# Jefferson v. Waxahachie ISD Board of Trustee

> District Court, N.D. Texas · September 3, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11157128

## Case

- **Full name:** Leslie Jefferson, as Next Friend of C.J., a minor, and Andrew White, as Next Friend of S.W., a minor v. Waxahachie ISD Board of Trustees, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Texas
- **Decided:** September 3, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

LESLIE JEFFERSON, as Next §
Friend of C.J., a minor, and §
ANDREW WHITE, as Next Friend §
of S.W., a minor, §
§
Plaintiffs, §
§
v. § Case No. 3:24-cv-01904-E
§
WAXAHACHIE ISD BOARD OF §
TRUSTEES, et al., §
§
Defendants. §

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiffs Leslie Jefferson, as Next Friend of C.J., a minor, and Andrew
White, as Next Friend of S.W., a minor, bring this civil rights action against
members of the Waxahachie Independent School District (WISD) Board of
Trustees in their official capacities and three WISD employees (or former
employees) in their individual capacities asserting claims under Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (as amended), 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arising
from alleged racially discriminatory disciplinary treatment of their daughters
following alleged incidents of bullying. See generally Am. Compl. (ECF No. 13).
The WISD Board Members and the individual Defendants filed separate motions
to dismiss certain of Plaintiffs’ claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6).1 As explained below, Plaintiffs cannot overcome the individual
Defendants’ entitlement to qualified immunity and Plaintiffs have failed to
adequately plead the elements of a Monell claim. Accordingly, the District Judge

should GRANT the individual Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 14)
Plaintiffs’ individual capacity § 1983 claims (Count II) as to Tonya Harris, Anthony
Escoto, and Karina White, and GRANT the WISD Board Members’ Motion to
Dismiss (ECF No. 16) Plaintiff’s Monell claim (Count III).
Background

As relevant to the pending motions, this lawsuit arises from the following
alleged facts.
1. Alleged Facts Pertaining to C.J.
C.J. is African American. Am. Compl. ¶ 3. During the 2023–2024 school
year, she was a sophomore at Waxahachie High School (WHS). Id. On September
18, 2023, C.J. was seated at a lunch table and approached by a student identified

as “White female classmate” (WF1). Id. ¶ 44. WF1 told C.J. “to get up and leave the
table because WF1 and her friends wanted the table.” Id. ¶ 44. C.J. stayed at the
table and WF1 left. Id. On September 22, 2023, C.J. was seated at the same lunch
table with another classmate and approached by WF1, who “again demanded that
C.J. vacate the lunch table but C.J. stayed seated.” Id. ¶ 48. Then, WF1 “poured her

beverage over C.J.’s head, on C.J.’s person and on the lunch table where C.J. sat,”

1 Defendants do not move for dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Title VI claims against WISD
(Count I).
“C.J. threw water at WF1 and tried to create distance between the two of them,”
WF1 punched C.J. in the face, and a physical fight ensued. Id. ¶ 49–50.
Defendant Anthony Escoto, Vice Principal at WHS, disciplined C.J. by

assigning her to in-school suspension (ISS) for five days. Id. ¶¶ 11, 51, 55. And “WF1
was either not disciplined or received lesser discipline than C.J.” Id. ¶ 51.
On September 26, 2023, Vice Principal Escoto held a hearing on the
September 22 cafeteria incident, determined that C.J. was not bullied and the
incident was “properly characterized as a ‘fight/mutual combat,’” and disciplined

C.J. by assigning her to a discretionary DAEP2 for 30 days. Id. ¶¶ 53–54.
C.J.’s mother filed a Level I appeal of this decision, and Defendant Tonya
Harris, Principal at WHS, conducted the Level I hearing. Id. ¶ 55. C.J.’s mother
learned there was video of the September 22 cafeteria incident that Principal
Harris had not watched and Principal Harris never interviewed C.J.’s classmate
who had been sitting at the same lunch table. Id. ¶¶ 10, 58. Principal Harris upheld

C.J.’s ISS and discretionary DAEP assignments. Id. ¶ 59. C.J.’s mother further
appealed the decisions and hearings related to these disciplinary actions, which

