# Beckwith v. The City of Syracuse

> District Court, N.D. New York · September 30, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11154177

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. New York
- **Decided:** September 30, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11154177

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that “an arrestee must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the officer created false information”
- noting that the plaintiff’s “criminal proceeding terminated in his favor . . . when the Appellate Division reversed his conviction” as against the weight of the evidence
- concluding that “if any of the [police officer] defendants misled the prosecutor by providing false statements regarding plaintiff’s conduct . . . they could be liable for malicious prosecution”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
____________________________________________

DAVONNE BECKWITH,

Plaintiff,
vs. 5:21-cv-809
(ECC/TWD)
THE CITY OF SYRACUSE,
DETECTIVE TERELL IRVINE, and
PATROL OFFICER JACOB BREEN

Defendants.
____________________________________________

Appearances:

Edward Sivin, Esq., for Plaintiff
Darienn P. Balin, Esq., for Defendants

Hon. Elizabeth C. Coombe, United States District Judge:
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Davonne Beckwith commenced this action against Defendants the City of
Syracuse, Detective Terell Irvine, and Patrol Officer Jacob Breen (Defendants) alleging violations
of his right to a fair trial and malicious prosecution. Amended Complaint, Dkt. No. 9 ¶¶ 50–55.
After a motion to dismiss, the following claims remain: (1) denial of the right to a fair trial, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteen Amendments against Irvine and
Breen; (2) malicious prosecution, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments against Irvine and Breen; and (3) malicious prosecution, in violation of New York
law against Defendants. Presently before the Court is Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
The motion is fully briefed. Dkt. Nos. 67-35, 71-4, 72, 77-2. For the following reasons,
Defendants’ motion is denied.
I. BACKGROUND1
The parties give different versions of the events before Plaintiff’s arrest and his subsequent
prosecution. Given these differences, each side’s version is provided separately.
A. Undisputed Facts Regarding the Stop

On September 6, 2016, around 3:00 a.m., Irvine and Breen were patrolling in a marked
police vehicle when they encountered Plaintiff who was driving his girlfriend in her car. Def. Stat.
¶¶ 1, 2, 7. Irvine and Breen initiated a traffic stop. Id. at ¶ 13.
Irvine and Breen parked behind Plaintiff’s car and got out. Def. Stat. ¶ 17. Irvine
approached Plaintiff’s driver’s side, while Breen approached the passenger’s side, where
Plaintiff’s girlfriend was sitting. Id. at ¶ 18. Irvine and Breen observed open containers of alcohol
on the passenger seat floor and in the back seat. Id. at ¶ 20.
B. Plaintiff’s Facts2
Plaintiff asked Irvine why he had been stopped, and Irvine did not mention any alleged
traffic violations, and questioned Plaintiff in an “accusatory and aggressive manner about whether

he had any drugs or weapons in the car.” Pl. Stat. ¶ 2. Irvine asked for Plaintiff’s driver’s license,
the car’s registration, and proof of insurance. Id. at ¶ 3. Plaintiff told Irvine that his license was
suspended and produced an Onondaga County Sheriff’s identification card. Id. at ¶ 3; Def. Stat.
¶ 30. Irvine asked Plaintiff whether he had a valid driver’s license, and Plaintiff responded that he

1 The following facts are drawn from Defendants’ Statement of Material Facts (Def. Stat.), Dkt.
No. 67-34, Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Facts (Pl. Resp.), Dkt.
No. 71-3, and Plaintiff’s Statement of Additional Facts, (Pl. Stat.), Dkt. No. 71-3. Unless
otherwise noted, citations to page numbers refer to pagination generated by the court’s electronic
filing system.

2 Citations to Defendants’ Statement of Material Facts in this summary of Plaintiff’s Facts indicate
that Plaintiff does not dispute those facts.
did not. Def. Stat. ¶ 31. Irvine then ordered Plaintiff to get out of the car and “mentioned
something about [Plaintiff] being on parole, and about [him] being out past [his] curfew,” but
Irvine did not mention marijuana. Pl. Resp. at ¶¶ 32, 39.
Plaintiff told the officers to “go run or check ‘his shit” and that he did not have to get out

of the car. Def. Stat. ¶ 45. Plaintiff did not get out of the car. Def. Stat. ¶ 46. Breen went from
the passenger’s side of the car to the driver’s side. Id. at ¶ 47. Plaintiff swore at Breen and repeated
that he would not leave the car. Id. at ¶ 49. Breen told Plaintiff that he was under arrest and
repeated the command to get out of the car. Id. at ¶ 50. Irvine then tried to open the driver’s-side
door, but it was locked, and he reached into the car through an open window to unlock the door
and open it. Id. at ¶ 51.
Plaintiff initially refused to get out of the car because he was “afraid of the officers, due to
their aggressive manner.” Pl. Stat. ¶ 6. At some point Plaintiff asked his girlfriend to record what
was happening on her phone, but she was not able to do so, and Plaintiff tried to use her phone.
Id. at ¶ 7. Plaintiff denies that he balled his fist or reached behind his back and also denies that

