# OCKLEY v. RADNOR TOWNSHIP

> District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · September 30, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11154223

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** September 30, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11154223

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating same elements for each claim

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

SIMONA OCKLEY :
: CIVIL ACTION
v. :
:
RADNOR TOWNSHIP, et. al. : NO. 24-4070
:

OPINION

I. Introduction
Plaintiff Simona Ockley (“Plaintiff”) has come upon difficult times over the past
few years, which are hard to overstate. By all accounts, Plaintiff suffered serious
physical injuries which required months of treatment, faced potential commitment
pursuant to the Pennsylvania Mental Health Procedures Act (“MPHA”), and was
unable to care for herself for extended periods, all while attempting to finalize the
sale of her home and complete the retrieval of her voluminous personal possessions.
During these difficulties, Plaintiff has also encountered private individuals
and government entities who have, in her view, frustrated her road to self-sufficiency
and recovery. She now brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for malicious
prosecution, false arrest, and false imprisonment, as well as claims under common
law, seeking recompense from these actors for their perceived role in this difficult
time in her life. But Plaintiff’s perception of the factual basis for those difficulties
does not create a legal basis for recovery.
It is impossible not to feel great sympathy for Plaintiff. But this is a Court of
law – and its charge is to apply the law, without sympathy or malice. For the reasons
to be explained infra, applying the law neutrally requires this Court to grant

summary judgment to all Defendants1 on all counts.
II. Undisputed Factual Background
The facts which gave rise to this case began in late 2021, when Plaintiff and
Rockwell-Glynn executed an agreement to sell her property, located at 416 South
Ithan Avenue, Villanova, PA, in Radnor Township (the “Property”), for $550,000.
(Dkt. #40 at ¶¶ 4, 8, 8.1). At Plaintiff’s request, settlement was delayed from January
31, 2022 until April 17, 2022. (Id. at ¶ 12). All parties agree that, as of April 2022, the

Property was in disarray. (Id. at ¶ 14).
On April 10, 2022, Plaintiff fell inside the Property and injured her left leg and
back. (Id. at ¶ 16). On April 21, 2022, Plaintiff called 9-1-1 and reported she had not
moved or eaten for eleven days. (Id.). Radnor police officers responded and found the
Property to be obstructed by Plaintiff’s belongings, akin to a hoarding situation. (Id.
at ¶ 17). Plaintiff was transported to the hospital via ambulance. (Id.). During this

incident, Plaintiff complained to Radnor that the responding officer, Mark Bates,
remained alone at the Property, believing his presence compromised the Property’s
security. (Id. at ¶ 20). Medical examination at the hospital revealed a large fracture
of her femur, which was treated by surgery with in-patient hospital recovery until

1 Radnor Township (“Radnor”), Jennifer Cocco, Joseph Pinto, Brady McHale, and Brian Brown
are the “Radnor Defendants.” The latter four are police officers and referred to as the “Individual
Radnor Defendants.” Rockwell Glynn, LP (“Rockwell-Glynn”), Jeffrey Brydzinski, and Tyler Prete are
the “Rockwell Defendants.”
May 7, 2022. (Id. at ¶ 19). Plaintiff was transferred to Broomall Manor for
rehabilitation until August 8, 2022. (Id.).
On April 26, 2022, Radnor issued a Notice of Condemnation for the Property.

(Id. at ¶ 22). This notice declared the Property unfit for human occupancy due to a
hole in the kitchen floor and excessive clutter, and permitted occupancy from only
8:00 A.M. until 4:00 P.M. for abatement, with sleeping and cooking not permitted.
(Id.). Radnor padlocked the Property in late April 2022. (Id. at ¶ 24).
On June 21, 2022, two months after the agreed April 17, 2022 settlement date,
Rockwell-Glynn filed a complaint in the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas,
which sought declaratory relief that it was permitted to record the deed to the

Property in its name. (Id. at ¶ 29). Three days later, Rockwell-Glynn filed a petition
for Special Injunctive Relief requesting the same relief it requested in its complaint.
(Id. at ¶ 29.1). On July 11, 2022, after a hearing on the matter, Judge John J. Whelan
issued an order which permitted Rockwell-Glynn to execute the deed upon payment
to Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶ 20, hereinafter the “First Order”). The First Order crucially said:
[Ockley] shall have unlimited and unfettered access to the Property at
her own risk to remove her personal property until September 1, 2022.
Any personal property remaining at the Property after September 1,
2022 shall be deemed abandoned and may be removed by Plaintiff as
refuse.

(Id.). On July 19, 2022, Plaintiff received $484,000, the balance that Rockwell-Glynn
owed for the sale of the Property. (Id. at ¶ 37).
On August 8, 2022, upon Plaintiff’s release from Broomall Manor, she called a
taxi and was driven to the Property around dinner time, where she found that the
entrances were sealed by two sets of locks, one belonging to Radnor and the other
belonging to Rockwell-Glynn. (Id. at ¶ 42). Plaintiff also saw the condemnation notice.
(Id.). After being told by Rockwell-Glynn that she was not permitted to enter the

property, the taxi driver drove Plaintiff to the Red Roof Inn in Tinicum Township,
still dressed in her hospital gown. (Id. at ¶ 44).
On August 9, 2022, after finding the locks were still on the Property and having
not immediately been given access to the Property, Plaintiff made an emergency
petition at the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, requesting the locks be
removed and her right of access reaffirmed. (Id. at ¶ 50). Judge Barry Dozor heard
this petition and issued an order which stated, in relevant part:

Simona Ockley shall have unlimited and unfettered access to the
property located at 416 South Ithan Avenue, Villanova, PA 19085 at her
own risk to remove her personal property until September 1, 2022.
Plaintiff shall remove any additional locks so that Defendant may access
the property until September 1, 2022. Plaintiff and/or the Radnor Police
Department shall allow access by removing locks to provide Defendant
access to the property to remove her personal property until September
1, 2022.

