# Thompson v. Wilshire

> District Court, S.D. West Virginia · September 5, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11157400

## Case

- **Full name:** Maurice-Edward Thompson v. S. Wilshire, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. West Virginia
- **Decided:** September 5, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11157400

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding the argument that tinted windows were not the actual reason that the police stopped a defendant was “irrelevant” to whether there was probable cause under Whren
- reversing dismissal and explaining that “claims of legal substance should not be forfeited because of a failure to state them with technical precision”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA

CHARLESTON DIVISION

MAURICE-EDWARD THOMPSON,

Plaintiff,

v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:24-cv-00268

S. WILSHIRE, et al.,

Defendants.

PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter is assigned to the Honorable Joseph R. Goodwin, United States
District Judge, and by standing order entered January 4, 2016, and filed in this case May
31, 2024, is referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for submission of
proposed findings and recommendations for disposition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(B). (ECF No. 3). Pending before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 24),
filed March 10, 2025, by Defendant S. Wilshire. Plaintiff Maurice-Edward Thompson,
who is proceeding pro se, responded in opposition on March 21, 2025, (ECF No. 27), and
Defendant timely replied (ECF No. 28). The matter is ready for adjudication.
For the reasons explained more fully herein, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED
that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 24) be DENIED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE and Plaintiff be granted leave to amend his Amended Complaint.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed his initial Complaint in this matter on May 30, 2024. (ECF No. 2).
After Defendant moved to dismiss on August 16, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiff leave
to amend his Complaint. See (ECF Nos. 12, 22). On February 24, 2025, Plaintiff filed the
operative Amended Complaint against Defendant.1 (ECF No. 18).
According to Plaintiff, on April 28, 2024, he was pulled over by Defendant, an
officer with the Oak Hill Police Department, for a traffic stop due to an alleged
malfunction of his registration plate light. (Id. at 2). Plaintiff was then directed by

Defendant to exit his vehicle, and Plaintiff complied. (Id.). Defendant then placed Plaintiff
in handcuffs and, together with other officers, began forcing Plaintiff into Defendant’s
police cruiser above Plaintiff’s requests to speak to a supervising officer. (Id.). Plaintiff
contends that he asked the officers to be patient because herniated discs in his back and
arthritis in his left knee made it difficult to get into the vehicle comfortably. (Id.). Despite
Plaintiff’s requests, Defendant and the other officers continued to force him into the
police cruiser. (Id.).
Plaintiff contends that the broken light cited by Defendant in the traffic stop was
mere pretext for the traffic stop and that Defendant “[took] it upon himself to arrest
[Plaintiff] without probable cause.” (Id. at 3). Accordingly, Plaintiff asserts three causes
of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Fourth Amendment in his Amended

Complaint: (1) a violation of his due process rights; (2) unlawful arrest; and (3) use of
excessive force. (ECF No. 18).
On March 10, 2025, Defendant filed the instant Motion to Dismiss, arguing that
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted and that Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity from suit. (ECF
No. 24). In response, Plaintiff contends that Defendant and another unnamed officer

1 Plaintiff clarifies in his Response that, despite referencing the Oak Hill Police Department in his
Complaint, his claims are against S. Wilshire only. (ECF No. 27 at 7).
violated their duties and oath of office by turning on the emergency lights in their police
cruiser when they pulled him over and that the stop was “all because of a previous
encounter” he had with Defendant, not based on reasonable suspicion. (ECF No. 27 at 2,
6). He further contends that traffic infractions are not crimes justifying a warrantless
arrest or detention, and thus, his arrest was unlawful. (Id. at 3). Finally, he asks this Court

to “reject the doctrines of absolute and qualified immunity completely” and find
Defendant liable for Plaintiff’s alleged injuries. (Id. at 4-5).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the “Federal Rules”) require a plaintiff’s
complaint, which is a type of “pleading,” to set forth a “short and plain statement of the
claim showing that [he or she] is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The purpose of
this procedural rule is to ensure that a plaintiff’s complaint provides the defendant with
“fair notice” of the plaintiff’s legal claims, and the alleged factual “grounds” for plaintiff’s
entitlement to relief pursuant to those claims. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555–56 (2007). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (“Our decision in
Twombly expounded the pleading standard for all civil actions[.]”) (quotation