2 According to Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, a DAEP, or disciplinary alternative
education program, “is a ‘school exclusion’ form of student discipline, meaning
students assigned to DAEP are physically removed from their schools and excluded
from the learning and studies transpiring in their classrooms.” Am. Compl. ¶ 30.
DAEP assignments may be mandatory or discretionary: “[m]andatory DAEP
assignments result from conduct specified in [Texas Education Code] Chapter 37”
including certain felonies and other serious crimes at a public school or on school
property; by contrast, “[d]iscretionary DAEP assignments are determined by each
district” and “result from alleged violations of the Student Code.” Id. ¶¶ 32, 33.
were either denied or concluded without a decision or ruling. Id. ¶¶ 61–68. C.J.’s
mother viewed WISD’s video of the September 22 cafeteria incident, which “clearly
reflects that WF1 started the incident by pouring her drink on C.J. and initiated

physical contact by punching C.J.” Id. ¶ 69.
C.J. completed her DAEP assignment—reduced to twenty-five days to
account for her five days in ISS—on October 30, 2023 and returned to WHS on
November 13, 202[3]. Id. ¶¶ 67, 70. The same day day, Plaintiffs spoke at a WISD
school board meeting and complained to the Board of Trustees about Principal

Harris and Vice Principal Escoto’s “unequal protection” of C.J. Id. ¶ 99.
As a result of the DAEP assignment, C.J. was barred from trying out for the
school cheerleading team. Id. ¶ 70.
2. Alleged Facts Pertaining to S.W.
S.W. is Latina. Am. Compl. ¶ 5. During the 2023–2024 school year, she was
a sixth grader at Howard Jr. High School (HJHS). Id. ¶ 71. On September 6 and

September 12, 2023, S.W.’s father informed Defendant Karina White, Assistant
Principal at HJHS, that a student identified as “White female classmate” (WF2)
“created and circulated a TikTok video in which the students call S.W. a ‘whore,’
among other things” and “continued to post derogatory social media messages
about S.W.” Id. ¶¶ 9, 72–73. On September 15, 2023, Assistant Principal White

issued a report on the matter, “finding that S.W. was bullied and finding that the
students’ conduct [. . .] constituted ‘bullying’ in violation of WISD policy.” Id. ¶ 74.
Assistant Principal White advised S.W.’s father that “the offending students ‘were
disciplined in accordance with the WISD student code of conduct and other
necessary precautions [had] been put in place.” Id. ¶ 74. Specifically, a stay away
directive3 was imposed on some of the students, including WF2, which required

those students not make any contact with S.W. Id. ¶ 75–76. In September,
Assistant Principal White’s report did not “express that S.W. was subject to any
stay away agreement,” White herself did not “advise or mention that any type of
stay away agreement would be imposed upon S.W.,” and S.W.’s father did not
receive a copy of any stay away directive for S.W. or attend any conference

pertaining to a stay away directive. Id. ¶¶ 77–79.
On October 6, 2023, at a school homecoming game, “WF2 [. . .] aggressively
approached and confronted S.W.” Id. ¶¶ 80, 82. But on October 10, 2023, Assistant
Principal White contacted S.W.’s father and advised him that “S.W. violated the
stay away directive [] previously issued” when “S.W. put herself in the same area
as some of the offending students . . . during [the game].” Id. ¶ 80. Plaintiffs allege

that Assistant Principal White’s “representation that [White’s] stay away directive
from [September] included S.W. was a false representation.” Id. ¶ 81. Assistant
Principal White told S.W.’s father that “S.W. would be disciplined with ISS for

3 According to Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, a “school-based stay agreement is a
binding written agreement or directive whereby an offending student is required
to stay away from a student he or she has targeted with bullying or other unwanted
conduct. The intent of a stay away agreement is to increase safety for the targeted
student.” Am. Comp. ¶ 23. “Stay away agreements are to be administered by the
school principal or designee in a conference with the offending student and his or
her parent” and “are signed by the offending student and his or her parent.” Id. ¶¶
24, 26.
violating the September 2023 stay away directive.” Id. ¶ 83. S.W.’s father requested
a copy of the stay away directive and told Assistant Principal White about cell
phone video footage that “supported S.W.’s account that she was simply watching

the game . . . when she was aggressively approached and confronted by WF2.” Id.
¶¶ 84–85.
On October 11, 2023, WF2 “taunted” S.W. during gym class and a physical
altercation ensued. Id. ¶ 86. Assistant Principal White disciplined S.W. with a 30-
day DAEP assignment for “fighting/mutual combat” and this punishment was “due

in part to the false charge that she previously violated the September 2023 stay
away directive.” Id. The next day, Assistant Principal White sent S.W.’s father what
she claimed was the September 2023 stay away directive, which noted that it was
“verbally issued” to S.W. Id. ¶ 87. The stay away directive attached to Assistant
Principal White’s email was signed in October 2023, and has a duration of
September 2023 to June 2023. Id. ¶ 88. On October 13, 2023, Assistant Principal

