# Richards v. Ind Dept of Corrs

> District Court, N.D. Indiana · October 1, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11154725

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Indiana
- **Decided:** October 1, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION

DANNY R. RICHARDS,

Plaintiff,

v. CAUSE NO. 3:25-CV-517-HAB-JEM

INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTION, et al.

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER
Danny R. Richards, a prisoner without a lawyer, filed a complaint against the
Indiana Department of Correction and eight other individuals because he believes he
suffers from a disability that is not being adequately accommodated and because he is
dissatisfied with his medical care related to that disability. ECF 1. He seeks both
monetary damages and accommodations for his disability. “A document filed pro se is
to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be
held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Nevertheless,
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must review the merits of a prisoner complaint and
dismiss it if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief.
According to the complaint, Richards was diagnosed with Clostridioides difficile
(“C. diff”) in August 2008. In February 2009, he underwent a total colectomy. In

September 2009, he had another surgery, which removed 98% of his rectum and a
portion of his large intestine. This led to the creation of a “J pouch.” ECF 1 at 5. A J
pouch is “a pouch inside the body that allows a person to get rid of stool in the usual
way.” https://www.mayoclinic.org/tests-procedures/j-pouch-surgery/about/pac-
20385069 (last visited Sept. 30, 2025). In February 2010, Richards underwent another
surgery where the J pouch was connected to what remained of his rectum. Richards

submitted exhibits with his complaint indicating that he had C. diff again in 2019. He
believes he has an active C. diff infection yet again, although Dr. Marthakis has
indicated otherwise. Whatever the cause, Richards reports that he is suffering from
chronic diarrhea, urinary incontinence, incomplete emptying with frequent urination
and bowel movements, and leakage from his bladder and J pouch.

Richards is housed in protective custody and, in the cell house, the only restroom
available to him is inside his cell. The Indiana Department of Correction (“IDOC”),
Assistant Warden Dawn Buss, Assistant Warden Mr. Nowatzke, Unit Team Manager J.
Schneider, Maj. Worlord, Sgt. Robinson, and Sgt. Schmitt have allegedly issued an
administrative directive or post order that cell doors remain locked during the three

hours of recreation allowed for inmates in Richards’ housing area.
The first hour of recreation takes place on the roof. There is not a restroom on the
roof, so Richards does not participate in the first hour of recreation and does not get to
enjoy fresh air and sunshine. The next two hours of recreation take place inside the cell
house’s dayroom. Because his cell door is locked, he does not have immediate access to
a restroom. This has caused Richards to urinate and defecate on himself several times.

When this occurs, he has been forced to wait up to twenty or thirty minutes to gain
access to his cell and clean up. Therefore, he no longer participates in the second or
third hour of recreation.
He claims that the Indiana Department of Correction (“IDOC”), Assistant
Warden Dawn Buss, Assistant Warden Mr. Nowatzke, UTM Schneider, Maj. Worlord,
Sgt. Robinson, and Sgt. Schmitt knows that he suffers from chronic diarrhea, urinary

incontinence, and severe pain, but they have disregarded his need for accommodations
to enjoy recreation; namely, access to a restroom without delay. Richards reports that
the defendants claim the doors are kept closed due to safety and security concerns.
However, the unit has eleven inmate sanitation workers, and they are each allowed to
keep their cell doors open from 6 a.m. to 6 p.m., including during recreation. The IDOC

and other named defendants will not make an exception for Richards. They will only
allow him to request permission to have his cell door opened so he can use the
restroom. But, when he requests that his cell door be opened, he has been yelled at or
told that the doors will open at the top of the hour, consistent with policy. Dr. Nancy
Marthakis allegedly informed Assistant Warden Buss, UTM Schneider, Sgt. Robinson,

and Sgt. Schmitt that Richards does not suffer from any disability or impairments, his C.
diff resolved in 2021, and he only has a chronic illness code, not a disability code.
Richards asserts that Dr. Marthakis’ refusal to categorize him as suffering from a
disability has resulted in a refusal to accommodate his medical needs by the IDOC and
other individual defendants. Richards contends that his C. diff should be treated as a
physical impairment that is episodic or in remission. He asserts that he is being denied

access to a program or activity, including recreation and a restroom.

