was
terminated on May 2, 2024. See Dkt. No. 7 at 15.
Metwalli responds to this apparent inconsistency by explaining that he was
terminated on May 23, 2024, as reflected in a TWC separation report, and that the
May 2 date was a clerical error. See Dkt. No. 16 at 1 & 24.
And the Court need not resolve this fact dispute at this phase to find that any
Chapter 21 claims that Metwalli may allege are time barred because the charge was

filed “more than 180 days after the occurrence of an alleged unlawful employment
practice.” Clark v. Champion Nat’l Sec., Inc., 952 F.3d 570, 586 n.5 (5th Cir. 2020)
(citing TEX. LAB. CODE § 21.202(a); Adams v. DaimlerChrysler Servs. NA LLC, 252 F.
App’x 681, 683 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam)).
But, as to the Title VII claims, because 300 days prior to March 11, 2025 was
May 15, 2024, the fact dispute does matter. And, given at least that the charge itself
is internally inconsistent, the Court should not find that Metwalli has pleaded

himself out of court based just on that the Title VII claims are untimely.
That said, the Court still must examine the charge made part of the pleadings
to determine the scope of claims exhausted by it, keeping in mind “that ‘the scope of
an EEOC complaint should be construed liberally.” Patton v. Jacobs Eng’g Grp., Inc.,
874 F.3d 437, 443 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Pacheco v. Mineta, 448 F.3d 783, 788 (5th
Cir. 2006)). But this liberal construction must be weighed against the statutory goals

of “trigger[ing] the investigatory and conciliatory procedures of the EEOC, in attempt
to achieve non-judicial resolution of employment discrimination claims.” Pacheco, 448
F.3d at 788-89.
And, to attain a balance between the two, courts in this circuit interpret
“what is properly embraced in review of a [wrongful employment
practice] claim somewhat broadly, not solely by the scope of the
administrative charge itself, but by the scope of the EEOC investigation
which ‘can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of
discrimination.’” Id. at 789 (quoting Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc.,
431 F.2d 455, 466 (5th Cir. 1970)). “[Courts should] engage in fact-
intensive analysis of the statement given by the plaintiff in the
administrative charge, and look slightly beyond its four corners, to its
substance rather than its label.” Id.
Patton, 874 F.3d at 443.
“In analyzing whether a complainant has exhausted her administrative
remedies, the crucial element of a charge of discrimination is the factual statement
contained therein.” Nuñez-Renck v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., No. 3:23-cv-1308-D, 2024
WL 4995572, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 5, 2024) (cleaned up); see also Stingley v. Watson
Quality Ford, Jackson, MS, 836 F. App’x 286, 291 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam)
(“Courts assess whether a claim is like or related to the underlying EEOC charge
through a fact-intensive analysis of the statement given by the plaintiff in the
administrative charge.” (cleaned up)).
The charge sets out that Metwalli complained to his employer in March 2024
about a team member “who tapped/slapped [him] on the shoulder with the back of
her hand and refused to follow directions.” Dkt. No. 7 at 15. The employer
investigated and could not substantiate Metwalli’s allegations. See id. Metwalli then
complained about the same team member again, and a manager “inappropriately told

[Metwalli he] was paid highly for [his] job” and “further discussed Metwalli’s salary
with others.” Id.
Metwalli claims that, after making these complaints, he was terminated and
“told [he] did not fit the rest of the team for being dishonest.” Id. But he believes his
firing was retaliatory in violation of Title VII. See id.; see also id. at 16 (alleging that
other employees were hostile to him, including one who may have complained that
Metwalli stuttered); id. (alleging that the company (1) did not compensate him for his
“car breakdown when [he] was sent on a work trip to Houston” and (2) “tried to stop
[his] unemployment by telling TWC that [his] termination was [for] misconduct”).

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), “[t]he antiretaliation provision of Title VII[,] prohibits
an employer from discriminating against an employee or job applicant because that
individual opposed any practice made unlawful by Title VII or made a charge,
testified, assisted, or participated in a Title VII proceeding or investigation.” Ayorinde
v. Team Indus. Servs. Inc., 121 F.4th 500, 507-08 (5th Cir. 2024) (quoting Brown v.
Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 969 F.3d 571, 576-77 (5th Cir. 2020), as revised (Aug. 14,
2020)).

