# ESTATE OF VINCENZO RUDI v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA

> District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · September 30, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11154633

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** September 30, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ESTATE OF VINCENZO RUDI et al :
Plaintiffs, :
v. No. 24-cev-5904
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA et al
Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM
Plaintiffs Estate of Vincenzo Rudi, Dominic Rudi, and Sandra Rudi bring this action
against the City of Philadelphia (“City”) and Unknown Officer No. 1. The City filed a motion to
dismiss, and for the reasons that follow, that motion is granted.
I FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On January 2, 2022, Unknown Officer No. 1 attempted to arrest Vincenzo Rudi
(“decedent”) pursuant to an arrest warrant at decedent’s car repair garage. ECF No. 3 4 12
[hereinafter Am. Compl.]. The Amended Complaint does not explain the lead up to the shooting,
but Unknown Officer No. 1 fired, at least twenty times, “his Sig Saur M400 rifle wherein decedent
was shot behind a vehicle in the back of decedent’s car repair garage.” /d. J§ 12,20. The decedent
also used a firearm and attempted to fire it once from the back of his garage. Id. § 17. Decedent
was pronounced dead later that day. Jd. § 13. Plaintiffs averred that there was no indication that
Unknown Officer No. 1 attempted to talk to the decedent prior to shooting the decedent, even
though Unknown Officer No. 1 was in the front doorway of the garage and decedent was in the
back of the garage. Jd. 14, 18-19. Apparently, information about decedent’s mental health was
given to the police prior to the attempted arrest. Jd. 4 15. Police were strongly urged to take

decedent’s mental health into account when making the arrest, but Plaintiffs claimed the police did
not do so. Id. 4 16.
Plaintiffs—Estate of Vincenzo Rudi, and Dominic Rudi and Sandra Rudi (parents of the
decedent)—claimed that the City is also liable because Unknown Officer No. 1 acted under “color
of law as an employee/servant/agent of the City of Philadelphia, deprived the decedent of rights
and privileges secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States including the due process
clause of the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and the 4th Amendment of
the Constitution of the United States as well as pursuant to the Constitution of the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania.” Am. Compl. f§ 2, 21.
Plaintiffs alleged ten counts in their Amended Complaint: Count I, negligence against
Unknown Officer No. 1; Count II, negligence against the City; Count III, survival action against
both defendants; Count IV, wrongful death against both defendants; Count V, claim for punitive
damages against both defendants; Count VI, a Section 1983 claim against Unknown Officer No.
1, alleging violations of constitutional rights including due process; Count VII, a Section 1983
claim against the City of Philadelphia, alleging violations of constitutional rights, including due
process; Count VIII, vicarious liability against the City of Philadelphia; Count IX, “Deprivation
of Rights Under the Pennsylvania Constitution,” apparently against both defendants; and Count
X, “Violation of Ministerial Duties,” apparently against both defendants.
Ul. LEGAL STANDARD
A defendant may move to dismiss a lawsuit for “failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.” Feb. R. Crv. P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a [plaintiff's]
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.”” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Ail. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). When ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, this
Court accepts Plaintiffs’ allegations in thetr Amended Complaint and makes reasonable inferences
based on the facts, in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs. Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333,
341 (Gd Cir. 2016). This Court need not accept legal conclusions and conclusory statements in
Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint. Jd.

Il. DISCUSSION
The counts pertaining to the City are Counts II, III, lV, V, VII, VII, EX, and X. Count II
is dismissed, with prejudice, against the City. Plaintiffs Dominic Rudi and Sandra Rudi’s claims
in Counts IIT and IV are dismissed, with prejudice, against the City. Count V is dismissed, with
prejudice, against the City. Count VII is dismissed, without prejudice, against the City. Count
VIII is dismissed, with prejudice, against the City. Plaintiffs have voluntarily withdrawn Counts
IX and X. ECF No. 5 at 10 [hereinafter Pls.’ Resp. □□
A. Counts II, V, and VIU: The City is Immune from Plaintiffs’ State Law
Claims.
The Pennsylvania Tort Claims Act (“PTCA”) states “[e}xcept as otherwise provided in this
subchapter, no local agency shall be liable for any damages on account of any injury to a person
or property caused by any act of the local agency or an employee thereof or any other person.” 42
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8541. Tort immunity of the City is an “absolute defense.” McShea vy. City of
Philadelphia, 606 Pa. 88, 99 (2010). The PTCA provides nine enumerated exceptions to
governmental immunity, though none are applicable here. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8542.
Therefore, the City cannot be liable under state law for tortious conduct, including Counts I
(negligence), V (punitive damages), and VIII (vicarious liability, deriving from Unknown Officer
No. 1’s tortious conduct).