Richards’ ADA and Rehabilitation Act Claims
Richards asserts that the IDOC and each of the individual defendants violated
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C §§ 12131–12134, and section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794. Title II of the ADA provides that qualified

individuals with disabilities may not “be excluded from participation in or be denied
the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
“Disability” in this context means: “(1) a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (2) a
record of such an impairment; or (3) being regarded as having such an

impairment.” Steffen v. Donahoe, 680 F.3d 738, 743 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation and internal
alteration omitted). Prisons and correctional facilities are public entities within the
purview of Title II. See Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210 (1998). Declaratory
and injunctive relief are available under the ADA. Radaszweski ex rel. Radaszewski v.
Maram, 383 F.3d 599, 606 (7th Cir. 2004). There is uncertainty about the availability of

monetary damages under the ADA, so where an inmate seeks monetary damages, the
Seventh Circuit has suggested replacing a prisoner’s ADA claim with a parallel claim
under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C`. § 701, because the relief available is
“coextensive.” Jaros v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 684 F.3d 667, 671–72 (7th Cir. 2012). Under the
Rehabilitation Act, damages are available against a state that accepts federal assistance
for prison operations, as all states do. Id. To state a claim under the Rehabilitation Act, a

plaintiff must allege that (1) he is a qualified person (2) with a disability and (3) the
defendant denied him access to a program, service, or activity or otherwise
discriminated against him because of his disability.1 Wagoner v. Lemmon, 778 F.3d 586,
592 (7th Cir. 2015). “Refusing to make reasonable accommodations is tantamount to
denying access[.]” Jaros, 684 F.3d at 672 (citation omitted). Additionally, a plaintiff can
establish intentional discrimination through a showing of deliberate indifference. Lacy

v. Cook Cty., Illinois, 897 F.3d 847, 863 (7th Cir. 2018). In other words, discrimination
occurs when the defendant knows that a violation of these rights is “substantially
likely” yet fails to act. Id. (citation omitted).
A claim under either the ADA or Rehabilitation Act cannot be brought against
individual employees. Any claim under these statutes is a claim against the state agency

itself and must be brought against the state agency itself. See Jaros, 684 F.3d at 670.
Therefore, Richards may not proceed against Assistant Warden Dawn Buss, Assistant
Warden Mr. Nowatzke, UTM Schneider, Maj. Worlord, Sgt. Robinson, Sgt. Schmitt, Dr.
Marthakis or Centurion Health on a claim pursuant to the ADA or Rehabilitation Act.

1 “[W]ith respect to this lawsuit, the analysis governing each statute is the same except that the
Rehabilitation Act includes as an additional element the receipt of federal funds, which all states accept
for their prisons.” Jaros, 684 F.3d at 670; see also Conners v. Wilkie, 984 F.3d 1255, 1260 (7th Cir. 2021)
(noting that the standards under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act are the same except that under the
Rehabilitation Act “the plaintiff’s disability must be the sole reason for the alleged discriminatory action”
while the ADA “requires only that [it] be a reason for the challenged action”) (emphasis in original).
Giving Richards the benefit of the inferences to which he is entitled at this stage
of the case, he will be allowed to proceed past the pleading stage on a Rehabilitation Act

claim against the IDOC for monetary damages and injunctive relief.2 Moreover, because
the scope of the ADA is slightly more broad than the Rehabilitation Act, see supra note 1,
he will be allowed to proceed against the IDOC for monetary damages and injunctive
relief under the ADA as well.

Richards’ Eighth Amendment Claim for Constitutionally Inadequate Medical Care

Richards is also suing the IDOC, Dr. Marthakis, Assistant Warden Dawn Buss,
Assistant Warden Mr. Nowatzke, UTM Schneider, Maj. Worlord, Sgt. Robinson, and
Sgt. Schmitt for providing him with constitutionally inadequate medical care. Inmates
are entitled to constitutionally adequate medical care for serious medical conditions.
Thomas v. Blackard, 2 F.4th 716, 722 (7th Cir. 2021). To establish liability under the Eighth

Amendment, a prisoner must show: (1) his medical need was objectively serious; and
(2) the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to that need. Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 834 (1994). “Deliberate indifference occupies a space slightly below intent and
poses a ‘high hurdle and an exacting standard’ requiring ‘something approaching a
total unconcern for the prisoner’s welfare in the face of serious risks.’” Stockton v.