White held a disciplinary meeting and disciplined S.W. with a 30-day DAEP
placement, which S.W.’s father appealed. Id. ¶ 90. All subsequent appeals were
either denied, concluded without a decision or ruling, or were still pending when
S.W. completed her DAEP assignment. Id. ¶¶ 92–97.
S.W. completed her DAEP assignment—reduced to twenty-five days—on

November 12, 2023. Id. ¶ 97. The next day, Plaintiffs spoke at a WISD school board
meeting and complained to the Board Defendants about White’s “unequal
protection” of S.W. Id. ¶ 99.
As a result of the DAEP assignment, S.W. lost her spot on the school
volleyball team. Id. ¶ 98.
3. Pattern of Unequal Treatment

Plaintiffs also allege that there is a “demonstrated pattern of unequal
treatment of Black and Latino WISD students in Discretionary DAEP
assignments.” Id. ¶¶ 100–111.
According to Plaintiffs, “[t]here is a history at Texas public schools of racial
discrimination in the implementation of student discipline.” Id. ¶ 100. And,

according to data provided to the Texas Education Agency (TEA), “a public school
student is more likely to be removed from his or her classroom and schoolhouse
via DAEP assignment if he or she is Black or Latino rather than White.” Id. ¶ 103.
This data also purportedly shows that “at WISD schools, the rate of Black and
Latino students removed from their classrooms and schools due to discretionary
DAEP assignment also was disproportionately high when compared to their

percentage of overall students, with their White counterparts disproportionately
low.” Id. ¶ 104. Plaintiffs include a chart that represents 11,621 students enrolled
in WISD in 2022–2023; and 41 percent of these students were White. Id. However,
White students made up only 27 percent of the students in DAEP. Id. While Black
students, who represent 18 percent of WISD students, made up 32 percent of the

DAEP students; and Latino students, who represent 35 percent of WISD students,
made up 36 percent of the DAEP students. Id. Plaintiffs assert that “[i]f discretion
in the assignment of discretionary DAEP was reasonable, one would logically
expect little-to-no variation between the racial percentages for mandatory versus
discretionary DAEP assignment.” Id. ¶ 108. Thus, Plaintiffs conclude “[w]hen
WISD staff uses its subjective discretion, the likelihood for school exclusion in the

form of DAEP increases for Black and Latino students.” Id. ¶ 107. And, “[t]herefore,
the discrimination suffered by C.J. and S.W. . . . is not a single occurrence—or even
two occurrences—but rather a reflection of a long-standing, vicious and pervasive
custom of discrimination at WISD public schools.” Id. ¶ 111.
4. Procedural History

Plaintiffs’ live pleading—their Amended Complaint—asserts a Title VI claim
against the WISD Board Members in their official capacities (Count I); a § 1983
claim against WHS Vice Principal Escoto, former WHS Principal Harris, and
former HJHS Assistant Principal White (the “individual Defendants”) (Count II);
a Monell claim against the WISD Board of Trustees members (Count III); and
claims for injunctive and declaratory relief against the WISD Board Members

(Count IV). Am. Compl. ¶¶ 112–43.
On November 11, 2024, the individual Defendants filed a motion to dismiss
Plaintiffs’ Complaint as to the § 1983 claims against each of them based on
qualified immunity. Ind. Defs.’ Mot. (ECF No. 14). The WISD Board Members filed
a motion to partially dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint against them, specifically as to

the § 1983 claims (Count III). WISD’s Mot. (ECF No. 16). Plaintiffs responded (ECF
Nos. 19 and 28) and Defendants replied (ECF Nos. 29 and 30). The District Judge
referred the motions to the undersigned for a recommendation and subsequently
granted the parties’ joint motion to defer a ruling on the motions until after the
parties’ tentative resolution was presented to the WISD Board of Trustees for
consideration on June 10, 2025. See ECF Nos. 33, 34, 36. On July 1, 2025, the

parties notified the Court that they were not able to reach a resolution. See Notice
(ECF No. 38). Accordingly, the motions are ripe for determination.
Legal Standards

