# Pete v. Louisiana State

> District Court, E.D. Louisiana · October 3, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11157166

## Case

- **Full name:** Norman Pete v. Louisiana State
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** October 3, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11157166

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding community notification provision did not inflict punishment
- holding Louisiana’s Prostitution statute and Crime Against Nature by Solicitation statute punish identical conduct, but only required one group to register as sex offenders was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
- finding community notification provision did not inflict punishment
- discussing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

NORMAN PETE CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 24-1836

LOUISIANA STATE SECTION “B” (3)

ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is plaintiff Norman Pete’s October 8, 2024, response to this Court’s
previous Order. Rec. Doc. 10. There has been no response to the complaint by defendant
“Louisiana State,” despite the summons being returned executed on Liz Murrill on August 9, 2024.
Rec. Doc. 8. For the reasons infra,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff’s §1983 complaint be DISMISSED.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On July 29, 2024, Pete Norman sued the defendant Liz Murrill, in her capacity as
Louisiana’s Attorney General, under 42 U.S.C. §1983 challenging the constitutionality of
Louisiana’s sex offender registration. In his Complaint, Pete asserts that the government has been
violating his civil rights under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution. Rec. Doc. 3 at 3. Pete details that Louisiana Legislators have implemented laws that
require those convicted of sex offenses to register, pay substantial fees, and adhere to various
requirements to avoid future prosecution. Id. at 4. His arguments center on the fact that he and
other sex offenders are being “discriminated against” with these requirements despite having
previously served full-term sentences for their precipitating charges.
In his petition, Norman Pete provides that he was recently released from Rayburn
Correctional Center after serving a full-term sentence from a conviction out of Orleans Parish for
Forcible Rape and Second-Degree Kidnapping. Rec. Doc. 11 at 12. Prior to his release, Pete signed
paperwork for the “Louisiana Sex Registration and Notification Requirements Upon Release from
Confinement by the Department of Public Safety and Corrections.” Rec. Doc. 11 at 8-15.
Additionally, Pete has provided some of the documentation from the various fees he has paid to
Orleans Parish in compliance with his registration requirements. Rec. Doc. 11 at 5-7.

Norman Pete filed the instant complaint on July 29, 2024. Rec. Doc. 3. To date, defendant
Liz Murrill has taken no actions to defend against Pete’s claims. Due to the defendant’s failure,
Pete filed a default judgment motion, on September 20, 2024. Rec. Doc. 9. Consistent with the
duties imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B), the Court denied plaintiff’s motion (Rec. Doc. 9)
and required plaintiff Pete to file a response to various matters on or before October 11, 2024. Rec.
Doc. 10. Prior to this deadline, plaintiff timely filed a document in response to the Court’s Order.
Rec. Doc. 11. In this instant motion, Pete asks this Court to find that all fees, sex offender
registrations, and disqualifications for re-entry programs be ruled unconstitutional, and for the
Court to award him twenty million dollars of punitive damages against the State of Louisiana. Rec.
Doc. 3.1

LAW AND ANALYSIS
Sua Sponte Dismissal
Sua sponte dismissal is appropriate when a plaintiff fails to prosecute his case. See
Griggs v. S.G.E. Mgmt., LLC, 905 F.3d 835, 844 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b)). It
is also appropriate when a complaint fails to state a claim. See Lozano v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, FSB,