Milwaukee Cnty., 44 F.4th 605, 615 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting Donald v. Wexford Health

2 Although the Eleventh Amendment generally bars suits for money damages against a state or
state agency, the Seventh Circuit has held that states waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity under
the Rehabilitation Act by accepting federal funds. Stanley v. Litscher, 213 F.3d 340, 344 (7th Cir. 2000).
Sources, Inc., 982 F.3d 451, 458 (7th Cir. 2020)); see also Rasho v. Jeffreys, 22 F.4th 703, 710
(7th Cir. 2022) (stating that deliberate-indifference claims will fail absent evidence of

“callous disregard” for inmate wellbeing).
For a medical professional to be held liable for deliberate indifference to an
inmate’s medical needs, he or she must make a decision that represents “such a
substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards, as to
demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a
judgment.” Jackson v. Kotter, 541 F.3d 688, 697 (7th Cir. 2008). As the Seventh Circuit has

explained:
[M]edical professionals are not required to provide proper medical treatment to
prisoners, but rather they must provide medical treatment that reflects
professional judgment, practice, or standards. There is not one proper way to
practice medicine in a prison, but rather a range of acceptable courses based on
prevailing standards in the field. A medical professional’s treatment decisions
will be accorded deference unless no minimally competent professional would
have so responded under those circumstances.

Id. at 697-98. Put another way, inmates are “not entitled to demand specific care,”
Walker v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 940 F.3d 954, 965 (7th Cir. 2019), nor are they
entitled to “the best care possible.” Forbes v. Edgar, 112 F.3d 262, 267 (7th Cir. 1997); see
also Johnson v. Doughty, 433 F.3d 1001, 1013 (7th Cir. 2006) (“The Eighth Amendment
does not require that prisoners receive unqualified access to health care.”). Rather, they
are entitled to “reasonable measures to meet a substantial risk of serious harm.” Forbes,
112 F.3d at 267.
Accordingly, deference must be given “to medical professionals’ treatment
decisions unless there is evidence that no minimally competent professional would
have so responded under those circumstances.” Walker, 940 F.3d at 965 (citation and
quotation marks omitted). This standard “reflects the reality that there is no single
‘proper’ way to practice medicine in a prison, but rather a range of acceptable courses

based on prevailing standards in the field.” Lockett v. Bonson, 937 F.3d 1016, 1024 (7th
Cir. 2019) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, it is not enough
that a medical professional be mistaken in his or her judgment. As noted above, the
deliberate indifference standard requires something “akin to criminal recklessness,”
Thomas, 2 F.4th at 722, rather than “negligence, gross negligence, or even recklessness.”
Hildreth v. Butler, 960 F.3d 420, 425–26 (7th Cir. 2020). Ignoring an inmate’s complaints

of pain or delaying necessary treatment can amount to deliberate indifference,
particularly where the delay “exacerbates an inmate’s medical condition or
unnecessarily prolongs suffering.” Goodloe v. Sood, 947 F.3d 1026, 1031 (7th Cir. 2020)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Richards’ Allegations Against Dr. Marthakis
Richards has a history of C. diff, in 2008 and again sometime around 2021. He
does not provide details regarding when exactly he had C. diff. Based on his symptoms,
including frequent diarrhea, Richards believes he is suffering from a recurrence of C.
diff. C. diff can recur, and at least one study shows that, after one recurrence, the risk of

future recurrence increases. https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/29/5/22-1294_article
(last visited Sept. 30, 2025). Richards also notes that Individuals with a J pouch can
suffer from other serious infections, such as pouchitis.3 He believes that Dr. Marthakis
should test him regularly for C. diff or send him to a gastrointestinal specialist who can

perform a colonscopy or pouchoscopy to check on his J pouch.
When Richards tries to discuss his concerns with Dr. Marthakis, she becomes
upset. Richards feels that Dr. Marthakis is belittling; she tells him he does not know
what he is talking about and emphasizes that she is the doctor. For example, Dr.
Marthakis told Richards that he does not continue to suffer from C. diff, but when
Richards asked Dr. Marthakis how she knows he does not have C. diff, she pointed to

her diploma and said, “Do you see that document on my wall[?] [I]t says Doctor. Do
you have one Mr. Richards?” She then ended the meeting.
Richards’ complaint demonstrates that Dr. Marthakis’ bedside manner is lacking.
Common decency requires that a treating physician answer her patient’s questions
about his medical condition with respect, but that is not a matter of constitutional