(Id. at Ex. 28, hereinafter the “Second Order,” and with the First Order, the
“Orders”)). After obtaining the Second Order, Plaintiff returned to the Property and
found Radnor’s locks removed from the garage door. (Id. at ¶ 52). Plaintiff requested
Rockwell-Glynn remove its locks but was unable to get full access to the Property.
(Id. at ¶ 53). Plaintiff returned to the Red Roof Inn for another evening. (Id.). Plaintiff
was still wearing her hospital gown. (Id.).
On August 10, 2022, Plaintiff returned to the Property and had a locksmith
remove Rockwell-Glynn’s locks on the garage and basement doors. (Id. at ¶ 54).
Despite having no power or water, Plaintiff stayed overnight at the Property. (Id. at
¶ 55). On August 11, 2022, Plaintiff had power restored to the Property without any
coordination with Radnor or the Property’s new ownership. (Id. at ¶ 56). That same

day, Plaintiff barred a tree contractor from entering the Property to remove dead and
hazardous trees and refused entry to a pest inspector sent by Radnor. (Id. at ¶ 58).
Plaintiff stayed at the Property on August 11, as well, still wearing a soiled hospital
gown and adult diaper from August 8, even though she had access to both a hotel
room and a friend’s home. (Id. at ¶ 59).
On August 12, 2022, Mr. Brydzinski went to the Radnor police station and
reported Plaintiff’s activity as a “possible squatting issue” and expressed concern for

Plaintiff’s safety due to the condition of the Property. (Id. at ¶ 60). Mr. Brydzinski
also reported that Plaintiff removed the condemnation and no-trespassing signs,
hindered construction, and restored utilities in her name. (Id. at ¶ 61). The Individual
Radnor Defendants and Radnor Police Sgt. Fischer responded to the Property that
day and found Plaintiff, still in her soiled hospital gown, laying on a couch with feces
stains, in temperatures exceeding 100 degrees. (Id. at ¶ 62). The kitchen floor was

damaged, there was no running water in the Property, and there was a stench of
sewage present. (Id.). This led the officers to deem the conditions life-threatening.
(Id.).
Defendant Officer Pinto followed protocols and contacted the Delaware County
Mobile Crisis Team (“MCT”), which dispatched two mental health responders to the
Property for a potential commitment pursuant to Section 302 of the MPHA (a Ҥ 302
Commitment”). (Id. at ¶ 64). The MCT evaluated Plaintiff and concluded Plaintiff
was unable to care for herself and make sound decisions, and therefore supported a §
302 Commitment. (Id. at ¶ 66). Based on the foregoing circumstances, Plaintiff was

transported to Crozer Hospital by ambulance for further evaluation. (Id. at ¶ 67).
Dr. Daniel Marotta conducted a psychiatric evaluation of Plaintiff at the
hospital and found that she was not a danger to herself or to others, and therefore
denied the § 302 Commitment. (Id. at ¶ 68). Plaintiff explained “her disheveled
appearance and presence in urine and feces was due to limited mobility from recent
leg surgery and lack of running water.” (Id. at ¶ 69). “Plaintiff was able to verbalize
a plan to perform activities of daily living with assistance from a friend and

caretaker.” (Id.).
On August 13, 2022, Plaintiff returned to the Property and found that it was
boarded up with plywood and locked by Rockwell-Glynn. (Id. at ¶ 72). The Rockwell
Defendants, knowing Plaintiff was released, asked the Radnor police to keep an eye
on the Property to ensure nothing illegal occurred. (Id. at ¶¶ 73-74). Defendant
Officer Cocco drove past the Property and observed Plaintiff on the Property, and saw

plywood on the ground, which indicated that Plaintiff attempted to enter the
Property. (Id. at ¶ 74). Plaintiff refused to leave the Property. (Id.). Defendant Cocco
arrested Plaintiff for burglary, criminal trespass, defiant trespass, and criminal
mischief. (Id. at ¶ 76). While arresting Plaintiff, Defendant Cocco said “I know what
the court order says… [y]ou are not allowed to live here, there’s no water, no PECO.
We read it yesterday… You’re not allowed to be here.” (Id. at ¶ 77.1). Defendant Cocco
was assisted in this arrest by Defendant Brown, a new hire and trainee officer. (Id.
at ¶ 78). Sgt. Fischer testified that probable cause existed for the arrest because
Plaintiff was present after being told not to return and damaged the Property, while

making no effort to remove belongings. (Id. at ¶ 79). Defendant Cocco testified in her
deposition that she was unaware of the Second Order at the time of the arrest, but
that its content would not have altered her actions, as it was her belief that Plaintiff
was attempting to reside in the property, not remove belongings, which was not
permitted under either the First or Second Order. (Id. at ¶ 97).
After arraignment, Plaintiff had bail set at one dollar, with conditions
including providing a new address and undergoing a psychological evaluation. (Id. at

¶ 81). She was transported to George W. Hill Correctional Facility. (Id.). Plaintiff was
held there until September 7, 2022, pending psychological evaluation. (Id. at ¶ 82).
After a psychological evaluation, officials determined that she did not need further
detention and released her. (Id.). The criminal charges against Plaintiff were
ultimately dismissed. (Id. at ¶ 83.1).
The Orders permitted the Rockwell Defendants to dispose of Plaintiff’s

personal property as abandoned if not retrieved by September 1, 2025. (Supra). As of
September 2, 2025, the Rockwell Defendants placed Plaintiff’s personal belongings in
PODS containers on the southwest corner of the Property. (Dkt. #40 at ¶ 86). The
record contains no evidence which suggests that the Rockwell Defendants were
required to do so; to the contrary, it appears that action was taken voluntarily.
On September 8, 2022, Judge Whelan held another hearing regarding
Plaintiff’s personal belongings and Plaintiff’s ability to access the Property. (Id. at ¶
84). In the hearing, Judge Whelan stated on the record that he did not know if an

attempt to live on the Property violated the order because his order did not
contemplate that issue, but that Radnor Township would be entitled to enforce its
condemnation order. (Id. at ¶ 85.1). The issue of the first hearing was “to make sure
[Plaintiff] had the ability to retrieve whatever personal property was in the
[Property]. . . .” (Id.).
As a result of the hearing, Judge Whelan issued a new written order, which
permitted Plaintiff to access only the southwest corner of the Property until

September 18, 2022, “for the sole purpose of retrieving her personal property from
the PODS and removing her personal property from the Property.” (Id. at Ex. 36,
hereinafter the “Third Order”). The Third Order said that after September 19, the
PODS could be removed from the Property and placed in storage for retrieval until
October 8, 2022. (Id.). After then, any remaining property could be disposed as refuse.
(Id.). Finally, the order stated that Plaintiff’s vehicle, also located in the southwest

corner of the Property, must be removed by Plaintiff no later than September 18,
2022, and would be considered abandoned if not recovered by then. (Id.). Plaintiff
retrieved her belongings in October 2022 after she obtained a court order extending
the time she had to retrieve her property. (Id. at ¶ 93). Upon doing so, Plaintiff
reported items missing from her car. (Id. at ¶ 94). Plaintiff has also alleged in her
brief that upon retrieving her possession from the PODS containers, some items were
missing. (Dkt. #37 at 18).
Plaintiff filed her complaint in this matter on August 8, 2024. (Dkt. #1). Count

I, brought against Defendant Officers Cocco, Pinto, and McHale, alleges a violation
of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983”) for false arrest/wrongful civil commitment regarding
the aforementioned § 302 Commitment. Count II, brought against Defendant Officer
Cocco, alleges a violation of § 1983 for false arrest in connection with Plaintiff’s
August 13, 2022 arrest. Count III, brought against Defendant Officers Cocco and
Brown, alleges a violation of § 1983 for false imprisonment in connection with the
filing of a criminal complaint against Plaintiff after her August 13, 2022 arrest. Count

IV, brought against Defendant Officers Brown and Cocco alleges a violation of § 1983
for malicious prosecution after Plaintiff’s August 13, 2022 arrest. Count V, brought
against Defendant Radnor, alleges a violation of § 1983 for failure to train its officers.
Count VI, brought against the Rockwell Defendants, alleges a common law malicious
prosecution tort claim based upon their reports to the police department. Count VII,
brought against the Rockwell Defendants, alleges conversion in connection with her

personal property which was missing when Plaintiff finally retrieved her belongings.
At the conclusion of fact discovery, both sets of Defendants moved for summary
judgment as to all counts against them. Summary judgment briefing is now complete,
and the motions are ripe for decision.
III. Legal Standards
Summary judgment is appropriate “when the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show

that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Mann v. Palmerton Area School District, 872
F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2017) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A fact
is “material” if, under the applicable substantive law, it is essential to the proper
disposition of the claims. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
An issue of material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Id.