the officers ordered him to show his hands. Pl. Resp. ¶¶ 40–43, 52.
Irvine and Breen drew their guns, but once Breen realized that Irvine had already drawn
his gun, Breen holstered his gun and drew his taser. Def. Stat. ¶ 60. Breen yelled, “taser, taser,
taser,” and deployed one cartridge; the probes struck Plaintiff’s chest and stomach. Id. at ¶ 61.
Plaintiff was still able to speak and move. Id. at ¶ 62. Plaintiff turned toward Breen and Irvine
and asked them if they were “‘serious’” referring to the taser use. Id. at ¶ 63. Breen and Irvine
grabbed Plaintiff, removed him from the car, and then put him onto the ground. Id. at ¶ 64.
Plaintiff threatened to sue the officers at some point. Pl. Resp. ¶ 80.
Irvine searched Plaintiff, but he found no “weapons, drugs, or other contraband,” and he
told Breen that Plaintiff was “‘clean.’” Pl. Stat ¶¶ 10, 11. Breen conducted a second, “more
extensive search” of Plaintiff, but did not recover anything. Id. at ¶ 12. Breen, “seem[ing] angry,”
put on gloves and “conducted an even more invasive search” reaching inside Plaintiff’s
“underwear against his bare skin, making contact with [his] penis and testicles, and also the area

around [his] anus.” Id. at ¶ 13. Plaintiff was “shocked” and “felt violated,” and he “yelled out
something like ‘get away from my balls’” or “‘get out of there.’” Id. at ¶ 14. Plaintiff also twisted
his body away from Breen and “tighten[ed] up his buttocks.” Id. Breen did not recover anything.
Id. at ¶ 16. Plaintiff again threatened to sue Breen and cursed at him. Id. at ¶ 17.
Breen then “went inside his police car,” came out, reached around Plaintiff’s waistband
and announced that “he found a bag containing drugs,” that Plaintiff had never possessed. Pl. Stat.
¶ 18. Plaintiff was handcuffed after the third search. Pl. Resp. ¶ 77.
Irvine and Breen then either failed to conduct any field test of the contents of the bag or
conducted a field test that was negative for any controlled substance. 3 Pl. Resp. ¶¶ 95–97. Irvine
and Breen put Plaintiff in the back of the patrol car. Def. Stat. ¶ 88.

When a Syracuse Police Sergeant came to make a use of force report, Plaintiff “complained
about his ‘rectum area, [his] asshole area” explaining that “‘it was burning;’” and stated that he
“‘need[ed] to go to the hospital.’” Pl. Resp. ¶ 105.
In arrest reports and the criminal complaints, Irvine and Breen made “false representations
about the encounter with Plaintiff,” including that Plaintiff struggled with Irvine and Breen and
Plaintiff possessed controlled substances. Pl. Stat. ¶¶ 33–39.

3 Plaintiff appears to deny that a field test was performed on the contents in the purportedly seized
bag, but he does not cite to any admissible evidence and admits that Breen “demonstrated the field
test kits” to another officer. See Pl. Resp. ¶¶ 93–95, 98.
C. Defendants’ Facts
Irvine and Breen saw Plaintiff commit several traffic violations before they pulled him
over. Def. Stat. ¶¶ 8, 11, 12. After stopping Plaintiff, Irvine and Breen smelled burned marijuana
coming from the car and saw a marijuana blunt in the front cupholder. Id. at ¶¶ 19, 21. Irvine told

Plaintiff that he had been stopped because of these traffic violations. Id. at ¶ 24.
When asked to produce his driver’s license, registration, and proof of insurance, Plaintiff
began to frantically look for the paperwork and asked why he was pulled over, and Irvine explained
the vehicle infractions again. Def. Stat. ¶ 26. Plaintiff’s behavior was overly excited, and he was
breathing heavily. Id. at ¶ 27. Plaintiff said that he had been drinking, but was “good to drive.”
Id. at ¶ 28. Plaintiff had “an unmistakable odor of alcohol” on his breath. Id. at ¶ 29. After
Plaintiff failed to produce a driver’s license, Irvine ordered Plaintiff to out of the car, and he did
not mention Plaintiff’s curfew or parole status. Id. at ¶¶ 31–32, 39.
Breen had observed Plaintiff “holding an item in his right hand which was closed into a
fist so that . . . Breen could not see what the object was.” Def. Stat. ¶ 40. Plaintiff’s right hand

was “balled-up between his upper right leg and the center console . . . as if to hide something in
the back of his pants.” Id. at ¶ 41. Irvine independently noticed Plaintiff “reach his right hand
behind his back towards his waistband and beg[in] ‘digging’ behind his back.” Id. at ¶ 42. For
“approximately one minute,” Plaintiff did not follow the order to get out of the car, and Plaintiff
continued digging behind his back while Breen ordered Plaintiff to “show his hands.” Id. at ¶ 43.
Breen pleaded with Plaintiff to leave the car. Id. at ¶ 47. Plaintiff said “fuck you” to Breen and
refused to get out of the car. Id. at ¶ 49. Breen told Plaintiff that he was under arrest and that he
needed to get out of the car. Id. at ¶ 50. Irvine unlocked Plaintiff’s door and continued to order
Plaintiff to show his hands. Id. at ¶¶ 51–52.
Irvine saw Plaintiff holding “a sandwich bag with a tan substance.” Def. Stat. ¶ 53.
Plaintiff tried to hand the bag to his girlfriend, but she refused to take it. Id. at ¶ 54. “Based upon
his observations, training, and experience with prior drug arrests,” Irvine believed that the tan
substance was “possibly heroin.” Id. at ¶ 55. Plaintiff reached behind his back with the bag still