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff’s complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “To be plausible, the complaint’s
‘[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.’” In re Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. LLC, 624 F.3d 201, 210 (5th Cir. 2010)
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
This pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations,” but it
does demand more than an unadorned accusation devoid of factual support.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[A] formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at

555 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). “While legal conclusions
can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual
allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Where the facts do not permit the Court to infer
more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has stopped short of
showing that the plaintiff is plausibly entitled to relief. Id. at 678 (citing Twombly,
550 U.S. at 557).

When applying the plausibility standard, the Court “accepts all well-pleaded
facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” In re
Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (internal
quotations and citations omitted). But a court may not look beyond the pleadings.
Spivey v. Robertson, 197 F.3d 772, 774 (5th Cir. 1999). Review is “limited to the

complaint, any documents attached to the complaint, and any documents attached
to the [motion to dismiss] that are central to the claim and referenced by the
complaint.” Smith v. Buffalo Wild Wings, 2021 WL 4265849, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Sept.
20, 2021) (citing Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d
383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010)); see also Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. v.
Heartland Cmty. Ass’n, Inc., 399 F. Supp. 3d 657, 665 (N.D. Tex. 2019) (“In ruling

on [a Rule 12(b)(6)] motion, the court cannot look beyond the pleadings.”) (citing
Spivey, 197 F.3d 772, 774 (5th Cir. 1999)), aff’d, 824 F. App’x 210 (5th Cir. 2020).
Analysis

1. Plaintiffs’ § 1983 Claims as to the Individual Defendants (Count II)
“A plaintiff makes out a § 1983 claim if he ‘shows a violation of the
Constitution or of federal law, and then shows that the violation was committed by
someone acting under color of state law.’” Rich v. Palko, 920 F.3d 288, 293–94
(5th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up) (quoting Brown v. Miller, 519 F.3d 231, 236 (5th Cir.
2008)). But a governmental employee sued under § 1983 may assert the
affirmative defense of qualified immunity. White v. Taylor, 959 F.2d 539, 544 (5th
Cir. 1992). “Qualified immunity protects government officials performing

discretionary functions from suit and liability for civil damages to the extent their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.” Blakely v. Andrade, 360 F. Supp.
3d 453, 477 (N.D. Tex. 2019) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818
(1982)). In other words, qualified immunity protects government officials when

their actions “could reasonably have been believed to be legal.” Anderson v.
Valdez, 845 F.3d 580, 599 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d
359, 370 (5th Cir. 2011)). And “this immunity protects ‘all but the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Id. (quoting Morgan, 659
F.3d at 371).
“‘State employment is generally sufficient to render the defendant a state

actor,’” and a defendant necessarily “acts under color of state law when he abuses
the position given to him by the State.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49–50 (1988)
(quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 n.18 (1982)). School
district officials like the individual Defendants “enjoy qualified immunity ‘unless
[Plaintiffs] plead[] facts showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or

constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of
the challenged conduct.’” Brown v. Tarrant Cnty., Tex., 985 F.3d 489, 494 (5th
Cir. 2021) (citing Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011)). Further, courts
“have discretion to decide which of the two prongs of qualified-immunity analysis
to tackle first.” Id.
Here, the individual Defendants assert qualified immunity and argue that

Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint does not plead facts sufficient to show violations of
clearly established law to demonstrate a federal constitutional deprivation of
Plaintiffs’ equal protection rights. See generally Ind. Defs.’ Br. (ECF No. 15).
To state a claim of racial discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause
and § 1983, the plaintiff must allege that “[(1) he or she] received treatment

different from that received by similarly situated individuals and that [(2)] the
unequal treatment stemmed from a discriminatory intent.” Fennell v. Marion
Indep. Sch. Dist., 804 F.3d 398, 412 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Priester v. Lowndes
Cnty., 354 F.3d 414, 424 (5th Cir. 2004)) (internal quotations omitted). To
demonstrate discriminatory intent, a plaintiff must establish “that the decision
maker singled out a particular group for disparate treatment and selected his

course of action at least in part for the purpose of causing its adverse effect on an
identifiable group.” Id. (citing Priester, 354 F.3d at 424) (internal quotations
omitted). “Allegations of discriminatory intent that are merely conclusory, without
reference to specific facts, will not suffice.” Id. (quoting Priester, 354 F.3d at 420).
A. Waxahachie High School Principal Tonya Harris and Vice Principal
Anthony Escoto

