# Williams v. McLean County Illinois

> District Court, C.D. Illinois · October 3, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11157131

## Case

- **Full name:** Sabrina Williams v. McLean County, Illinois, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, C.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** October 3, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11157131

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating a denial of access to the courts claim must show actual prejudice to plaintiff

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
PEORIA DIVISION

SABRINA WILLIAMS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
v. ) Case No. 25-CV-1405-MMM
)
MCLEAN COUNTY, ILLINOIS, et al., )
)
Defendants. )

ORDER
Plaintiff Sabrina Williams has filed a pro se [1] Complaint and a [2] Motion to Proceed in
forma pauperis (“IFP”). For the reasons below, the Court DENIES the [2] Motion to Proceed IFP
and DISMISSES [1] Complaint.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), a Court may authorize a plaintiff to proceed IFP if she
demonstrates an inability to pay the required costs and fees. When reviewing an IFP petition, the
Court must also dismiss the complaint if it “fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Here, neither Plaintiff’s [2] IFP petition nor her [1]
Complaint includes her required signature. D. 2, p. 2; D. 1, p. 5. Though failure to sign her IFP
petition may be remedied through leave to amend, such leave would be futile given that Plaintiff’s
corresponding Complaint fails to state a claim.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff’s action stems from a state court proceeding in McLean County, Illinois. On
October 29, 2024, Plaintiff was served with an Order of Protection petition containing allegations
that she was involved in a “disturbance” at the McLean County Courthouse days earlier. (McLean
County Case No. 24-OP-666). A preliminary hearing was scheduled regarding these allegations.
Plaintiff alleges that, prior to this hearing, county employees engaged in certain misconduct which
frustrated her ability to develop her defense. First, she alleges that a county employee withdrew
her request under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) to access the video footage of the
underlying disturbance. Second, she claims that an employee at the McLean County Sherriff’s
Department refused her attempt to file a report related to the disturbance. She also claims that the
Supervisor Deputy Circuit Clerk filed an affidavit two days prior to the preliminary hearing

without first providing her notice, and this testimony was presented at the hearing. Plaintiff claims
these actions prevented her from preparing and presenting a defense at the preliminary hearing in
violation of her constitutional rights to due process and access to the courts. D. 1, p. 6. She also
alleges that, by withdrawing her FOIA request and refusing to accept her report, Defendants treated
her differently than other similarly situated individual, in violation of equal protection. Id.
Plaintiff now seeks damages and an order from this Court ensuring meaningful access to
reporting procedures and public records, prohibiting county officials from withdrawing or
blocking lawful FOIA requests, and that county law enforcement agencies apply reporting and
evidence-handling procedures in a nondiscriminatory manner. Id.

II. DISCUSSION
It is not clear whether Plaintiff is stating a claim under the FOIA or 28 U.S.C. § 1983.
However, as discussed below, neither state a plausible claim for relief.
Beginning with her FOIA claim, the federal FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552, does not apply to state
or local government agencies. See Veasey v. Thoms, 2024 WL 253615, at *1 (C.D. Ill. Jan. 23,
2024) (state and local government entities are not ‘agencies’ subject to the federal FOIA); see also
5 U.S.C. § 551. Thus, Plaintiff can only state a claim against Defendants under the Illinois FOIA.
The Illinois FOIA statute provides that a lawsuit related to such denials “may be filed in the circuit
court for the county where the public body has its principal office or where the person denied
access resides.” 5 ILCS 140/11(b); see also Veasey, 2024 WL 253615, at *1 (citing Plummer v.
Godinez, 2015 WL 4910562, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 17, 2015) (“Courts within this District have read
[the Illinois Freedom of Information Act] as requiring claims to be heard in state court.”)).
Therefore, the appropriate venue for Plaintiff’s FOIA claims is the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in
McLean County, Illinois.

Alternatively, while the Complaint does not identify any federal statutes that it is being
brought under, to the extent Plaintiff is seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 her claims similarly
fail. Plaintiff’s due process claim centers around her FOIA request being withdrawn and does not
otherwise allege how defendants’ conduct resulted in a deprivation of a protected interest. See
Reed v. Goertz, 598 U.S. 230, 236 (2023) (“A procedural due process claim consists of two
elements (i) deprivation by state action of a protected interest in life, liberty, or property and (ii)
inadequate state process.”).
Plaintiff’s “access-to-courts” claim fails, because she does not allege how the named
Defendants rendered her unable “to pursue a legitimate” claim. Ortiz v. Downey, 561 F.3d 664,