1 While not outcome-determinative here, Pete appears to have a lengthy history of suing state officials,
often unsuccessfully. See Pete v. Foti, 2:89-cv-04277; Pete v. Foti, 2:89-cv-00813; Pete v. Foti, 2:98-cv-
02087; Pete v. LA Parole Board, et al., 2:00-cv-03166; Pete v. Orleans Parish Criminal Sheriff’s Office, et
al., 2:04-cv-02139; Pete v. Gusman, 2:07-cv-03776; Pete v. Tanner, 2:09-cv-03403; Pete v. McCain, 2:15-
cv-01464; Pete v. Tanner, 2:17-cv-01802; Pete v. Tanner, 2:18-cv-10535; Pete v. Day, 2:22-cv-00240, Pete
v. Doe, 2:22-cv-02327; Pete v. Doe, 2:22-cv-03041; Pete v. Wainwright et al., 2:24-cv-00879; Pete v.
Prevose, 2:24-cv-01614; Pete v. Louisiana State et al., 2:24-cv-02375; Pete v. Williams et al., 2:25-cv-
00199.
489 F.3d 636, 642 (5th Cir. 2007) (The Fifth Circuit has held that a district court is authorized to
consider the sufficiency of the complaint on its own initiative.” (quotations omitted)). Finally,
sua sponte dismissal is mandatory when a court discovers that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction.
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3). The Court possesses the authority to dismiss an action sua sponte

without motion by a defendant if the procedure is fair. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); See, e.g., Gaffney
v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 294 F.App’x 975, 977 (5th Cir. 2008); Carroll v. Fort James
Corp., 470 F.3d 1171, 1177 (5th Cir. 2006). The Fifth Circuit suggests that “fairness in this
context requires both notice of the court’s intention [to dismiss sua sponte] and an opportunity to
respond.” Gaffney, 294 F.App’x 975 at 977 (citing Lozano v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, FSB, 489 F.3d
636,643 (5th Cir. 2007)). In the alternative, dismissal will only be upheld if the plaintiff has
alleged his “best case.” Id.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 provides that the pleading must contain “enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Varela v. Gonzales, 773 F.3d 704, 707 (5th Cir.
2014) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In other words, a plaintiff’s

“[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (discussing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)). “A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing
Twombly, 556 U.S. at 556).
When deciding whether a plaintiff has met its burden, a court “accept[s] all well-pleaded
factual allegations as true and interpret[s] the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
but ‘[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements’ cannot establish facial plausibility.” Snow Ingredients, Inc. v. SnoWizard, Inc., 833
F.3d 512, 520 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678) (some internal citations and
quotation marks omitted). Plaintiffs must “nudge [] their claims across the line from conceivable
to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. A complaint does not meet the plausibility standard “if it
offers only labels and conclusions, or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.”

Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 638 (5th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing
Twombly, 556 U.S. at 555).
Although motions to dismiss are evaluated by the content in the complaint, the United States
Supreme Court has described the extent of possible evidence: “[C]ourts must consider the
complaint in its entirety, as well as other sources courts ordinarily examine when ruling on Rule
12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, in particular, documents incorporated into the complaint by reference,
and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd,
551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007) (citation omitted). The Court may also take judicial notice of public
records while conducting a 12(b)(6) analysis. See Viking Constr. Grp., LLC et al. v. Satterfield &
Pontikes Constr. Grp., et al., No. 17-12838, 2018 WL 398751, at *4 n.18 (E.D. La. Jan. 12, 2018);

Rantz v. Shield Coat, Inc., No. 17-3338, 2017 WL 3188415, at *5 (E.D. La. July 26, 2017). Here,
plaintiff includes in his filing a response to this Court’s previous Order. See Rec. Doc. 11. This
document is central to plaintiff’s complaint. Id. Thus, both are appropriately considered.
It is not uncommon for a court to allow a plaintiff to amend their pleading before dismissing
the action with prejudice when the dismissal is for failure to state a claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a);
see Great Plains Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 329 (5th Cir.
2002). However, “leave to amend is in no way automatic, but the district court must possess a
‘substantial reason’ to deny a party’s request for leave to amend.” Marucci Sports, L.L.C. V. Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 751 F.3d 368, 378 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing Jones v. Robinson Prop.Grp.,
LP, 427 F.3d 987, 994 (5th Cir. 2005)). Further, the Fifth Circuit has made clear that a court should
deny leave to submit futile amendments if the defects are incurable. See Id; Jamieson v. Shaw, 772
F.2d 1205, 1209 (5th Cir. 1985). An amendment would be deemed futile “if it would fail to survive
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” Marucci Sports, L.L.C., 751 F.3d at 378.