Plaintiffs fail to allege sufficient facts to overcome Principal Harris and Vice
Principal Escoto’s assertion of qualified immunity.
In their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that, after the September 22,
2023 cafeteria incident, Vice Principal Escoto disciplined C.J. with a 5-day ISS
assignment, when “WF1 was either not disciplined or received lesser discipline

than C.J.” Am. Compl. ¶ 51. Escoto held a hearing on the incident, observed video
of the incident and characterized it as a “fight/mutual combat,” found “that C.J.
was not bullied but instead engaged in aggressive behavior equally culpable with
WF1,” and further “punished C.J. with discretionary DAEP for 30 days.” Id. ¶¶ 51,
53–54; Pls.’ Resp. 9 (ECF No. 19). Plaintiffs argue that these factual allegations

show Vice Principal Escoto’s conduct constitutes intentional discrimination
against C.J. based on her race. Pls.’ Resp. 9.
As to Principal Harris, Plaintiffs allege that Principal Harris heard C.J.’s
Level I appeal of Vice Principal Escoto’s findings and DAEP punishment. Am.
Compl. ¶ 55. Plaintiffs further allege that as part of the hearing, Principal Harris
intentionally misstated State of Texas bullying criteria to C.J.’s mother,

intentionally failed to interview witnesses to the two bullying incidents and did not
question C.J.’s friend who was present and observed the alleged bullying,
intentionally ignored video evidence depicting the September 22 incident, and
intentionally upheld C.J.’s “harsh punishment despite knowing that the basis for
that punishment was fraudulent.” Id. ¶¶ 56–61; Pls.’ Resp. 8. And Plaintiffs argue

that these factual allegations show Principal Harris’s conduct constitutes
intentional discrimination against C.J. based on her race. Pls.’ Resp. 9.
The individual Defendants argue that these factual allegations “do not speak
in terms of equal protection or race” and Plaintiffs plead “no factual allegations
supporting how [Principal Harris and Vice Principal Escoto] treated C.J.

differently than similarly situated individuals, much less factual allegations
reflecting intentional discrimination on the basis of race other than the single
reference to the alleged bully being a white female.” Ind. Defs.’ Reply 3, 4 (ECF No.
29).
Viewing all well-pleaded allegations as true and drawing all reasonable

inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, the Amended Complaint alleges that Principal Harris
and Vice Principal Escoto treated C.J. differently than WF1, a similarly situated
white student. See Am. Compl. ¶ 51. But this allegation is conclusory and fails to
allege any specific facts with respect to WF1’s treatment. Plaintiffs’ Amended
Complaint also fails to plead facts to show that the alleged different treatment
stemmed from any racially discriminatory intent. See, e.g., Mohamed for A.M. v.

Irving Indep. Sch. Dist., 252 F. Supp. 3d 602, 623 (N.D. Tex. 2017) (plaintiff’s
allegation that the defendant principal was “aware of all of the facts that would
inform a reasonable principal that there was no conduct meriting discipline” was
“nothing more than [a] conclusory, speculative, and sweeping allegation[] of
constitutional violation[] and intent” that was insufficient to overcome the

principal’s qualified immunity defense). Without specific facts to show that
Principal Harris and Vice Principal Escoto singled out C.J. for disparate treatment
because of her race, Plaintiffs cannot overcome the administrators’ entitlement to
qualified immunity.
Plaintiffs’ inclusion of statistics regarding racially discriminatory discipline

in the State of Texas and WISD does not save their claim from dismissal. As
alleged, the statistics are not specific to WHS and do not reflect any discretionary
disciplinary decisions by Principal Harris or Vice Principal Escoto. See Mohamed
for A.M., 252 F. Supp. 3d at 624 (allegations that school district had a pattern of
disciplining African-American students more harshly than other students were

insufficient to impute liability to defendant principal; “[t]o overcome Principal
Cummings’s qualified immunity defense, Plaintiff must, at a minimum, allege facts
from which the court may infer that Principal Cummings was himself personally
motivated by discriminatory animus.”). Accordingly, Principal Harris and Vice
Principal Escoto are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims.
B. Howard Junior High School Assistant Principal Karina White