The party moving under Rule 56 “bears the burden of demonstrating the
absence of any genuine issues of material fact. When determining whether there is a
triable dispute of material fact, the court draws all inferences in favor of the non-
moving party.” Doeblers’ Pennsylvania Hybrids, Inc. v. Doebler, 442 F.3d 812, 820-21
(3d Cir. 2006) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
The movant’s initial burden does not relieve complainant’s obligation of

producing evidence that would support a jury verdict. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256.
Because a motion for summary judgment looks beyond the pleadings, the opposing
party must advance specific facts showing that there is a genuine factual dispute.
See Marshall v. Sisters of Holy Family of Nazareth, 399 F.Supp.2d 597, 598 (E.D. Pa.
2005). The non-movant may not rest on their pleadings but must point to probative
evidence tending to support the complaint. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. “The mere
existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position will be
insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the
plaintiff.” Id. at 252. If the “evidence presented by the non-movant is merely colorable,

or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Id. at 249-50.
Section 1983 permits recovery against any person who, under color of state
law, subjects or causes to be subjected another person to “the deprivation of any
rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Even if such a violation has occurred, government officials are protected from liability
by qualified immunity as long as they do not “violate clearly established…
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Gibbs v. City

of Philadelphia, No. CV 25-2810, 2025 WL 2608625, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 9, 2025)
(Pappert, J.) (alterations in original) (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231
(2009)).
To determine the doctrine's applicability, a court must ascertain
whether the facts shown by the plaintiff make out a violation of a
constitutional right and whether that right was clearly established at
time of the defendant's alleged misconduct. A right is “clearly
established” when its contours are sufficiently definite that any
reasonable official in the defendant's shoes would have understood that
he was violating it. While there does not have to be a case directly on
point, existing precedent must place the lawfulness of the particular
action beyond debate.

Id. (cleaned up)

While this Court has not found a decision in a pure civil litigation context,
Pennsylvania’s appellate courts in other contexts have deemphasized the force of a
judge’s oral reasoning at a hearing and placed emphasis back upon the need for a
clear, written order. See, e.g.: R.L.P. v. R.F.M., 110 A.3d 201, 203 (Pa. Super. 2015)
(“[I]n order to be sufficiently specific to be enforced, an order of custody must be
entered as a separate written order, or as a separate section of a written opinion.”);

Com. v. Isabell, 467 A.2d 1287, 1292 (Pa. 1983) (“Generally, the signed sentencing
order, if legal, controls over oral statements of the sentencing judge not incorporated
into the signed judgment of sentence.”).
IV. Analysis
a. The First Order and Second Order permitted Plaintiff to access
the Property only for purposes of removing her personal
property, and attempts to reside therein or conduct any activity
which was not the removal of her property exceeded the
authority of the plain text of the Orders.

How this Court interprets the language of the Orders is central to this case
and has the potential to be dispositive to many of Plaintiff’s claims in her Complaint.
For this reason, the Court will address this interpretive dispute first. The key
language in the Second Order (which is the same as the First Order for all relevant
purposes) is that Plaintiff “shall have unlimited and unfettered access to the property
located at 416 South Ithan Avenue, Villanova, PA 19085 at her own risk to remove
her personal property.” (Second Order, supra).
Plaintiff urges this Court to give vigorous meaning to the phrase “unlimited
and unfettered access to the Property” in the Orders, and in so doing rule that
Plaintiff was permitted to do anything she liked on the Property. Plaintiff implicitly
suggests to this Court that “unlimited” and “unfettered” carry the entirety of the
interpretive weight of those provisions, and the Court need not look any further to
know if she was lawfully permitted to do everything she did on the Property,
including staying overnight.
While Plaintiff’s definition may well be what the words “unlimited and

unfettered” mean absent a limiting principle, Plaintiff asks this Court to disregard
the remainder of that sentence, which says “to remove her personal property.”
Defendants ask this Court to understand that the unlimited and unfettered access
she was granted was provided only in the context of removing her personal property.
So, they argue, while her access to the Property could not be limited to the extent she
was removing her property, any access for a purpose other than removing property
or in addition to removing property was not permitted by the Orders.

Giving meaning to every word in the Orders, this Court concludes that
Plaintiff’s unlimited and unfettered right to access the Property was only to do what
she needed to do to effectuate the removal of her personal property. For example,
Defendants could not limit the number of visits she made, could not prohibit her from
bringing a moving truck, and could not force her to obtain insurance before removing
her property. In that sense, her ability to remove her personal property from the

Property was unfettered and unlimited. But that access was only permitted to remove
her personal property from the Property.
In all other aspects, the Rockwell Defendants retained an absolute right to
exclude Plaintiff from the Property. The Orders, by their own plain meaning, did not
entitle Plaintiff to establish residency or do anything besides remove her property. If
Plaintiff accessed the Property for a purpose other than removing her personal
property, she could be lawfully removed from it.
This interpretation is the only one reasonable under the circumstances. If your

renovation contract grants the contractor unlimited access to your property to
perform the contracted work, everyone would understand that to mean that you
cannot refuse the contractor entry during working hours when they arrive with their
toolbox. But everyone would also understand that the contractor would not be
permitted to host Thanksgiving dinner in your dining room. So too, while your
“unlimited” gym membership would grant you 24/7 access to the ellipticals, it would
not permit you to set up a board game club in the sauna. Put simply: unlimited access

for a limited purpose are concepts which can, and regularly do, comfortably work side-
by-side.
Plaintiff’s best argument for her reading of the Orders is that Judge Whelan
made comments during the hearing which suggests that he did not understand the
Orders to have the limitation that the Court finds the Orders imposed. Plaintiff
specifically points to Judge Whelan saying, “you’re allowed to live and/or access the

property up until September 1st.”
These arguments are unpersuasive. As this Court mentioned above, it is the
text of the Orders, rather than the commentary of the Judges who issued them, which
controls the legal relationship between the Parties.2 See supra. And as explained,