in his hand so that the bag was no longer in Irvine’s view. Id. at ¶ 56. Irvine continued to order
him to show his hands before Plaintiff turned his body “left to face the driver’s side door.” Id. at
¶ 57. “Plaintiff’s right hand remained behind his back while he then swung his left arm upward
toward” Breen. Id. at ¶ 58.
After using a taser to no effect, Irvine and Breen removed Plaintiff from the car and onto
the ground. Def. Stat. ¶¶ 60–64. Breen yelled, “he’s got “dope.” Id. at ¶ 65. After Plaintiff was
on the ground, the officers ordered Plaintiff to place his hands behind his back and stop resisting,
and Plaintiff continued “to kick, thrash, and push” Irvine and Breen. Id. at ¶ 67. “While wrestling
with the Officers, Plaintiff stated that he was related to” the Syracuse Police Chief Fowler, “that
he had previously testified against murderers, and that he could ‘drop’ officers a gun.” Id. at ¶ 70.

After “approximately one to two minutes” of struggle, including kicking and flailing, Plaintiff was
handcuffed. Id. at ¶ 72. During the struggle, Plaintiff’s “pants and underwear [were] pushed
down, exposing most of his buttocks.” Id. at ¶ 73. While handcuffed, Plaintiff continued trying
to reach his hand into “the same area of his waistband that he had while inside” the car. Id. at ¶ 74.
After Irvine and Breen pulled Plaintiff to his feet, they observed “a bag that was half-exposed at
the top of the waistline of [his] underwear” that “appeared to be the same one that Plaintiff had
attempted to hand” to his girlfriend. Id. at ¶ 76. Irvine and another officer walked Plaintiff to the
patrol car and removed the bag by pulling it from outside the waistband. Id. at ¶¶ 77–78. Irvine
frisked Plaintiff, and Plaintiff began “moving his body and thrusting his hips and groin” against
the patrol car while swearing at the officers and threatening to sue them and kill them and their
families.4 Id. at ¶¶ 79–80. Irvine was the only officer who searched the Plaintiff; he searched
Plaintiff only once; and he did not place his hand between Plaintiff’s underwear and his pants or
in the area of Plaintiff’s anus. Id. at ¶¶ 82–84. Plaintiff never complained about the nature of the

search to Irvine and Breen. Id. at ¶ 108.
The bag recovered from Plaintiff “appeared to be a clear sandwich bag with loose rice in
the bottom containing two smaller knotted bags, one containing a tan powder that appeared to be
cocaine and the other containing a chunky beigey white substance that appeared to be cocaine or
crack cocaine.” Def. Stat. ¶ 87. A field test of the substances in the bag was positive for heroin
and cocaine. Id. at ¶¶ 96–97. A field test of the blunt was positive for marijuana. Id. at ¶ 101.
D. Undisputed Facts
A Syracuse Police Sergeant went to the scene to investigate the use of force. See Def. Stat.
¶ 105. Plaintiff told the sergeant that “he was not injured.” Id. The Use of Force report states that
Plaintiff reported being “strip[] searched.” Dkt. No. 67-13 at 1. The Use of Force report also

states that Plaintiff told the Sergeant that Irvine and Breen planted drugs on him that they took
from their car’s glove box after his arrest. Id.
Plaintiff was taken to the Onondaga County Justice Center where a nurse evaluated him
and then he was taken to Upstate University Hospital. Def. Stat. ¶¶ 106, 116, 118. At Upstate,
Plaintiff (1) told a doctor that “‘an arresting police officer’. . . searched for drugs around his
genitals and, in the process, scratched him around the anus;” (2) “denied ‘rectal entry by the
officer;” and (3) “requested a sexual assault evaluation,” as “‘he just wanted to make sure his
injuries were documented.’” Id. at ¶¶ 119–20, 124–25. Plaintiff “was diagnosed with an ‘abrasion

4 Plaintiff repeated the threats when he was taken to the Justice Center. Def. Stat. ¶ 107.
of [his] buttocks excluding anus.’” Id. at ¶ 122. The medical records note “2 superficial abrasions
just left of the anus. Both <1 cm in diameter.” Upstate University Medical Records at 7, Dkt. No.
67-19. Plaintiff was given hydrocortisone cream and discharged. Def. Stat. ¶¶ 129–30.
Plaintiff’s girlfriend testified before an Onondaga County Grand Jury that she had “‘a little

visual’ of what occurred;” but she was drunk and could not “remember exactly” what happened;
and Plaintiff said “something like ‘get out my balls’ or ‘get out something, get out, get out.’”
Grand Jury Transcript (Grand Jury Tr.) at 109:20–25, 110:6–8, 110:14–15, Dkt. No. 67-8; Def.
Stat. ¶¶ 132, 143. Plaintiff waived immunity and testified about the events leading up to his arrest
and his arrest. Def. Stat. ¶ 136; see Grand Jury Tr. at 40:19–73:1. Regarding Breen’s alleged third
search, he testified that Breen “went in my rectum, slid his hand in my pants and rectum to see if
I have anything. He stood me up.” Grand Jury Tr. at 45:9–10. “After he just did three searches
on me, did a cavity search and everything he didn’t find nothing.” Id. at 45:16–18. After Plaintiff
described Breen planting drugs on him, a prosecutor asked, “[s]o this is the drugs that you never
possessed before in your life?” and Plaintiff answered, “I never possessed these drugs, sir.” Id. at