Similarly, Plaintiffs fail to allege sufficient facts to overcome Assistant
Principal White’s assertion of qualified immunity.
Plaintiffs allege that after Assistant Principal White concluded her
investigation into the bullying of S.W. the month prior, she produced a backdated
stay away directive as to S.W. and then claimed S.W. violated the stay away

directive when she was approached by WF2 at a school homecoming game. Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 80, 82. Plaintiffs allege that Assistant Principal White disciplined S.W.
by assigning her to ISS. Id. ¶ 83. Plaintiffs allege that after a physical altercation
ensued between S.W. and WF2 during gym class, Assistant Principal White
disciplined S.W. with a 30-day DAEP assignment, “in part due to the false charge
that she previously violated the September 2023 stay away directive.” Id. ¶ 86.

The individual Defendants argue that these factual allegations “do not speak
in terms of equal protection or race” and Plaintiffs plead “no factual allegations
supporting how Assistant Principal White treated S.W. differently than similarly
situated individuals, much less factual allegations reflecting intentional
discrimination on the basis of race. Ind. Defs.’ Reply 2–3.

Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint fails to allege facts—even in the most
conclusory manner—to show that Assistant Principal White treated S.W.
differently than any similarly situated individuals. The Amended Complaint
contains no factual allegations as to Assistant Principal White’s discipline of WF2
after the homecoming game or the gym class altercation, or any other similarly
situated student. It also fails to allege specific facts to show that White singled out

S.W. for disparate treatment because of her race.
Again, Plaintiffs’ inclusion of statistics regarding racially discriminatory
discipline in the State of Texas and WISD does not save their claim. As alleged, the
statistics are not specific to HJHS and do not reflect any discretionary disciplinary
decisions by Assistant Principal White.

Accordingly, Assistant Principal White is entitled to qualified immunity on
Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims.
2. Plaintiffs’ Monell Claim as to WISD (Count III)
The WISD Board Members move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against
them on the ground that Plaintiffs have failed to adequately plead the elements of

a Monell claim. See generally WISD’s Br. (ECF No. 17).
Plaintiffs’ suit against the WISD Board Members, in their official capacities,
is effectively a suit against WISD. Jathanna v. Spring Branch Indep. Sch. Dist.,
2012 WL 6096675, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 7, 2012); see also Monell v. Dep’t. of Social
Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978) (official-capacity

suits “generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity
of which an officer is an agent”). And WISD, like other school districts, is
considered to be a local government unit or municipality subject to liability under
§ 1983. See S.J. as Next Friend of N.J. v. Perryton Indep. Sch. Dist., 2024 WL
4906751, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 27, 2024) (citing Moore v. Willis Indep. Sch. Dist.,
233 F.3d 871, 874 (5th Cir. 2000) (“[S]chool districts are municipal entities under

Section 1983.”)). A municipality is a “person” subject to liability under § 1983 only
if its employees inflicted the deprivation of a constitutional right pursuant to an
official policy or custom. Monell, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (2018); see also Piotrowski v.
City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 579 (5th Cir. 2001). Isolated unconstitutional
actions by municipal employees will almost never trigger municipal liability.

Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 578. And a school district “cannot be liable for civil rights
violations under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.” Bailey v.
Mansfield Indep. Sch. Dist., 425 F. Supp. 3d 696, 713 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 21, 2019)
(citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 691); see also Barrow v. Greenville Indep. Sch. Dist.,
480 F.3d 377, 380 (5th Cir. 2007) (“A school district has no vicarious liability
under § 1983. Rather, it is liable for the unconstitutional conduct of its

policymakers, including persons to whom it has delegated policymaking authority
in certain areas.”); Baskin v. Parker, 602 F.2d 1205, 1208 (5th Cir. 1979)
(recognizing that “state vicarious liability doctrines are inapplicable in [section]
1983 suits.”).
“To hold a school district liable under Monell, a plaintiff must plead facts

that plausibly establish that (1) an official policy (2) promulgated by the municipal
policymaker (3) was the moving force behind the violation of a constitutional
right.” S.J. as Next Friend of N.J., 2024 WL 4906751, at *2 (citing St. Maron
Props., L.L.C. v. City of Houston, 78 F.4th 754, 760 (5th Cir. 2023)) (internal
quotations omitted). “In Texas, the final policymaker for a school district is the
Board of Trustees.” Sims v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 2024 WL 495259, at *2 (N.D.