Failure to state a claim
Pete’s petition barely describes the grounds on which he bases his claims. See Rec. Doc.
3. Pete states his rights were infringed upon by the State of Louisiana’s requirements to submit to
sex offender registration and notification requirements. Id. These “punishments,” per Pete, deprive
him of his Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Rec. Doc. 3 at 3. In this petition,
Norman Pete is not contesting his convictions for Forcible Rape or Second Degree Kidnapping.
Rec. Doc. 11 at 12. Nor is he contesting his requirement to register as a sex offender under LA.
STAT. ANN. § 15:542. Rec. Docs. 3 and 11. Instead, Pete utilizes this motion to argue that the
registration and notification requirements are depriving him of rights, privileges, and immunities
protected by the Fifth Amendment, Eighth Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment. To allege a

§1983 violation, a plaintiff must state a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of
the United States and state that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under the color
of state law. Anderson v. Law Firm of Shorty, Dooley & Hall, 393 Fed.Appx. 214 (5th Cir. 2010)
(citation omitted). Therefore, the inquiry here must be whether Pete has stated a viable
infringement on his Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S.
137, 140 (1979).
Being that Pete asserts a §1983 claim pursuant to his Fourteenth Amendment rights being
violated, it is pertinent to discuss possible procedural due process claims. Per what little
information we have, Pete has been convicted of a sex offense and must register as a sex offender
per Louisiana law. Rec. Docs. 3 and 11; LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:542 (2025). “When a state interferes
with liberty interest, ‘the procedures attendant upon that deprivation [must be] constitutionally
sufficient.” Does 1-7 v. Abbott, 945 F.3d 307 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v.
Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989)). “‘The individual convicted of a sex crime in a prior

adversarial setting, whether as the result of a bench trial, jury trial, or plea agreement, has received
the minimum protections required by due process.’” Id. (citing Meza v. Livingston, 607 F.3d 392,
401 (5th Cir. 2010)). “Therefore, when a registry’s requirements ‘turn on an offender’s conviction
alone—a fact that a convicted offender has already had a procedurally safeguarded opportunity to
contest’—persons convicted of sexual offenses are owned no additional process.” Id. (citing Conn.
Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe v. Doe (“CDPS”), 538 U.S. 1, 7-8 (2003)).
Regarding Pete’s Equal Protection claims, the Eastern District of Louisiana previously
determined that when conduct receives punishments not issued to identical conduct, the Fourteenth
Amendment protects those being denied equal protection of the laws. See Doe v. Jindal, 851
F.Supp.2d 995 (E.D. La. 2012) (holding Louisiana’s Prostitution statute and Crime Against Nature

by Solicitation statute punish identical conduct, but only required one group to register as sex
offenders was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment). Here, Pete has failed to assert that
Louisiana sex offender registration and notification laws do not apply to all similarly situated sex
offenders, thus we find no merit in Pete’s Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim.
Pete’s claim that his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights are being violated suggest he
is asserting a substantive due process claim. “[T]he Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee
of ‘due process of law’ [ ] include a substantive component, which forbids the government to
infringe certain ‘fundamental’ liberty interests at all, no matter what process is provided, unless
the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.” Greenwald v. Cantrell,
675 F.Supp.3d 709 (E.D. La. 2023), appeal dismissed as moot sub nom. Greenwald v. Murrill, No.
23-30429, 2024 WL 1929012 (5th Cir. May 2, 2024) (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-02
(1993)). Substantive due process protects against arbitrary government action, but mostly behavior
that “shocks the conscience”—“conduct intended to injure in some way unjustifiable by any

government interest.” Id. (citations omitted).
With respect to substantive due process, Pete contends that the burdens of the Louisiana’s
sex offender laws are excessive, causing him to pay substantial fees pay fees, and live in certain
places, and register after serving a prison sentence. However, despite showing proof of fees
totaling over two thousand dollars (Rec. Doc. 11 at 5-7), this Court is not persuaded that the
registration requirements are unjustified or that they are imposed with the intent to injure Pete.
Further, he has not shown that the restrictions rise to the level of shocking the conscience. Thus
Pete’s substantive due process claim fails.
Regarding Pete’s Eighth Amendment claim, the petitioner, again, fails to state a viable
claim. The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. A statute may violate this