Plaintiffs argued that Section 8550 revokes the City’s immunity because Unknown Officer
No. 1’s actions constituted willful misconduct. Section 8550 states “‘[iJn any action against a local
agency ... in which it is judicially determined that the act of the employee caused the injury and
that such act constituted a crime, actual fraud, actual malice or willful misconduct, the provisions
of sections 8545 (relating to official liability generally), 8546 (relating to defense of official
immunity), 8548 (relating to indemnity) and 8549 (relating to limitation on damages) shall not
apply.” 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8550. Notably, Section 8550 does not null immunity for Sections
8541 and 8542, which relate to governmental immunity, and so reference to Section 8550 does
nothing to advance Plaintiffs’ argument.
B. Counts IIT and IV: Dominic Rudi and Sandra Rudi Cannot Individually
Assert Survival and Wrongful Death Actions.
Survival and wrongful death actions may only be brought by a representative of a
decedent’s estate. See Bouchon v. Citizen Care, Inc., 176 A.3d 244, 259 (2017) (“an individual,
even if he or she qualifies as a wrongful death beneficiary, may not institute an action individually
on his or her own behalf.”); see also Ferencz v. Medlock, 905 F. Supp. 2d 656, 671 (W.D. Pa.
2012)“. .. Pennsylvania law clearly states that an action for wrongful death shall only be brought
by the personal representative of the decedent for the benefit of those persons entitled by law to
recover damages for such wrongful death.”). Even though Dominic Rudi and Sandra Rudi may
be the proper beneficiaries of the decedent’s estate, they may not bring these claims against the
City in their individual capacity. Dominic Rudi may bring these claims as the personal
representative of the Estate of Vincenzo Rudi. Consequently, Dominic Rudi and Sandra Rudi’s
claims in Counts III and IV are dismissed against the City, but the Estate of Vincenzo Rudi’s
claims in Counts ITI and IV remain alive.

C. Count VII: Plaintiffs’ Complaint Failed to Plead Adequately a Section
1983 Claim Against the City.
Plaintiffs’ allegations in Count VII are lackluster. The Amended Complaint does not
clearly articulate the theory underlying Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claim against the City. To the
extent Plaintiffs claimed Section 1983 liability by way of respondent superior, that is dismissed.
See McGreevy v. Stroup, 413 F.3d 359, 367 (3d Cir. 2005) (“a municipality cannot be held liable
under § 1983 for the constitutional torts of its employees by virtue of respondeat superior.”). To
the extent Plaintiffs claimed Section 1983 liability by way of a Monell claim, as argued in
Plaintiffs’ response, such claim is deficient under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 8. Pls.’
Resp. at 9-10. Plaintiffs asserted for the first time in its response to the City’s motion to dismiss
that the City was liable under Monell for its “policy or custom.” Jd. at 10. Plaintiffs cannot
supplement their pleading with new allegations or facts in their response to a motion to dismiss;
the correct procedure is to seek leave to amend. Even so, the allegations in Plaintiffs’ brief fall
short of making out a plausible Monell claim. Wood v. Williams, 568 F. App’x 100, 104 (3d Cir.
2014) (“Simply paraphrasing § 1983 does not meet Rule 8’s pleading requirements because it fails
to satisfy the rigorous standards of culpability and causation required to state a claim for municipal
hiability.”) (cleaned up).
Plaintiffs also requested discovery to make out its Monell claim. However, because
Plaintiffs have not satisfied Rule 8’s pleading standard, this Court cannot grant limited discovery
to help them reach that standard. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 686 (2009) (“Because
respondent’s complaint is deficient under Rule 8, he is not entitled to discovery, cabined or
otherwise.”). The Court dismisses Count VII, without prejudice. If Plaintiffs can allege more facts
to support a Section 1983 claim against the City, then they may move to amend their complaint.

IV. CONCLUSION
For the forgoing reasons, Count II, V, and VIII are dismissed, with prejudice, against the
City. Plaintiffs Dominic Rudi and Sandra Rudi’s claims in Counts III and IV are dismissed, with
prejudice, against the City. Count VII is dismissed, without prejudice, against the City. Counts
IX and X are dismissed because Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the claims.

BY THE COURT:

ty he Loot
HON. KAI N. SCOTT
United States District Court Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11154633. Public record. Not legal advice.