56:13–15. A prosecutor asked, “do you think they planted drugs on you that a user would possess
or they planted drugs on you to show you were a drug dealer,” and Plaintiff answered, “I don’t
know the reason for him planting that on me at all, sir.” Id. at 57:3–6, 57:8–10.
The grand jury returned an indictment charging Plaintiff with all of the counts in the
complaint: two counts of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree, one
count of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fourth degree, one count of criminal
possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree, unlawful possession of marijuana,
resisting arrest, obstructing governmental administration in the second degree, tampering with
physical evidence, aggravated unlicensed operation, and “various traffic offenses” Def. Stat.
¶¶ 103, 144. An Onondaga County Assistant District Attorney then presented the grand jury with
a perjury in the first degree count arising from Plaintiff’s grand jury testimony, and the grand jury
returned an indictment on that count. Id. at ¶¶ 145, 146, 148.
Several months later, a laboratory report concluded that there were no controlled

substances in the substances in the bag allegedly seized from Plaintiff. Def. Stat. ¶ 160. The lab
also failed to find any fingerprints on the bag. Pl. Stat. ¶ 28. Shortly after that, the District
Attorney dismissed all the “drug charges” against Plaintiff. Def. Stat. ¶ 161.
The case went to trial on the remaining charges, and Plaintiff testified. Def. Stat. ¶¶ 164–
65. Regarding the alleged third search, Plaintiff testified, “[w]hat I meant was . . . he slid his hands
inside my front of my boxers, grabbed my balls, spread them apart, then he slid his hand in the
back of my ass in my buttocks area and, like, sort of swiped me with his finger. He felt like he
was digging to feel . . . my asshole, my anus.” Trial Tr. 2 at 88:1–6, Dkt. No. 67-25. When asked
for his “understanding of what the rectum is,” Plaintiff testified that it is the “bottom of my
asshole.” Id. at 88:7–10. When asked whether he knew “what a cavity search is,” Plaintiff testified

that it is “[w]hen you check somebody when they’re naked their inside clothing area. Like, a visual
cavity search. Like, they make you squat, see if you had anything, you know, things like that. But
he didn’t do that. He did a physical cavity search. . . . He . . . intruded. He went inside my
underwear.” Id. at 88:19–89:9.
The jury found Plaintiff guilty of perjury and resisting arrest, and he was sentenced to “two
to four years in prison” for his perjury conviction, and one year consecutive for resisting arrest.
Def. Stat. ¶¶ 168, 170; Dkt. No. 67-26.5 The jury found that Plaintiff was guilty of perjury for

5 The obstruction of governmental administration charge was not submitted to the jury. Trial Tr.
2 at 197:18–23.
four specific statements: (1) “He went in my rectum, slid his hand in my pants and rectum to see
if I have anything. He stood me up;” (2) “after he just did three searches on me, did a cavity search
and everything he didn’t find nothing;” (3) “I never possessed these drugs, sir;” and (4) “I don’t
know the reason for him planting that on me at all, sir.” Def. Stat. ¶ 169.

In 2020, the New York State Appellate Division, Fourth Department reversed Plaintiff’s
perjury conviction because it was against the weight of the evidence. Def. Stat. ¶ 174; People v.
Beckwith, 182 A.D.3d 995, 995 (4th Dep’t 2020). The Appellate Division’s decision noted
As we recently observed in analogous circumstances, “[a]lthough
the People may have proved that defendant is probably guilty, the
burden of proof in a criminal action is, of course, much higher than
probable cause; the prosecution is required to prove a defendant’s
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the evidence in this case does
not meet that high standard.”

Beckwith, 182 A.D.3d at 996 (quoting People v. Carter, 158 A.D.3d 1105, 1106 (4th Dep’t 2018)).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), summary judgment may be granted only if
all the submissions taken together “show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 322 (1986); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986). The
moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating “the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. A fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under
the governing law,” and is genuinely in dispute “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see Jeffreys v. City of New
York, 426 F.3d 549, 553 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Anderson). The movant may meet this burden by
showing that the nonmoving party has “fail[ed] to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden
of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322; Selevan v. N.Y. Thruway Auth., 711 F.3d 253, 256 (2d
Cir. 2013) (explaining that summary judgment is appropriate where the nonmoving party fails to
“‘come forth with evidence sufficient to permit a reasonable juror to return a verdict in his or her
favor on’ an essential element of a claim”) (quoting In re Omnicom Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 597 F.3d