omitted); accord Willner v. Dimon, 849 F.3d 93, 112 (4th Cir. 2017). Pursuant to
Federal Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a defendant may challenge
the legal sufficiency of a complaint by filing a motion to dismiss, which posits that, even
if the facts alleged by the plaintiff are true, the complaint fails to state “a claim upon
which relief can be granted” under the applicable law. Glessner v. Chardan, LLC, 22-cv-
3333, 2023 WL 4351331, at *2 (D. Md. July 5, 2023) (citing In re Birmingham, 846 F.3d
88, 92 (4th Cir. 2017); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)).
To survive a motion to dismiss under this minimal standard, the complaint only
needs to set forth enough allegations of fact which, if true, suggest a clearly identifiable
legal claim for relief that “is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 570. For a
claim to be “plausible,” the complaint does not need to include “detailed factual
allegations.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Further, a complaint should not be dismissed
simply because the actual proof of those facts is improbable, because recovery is unlikely,

or because the legal theory supporting the claim is not stated perfectly. Id.; accord
Johnson v. City of Shelby, 574 U.S. 10, 11 (2014) (per curiam). On the other hand, a
complaint may not simply rely on bald accusations, conclusory statements, or mere
speculation. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see Painter’s Mill Grille, LLC v. Brown, 716 F.3d
342, 350 (4th Cir. 2013). The U.S. Supreme Court has explained that if the complaint
provides no more than “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action,” dismissal is proper. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. In other
words, it is fundamentally insufficient for a complaint to be made up of nothing
more than “an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Instead, the complaint must
plead facts which move the claim beyond the realm of mere possibility and allow the court

to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
When reviewing a defendant’s motion to dismiss, the Court decides whether the
complaint met this standard by separating the legal conclusions from the factual
allegations, assuming the truth of only the factual allegations, and then determining
whether those allegations allow the court to “reasonably infer” that the plaintiff is entitled
to the legal remedy he or she seeks. A Soc’y Without a Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342,
346 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 566 U.S. 937 (2012).
Additionally, when a plaintiff is proceeding “pro se”—or in other words, without
legal counsel—the Court must “liberally construe” the complaint, meaning that it is held
to a less stringent standards than if it had been drafted by an attorney. Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Therefore, when a potentially viable complaint is deficient but its
shortcomings can be remedied by amendment, the pro-se plaintiff should be given an
opportunity to amend the complaint and “particularize” his or her allegations. See

Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980); accord Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151-53
(4th Cir. 1978) (“What might be a meritorious claim on the part of a pro se litigant
unversed in the law should not be defeated without affording the pleader a reasonable
opportunity to articulate his cause of action.”); Coleman v. Peyton, 370 F.2d 603, 604
(4th Cir. 1965) (reversing dismissal and explaining that “claims of legal substance should
not be forfeited because of a failure to state them with technical precision”). Nevertheless,
the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court may ignore a clear
failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a cognizable claim. See Weller v.
Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 685 (2009).
Likewise, “a district court is not required to recognize obscure or extravagant claims
defying the most concerted efforts to unravel them.” Weller v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 901

F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990) (“[E]ven a solicitous examination of the allegations reveals
little on which federal subject matter jurisdiction may be based.”) (internal markings
omitted). In other words, the mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings
means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which
the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so; however, a district court may not rewrite a
complaint to include claims that were never presented, construct the plaintiff's legal
arguments for him or her, or “conjure up questions never squarely presented” to the
Court. Randolph v. Baltimore City, 14-3176, 2014 WL 5293708, at *1 (D. Md. Oct. 14,
2014), aff’d sub nom. Randolph v. New Tech, 588 Fed. App’x 219 (4th Cir. 2014) (citations
omitted) (quoting Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985)). See
also Weller, 901 F.2d at 391 (affirming dismissal where the “complaint fail[ed] to allege
anything that even remotely suggests a factual basis for the claim,” and explaining that
“[t]he ‘special judicial solicitude’ with which a district court should view such pro se

complaints does not transform the court into an advocate”). Consequently, the Court may
deny leave to amend when “the amendment would be futile,” such that “it is clearly
insufficient or frivolous on its face” or “if the claim it presents would not survive a motion
to dismiss.” Equal Rights Ctr. v. Niles Bolton Assocs., 602 F.3d 597, 603 (4th Cir. 2010);
Save Our Sound OBX, Inc. v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 914 F.3d 213, 228 (4th Cir. 2019).
III. ANALYSIS
Construing Plaintiff’s Complaint liberally, in light of his status as both a pro-se
party and the non-moving party, the Court surmises that Plaintiff seeks to assert three
constitutional claims against Defendant, Officer S. Wilshire, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
based upon three alleged Fourth Amendment violations.
First, Plaintiff appears to assert that Defendant conducted an unlawful Terry stop