concern. This court must focus on Richards’ medical conditions and the care he did or
did not receive. It is unclear from the complaint when Richards saw Dr. Marthakis,
what information he provided her about his symptoms, what tests were performed, or
what treatments were offered. Without additional details, the court cannot conclude
that Dr. Marthakis’ decision to forego a test for C. diff and a referral to a specialist

amount to deliberate indifference. However, given Richards’ medical history, the

3 Pouchitis is “inflammation… in the lining of a pouch made during surgery to remove the
colon.” https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/pouchitis/symptoms-causes/syc-20361991
(last visited Sept. 30, 2025).
symptoms he describes are concerning. Therefore, the court will direct the clerk to add
the Warden of the Indiana State Prison in his official capacity as a defendant and will

permit Richards to proceed on a claim for injunctive relief against the Warden to obtain
constitutionally adequate care for his symptoms of diarrhea, urinary incontinence, and
pain. See Gonzalez v. Feinerman, 663 F.3d 311, 315 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he warden . . . is a
proper defendant [for] injunctive relief [and is] responsible for ensuring that any
injunctive relief is carried out.”).

Richards’ Allegations Against Assistant Warden Buss, Assistant Warden Nowatzke,
UTM Schneider, Maj. Worlord, Sgt. Robinson, and Sgt. Schmitt

Richards is also suing Assistant Warden Buss, Assistant Warden Nowatzke,
UTM Schneider, Maj. Worlord, Sgt. Robinson, and Sgt. Schmitt for deliberate
indifference to his medical needs. As noted earlier in this order, Richards contends that
each of these defendants is aware that he suffers from chronic diarrhea and urinary
incontinence, as well as severe pain. He argues that their failure to insist that Dr.
Marthakis do her job right and test him amounts to deliberate indifference. But none of
these individuals are doctors. Non-medical staff rely on medical experts and are
“entitled to relegate to the prison’s medical staff the provision of good medical
care.” Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 595 (7th Cir. 2009). Here, no medical provider
determined that Richards’ reports of ongoing diarrhea, urinary incontinence, or pain
requires additional testing. It cannot be plausibly inferred from the facts alleged in the
complaint that any of these non-medical defendants were deliberately indifference to
Richards’ medical needs.
Richards’ Allegations Against IDOC
Richards has also named the IDOC as a defendant that allegedly violated his
Eighth Amendment right to adequate medical care. Eighth Amendment claims must be

brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a cause of action for constitutional
violations by people acting under color of state law. Savory v. Lyons, 469 F.3d 667, 670
(7th Cir. 2006). The IDOC is an arm of the state and, as such, cannot be sued in federal
court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Wagoner v. Lemmon, 778 F.3d 586, 592 (7th Cir. 2015).
States and state agencies are not “persons” for the purposes of § 1983. Will v. Mich. Dep’t

of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989); Williams v. Wisconsin, 336 F.3d 576, 580 (7th Cir. 2003).
Therefore, he cannot proceed on an Eighth Amendment claim against the IDOC.

Richards’ Allegations Against Centurion Health
Richards is suing Centurion because Dr. Marthakis says that he does not fit

Centurion’s criteria to be considered disabled, and other defendants have used that
information to conclude that he does not qualify for accommodations under the ADA or
Rehabilitation Act. A private company performing a public function can be held liable if
its own policies caused an alleged constitutional violation. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The purpose of the official policy

requirement is to “distinguish between the isolated wrongdoing of one or a few rogue
employees and other, more widespread practices.” Howell v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc.,
987 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2021). Here, Richards has not alleged facts from which it can
be plausibly inferred that Centurion had a policy that caused Dr. Marthakis to find that
he did not suffer from a disability. To the extent that there was an error in categorizing
Richards, there are no facts suggesting that that error is anything more than Dr.

Marthakis’ error. Richards has not identified any specific unconstitutional policy,
practice, or custom of Centurion. Instead, he merely speculates that because Marthakis
determined that he did not suffer from a disability as it has been defined by Centurion,
the policy must be unconstitutional. Therefore, he may not proceed against Centurion.