501, 509 (2d Cir. 2010)).
If the moving party meets this burden, the nonmoving party must “set forth specific facts
showing a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 250; see Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323–
24; Wright v. Goord, 554 F.3d 255, 266 (2d Cir. 2009). “When ruling on a summary judgment
motion, the district court must construe the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party and must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the movant.”
Dallas Aerospace, Inc. v. CIS Air Corp., 352 F.3d 775, 780 (2d Cir. 2003). Still, the nonmoving
party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material
facts,” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986), and cannot
rely on “mere speculation or conjecture as to the true nature of the facts to overcome a motion for

summary judgment,” Knight v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 9, 12 (2d Cir. 1986) (citing Quarles v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 758 F.2d 839, 840 (2d Cir. 1985)). Further, “[m]ere conclusory allegations or
denials . . . cannot by themselves create a genuine issue of material fact where none would
otherwise exist.” Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159, 166 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Fletcher v. Atex, Inc.,
68 F.3d 1451, 1456 (2d Cir. 1995)).
III. DISCUSSION
Defendants move for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff’s claims. 6

6 Plaintiff argues that the motion should be denied because Defendants violated N.D.N.Y. Local
Rule 56.1(a) by representing that their Statement of Material Facts were not disputed when they
knew that Plaintiff disputed many of those facts. Dkt. No. 71-3 at 1. Given that Defendants argue
A. Denial of Right to Fair Trial
Plaintiff claims that Irvine and Breen violated his right to a fair trial by fabricating evidence
that supported the perjury charge. Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment
on this claim because Plaintiff cannot establish that Irvine and Breen were investigating officials

given the presumption that the prosecutor “exercised his independent prosecutorial discretion.”
Defendants’ Memorandum of Law (Def. Mem.) at 19–23, Dkt. No. 67-35. They also argue that
Plaintiff has not offered sufficient evidence for a rational jury to find that they fabricated any
evidence. Def. Mem. at 10–18.
Plaintiff responds, among other things, that there are genuine issues of disputed material
facts regarding whether (1) Irvine and Breen were investigating officials, (2) the prosecutor’s
decision was a superseding cause, and (3) Irvine and Breen fabricated evidence. Plaintiff’s
Memorandum of Law (Pl. Mem.) at 12–26, Dkt. No. 71-4. For the following reasons, Defendants’
motion is denied on this claim.
“In a § 1983 suit alleging the denial of a fair trial because of fabricated evidence, a plaintiff

must show that ‘an (1) investigating official (2) fabricate[d] information (3) that is likely to
influence a jury’s verdict, (4) forward[ed] that information to prosecutors, and (5) the plaintiff
suffer[ed] a deprivation of life, liberty, or property as a result.’” Davis-Guider v. City of Troy, No.
23-589, 2024 WL 5199294, at *3 (2d Cir. Dec. 23, 2024) (quoting Garnett v. Undercover Officer
C0039, 838 F.3d 265, 279 (2d Cir. 2016)).
“The second element of a fair trial claim based on fabricated evidence requires a plaintiff
to prove that a defendant’s use of inaccurate information was ‘knowing, as opposed to mistaken.’”

that Plaintiff has not produced sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact, this
request is denied.
Davis-Guider, 2024 WL 5199294, at *3 (quoting Barnes v. City of New York, 68 F.4th 123, 129
(2d Cir. 2023) and citing Garnett, 838 F.3d at 280 (explaining that “an arrestee must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the officer created false information”)). In other words,
“absent scienter, showing that the prosecution relied on false evidence is insufficient.” Id. Further,

the “mere fact that the parties present conflicting evidence does not mean that one side’s evidence
was fabricated.” Id. Nonetheless, “a § 1983 plaintiff’s testimony alone may be independently
sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact.” Bellamy v. City of New York, 914 F.3d 727,
746 (2d Cir. 2019) (citing Rentas v. Ruffin, 816 F.3d 214, 221 (2d Cir. 2016)).
In Bellamy, the Second Circuit reversed a district court’s decision granting summary
judgment for the defendant on a fair trial claim based on an allegation that the defendant detective
lied that plaintiff had made an inculpatory statement. 914 F.3d at 746. The district court found
that because the evidence supporting the plaintiff’s allegation was “self-serving deposition
testimony that [was] ‘unsubstantiated by any other direct evidence,’” it could not “raise an issue
of material fact.” Id. The Second Circuit reversed and concluded that the plaintiff’s “testimony

was consistent and uncomplicated: he never made the statement,” and his testimony was not
“wholly improbable.” Id. Therefore, a reasonable jury could make the “inference that [the
defendant detective] fabricated the . . . statement.” Id. at 747.
Like the plaintiff in Bellamy, Plaintiff’s testimony was “consistent and uncomplicated.”
914 F.3d at 746. Plaintiff testifies that he never possessed the bag that allegedly field tested
positive for controlled substances; Breen made contact with his penis, testicles, and the area around
his anus during a search; and Irvine and Breen lied about the bag and the contact in their reports.
Pl. Stat. ¶¶ 13, 18, 33–36. In addition, Plaintiff’s testimony is not “wholly improbable” about
either the bag or the search. Bellamy, 914 F.3d at 746. Regarding the bag, it is undisputed that
there was no fingerprint evidence on it, and the lab report concluded that there were no controlled
substances in it. Def. Stat. ¶ 160; Pl. Stat. ¶ 28. This is sufficient to create an issue of material
disputed fact about whether Irvine and Breen planted the bag on Plaintiff and lied about what
happened. That is, a rational jury could rely on this evidence to conclude that Plaintiff never