2 This is especially true as to the Individual Radnor Defendants, who also have the cloak of
qualified immunity. Even if the commentary of the Judge controlled here, there is no evidence that
the Individual Radnor Defendants had access to the hearing transcripts, and it would not have been
above, this Court finds the plain text of the Orders permits Plaintiff access to the
Property only to remove her belongings, and not to establish residency.3 While the
cases cited above arose in family and criminal court contexts, the reasoning

underpinning them is equally applicable in a civil context. Those decisions stand for
the proposition that nailing down the exact legal force of one portion of a transcript
as opposed to another is a self-defeating process which would lead to uncertainty in
application and inevitably bring the litigants back to court for clarification. These
holdings also make logical sense in terms of timing. A written order is typically
second-in-time after the hearing and therefore could also represent a judge thinking
longer and harder about something and reaching what they believe to be a better

decision than the one alluded to off the cuff.
Finality demands clarity, and therefore the text of an order, when
unambiguous, renders the oral statements of the court interpretively unnecessary.
Because this Court finds the Orders to be unambiguous, Judge Whelan’s statements
do not impact this Court’s analysis, and this Court holds that Plaintiff’s access to the
Property was limited to access for purposes of removing her personal property.

unreasonable to mistrust the recollection of Plaintiff, whose actions at the time of her encounters
would lead any reasonable officer to, at the very least, take Plaintiff’s assertions with a grain of salt.

3 Further, Judge Whelan said in a later hearing that “[w]e never addressed whether she moved
in [sic], because I never even considered to move [sic] in because of the condemnation” and that it
“would be up to the Radnor Township solicitor to enforce that condemnation order.” (Dkt. #40 at ¶
85.1). Clearly, Judge Whelan did not understand his order to address residency. Even if we did credit
a judge’s statements during the hearing over the text of his order, the judge’s statements on this issue
are, at best for Plaintiff, contradictory. When Judge Whelan had the entire factual situation placed in
front of him, made it clear he did not issue an order which would permit residence. So even under
Plaintiff’s preferred analytical framework, she still cannot prevail.
b. Count I for False Arrest and Wrongful Civil Commitment under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 fails because the Defendants had probable cause
for the detention and commitment.

Pennsylvania law permits someone to be detained for involuntary commitment
if “when, as a result of mental illness, his capacity to exercise self-control, judgment
and discretion in the conduct of his affairs and social relations or to care for his own
personal needs is so lessened that he poses a clear and present danger of harm to
others or to himself . . . .” 50 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 7301(a). Clear and present danger to
himself is proven by showing, inter alia, “ the person has acted in such manner as to
evidence that he would be unable, without care, supervision and the continued
assistance of others, to satisfy his need for nourishment, personal or medical care,
shelter, or self-protection and safety, and that there is a reasonable probability that
death, serious bodily injury or serious physical debilitation would ensue within 30
days unless adequate treatment were afforded under this act . . . .” 50 Pa. Stat. Ann.
§ 7301(b)(2)(i).
To prevail on a false arrest claim, the necessary elements of a cause of action
for false arrest are: (1) the detention of another person, and (2) the unlawfulness of

such detention. Bryant v. Collins, No. CV 15-00302, 2017 WL 1354941, at *7 (E.D.
Pa. Apr. 13, 2017) (Pappert, J.) An arrest that is based upon probable cause is legally
justified, regardless of the arrestee’s ultimate guilt or innocence. Borough of
Coraopolis v. Papa, 295 A.3d 742 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2023); see also: Paszkowski v. Roxbury
Twp. Police Dep't, 581 Fed. Appx. 149, 152 (3d Cir. 2014).
“Probable cause… has been defined as: reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficient to warrant an ordinary prudent man in the
same situation in believing that the party is guilty of the offense.” Velez v. Cessna,

No. 5:24-CV-00481, 2025 WL 606177, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 24, 2025) (Weilheimer, J.)
(citing Napier v. City of New Castle, 407 Fed. Appx. 578, 583 (3d Cir. 2010)). The
Third Circuit has instructed that probable cause exists where “reasonably
trustworthy information or circumstances within a police officer's knowledge are
sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to conclude than an offense has
been committed by the person being arrested.” United States v. Myers, 308 F.3d 251,
255 (3d Cir. 2002). It must be more than just mere suspicion but does not require

enough evidence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Glasser,
750 F.2d 1197, 1205 (3d Cir. 1984).
Synthesized together, there is probable cause for a § 302 commitment where,
inter alia, an officer has “reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances
sufficient to warrant an ordinary prudent man in the same situation” that the person
they are encountering a person who “would be unable, without care, supervision and

the continued assistance of others, to satisfy his need for nourishment, personal or
medical care, shelter, or self-protection and safety, and that there is a reasonable
probability that… serious bodily injury would ensue within 30 days…” without
commitment. See Velez, 2025 WL 606177, at *4; 50 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 7301(b)(2)(i).
Here, this Court concludes with little difficulty that the police officers against
whom Count I is brought had probable cause to detain Plaintiff for a mental health §
302 evaluation. The stipulated facts upon which all parties agree are that the police
arrived at the Property with temperatures in the triple digits, no power or running
water, the home in disarray, the smell of sewage, and Plaintiff in soiled clothes and

an adult diaper. While Plaintiff was ultimately cleared by the doctor at the hospital,
those circumstances are “sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to
conclude” that Plaintiff was unable to satisfy her need for nourishment, personal care,
and shelter, and that such inability might result in serious injury or debilitation
within 30 days. See Myers, 308 F.3d at 255.
The judgment of the officers need not be correct to establish probable cause;
reasonable mistakes of both fact and law can be used to establish probable cause and

avoid individual liability. See Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 63 (2014) (holding
that probable cause “encompasse[s] suspicion based on reasonable mistakes of both
fact and law.”); see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987) (“We have
recognized that it is inevitable that law enforcement officials will in some cases
reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present, and we have
indicated that in such cases those officials—like other officials who act in ways they

reasonably believe to be lawful—should not be held personally liable.”).
Objectively, the undisputed evidence raised serious concerns about Plaintiff’s
ability to care for herself, as she had not eaten, was laying on a couch in dangerous
temperatures, and had no access to running water. Even if she were permitted to
reside on the Property (which she was not), the Individual Radnor Defendants against
whom Count I was brought would be well within their rights to detain her for a § 302
evaluation.4
c. Counts II and III for False Arrest and False Imprisonment under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 fail because the Defendants had probable cause
for Plaintiff’s detention and imprisonment.