of Plaintiff’s vehicle due to an alleged “malfunction of a registration plate light,” which
violated Plaintiff’s due process rights. (ECF No. 18 at 2). It is well-settled that “a traffic
stop based on a reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation comports with the Fourth
Amendment.” Hawthorne v. Cty. of Putnam, 492 F. Supp. 3d 281, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).
Cf. United States v. DeSantis, 23-4421, 2024 WL 3439423, at *1 (4th Cir. July 16, 2024)
(finding that “upon observing DeSantis following too closely to another vehicle, Ohio
State Trooper Seth Jones had probable cause to believe a traffic violation had been
committed and therefore lawfully stopped the vehicle”). “[I]n determining whether a
traffic stop is reasonable, [courts] apply the standard articulated in Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968), wherein the court asks,” inter alia, “if the stop was legitimate at its
inception[.]” United States v. Smith, 2:18-cr-173, 2019 WL 4691469, at *2 (S.D. W. Va.
Sept. 25, 2019) (citing United States v. Bowman, 884 F.3d 200, 209 (4th Cir. 2018)).
Even if the officer is ultimately incorrect about whether the traffic infraction occurred, a

mistaken but reasonable belief does not violate the Fourth Amendment, which simply
“requires that an officer making a traffic stop have probable cause or reasonable suspicion
that the person stopped has committed a traffic violation[.]” United States v. Stewart, 551
F.3d 187, 191 (2d Cir. 2009). See also United States v. Martin, 411 F.3d 998, 1001 (8th
Cir. 2005) (“The determinative question is not whether [defendant] actually violated the
Motor Vehicle Code by operating a vehicle with one defective brake light, but whether an
objectively reasonable police officer could have formed a reasonable suspicion that
[defendant] was committing a code violation.”); United States v. Lopez–Soto, 205 F.3d
1101, 1105 (9th Cir.2000) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment requires only reasonable suspicion
in the context of investigative traffic stops.”).
In Hawthorne, the plaintiff argued that the officer in that case, Deputy Kennedy,

violated the Fourth Amendment by initiating a traffic stop in light of the ultimate
dismissal of the traffic citations. Hawthorne, 492 F. Supp. 3d at 295-96. The U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York found that the officer’s traffic stop “does not
automatically give rise to a Fourth Amendment claim . . . [n]or does it equate in itself to
a plausible allegation that Deputy Kennedy lacked reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry
stop.” Id. at 296. The court in Hawthorne found it significant that the plaintiff “does not
go so far as to accuse Deputy Kennedy of falsifying the allegation in order to create pretext
for a traffic stop.” Id. at 295. Because the plaintiff stopped short of “assert[ing] facts
expressly challenging [Officer Kennedy’s] version of events,” the court dismissed his
claim.
Here, like in Hawthorne, Plaintiff falls short of explicitly alleging that Defendant
falsified the allegation in order to create pretext for a traffic stop, instead implying that
the traffic stop must have been pretextual because Defendant “did not bring [the broken

light] forward in his charges.” (ECF No. 18 at 3). Plaintiff alleges that Officer Wilshire has
had prior dealings with him and that “he was asserting his ‘authority’” by arresting him
without probable cause. (Id.). However, the Court’s Fourth Amendment analysis “does
not depend on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved.” Whren v. United
States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). See also United States v. Lucas, 19-cr-3937, 2021 WL
3700944, at *1 n.1 (2d Cir. Aug. 20, 2021) (finding the argument that tinted windows were
not the actual reason that the police stopped a defendant was “irrelevant” to whether there
was probable cause under Whren). Without more factual allegations, it is not clear from
the face of the Complaint whether Defendant’s alleged actions violated the Fourth
Amendment. Despite giving Plaintiff leave to amend his original Complaint, the factual
deficiencies that plagued that Complaint remain.

The second of Plaintiff’s three apparent Fourth Amendment claims under § 1983
appears to be a claim for “unlawful arrest.” (ECF No. 18 at 1). However, the U.S. Supreme
Court has held that an officer has probable cause to arrest an individual for even a minor
traffic violation that is committed in the officer's presence. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista,
532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001) (upholding warrantless arrest based upon driver’s failure to wear
seatbelt). See also United States v. Fayton, 694 F. Supp. 3d 179, 191 (S.D.N.Y. 2023)
(“While it may not be the NYPD's general approach to arrest a driver and take him back
to the precinct for minor traffic violations committed in the officers’ presence, rather than
issue a ticket or summons on site, such an arrest is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.”). Thus, just as with the prior claim, without more, it is not clear from the
face of the Amended Complaint whether Officer Wilshire’s alleged actions violated the
Fourth Amendment.
Third and finally, Plaintiff asserts a claim for excessive force. However, this claim,

too, suffers from fatally scant factual detail. A “claim that law enforcement officials used
excessive force in the course of making an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of
[a] person” is “properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's ‘objective
reasonableness’ standard.” Estate of Armstrong ex rel. Amrstrong v.Vill. of Pinehurst,
810 F.3d 892, 899 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 388). “An officer may
employ force, when such force is reasonable under the circumstances, in the course of his
or her duty.” Moody v. City of Newport News, Virginia, 193 F. Supp. 3d 530, 543 (E.D.
Va. 2016), aff'd sub nom. Moody v. Hollandsworth, 690 F. App'x 140 (4th Cir. 2017).
In determining whether force is reasonable, courts must carefully balance “ ‘the
nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests’
against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396