Tex. Feb. 7, 2024) (citing Tex. Educ. Code § 11.051; Mohamed for A.M., 252 F.
Supp. 3d at n.6).
Where a Monell claim fails as to one prong, the Court “need not consider
whether [the] claim also fails the other two Monell prongs.” Brown, 985 F.3d at
497 & n.11 (5th Cir. 2021); see also Zarnow v. City of Wichita Falls, 614 F.3d 161,

168-69 (5th Cir. 2010) (court need not consider “moving force” prong because it
found no “custom or policy” to link to the allegedly unconstitutional conduct).
A. Plaintiffs Fail to Allege an Underlying Constitutional Violation.
The Court first addresses whether Plaintiffs have stated a claim for an
underlying constitutional violation. See Lockett v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 977 F.3d

737, 741 (9th Cir. 2020) (Monell claims are “contingent on a violation of
constitutional rights.”). Mirroring the individual Defendants’ arguments, the
WISD Board Members argue that Plaintiffs cannot establish a violation of C.J. and
S.W.’s constitutional right to equal protection, as required to establish Monell
liability. WISD’s Br. 13–14.

As the Court addressed above, Plaintiffs have failed to plead a violation of
C.J. and S.W.’s constitutional right to equal protection. As to C.J., Plaintiffs fail to
allege any specific facts with respect to WF1—beyond the fact that Principal Harris
and Vice Principal Escoto did not discipline her or that she received lesser
discipline—and they fail to plead specific facts that show that the alleged disparate
treatment stemmed from a racially discriminatory intent. Supra 14–15. And as to

S.W., Plaintiffs fail to plead at all that Assistant Principal White treated S.W.
differently than any similarly situated individuals and also fail to plead specific
facts that show that any alleged disparate treatment stemmed from a racially
discriminatory intent. Supra 15–16.
Also as addressed above, Plaintiffs’ allegations of statistics regarding racially

discriminatory discipline in the State of Texas and WISD, even taken as true, do
not sufficiently plead any discretionary disciplinary decisions by Principal Harris,
Vice Principal Escoto, or Assistant Principal White. Supra 15, 16.
Because Plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege a constitutional violation, they
have also failed to plausibly allege a Monell claim.
To the extent Plaintiffs attempt to allege that a custom of racial

discrimination in itself violated Black and Latino students’ constitutionally
protected rights, the Court addresses this argument below.
B. Official Policy or Custom
Additionally, Plaintiffs fail to plead an official policy or custom of racial
discrimination.

“The first element of Monell liability is that the [p]laintiff must allege facts
sufficient to plausibly show the constitutional deprivation arose from an official
policy or custom of the school district.” S.J. as Next Friend, 2024 WL 4906751, at
*3. “An official policy can be shown by (1) an explicit policy statement, ordinance,
regulation, or decision officially adopted or promulgated; or (2) a custom that is
the ‘persistent, widespread practice’ of the school district and is ‘so common and

well settled’ that it ‘fairly represents’ school district policy. Id. (citing Pineda v. City
of Houston, 291 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 2002)).
“To be a custom, harms must come from more than just random acts or
isolated incidents” and must instead come from a pattern of conduct. Id. (citing
Fraire v. City of Arlington, 957 F.2d 1268, 1278 (5th Cir. 1992)); McConney v. City

of Houston, 863 F. 2d 1180, 1184 (5th Cir. 1989)); see also Zarnow, 614 F.3d at 169
(a “pattern of conduct” is necessary when the municipal actors are not
policymakers). And “[a] pattern requires similarity and specificity; ‘[p]rior
indications cannot simply be for any and all ‘bad’ or unwise acts, but rather must
point to the specific violation in question.’” Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, 588
F.3d 838, 851 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Estate of Davis ex rel. McCully v. City of