False arrest and false imprisonment claims are nearly identical, and courts
tend to analyze them together. Covington v. Plymouth Twp. Police Dep't, 779 F. Supp.
3d 509, 523 (E.D. Pa. 2025) (Younge, J.). The same standards outlined above in a false
arrest case apply in a false imprisonment context. See Alleyne v. Pirrone, 180 A.3d
524, 543 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) (stating same elements for each claim). “An arrest based
on probable cause cannot become the source of a claim for false imprisonment.”
Groman v. Twp. Of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 636 (3d Cir. 1995) (cleaned up).
Counts II and III for false arrest and false imprisonment are brought against
Defendant Cocco and both Defendants Cocco and Brown, respectively. The allegations
in support of these counts surround Plaintiff’s arrest on August 13, 2022. As
explained, supra, this cause of action fails if there was probable cause to arrest
Plaintiff. Importantly, even a single offense for which there was probable cause will

defeat a false arrest claim. See Rivera-Guadalupe v. City of Harrisburg, 124 F.4th
295, 302 (3d Cir. 2024). Defendant Cocco arrested Plaintiff for, inter alia, criminal
mischief, based upon her observation that Plaintiff had removed plywood which was
attached to the Property. Under Pennsylvania law, criminal mischief punishes

4 And even if there was not probable cause, as the above analysis shows, the case presented a
close call. For that reason, the officers would be protected by qualified immunity.
someone who damages the tangible property of another intentionally or recklessly.
18 Pa.C.S. § 3304(a)(1).5
There was probable cause for that charge, as the evidence at the Property that

day showed that Plaintiff removed plywood erected in front of the garage door by the
Rockwell Defendants. (Dkt. #40 at Ex. 24, p. 2). While this would hardly be the
criminal mischief case of the century, this Court cannot say that there was no
probable cause to support that charge. As just one example, the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania has found that a property’s wall is “tangible property” under the statute
and that placing graffiti on that wall constituted damage sufficient to support a
criminal mischief conviction. In Int. of Rodriquez, 537 A.2d 854, 855 (Pa. Super.

1988). The Second Order, which was the effective court order at the time of the
hearing, required Rockwell-Glynn to remove its locks to permit Plaintiff to access the
Property. It did not permit Plaintiff to engage in self-help in removing the plywood.
Plaintiff may well have prevailed if the criminal mischief matter had gone to trial.
But that does not mean there was no probable cause at the time the arrest was made.
Plaintiff argues that criminal mischief cannot apply because all the personal

belongings in the house were her own. But in so doing, she ignores the damage done
to the Property itself, which she legally sold and, therefore, no longer owned. Plaintiff
also attempts to defeat probable cause by citing to a provision of the statute which
deals with fire, explosives, or dangerous means of damaging the property, and

5 The portions of the relevant criminal statutes cited throughout this opinion correspond to the
sub-sections under which Plaintiff was charged according to the record evidence attached by the
Parties to their joint statement of undisputed facts.
suggesting none of those was present here. But that provision only applies where the
criminal mischief charge is brought for damage done negligently. Here, the
allegations were that Plaintiff intentionally damaged the Property. The fire and

explosives provision is entirely inapt.
Because there was probable cause for at least one of the offenses for which she
was arrested, Counts II and III for false arrest and false imprisonment fail as a
matter of law.6
d. Count IV for malicious prosecution against Defendants Brown
and Cocco must be dismissed because there was no showing that
they provided false information to charging authorities, there
was probable cause to support all charges brought against her,
there is no evidence of malicious intent, and they otherwise
would be shielded by qualified immunity.

To prevail on a malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff must plead and prove
that: (1) the defendant initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding
ended in plaintiff’s favor; (3) the proceeding was initiated without probable cause; (4)
the defendants acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to
justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept
of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding. Velez, 2025 WL 606177, * 4 (citing
Harvard v. Cesnalis, 973 F.3d 190, 203 (3d Cir. 2020)). When a malicious prosecution
claim is brought against a private individual who is not a member of law enforcement,
the plaintiff must additionally be able to prove and show either “[the individual’s]

6 Again, even if there were not probable cause, or even if such a claim could proceed, qualified
immunity would shield the Individual Radnor Defendants, as there the Court finds no clearly
established right which was violated here.
desire to have the proceedings initiated, expressed by direction, request or pressure
of any kind, was the determining factor in the official's decision to commence the
prosecution, or that the information furnished by him upon which the official acted

was known to be false.” Hess v. Lancaster Cnty., 514 A.2d 681, 683 (Pa. Cmwlth.
1986). “The existence of probable cause is an absolute defense to a malicious
prosecution claim.” Givens v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 22-2989, 2023 WL 7144628,
at *2 (3d Cir. Oct. 31, 2023) (cleaned up); see also: Tomaskevitch v. Specialty Recs.
Corp., 717 A.2d 30, 33 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998) (“The showing of probable cause is an
absolute defense to a charge of malicious prosecution.”).
“Probable cause for the purpose of malicious prosecution actions has been

defined as: reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficient to
warrant an ordinary prudent man in the same situation in believing that the party
is guilty of the offense.” Napier, 407 Fed. Appx. at 583 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). Probable cause is established if, at the moment of
arrest, “the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge and of which they
had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in

believing that the suspect had committed or was committing an offense.” Id. (internal
citation and punctuation omitted) (citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)); see
also Harvard, 973 F.3d at 199-200. At the summary judgment stage, the existence of
probable cause is assessed based on the totality-of-the-circumstances available to the
officer effectuating the arrest. Harvard, 973 F.3d at 200. The reviewing court must
evaluate these circumstances in the light most favorable to the complainant. Id.
Importantly, probable cause does not require factual correctness. Illinois v.
Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 184 (1990).
As an initial matter, Defendants Cocco and Brown point to the Hess decision

(supra) and its progeny which suggest that they are not considered the charging party
in this case, and that they are therefore shielded from liability as long as they did not
provide any false information in their police report. Plaintiff does not challenge this
assertion.7 Instead, Plaintiff asserts that the police report submitted to charging
authorities was false or misleading in that it did not mention the Orders. But as this
Court has explained, Plaintiff’s interpretation of the Orders is incorrect, and
therefore her assertion that the officers misled the authorities is as well. The Orders

did not permit Plaintiff to behave as she was behaving. Therefore, omitting reference
to the Orders, while perhaps rendering the police report less fulsome than it may
otherwise have been, did nothing to mislead either the charging authorities or the
tribunal which approved the charges with respect to a fact in consequence. There is
nothing inaccurate or misleading in the police report.
Further, there is probable cause to justify each of the charges brought. As

explained, supra, there is probable cause of criminal mischief. Plaintiff was also
charged with criminal trespass under two provisions of the Pennsylvania Code. The
first punishes someone who, knowing they are not licensed or privileged to do so,
“enters, gains entry by subterfuge or surreptitiously remains in any building or
occupied structure or separately secured or occupied portion thereof.” 18 Pa.C.S. §