possessed the bag purportedly seized during the stop.
Regarding the search, in addition to Plaintiff’s testimony, Plaintiff offered evidence that a
rational jury could find corroborates his testimony including (1) medical records demonstrating
that he had injuries consistent with his testimony; (2) his girlfriend’s grand jury testimony that
Plaintiff said “something like ‘get out my balls’ or ‘get out something, get out, get out;’’’ and (3)
contemporaneous statements to the sergeant investigating the use of force and medical personnel.7
Def. Stat. ¶¶120, 122. 124–25; Grand Jury Tr. at 110:6–8; Dkt. No. 67-13 at 1.
Defendants offer reasons why a jury may not credit Plaintiff’s testimony or the potential
corroborating evidence, and they argue that the corroborating evidence does not “prove”
fabrication. Dkt. No. 72. at 7. But the standard here is not whether Plaintiff has proven fabrication.

The standard is instead whether there is a genuine issue of material disputed fact regarding
fabrication, and whether a rational jury could find fabrication based on the evidence Plaintiff has
presented. Plaintiff has satisfied that standard as to the fabrication element.
Defendants also focus on the first element of a fair trial claim.8 That element requires a
plaintiff to prove that the defendant was an “investigating official.” “[T]he Second Circuit does

7 Plaintiff also relies on the Syracuse Citizen Review Board findings that he argues sustained his
allegations against Irvine and Breen. Plaintiff has not explained how this document would be
admissible, and it is therefore not considered. See Grant v. Lockett, No. 19-1558, 2021 WL
5816245, at *2 (2d Cir. Dec. 8, 2021) (concluding that similar Syracuse Citizen Review Board
findings are inadmissible hearsay).
8 The Court does not address the other elements of the fair-trial claim because the Defendants do
not address them in their papers.
not require that an officer strictly be an ‘investigating officer’ to be held liable.” DiPippo v. Cnty.
of Putnam, No. 17-cv-7948, 2019 WL 1004152, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2019); see also Alston
v. Rutkowski, No. 3:23-cv-1304, 2024 WL 3638259, at *4 (D. Conn. Aug. 2, 2024) (noting that
“any official can be held liable under § 1983 if he fabricates evidence that is forwarded to a

prosecutor”). Rather, the Second Circuit has “emphasized that ‘[w]hen[ever] a police officer
creates false information likely to influence a jury’s decision and forwards that information to
prosecutors, he violates the accused’s constitutional right to a fair trial, and the harm occasioned
by such an unconscionable action is redressable in an action for damages.’” DiPippo, 2019 WL
1004152, at *17 (quoting Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 124 F.3d 123, 130 (2d Cir. 1997) and
citing Garnett, 838 F.3d at 276).
The position taken by Irvine and Breen—that the prosecutorial decision to add a perjury
charge would shield them from liability regardless of whether they knowingly fabricated
evidence—is not persuasive. Perjury charges normally occur after an investigation, and just as
when a prosecutor decides whether to pursue charges or dismiss a complaint, the decision to pursue

charges “may depend on the prosecutor’s . . . assessment[] of the strength of the case,” that “may
be critically influenced by fabricated evidence.” Garnett, 838 F.3d at 277. In addition, any
argument “that false evidence about one charge cannot support a fair trial claim if the plaintiff is
not ultimately prosecuted for that crime . . . is inconsistent with controlling law.” McKinley v.
Crevatas, No. 20-cv-3606, 2023 WL 4364182, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 2023); see id. (observing
that the defendants’ statements about plaintiff’s “participation in a drug sale could have impacted
the prosecutor’s decision to charge him with resisting arrest” and concluding that the defendants’
“false statements about the drug crime are not as attenuated from the obstruction crime as [the
d]efendants make them out to be, because they could have contributed to [the p]laintiff’s
prosecution for that separate crime.”).
Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, a reasonable jury could
conclude that the prosecutor’s decision relied on Irvine and Breen’s knowing fabrications. See
Ricciuti, 124 F.3d at 130 (“When a police officer creates false information likely to influence a

jury’s decision and forwards that information to prosecutors, he violates the accused's
constitutional right to a fair trial and the harm occasioned by such an unconscionable action is
redressable in an action . . . under . . . § 1983.).
Summary judgment is therefore denied as to the fair trial claim.
B. Malicious Prosecution
Defendants seek summary judgment on Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claims arguing
that Irvine and Breen did not initiate the perjury prosecution or act with malice, and Plaintiff cannot
rebut the presumption of probable cause created by the indictment. Def. Mem. at 19–28.
Regarding Plaintiff’s claim under New York law, Defendants argue that language in the decision
reversing Plaintiff’s perjury conviction is inconsistent with innocence. Id. at 28–30.