North Richland Hills, 406 F.3d 375, 383 (5th Cir. 2005)). “A pattern also requires
‘sufficiently numerous prior incidents,’ as opposed to ‘isolated instances.’” Id.
(quoting McConney v. City of Houston, 863 F.2d 1180, 1184 (5th Cir. 1989)).
“When a plaintiff has alleged liability based on an official policy, the plaintiff
must show, among other things, either (1) that the policy itself violated federal law

or authorized or directed the deprivation of federal rights or (2) that the policy was
adopted or maintained by the municipality’s policymakers with deliberate
indifference as to its known or obvious consequences of constitutional violations.”
Sims v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 2024 WL 495259, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 7, 2024)
(quotations and citations omitted).
Plaintiffs do not allege an explicit policy statement, ordinance, regulation,

or decision that shows an official policy of racial discrimination. Instead, Plaintiffs’
Amended Complaint points to data from Texas public schools and WISD schools
in 2022–2023 that purports to show a “demonstrated pattern of unequal
treatment of Black and Latino WISD students in discretionary DAEP
assignments.” See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 100–11. Including charts from the TEA, Plaintiffs

allege that:
• “the rate of Black and Latino students removed from their
classrooms and schools due to discretionary DAEP
assignment[s] [] was disproportionately high when compared
to their percentage of overall students, [and] with their White
counterparts, disproportionately low.” Id. ¶ 104.

• “the rate of Black and Latino students assigned to discretionary
DAEP—versus mandatory DAEP assignment—also was
disproportionately high when compared to that of their White
counterparts.” Id. ¶ 106.

Plaintiffs allege that this data shows that “when WISD uses its subjective
discretion, the likelihood for school exclusion in the form of DAEP increases for
Black and Latino students” and “the discrimination suffered by C.J. and S.W. [] is
not a single occurrence—or even two occurrences—but rather a reflection of long-
standing, vicious, and pervasive custom of discrimination at WISD public schools,
including WHS and HJHS.” Id. ¶¶ 107, 111.
The WISD Board Members argue that Plaintiffs’ “mere recitation of
disciplinary data from prior District reports is not enough to establish an actual
policy or procedure” that caused the alleged constitutional violation. WISD’s Br.
16–17. The Court agrees that Plaintiffs’ statistical evidence is not sufficient to plead
a custom or policy of racial discrimination on the part of WISD. It does not provide
context for the Court to draw the reasonable inference that a custom of WISD
administrators racially discriminated at the time of the disciplinary incidents
giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claims.
While plaintiffs may use statistical evidence to plead a custom or policy of
racial discrimination, the Court is not satisfied that Plaintiffs have carried their
burden here. In Mohamed for A.M., Plaintiffs attempted to use student discipline
statistics compiled by the TEA to allege a “pattern of discrimination” that “led
directly” to the “over-discipline” of the minor student. 252 F. Supp. 3d at 617. This
Court held that the TEA report, among other allegations, was insufficient to plead
evidence of a discriminatory policy or custom necessary for municipal liability

under Monell. Id. Plaintiffs’ allegations here fail for the same or similar reasons.
Additionally, the general disciplinary statistics are presented without information
on circumstances leading to the discipline, making it impossible for the Court to
draw meaningful inferences of a policy simply from the state-wide and district-
wide statistics. Cf. Wright v. City of San Diego, 2025 WL 1746305, at *2 (S.D. Cal.

June 24, 2025) (explaining that “data and statistics created a plausible inference
of support [for] a Monell failure to train claim at the motion to dismiss stage where
the plaintiff [was] without discovery or retained experts” and allegations of a
custom of policy “relied on statistical data that showed that the San Diego Police
stopped Black people at the highest rates than any other group and Black San
Diegans are stopped 4.2 times as often as White San Diegans.”).

Because Plaintiffs’ Monell claim fails to plead a custom or policy to link the
allegedly unconstitutional conduct to, the Court need not consider the remaining
Monell prongs.
Recommendation
The District Judge should GRANT the individual Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss (ECF No. 14) Plaintiffs’ individual capacity § 1983 claims (Count II) as to
Tonya Harris, Anthony Escoto, and Karina White, and GRANT WISD’s Motion to
Dismiss (ECF No. 16) Plaintiffs’ Monell claim (Count III).
SO RECOMMENDED.
September 3, 2025.

REBECCA room
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties in
the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and
recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being
served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. Civ. P. 72(b). To be specific,
an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which
objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed determination
is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the
briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written
objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal
conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district
court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto.
Assn, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).

24

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11157128. Public record. Not legal advice.