7 Because Plaintiff does not make argument regarding this standard and implicitly concedes its
applicability by engaging it without rebuttal, this Court will not dive deeper into that issue.
3503(a)(1)(i). The second provision, labeled in the Pennsylvania Code as a “Defiant
trespasser,” punishes someone who, knowing they are not licensed or privileged to do
so, “enters or remains in any place to which notice against trespass is given by actual

communication to the actor. . . .” Id. at § 3503(b)(1)(i).
As this Court has already addressed, Plaintiff’s access to the Property was
limited to access for purposes of removing her belongings. Any access beyond that
was unlawful. Officers Cocco and Brown, aware of the First Order which had
language basically identical to the Second Order for purposes of access to the
Property, had probable cause to believe that Plaintiff gained entry to the Property by
subterfuge (i.e., entering the Property intending to reside despite the Second Order’s

restriction and removing the plywood) and remained unlawfully. Further, before
arresting Plaintiff, the undisputed facts show that the officers instructed Plaintiff to
leave, and she refused to do so. For that reason, the elements for both trespass and
defiant trespass were at least apparently met.8 Therefore, there was probable cause
for both of these charges.
Finally, according to the police report, the provision of Pennsylvania’s burglary

law under which Plaintiff was charged punishes a person who “enters a building or
occupied structure, or separately secured or occupied portion thereof that is not
adapted for overnight accommodations in which at the time of the offense no person

8 Nor can Plaintiff defeat probable cause for trespass based upon an assertion that she
subjectively understood the Orders to permit her to access the Property to reside there. Even if Plaintiff
subjectively misunderstood the Orders (which would likely be a complete defense to the criminal
charges at trial), it was understandable that the officers on the scene would enforce the law based
upon the assumption that Plaintiff understood the objectively reasonable meaning of the Orders,
rather than Plaintiff’s self-interested idiosyncratic understanding.
is present” and has “the intent to commit a crime therein. . . .” 18 Pa.C.S. § 3502(a)(4).
The Pennsylvania Superior Court has held that the underlying crime which one must
intend to commit can include summary misdemeanors such as criminal mischief. In

Int. of Golden, 365 A.2d 157, 158 (Pa. Super. 1976).
While this charge may have been a stretch, it was not without probable cause.
Based on the responding officers’ reasonable belief that Plaintiff intended to reside in
a property which she no longer owned and which lacked running water, Plaintiff’s
residency at the Property was almost sure to result in further criminal mischief in
the form of damage to the Property.9 To the extent such an underlying crime was not
an adequate intended crime pursuant to Pennsylvania’s burglary law, it was

certainly a reasonable mistake for which recovery is not permissible.10
As to the “malicious” nature of the prosecution, this Court finds that Plaintiff’s
evidence is sorely lacking. To prevail, Plaintiff must be able to show that the officers
acted for a purpose other than bringing her to justice. But Plaintiff brings forth no
evidence whatsoever of what that other motive might be.
The undisputed and stipulated facts make clear to this Court that the

Individual Radnor Defendants, in contrast to Plaintiff’s assertions, acted with the
utmost professionalism when faced with a difficult series of boots-on-the-ground
decisions to make. Faced with a woman wearing a soiled hospital gown and a diaper

9 Further, while ordinary trespass likely cannot be the underlying intended crime for burglary
(as such a rule would turn every trespass into a burglary), defiant trespass, i.e., remaining after being
told to leave, might well be. The Court was unable to find binding Pennsylvania case law on the issue.

10 This Court would find qualified immunity protects the officers even if there was not probable
cause, given that such a mistake would have been a reasonable mistake based on a contested issue of
law.
while she was residing on a condemned Property she no longer owned, the first
instinct of the responding officers was to have concern for her mental health and to
work to obtain care for her. It was not until she was cleared by a doctor and released,

and then returned to the condemned Property for the purpose of residing there that
the police officers ultimately had no choice but to arrest Plaintiff, as she was
exceeding the permission granted to her to access the Property and exposing herself
to living in dangerous conditions, such as the hole in the kitchen floor, hoarding
condition, extreme heat and her prior leg injury, which in turn creates risks to first
responders who might ultimately be called upon to assist her. This Court commends
the police officers who acted in sound judgment and attempted to avoid criminal

charges until they were inevitable.
Finally, even if there was some technical flaw in how the officers behaved with
respect to Plaintiff’s being prosecuted, such flaw would be technical in nature and
entirely reasonable. For that reason, the officers would be entitled to qualified
immunity, anyway.
e. Count V for failure to train fails because Plaintiff has no
evidence that Radnor failed to train its officers and cannot
prove causation.

Next, this Court addresses Plaintiff’s Monell claim that Radnor failed to train
its officers. To prevail on a Monell claim, a plaintiff must show: (1) the municipality
had a policy or custom that deprived the plaintiff of his constitutional rights; (2) the
municipality acted deliberately and was the moving force behind the deprivation; and
(3) the plaintiff's injuries were caused by the identified policy or custom.
Buoniconti v. City of Philadelphia, 148 F. Supp. 3d 425, 436 (E.D. Pa. 2015). While a
party must ordinarily show there is a pattern of mistakes to create an inference of a
failure to train, such pattern is not required if the need to train officers is obvious and

the inadequacy is very likely to result in a constitutional violation. Carter v. City of
Philadelphia, 181 F.3d 339, 357 (3d Cir. 1999).
In her brief in opposition to summary judgment, Plaintiff summarily argues
that Radnor failed to train its officers in “dealing with court orders or whether
ordinances trumped orders or orders of a state court trumped ordinances of a
township.” (Dkt. #36 at 19). Further, Plaintiff argues, “this lack of training plays out
as constitutional violations in the nature of exculpatory evidence being withheld

intentionally and arrogantly by all of the officers of the Radnor Police Department.”
(Id.).
As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s briefing on this issue is a mess and does not aid
the Court in determining Plaintiff’s position. The third full paragraph begins with a
period, and the first sentence of that paragraph includes a long quote with an “id”
citation which presumptively refers back to the decision in Olender v. Twp. Of

Bensalem, the last case cited by Plaintiff. But a review of that case makes it clear
that is not the case that quoted case, and this Court is left to guess what case Plaintiff
wanted to cite. The next sentence has several quotations, but once again includes a
missing citation, followed by a “see also” cite.
Technical briefing failings aside, Plaintiff’s arguments fail on the merits. While
this Court, as will be explained next, does not find any evidence of a failure to train,
even if there was a failure to train on how to balance a court order and a township
condemnation ordinance, that failure would not have caused Plaintiff’s injury. The
Orders and the condemnation order do not contradict each other. Rather, they

actually stand for the same basic proposition. The Property can be occupied only for
the purposes of removing property. Therefore, the Monell claim fails.11
Further, Plaintiff has brought no evidence that there was even a failure to
train at all. Plaintiff references no similar issues ever encountered by anyone
detained by the Radnor police. Despite Plaintiff’s broad and unsupported claims, this
Court does not find it “obvious” that separate training is necessary on that issue
where, as here, there is no evidence that anyone (including Plaintiff) has ever been

harmed by Radnor police officers making mistakes on this issue. For these reasons,
Plaintiff’s Monell claim fails.
f. Count VI against the Rockwell Defendants for malicious
prosecution fails because there is no showing that the
prosecution was done as a result of their desire, request, or
pressure, or that they furnished false information to the
prosecuting authorities.