Plaintiff responds that it is law of the case that Irvine and Breen initiated the perjury
prosecution or, in the alternative, that there is a genuine dispute of material fact whether Irvine and
Breen initiated or continued the perjury prosecution. Pl. Mem. at 26–35. Plaintiff argues that there
is also a genuine issue of material disputed fact as to whether there was probable cause for the
perjury indictment and whether there is malice given that malice may be inferred from the absence
of probable cause. Id. at 35–37. Finally, Plaintiff argues that the reversal of his perjury conviction
was not inconsistent with his innocence. Id. at 37–41.
To establish a malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 and New York law, a plaintiff
must allege “(1) the initiation or continuation of a criminal proceeding against plaintiff; (2)
termination of the proceeding in plaintiff’s favor; (3) lack of probable cause for commencing the
proceeding; and (4) actual malice as a motivation for defendant’s actions.” Manganiello v. City of
New York, 612 F.3d 149, 160–61 (2d Cir. 2010); see Smith-Hunter v. Harvey, 95 N.Y.2d 191, 195
(2000) (providing the elements of a malicious prosecution claim under New York law). A § 1983

malicious prosecution claim requires a plaintiff to also “demonstrate a ‘sufficient post-arraignment
liberty restraint.’” Kee v. City of New York, 12 F.4th 150, 162 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting Rohman v.
N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 215 F.3d 208, 215 (2d Cir. 2000)).
As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s attempt to rely on the law of the case doctrine to establish
that Irvine and Breen initiated the prosecution is not persuasive. “[T]he discretionary law of the
case doctrine applies to issues of law already decided by the Court.” McAnaney v. Astoria Fin.
Corp., 665 F. Supp. 2d 132, 142 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). Here, Plaintiff ask the Court to treat a decision
on a motion to dismiss as law of the case for this summary judgment motion. Given the different
standards of review for motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment, the Court declines
to apply that doctrine here. See Cargill, Inc. v. Sears Petroleum & Transp. Corp., 334 F. Supp. 2d

197, 244 (N.D.N.Y. 2004) (concluding, when considering a summary judgment motion, that
decision on motion to dismiss issued “at an early procedural juncture, prior to the completion of
discovery, and upon a scant record, particularly in contrast to the exhaustive materials now before
the court” was not law of the case); Nobel Ins. Co. v. City of New York, No. 00–cv-1328, 2006 WL
2848121, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2006) (noting that law of the case doctrine “does not preclude”
a court “from reconsidering issues on summary judgment that have initially been raised in the
context of a motion to dismiss”). The decision on Defendant’s motion to dismiss is therefore not
law of the case.
For the first element—initiation of a criminal proceeding—the defendant must “play[] an
active role in the prosecution, such as giving advice and encouragement or importuning the
authorities to act.” Rohman, 215 F.3d at 217 (citation omitted). As explained above, Plaintiff has
produced evidence that would allow a rational jury to conclude that Irvine and Breen fabricated
evidence and forwarded it to the prosecutors. This is sufficient for the initiation element. See

Ricciuti, 124 F.3d at 130 (concluding for a malicious prosecution claim that even where “charges
were added by” a prosecutor, and not “directly filed” by a police officer, “a jury could find that”
the police officer “played a role in initiating the prosecution by preparing allegedly fabricated
evidence and forwarding it to prosecutors.”); Chimurenga v. City of New York, 45 F. Supp. 2d 337,
343 (S.D.N.Y.1999) (noting in a case with a police officer defendant that “[w]here a party is
responsible for providing false information or manufactured evidence that influences a decision
whether to prosecute, he may be held liable for malicious prosecution”); Douglas v. City of New
York, 595 F. Supp. 2d 333, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (concluding that “if any of the [police officer]
defendants misled the prosecutor by providing false statements regarding plaintiff’s conduct . . .
they could be liable for malicious prosecution”). This question—whether Irvine and Breen

fabricated evidence and forwarded it to prosecutors—is a genuine issue of disputed material fact
that a jury must resolve.9
For the second element—favorable termination—for § 1983 malicious prosecution claims,

9 Moreover, “defendants in [§] 1983 cases are liable for consequences caused by reasonably
foreseeable intervening forces.” Higazy v. Templeton, 505 F.3d 161, 177 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting
Zahery v. Coffey, 221 F.3d 342, 352 (2d Cir. 2000) (other citation omitted). The Second Circuit
has “observed that a defendant cannot rely on the alleged existence of a superseding cause when
that subsequent decision-maker has been deceived by the defendant’s actions,” id. (citing Townes
v. City of New York, 176 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 1999) and has also “explained that ‘[e]ven if the
intervening decision-maker (such as a prosecutor, grand jury, or judge) is not misled or coerced, it
is not readily apparent why the chain of causation should be considered broken where the initial
wrongdoer can reasonably foresee that his misconduct will contribute to an ‘independent’ decision
that results in a deprivation of liberty,” id. (quoting Zahery, 221 F.3d at 352). This is another
reason why summary judgment is inappropriate; a jury must decide this question.
a “plaintiff need only show that the criminal prosecution ended without a conviction.” Thompson
v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 49 (2022). For malicious prosecution claims under New York law, “any
termination of a criminal prosecution, such that the criminal charges may not be brought again,
qualifies as a favorable termination, so long as the circumstances surrounding the termination are

not inconsistent with the innocence of the accused.” Cantalino v. Danner, 96 N.Y.2d 391, 395
(2001) (citing Smith-Hunter, 95 N.Y.2d at 199). “[T]he question is whether, under the circum-
stances of each case, the disposition was inconsistent with the innocence of the accused.” Id. at
396. “[S]everal types of terminations do not qualify as ‘favorable’ at common law, since they are
fundamentally inconsistent with innocence,” including misconduct by the defendant that prevents
the trial, charges that are withdrawn or abandoned as a result of a compromise, and charges that
are withdrawn out of mercy. Id. at 395 (citing Smith-Hunter, 95 N.Y.2d at 196–97).
In contrast, courts in the Second Circuit have concluded that convictions were favorably
terminated when they were reversed as against the weight of the evidence. See Bailey v. City of
New York, 79 F. Supp. 3d 424, 438, 456 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (noting that the plaintiff’s “criminal