And, when a court applies Rule 12(b)(6)’s standards to a Title VII claim, the
complaint “need not contain specific facts establishing a prima facie case of
[retaliation] under the framework set forth ... in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973).” Norsworthy v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.4th 332, 336 (5th
Cir. 2023) (cleaned up); accord Hamilton v. Dall. Cnty., 79 F.4th 494, 502 n.45 (5th
Cir. 2023) (en banc).

“But a plaintiff is still required to plead sufficient facts on all of the ultimate
elements of [each] claim.” Norsworthy, 70 F.4th at 336 (cleaned up; emphasis in
original); accord Smith v. Kendall, No. 23-50713, 2024 WL 4442040, at *4 (5th Cir.
Oct. 8, 2024) (per curiam) (same as to retaliation).
For a retaliation claim, those “ultimate elements” are “that 1) [the plaintiff]
engaged in protected activity, 2) she suffered an adverse employment action, and 3)
a causal link exists between the protected activity and the adverse employment
action.” Wright v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 990 F.3d 428, 433 (5th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up).
And, while internal complaints may constitute a protected activity for purposes

of a retaliation claim, such complaints must “oppose[ a] practice made unlawful by
Title VII.” Ayorinde, 121 F.4th at 507-08; Brown, 969 F.3d at 576-77 (quoting
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 56 (2006) (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-3(a))); see, e.g., Rodriguez v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 540 F. App’x 322, 328 (5th
Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (“An employee that files an internal complaint of
discrimination engages in a protected activity.” (citing Fierros v. Tex. Dep’t of Health,
274 F.3d 187, 194 (5th Cir. 2001))); Walker v. Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch – Galveston,

No. 3:17-CV-00313, 2018 WL 3850827, at *4 (S.D. Tex. July 3, 2018) (noting that
courts in this circuit “uniformly hold that an informal complaint must reference a
discriminatory practice to constitute a protected activity” (citations omitted)), rec.
adopted, 2018 WL 3844691 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 13, 2018); cf. Brown v. United Parcel Serv.,
Inc., 406 F. App’x 837, 840 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (“Magic words are not
required, but protected opposition must at least alert an employer to the employee’s

reasonable belief that unlawful discrimination is at issue.” (collecting cases)).
Liberally construing the facts stated in the charge, no exhausted allegations
presented by Metwalli reflect that he made an internal complaint related to
discrimination. Complaining about an uncooperative, rude, or disruptive team
member, or about a manager discussing your salary, or about your employer not
compensating you for travel expenses does not, without more, qualify as a protected
activity.
And, so, as to any claims that Metwalli has exhausted, he has not alleged a
plausible claim under Title VII. And the Court should therefore grant Canadian

Solar’s motion to dismiss.
The opportunity file objections to these findings, conclusions, and
recommendation (as further explained below) allows Metwalli an opportunity to show
that this case should not be dismissed and that the Court should instead grant leave
to amend. See Scott v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 16 F.4th 1204, 1209 (5th Cir. 2021) (per
curiam) (“A court should freely give leave to amend when justice so requires, but a
movant must give the court at least some notice of what his or her amendments would

be and how those amendments would cure the initial complaint’s defects. If the
plaintiff does not provide a copy of the amended complaint nor explain how the defects
could be cured, a district court may deny leave.” (citations omitted)).
And the Court should dismiss this lawsuit with prejudice if Metwalli fails to
timely object and show a basis to amend to allege a plausible claim – that is, one
supported by “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Recommendation
The Court should grant Defendant Canadian Solar U.S. Module
Manufacturing Corporation’s motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) [Dkt. No. 11] to the extent that any claims that Plaintiff
Deyadeldin Metwalli may make under Chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code are time
barred and to the extent that Metwalli’s exhausted allegations under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 fail to state a claim on which relief can be granted, and the
Court should dismiss this lawsuit with prejudice unless Metwalli files timely
objections that show a basis to amend to allege a timely, exhausted, and plausible
claim.
A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on
all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these
findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections
within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIv.
P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or
recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and
specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation
where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by
reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure
to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the
factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or
adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v.
United Servs. Auto. Assn, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
DATED: September 4, 2025
bee
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

-14-

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11157459. Public record. Not legal advice.