(quoting Tenneessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985)). To do so, courts “focus on the facts
and circumstances of each case, taking into account ‘[1] the severity of the crime at issue,
[2] whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others,
and [3] whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.’ ”
Yates v. Terry, 817 F.3d 877, 885 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396);
Armstrong, 810 F.3d at 899. Courts must consider the reasonableness of the force
employed “ ‘in full context, with an eye toward the proportionality of the force in light of
all the circumstances.’ ” Smith v. Ray, 781 F.3d 95, 101 (4th Cir.2015) (quoting Waterman
v. Batton, 393 F.3d 471, 481 (4th Cir.2005)). The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
has recognized that “ ‘police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in
circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—[and] we take care to
consider the facts from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, and avoid
judging the officer's conduct with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.’ ” Cooper v. Sheehan, 735

F.3d 153, 158–59 (4th Cir.2013) (quoting Clem v. Corbeau, 284 F.3d 543, 550 (4th
Cir.2002)).
While the pleading standard set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “does
not require detailed factual allegations . . . it demands more than an unadorned, ‘the-
defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me’ accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Yet Plaintiff’s
Complaint does just that—alleges that Defendant used excessive force in putting Plaintiff
in the patrol vehicle without telling the Court how the force used was excessive. Plaintiff’s
factual allegations related to this claim are as follows:
After defendant S. Wilshire placed me in handcuffs, he and the other officers
used excessive force to place me in the vehicle after I politely asked to speak
to the supervisor above them all. As they continued to force me in the
vehicle[,] I asked them to be patient because I couldn’t be comfortable
getting in the way they were forcing me to get in. I informed them that I had
herniated discs in my back. I also have bad arthritis in my left knee. They
continued to force me into the patrol car.

(ECF No. 18 at 2). This falls short of the requisite standard.
In short, each of Plaintiff’s claims set forth in the Amended Complaint—despite
having a prior opportunity to amend and cure factual deficiencies—still falls short of the
pleading standard and warrants dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. However, the undersigned notes that “the Fourth Circuit has stated that
a court should consider granting plaintiffs, particularly pro se plaintiffs, leave to amend
if it dismisses a complaint based on [Rule] 12(b)(6).” Smith v. Virginia, No. 3:08cv800,
2009 WL 2175759, at *9 (E.D. Va. July 16, 2009) (citing Ostrzenski v. Seigel, 177 F.3d
245, 252–53 (4th Cir.1999)). In fact, amendment should be refused only if it appears to a
certainty that plaintiff cannot state a claim. The better practice is to allow at least one
amendment regardless of how unpromising the initial pleading appears because except
in unusual circumstances it is unlikely that the court will be able to determine conclusively

on the face of a defective pleading whether plaintiff can state a proper claim. Id. at 253.
Accordingly, the undersigned FINDS that Plaintiff should be granted leave to file a
Second Amended Complaint that sets forth sufficient factual support for Plaintiff’s claims.
IV. RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned respectfully RECOMMENDS that
Defendant’s motion be DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, and Plaintiff be granted a
reasonable period of time from the presiding District Judge’s adjudication of the instant
Proposed Findings and Recommendation to file a Second Amended Complaint.
The parties are notified that this Proposed Findings and Recommendation is
hereby FILED, and a copy will be submitted to the Honorable Joseph R. Goodwin, United
States District Judge. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), the parties shall have fourteen (14) days (filing of
objections) and three (3) days (mailing) from the date of the filing of this Proposed
Findings and Recommendation to file with the Clerk of this Court specific written
objections identifying the portions of the Proposed Findings and Recommendation to
which objection is made and the basis of such objection. Extension of this time period
may be granted by the presiding District Judge for good cause shown. Copies of any
objections shall be provided to the opposing party or, if it is represented by counsel, to its
counsel, and to Judge Goodwin.
Failure to file written objections as set forth above shall constitute a waiver of de
novo review by the District Court and a waiver of appellate review by the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 155 (1985);
Snyder v. Ridenour, 889 F.2d 1363, 1366 (4th Cir. 1989); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841,
846 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91, 94 (4th Cir. 1984).
The Clerk is DIRECTED to file this Proposed Findings and Recommendation and
to mail a copy of the same to Plaintiff and to transmit a copy to counsel of record.
ENTERED: September 5, 2025
a + ~~
/ = \A
Dwane L. Tinsley .
_ United States Magistrate Judge ;

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11157400. Public record. Not legal advice.