Richards’ Allegations of Unconstitutional Conditions of Confinement

Richards is suing each individual defendant for subjecting him to
unconstitutional conditions of confinement. The Eighth Amendment prohibits
conditions of confinement that deny inmates “the minimal civilized measure of life’s
necessities.” Townsend v. Fuchs, 522 F.3d 765, 773 (7th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). In
evaluating an Eighth Amendment claim, courts conduct both an objective and a

subjective inquiry. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). The objective prong asks
whether the alleged deprivation is “sufficiently serious” that the action or inaction of a
prison official leads to “the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s
necessities.” Id. (citations omitted). Although “the Constitution does not mandate
comfortable prisons,” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981), inmates are entitled to

adequate food, clothing, shelter, bedding, hygiene materials, and sanitation. Knight v.
Wiseman, 590 F.3d 458, 463 (7th Cir. 2009); Gillis v. Litscher, 468 F.3d 488, 493 (7th Cir.
2006). On the subjective prong, the prisoner must show the defendant acted with
deliberate indifference to the inmate’s health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. As the
Seventh Circuit has explained:

[C]onduct is deliberately indifferent when the official has acted in an
intentional or criminally reckless manner, i.e., the defendant must have
known that the plaintiff was at serious risk of being harmed and decided
not to do anything to prevent that harm from occurring even though he
could have easily done so.

Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2005) (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted); see also Reed v. McBride, 178 F.3d 849, 855 (7th Cir. 1999) (where inmate
complained about severe deprivations but was ignored, he established a “prototypical
case of deliberate indifference.”).
According to Richards, he has been forced to forego recreation, and this poses a
risk of serious damage to his future health. He does not mention any other condition of
confinement that is allegedly inadequate, and he does not explain how a lack of
recreation has affected his health. Here, Richards has not alleged that he was deprived
of all physical activity. Though a total lack of exercise would state a claim “[w]here
movement is denied and muscles are allowed to atrophy,” French v. Owens, 777 F.2d
1250, 1255 (7th Cir. 1985), the denial of “desirable, entertaining diversions . . . [do] not
raise a constitutional issue,” Harris v. Fleming, 839 F.2d 1232, 1236 (7th Cir. 1988).
Recreation and the ability to obtain physical exercise have been properly
recognized as important human needs. See, e.g., Davenport v.
DeRobertis, 844 F.2d 1310, 1315–16 (7th Cir.1988). However, there is no
constitutional right to a specific form of recreation. Rather, only the
objective harm that can result from a significant deprivation of movement
implicates the Eighth Amendment. French v. Owens, 777 F.2d 1250, 1255
(7th Cir.1985) (the Eighth Amendment is implicated where a denial of
exercise causes the muscles to atrophy and threatens the health of the
individual).
Douglas v. DeBruyn, 936 F. Supp. 572, 578 (S.D. Ind. 1996); see also Smith v. Erickson, 684

Fed. Appx. 576, 578–79 (7th Cir. 2017) (collecting cases and recognizing the distinction
between the denial of “recreation,” which did not state a plausible constitutional
violation, versus the denial of exercise in its entirely, which could). Richards has not
alleged that he has been denied all exercise, and he therefore cannot proceed on a
conditions of confinement claim.

Richards’ Request for a Preliminary Injunction
Richards also filed a motion seeking a preliminary injunction. ECF 10. He seeks
the following injunctive relief:
1) An order that his cell door remain open during recreation;
2) An order directing that both centurion and the IDOC designate him as disabled;
3) An order that Centurion immediately send him out to be evaluated by a
gastroenterologist to check on his J-pouch; and
4) An order that Centurion place Richards back on Neurontin to address his pain,
because he indicated he has never abused his medication despite Dr. Marthakis’
allegation to the contrary.

“[A] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that
should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of
persuasion.” Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997). “A plaintiff seeking a
preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is
likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of
equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat.
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
As to the first prong, “the applicant need not show that it definitely will win the
case.” Illinois Republican Party v. Pritzker, 973 F.3d 760, 763 (7th Cir. 2020). However, “a

mere possibility of success is not enough.” Id. at 762. “A strong showing . . . normally
includes a demonstration of how the applicant proposes to prove the key elements of its
case.” Id. at 763 (quotation marks omitted).
As to the second prong, “[i]ssuing a preliminary injunction based only on a
possibility of irreparable harm is inconsistent with . . . injunctive relief as an extraordinary
remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to

such relief.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 22. “Mandatory preliminary injunctions – those requiring
an affirmative act by the defendant – are ordinarily cautiously viewed and sparingly
issued [because] review of a preliminary injunction is even more searching when the
injunction is mandatory rather than prohibitory in nature.” Mays v. Dart, 974 F.3d 810,
818 (7th Cir. 2020) (quotation marks omitted).