671 (7th Cir. 2009). Rather, her allegations indicate that she was present and had the opportunity
to be heard at the state court proceedings. To the extent she had issues with service or discovery,
those should have been raised before the State court. She also does not allege that any of the
defendants’ misconduct prejudiced her at the preliminary hearing. See DeMallory v. Cullen, 855
F.2d 442, 448 (7th Cir. 1988) (stating a denial of access to the courts claim must show actual
prejudice to plaintiff).
Plaintiff also fails to state a claim for equal protection. The Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits two kinds of government discrimination: (1) on the basis of
certain protected classifications; or (2) from treating a person irrationally as a so-called “class of
one.” Reget v. City of La Crosse, 595 F.3d 691, 695 (7th Cir. 2010).“For an equal-protection claim
based on class membership to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must sufficiently allege that
they were treated differently by the government based on membership in a protected class, and
that the defendant acted with discriminatory intent.” Doe v. Bd. of Educ., No. 19-C-00263, 2020
WL 1445638, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 24, 2020). To state a “class-of-one” equal-protection claim is

a plaintiff must allege that (1) a state actor intentionally treated them “differently than others
similarly situated, and (2) there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Reget, 595
F.3d at 695. Here, Plaintiff’s allegations fail under both theories. Under the class-membership
theory, Plaintiff does not allege that she was discriminated against based on her membership to a
protected class, or that Defendant acted with discriminatory intent. Plaintiff also does not allege
that Defendants treated her differently from others similarly situated and there was no rational
basis for the different treatment.
This Court also finds that dismissal of John/Jane Doe is appropriate because Plaintiff has
not identified their roles in this dispute. Similarly, any claim against the McLean County fails

because for a municipal liability under § 1983, the constitutional violation must be caused by one
of the following: (1) an express municipal policy; (2) a widespread, though unwritten, custom or
practice; or (3) a decision by a municipal agent with “final policymaking authority.” Milestone v.
City of Monroe, 665 F.3d 774, 780 (7th Cir. 2011). Plaintiff must plead a sufficient factual basis
for a Monell claim, as it is not enough to merely plead the legal elements of the claim. McCauley
v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 617-18 (7th Cir. 2011). Here, Plaintiff has not identified an
express policy or widespread practice that has violated her federal rights. See Monell v. New York
City Dept. of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
Furthermore, § 1983 does not allow actions against individuals based solely on their
supervisory role of others. Brown v. Randle, 847 F.3d 861, 865 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Public officials
are accountable for their own conduct, but they are not vicariously liable for the acts of their
subordinates.” Plaintiff does not state whether the individually named Defendants are being sued
in their individual or official capacities. If sued in their individual capacity, Plaintiff must allege

that the officials personally participated in the deprivation or were deliberately reckless as to the
misconduct of subordinates or were aware and condoned, acquiesced, or turned a blind eye to it.
Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 740 (7th Cir. 2001). On the other hand, if sued in their
official capacity, this tantamount to a suit against McLean County or McLean County Sherrif’s
Department, who is not named as a Defendant, for which the pleading requirements under Monell
are required and not met. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691–92.
Further, the Eleventh Amendment bars § 1983 suits seeking damages against a state official
in her official capacity, as they are deemed suits against the state. On the other hand, “official-
capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as actions against the State” and thus are not

barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.14.
(1985) (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)); Marie O. v. Edgar, 131 F.3d 610, 615 (7th
Cir. 1997) (“suits against state officials seeking prospective equitable relief for ongoing violations
of federal law are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment under the Ex parte Young doctrine.”).
A plaintiff may only seek prospective relief on an official-capacity claim if she sufficiently
alleges that the entity of which the government official is an agent has a policy or custom that
“played a part in the violation of federal law.” Graham, 473 U.S. at 166. Plaintiff has not
alleged any facts indicating that a policy or custom of the state caused the constitutional violations.
Moreover, to have standing to seek prospective injunctive relief, Plaintiff must show a real and
immediate threat of future injury. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983). Past
injury alone, however, is insufficient as it is a threat of injury that is solely conjectural or
hypothetical. Simic v. City of Chicago, 851 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 2017). Absent a plausible
allegation of a real and immediate future injury, she lacks standing to seek injunctive relief.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s [2] Motion to Proceed in forma pauperis is DENIED, and her [1]

Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice. Plaintiff may file an amended complaint addressing
the above deficiencies by no later than October 17, 2025. If Plaintiff fails to do so, her case will
be dismissed with prejudice for want of prosecution. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
Entered on October 3, 2025.
/s/ Michael M. Mihm
Michael M. Mihm
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11157131. Public record. Not legal advice.