As explained, supra, a cause of action for malicious prosecution fails if there is
probable cause for the charges filed. As this Court has already explained, there was
probable cause for the charges filed against Plaintiff, and for that reason her claim
fails.

11 Plaintiff’s opposition brief intemperately refers to the officers’ actions as “ignorant[]” and
“arrogant[].” Such aspersions are rarely - if ever – appropriate. They are particularly inappropriate
where, as here, it is the party casting the aspersions who is wrong.
Further, a malicious prosecution case against a private defendant can only
proceed if “[the individual’s] desire to have the proceedings initiated, expressed by
direction, request or pressure of any kind, was the determining factor in the official's

decision to commence the prosecution, or that the information furnished by him upon
which the official acted was known to be false.” Hess, 514 A.2d at 683. The stipulated
undisputed facts in this case indicate that prior to Plaintiff’s § 302 detention, the
Rockwell Defendants alerted the police to a “possible squatting issue” and that
Plaintiff was exceeding her permitted occupancy, which limited her only to retrieving
her property. (Dkt. #40 at ¶¶ 60, 60.1). Defendant Brydzinski further reported that
“Plaintiff removed condemnation and no-trespassing signs, hindered construction,

blocked a pest inspector, and restored utilities (PECO, Verizon, and attempted Aqua)
in her name.” (Id. at ¶ 61). As to Plaintiff’s later arrest, the undisputed facts
regarding the Rockwell Defendants state that all they did was ask the police to keep
an eye on the Property. (Id. at ¶¶ 73-74).
Plaintiff’s brief on this issue is rife with histrionics and attempted
catchphrases, but noticeably light on analysis. Plaintiff essentially seems to be

arguing that because the Orders permitted her to occupy the Property for any purpose
(which they do not), the Rockwell Defendants’ efforts to exclude her were malicious
and therefore support a malicious prosecution claim. But, as was explained supra,
that is not what the Orders permitted, and therefore Plaintiff’s argument lacks merit.
Examining the contents of the Rockwell Defendants’ actual comments to the
police, this Court can identify no dishonesty or misstatement on behalf of the
Rockwell Defendants. There is also no evidence that the Rockwell Defendants
expressed a desire that she be arrested or that such desire (if any) was passed along
to the charging authorities and therefore had even the possibility to actually motivate

the prosecution of Plaintiff, rather than legitimate efforts to enforce the law. For that
reason, too, the malicious prosecution claim against the Rockwell Defendants fails.
g. Count VII against the Rockwell Defendants fails because
Plaintiff has no competent evidence that the Rockwell
Defendants converted her personal property.

Turning to Plaintiff’s final claim, Plaintiff asserts that the Rockwell
Defendants converted her personal property. In support of that claim, Plaintiff
essentially argues that some of her personal property was left within the Property,
but by the time she opened the PODS containers, it was no longer there.12 In her
deposition, Plaintiff testified as to specific missing items that were previously in her
car. (Dkt. #40 at § 94). Having searched Plaintiff’s briefing, this Court has not found
any record evidence of what other items, if any, Plaintiff maintains were converted.
Plaintiff’s briefing mentions that “significant items were missing[]” without any
record support at all. (Dkt. #37 at 18).13

12 Plaintiff’s briefing on this issue is once again haphazard, as one paragraph includes what
appears to be a Westlaw or Lexis “star cite” within text which purports to be original content that is
absent a citation. (Dkt. #37 at 19, second full paragraph). That same sentence refers to “plaintiffs” in
the plural rather than the singular, further raising questions as to whether this sentence is an original
thought or take from another pleading or decision without citation.

13 It is not the Court’s job to scour the voluminous record to find Plaintiff’s evidence of which
items were missing from storage. It is Plaintiff’s job, rather, to support her claim for conversion which
was challenged at summary judgment by pointing in her briefing or in the Parties’ joint statement of
undisputed facts to competent record evidence that there were items of Plaintiff’s that were converted,
and what they were. Because the Rockwell Defendants do not seem to dispute that certain items are
missing, this Court will not dwell on or rule based upon this apparent deficiency.
The elements of a claim for conversion under Pennsylvania law are: (1) the
deprivation of another's right in, or use or possession of, property, (2) without the
owner's consent, and (3) without lawful justification.” Rapid Cirs., Inc. v. Sun Nat.

Bank, No. CIV.A. 10-6401, 2011 WL 1666919, at *8 (E.D. Pa. May 3, 2011). In
Pennsylvania, conversion is a willful tort. Baram v. Farugia, 606 F.2d 42, 43 (3d Cir.
1979). A claim for conversion, therefore, does not sound in negligence. See Ickes v.
Grassmeyer, 30 F. Supp. 3d 375, 402 (W.D. Pa. 2014); see also Burke v. Dep't of Corr.,
No. 452 M.D. 2019, 2020 WL 2187768, at *6 (Pa. Commw. Ct. May 6, 2020).
“Conversion may be committed by: (a) Acquiring possession of the goods, with
an intent to assert a right to them which is in fact adverse to that of the owner[;] (b)

Transferring the goods in a manner which deprives the owner of control[;] (c)
Unreasonably withholding possession from one who has the right to it[; or] (d)
Seriously damaging or misusing the chattel in defiance of the owner's rights.” Pizza
Zone, LLC v. Catalina Partners, L.P., 304 A.3d 753 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2023) (McCaffrey,
J.) (citing Norriton E. Realty Corp. v. Cent.-Penn Nat'l Bank, 254 A.2d 637, 638 (Pa.
1969)). Importantly, “the exercise of control over the chattel must be intentional. . . .”

Id. (citing McKeeman v. Corestates Bank, N.A., 751 A.2d 655, 659 n.3 (Pa. Super.
2000)). Put another way: “[t]here is no such thing as a reckless, negligent or
accidental conversion.” Spickler v. Lombardo, 3 Pa. D. & C.3d 591, 603 (Pa. Com. Pl.
1977).
In reviewing this case in response to the motions, this Court considered
whether a bailment analysis would be proper in this context. “A bailment is a delivery
of personalty for the accomplishment of some purpose upon a contract, express or
implied, that after the purpose has been fulfilled, it shall be redelivered to the person
who delivered it, otherwise dealt with according to his directions or kept until he

reclaims it[.]” Smalich v. Westfall, A.2d 476, 480 (Pa. 1970) (citations omitted). “To
constitute bailment, there must be a delivery of personal property to another, who
accepts possession of the property, and exercises custody and control over it.” Riggs
v. Com., Dept. of Transp., 463 A.2d 1219, 1220–21 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1983). “A constructive
bailment arises where the person having the possession of a chattel holds it under
such circumstances that the law imposes upon him the obligation to deliver it to
another.” Maher v. Chapins Lunch Co., 180 A. 739, 740 (Pa. Super. 1935).