Amendment if it is punitive. Greenwald, 675 F.Supp.3d at 716. To determine whether a statute is
punitive, courts determine: “‘if the intention of the legislature was to impose punishment, that ends
the inquiry;’ but if the law was not intended to be punitive, the question becomes whether it is ‘so
punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate the State’s intention to deem it civil.’” Id. (citing
Abbot, 945 F.3d at 314). The Fifth Circuit and the Supreme Court have already made this
determination regarding sex offender registration statutes, finding they are non-punitive. Id. (citing
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 104 (2003); Moore v. Avoyelles Corr. Ctr., 253 F.3d 870, 872 (5th Cir.
2001) (finding community notification provision did not inflict punishment); Abbott, 945 F.3d at
314 (5th Cir. 2019)). Finding these laws nonpunitive relies heavily on the rational connection to
the statutes nonpunitive purpose—public safety. Abbott, 945 F.3d at 314 (citing Smith, 538 U.S.
at 97).
The Fifth Circuit has stated that to prove this claim, a plaintiff must provide “‘clearest
proof” that the Louisiana law is ‘so punitive in form and effect as to render [it] criminal despite

[the legislature’s] intent to the contrary.’” Id. (citations and quotations omitted). Here, no such
proof has been provided by petitioner to make this Court reach a different conclusion from that of
the Fifth Circuit or the Supreme Court of the United States of America. Thus, while Pete may feel
that these requirements are punitive, the Fifth Circuit has already held otherwise. Id. (citing Moore,
253 F.3d at 872 (citation omitted) (“A law serving nonpunitive goals ‘is not punishment, even
though it may bear harshly on one affected.’”)).
Court Lacks Subject-Matter Jurisdiction—Liz Murrill
In Pete’s complaint he lists both Liz Murrill and the Louisiana State as defendants. Rec.
Doc. 3 at 1 and 2. The Eleventh Amendment generally bars private citizens from suing a state in
federal court. See U.S. Const. amend. XI; K.P. v. LeBlanc, 627 F.3d 115, 114 (5th Cir. 2010)

(citation omitted). The Eleventh Amendment also bars private citizens from suing a state
employee in his official capacity because an official-capacity claim against a state employee is
equivalent to suing the state itself. See Will v. Mich Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71
(1989); K.P. v. LeBlanc, 627 F.3d at 124.
Nevertheless, there is an exception, the Ex parte Young doctrine. K.P. v. LeBlanc, 627
F.3d at 124 (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); Will, 491 U.S. at 71 n.10). Thus, if
Pete had been shown that the state official, Liz Murrill had “some connection with the
enforcement of [an] [unconstitutional] act” he may have been able to assert a claim against
Murrill. However, here, as discussed supra, Pete has failed to assert an unconstitutional act. Id.
Thus, he will not be able to connect Murrill with the enforcement of an “unconstitutional act,”
here. Further, allegations that Murrill has carried out her constitutional duties does not satisfy Ex
parte Young’s requirement that there be “some connection” between the state official and
enforcement of the allegedly unconstitutional act. See Doe v. Jindal, No. CV 15-1283, 2015 WL

7300506 (E.D. La. Nov. 18, 2015) (citing Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405, 417 (5th Cir. 2001);
Doe v. Jindal, No. 11-3888, 2011 WL 3925042, at *5 (E.D. La. Sept. 7, 2011)). Accordingly, the
claims against Murrill must be dismissed.
New Orleans, Louisiana this 3rd day of October 2025

_______________________________________
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11157166. Public record. Not legal advice.