Additionally,
[t]he PLRA circumscribes the scope of the court’s authority to enter an
injunction in the corrections context. Where prison conditions are found to
violate federal rights, remedial injunctive relief must be narrowly drawn,
extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right,
and use the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the
Federal right. This section of the PLRA enforces a point repeatedly made by
the Supreme Court in cases challenging prison conditions: Prison officials
have broad administrative and discretionary authority over the institutions
they manage.

Westefer v. Neal, 682 F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 2012) (quotation marks, brackets, and citations
omitted).
After a review of Richards’ complaint, motion for preliminary injunction, and the
exhibits attached to the motion, the court has determined that further briefing is required

on both Richards’ ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims for injunctive relief and his Eighth
Amendment claim for injunctive relief. The Commissioner and Warden will have an
opportunity to respond to the motion, and Richards will have an opportunity to file a
reply.
For these reasons, the court:
(1) GRANTS Danny R. Richards leave to proceed against the IDOC for monetary

damages for failing to accommodate Richards’ disability by providing him with prompt
access to a restroom so he can enjoy the benefits of recreation, in violation of the ADA
and the Rehabilitation Act;
(2) GRANTS Danny R. Richards leave to proceed against the IDOC for injunctive
relief to accommodate his disability by providing prompt access to a restroom so he can

enjoy the benefits of recreation, to the extent required by the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act;
(3) DIRECTS the clerk to add the Warden of the Indiana State Prison in his
official capacity as a defendant;
(4) GRANTS Danny R. Richards leave to proceed against the Warden of the

Indiana State Prison in his official capacity for injunctive relief to receive
constitutionally adequate medical care for his severe diarrhea and pain, in violation of
the Eighth Amendment;
(5) DISMISSES all other claims;
(6) DISMISSES Assistant Warden Dawn Buss, Assistant Warden Mr. Nowatzke,
Unit Team Manager J. Schneider, Maj. Worlord, Sgt. Robinson, Sgt. Schmitt, Dr.

Marthakis, and Centurion Health;
(7) DIRECTS the clerk, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), to request Waiver of Service
from (and if necessary, the United States Marshals Service to use any lawful means to
locate and serve process on) the Indiana Department of Correction and Warden of the
Indiana State Prison at the Indiana Department of Correction, with a copy of this order
and the complaint (ECF 1);

(8) DIRECTS the Clerk to fax or email a copy of the request for waiver of service,
this order, the complaint (ECF 1), and the motion for preliminary injunction (ECF 10) to
both the Warden of the Indiana State Prison and the Commissioner of the Indiana
Department of Correction;
(9) ORDERS the Commissioner of the Indiana Department of Correction to

respond to the request for preliminary injunction contained in Richards’ complaint to
the extent that it concerns his claims under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act, and file an
affidavit or declaration with the court, explaining whether Richards is disabled within
the meaning of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act and, if so, how his disabilities are being
accommodated in a manner that complies with the ADA and Rehabilitation Act

by October 27, 2025;
(10) ORDERS the Warden of the Indiana State Prison to respond to the request
for preliminary injunction contained in Richards’ complaint to the extent that it
concerns his Eighth Amendment claim that his medical care has been constitutionally
inadequate, and file an affidavit or declaration with the court, explaining how Richards’
medical care for his and severe diarrhea and related pain is being addressed in a

manner that comports with the Eighth Amendment’s requirements by October 27, 2025;
(9) GRANTS Richards until November 21, 2025, to file replies to the Commissioner’s
and Warden’s responses;
(11) ORDERS the Indiana Department of Correction to provide the full name,
date of birth, and last known home address of any defendant who does not waive
service if it has such information; and

(12) ORDERS, under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), IDOC and the Warden of Indiana
State Prison and Commissioner of the IDOC in their official capacities respond, as
provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and N.D. Ind. L.R. 10-1(b), only to
the claims for which the plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in this screening
order.

SO ORDERED on October 1, 2025

/s/Gretchen S. Lund
JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11154725. Public record. Not legal advice.