Pennsylvania law regarding whether a court could presume conversion based
solely on the loss of bailed property was addressed in Adams v. Ryan & Christie
Storage. 563 F.Supp. 409 (E.D.Pa. 1983). In Adams, the plaintiff deposited various
items of value in a warehouse for storage. Id. at 410. When the plaintiff came back to
retrieve the goods, they were missing, and none of the warehouse’s staff or officers
were able to supply any information as to where the items ended up. Id. Faced with

determining whether that fact pattern stated a claim for conversion or for negligence,
the Court noted a lack of Pennsylvania authority on the matter but concluded
Pennsylvania courts would hold “that where the record is silent as to the actual
disposition of the bailed goods, and that silence includes not even an attempt by the
bailee to offer an explanation, the permissible inference is one of negligence but not
one of conversion. . . .” Id. at 414. To find a bailee has converted the property, a
plaintiff must show a “positive wrongful act.” See W. Min. Corp. v. Standard
Terminals, Inc., 577 F. Supp. 847, 851 (W.D. Pa. 1984), aff'd, 745 F.2d 49 (3d Cir.
1984). Another court in our Circuit has described the presumption of negligence,

rather than conversion, to be the majority view among states. In re Stone & Webster,
Inc., 335 B.R. 300, 308 (Bankr. D. Del. 2005). Other courts in other circuits have held
similarly. See Int'l Nickel Co. v. Trammel Crow Distribution Corp., 803 F.2d 150, 154
(5th Cir. 1986) (collecting cases). This Court has not found any Pennsylvania
decisions contrary to this prevailing view of the law.
This Court finds that, by virtue of the three Court of Common Pleas orders
discussed supra, the Rockwell Defendants became constructive or involuntary bailees

of Plaintiff’s personal property.14 Upon taking ownership and possession of the
Property, Plaintiff’s personal property was now in their possession and protection,
but they were required to hold onto and safeguard it until she could retrieve it, by a
later date fixed by the court. Put differently: despite being in physical custody of those
possessions, the Rockwell Defendants had no legal title to them. For that reason, this
Court finds the above cases establishing the presumption of negligence in the context

of a bailed object which has gone missing to apply.
With that background principle in place, Plaintiff’s conversion claim could only
prevail based upon some additional evidence that upsets this presumption. Facts

14 While no Party brought this bailment framework to the Court’s attention, the issue of
summary judgment on the conversion Count is before this Court, and “when an issue or claim is
properly before the court, the court is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the
parties. . . . “ U.S. Nat. Bank of Oregon v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 446 (1993)
(cleaned up).
such as an eyewitness who saw the Rockwell Defendants with the items. Or perhaps
saw them leaving a pawn shop. Or perhaps financial records showing payments from
a pawn shop or some other secondhand store. It may even be enough to introduce

evidence of a comment by one of the Rockwell Defendants about how much they
needed an iPad or the other items which were allegedly converted. Something which
could just barely inch Plaintiff past the presumption of negligence. But Plaintiff
brings no such evidence, meaning the presumption of negligence survives and
therefore her conversion claim fails.15
Even without application of this constructive bailment analysis, this Court
would have reached the same conclusion on much the same logic as underpins the

decisions in the bailment context. The undisputed facts show that various people, not
just the Rockwell Defendants, had access to the Property during the timeframe when
the property went missing, including police officers, paramedics, township health
inspectors, pest control workers, contractors, and movers.16 Plaintiff has absolutely
no evidence from which a jury could conclude the Rockwell Defendants committed
that intentional tort rather than any of those others who had access.

Further, given the undisputed facts show that the Property was in a hoarding
condition, the items of personal property which Plaintiff claims were converted could

15 Plaintiff brings no claim for negligence and therefore cannot recover under that theory. She
may well have survived summary judgment on that count had she brought it. That claim is now time-
barred, as her cause of action accrued in October 2022 (see: Dkt. #40 at ¶ 93) and the statute of
limitations in Pennsylvania for negligence is two years. 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524(2).

16 Plaintiff herself was insistent that non-defendant Officer Bates of the Radnor Police
Department was not to be trusted alone in her home when Plaintiff was hospitalized with her broken
femur. (Supra).
just have well been broken or negligently lost. As then-Judge McCaffrey’s decision in
Pizza Zone makes clear, while there are various ways a conversion can take place,
they all involve some form of affirmative intentional wrongdoing. Plaintiff has no

evidence which could rule out that theory such that a reasonable jury could be sure
on a preponderance of the evidence that a wrongful act of conversion occurred, as
opposed to basic negligence.
Finally, setting aside this interesting discussion on the exact contours of
Pennsylvnia’s conversion tort in various contexts, Plaintiff has a timeline problem.
The Second Order permitted the Rockwell Defendants to dispose of Plaintiff’s
personal property in any way they saw fit as of September 1. The Second Order was

still the controlling order as of September 1. On September 2, the Rockwell
Defendants, whether out of kindness or in anticipation of further litigation,
voluntarily chose to put at least some of Plaintiff’s personal items in PODS
containers. They had no obligation to do so. Per the Orders, they were free to do
anything they wanted to with Plaintiff’s personal possessions, including destroy
them. The Third Order merely required the Rockwell Defendants to hold onto the

items already in the PODS for a period of time. It did not require the Rockwell
Defendants to preserve any other possessions or return items they hypothetically
took for themselves or destroyed in the time between September 1 and September 9.
Anything which Plaintiff claims is converted could have been lawfully taken during
that period. For that reason, even if this Court were to grant an inference that the
missing items were taken or destroyed intentionally, Plaintiff has no evidence at all
that they did so in a time in which it was unlawful to do so. For all these reasons,
Plaintiff's conversion claim fails as a matter of law.!7
V. Conclusion
This very complicated case turns on a very simple concept: Plaintiff was
entitled to access the Property, but only for purposes of removing her personal
property from it. Any other purpose was impermissible. The Rockwell Defendants
had every right to exclude Plaintiff from the Property if she was doing anything
besides that. The Radnor Defendants had every right to detain, arrest, and charge
her with criminal offenses related to the same. Despite Plaintiffs effusive arguments
to the contrary, all defendants are entitled to judgment with prejudice as to all counts.
An appropriate order will follow.

DATED: September 29, 2025 BY THE COURT:

GAIL WEILHEIMER J.

7 Plaintiff additionally emphasizes that the sales contract between Rockwell-Glynn and Jeffrey
Brydzinski required indemnification with relation to damages occurring prior to demolition. This is
plainly irrelevant. The cause of action before the Court is conversion, not breach of contract. Further,
the provision cited by Plaintiff deals with an assignment of liability from Mr. Brydzinski to Rockwell-
Glynn. It does not create any liability or responsibilities with respect to Plaintiff. Rather, it just says
that if there were a responsibility owed by Mr. Brydzinski to Plaintiff which was breached, Rockwell-
Glynn would bear the costs of defense and liability. Plaintiff's references to this very standard and
easily understood provision are confounding.

36

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11154223. Public record. Not legal advice.