proceeding terminated in his favor . . . when the Appellate Division reversed his conviction” as
against the weight of the evidence); Boley v. Durets, No. 12-cv-4090, 2013 WL 6562445, at *1,
*6 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2013) (same)); see also Mitchell v. Victoria Home, 434 F. Supp. 2d 219,
225, 227 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (same where defendant admitted this element)).
Here, Defendants rely on the Appellate Division’s statement in its decision reversing
Plaintiff’s conviction: “in analogous circumstances, ‘[a]lthough the People may have proved that
defendant is probably guilty, the burden of proof in a criminal action is, of course, much higher
than probable cause.’” People v. Beckwith, 182 A.D.3d 995, 996 (4th Dep’t 2020). As an initial
matter, it is not clear that this language is a statement that Plaintiff was more likely than not guilty,
but even if it were, neither the reversal nor this language was inconsistent with innocence.
Plaintiff’s prosecution was not terminated “as a result of a settlement, mercy or any misconduct
by plaintiff,” see Smith-Hunter, 95 N.Y.2d at 198, or any of the other circumstances where a
defendant’s guilt would have been established beyond a reasonable doubt but for the dismissal,

see id. at 196–97. Indeed, the Appellate Division stated, “[w]e agree with defendant that the People
failed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that any of [Plaintiff’s] allegedly perjurious statements
to the grand jury were actually false.” Beckwith, 182 A.D.3d at 995. Defendant’s argument on
this issue therefore fails. See Cantalino, 96 N.Y.2d at 395.
Regarding the third element—lack of probable cause for commencing the proceeding—it
is well established that the “existence of probable cause is a complete defense to a malicious
prosecution claim,” Cornelio v. Connecticut, 32 F.4th 160, 178–79 (2d Cir. 2022), and “indictment
by a grand jury creates a presumption of probable cause,” Savino v. City of New York, 331 F.3d
63, 72 (2d Cir.2003). “That presumption may be rebutted only by evidence that the indictment
was procured by fraud, perjury, the suppression of evidence or other police conduct undertaken in

bad faith.” Manganiello, 612 F.3d at 162 (citation omitted).
“Where there is some indication in the police records that, as to a fact crucial to the
existence of probable cause, the arresting officers may have ‘lied in order to secure an indictment,’
and ‘a jury could reasonably find that the indictment was secured through bad faith or perjury,’
the presumption of probable cause created by the indictment may be overcome.” Manganiello,
182 F. Supp. 3d at 162 (citation omitted). Further, “a police officer’s fabrication and forwarding
to prosecutors of known false evidence works an unacceptable ‘corruption of the truth-seeking
function of the trial process.’” Id. (quoting Ricciuti, 124 F.3d at 130) (additional citation omitted).
In addition, the element of “malice can be inferred when a plaintiff is prosecuted without probable
cause.” Rentas, 816 F.3d at 221. Finally, “[a]t summary judgment” on a malicious prosecution
claim, a plaintiff is “entitled to rely on his own testimony to establish his malicious prosecution
claim” and “contradict the defendants’ version of events” and does not have to “produce
independent evidence that the defendants lied to prosecutors.” Id. at 221; cf. Ortiz v. Stambach,

137 F.4th 48, 62 (2d Cir. 2025) (noting, in a case where the plaintiff could not “remember his
interaction” with defendant detective, “the law does not require a [malicious prosecution] plaintiff
to prove that police officers fabricated evidence or engaged in bad faith through any particular type
of evidence, and, thus, a plaintiff may do so entirely through circumstantial evidence”).
Here, as discussed above, Plaintiff testified that he never possessed the bag with substances
that purportedly field tested positive for controlled substances; Breen made contact with his penis,
testicles, and the area around his anus during a search; and Irvine and Breen lied about the bag and
the contact in their reports. Pl. Stat. ¶¶ 13, 18, 33–36. Regarding the bag, it is undisputed that
there was no fingerprint evidence on it, and the lab report concluded that there were no controlled
substances in it. Def. Stat. ¶ 160; Pl. Stat. ¶ 28. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable

to Plaintiff, it is sufficient to create an issue of material disputed fact about whether Irvine and
Breen planted the bag on Plaintiff and lied about what happened. In addition, a rational jury could
rely on this evidence to conclude that Plaintiff never possessed the bag supposedly seized during
the stop.
Regarding the search, in addition to Plaintiff’s testimony, Plaintiff offered evidence that a
rational jury could find corroborates his testimony including (1) medical records demonstrating
that he had injuries consistent with his testimony; (2) his girlfriend’s grand jury testimony that
Plaintiff said “something like ‘get out my balls’ or ‘get out something, get out, get out;’” and (3)
contemporaneous statements to the sergeant investigating the use of force and medical personnel.!”
Def. Stat. 49120, 122. 124-25; Grand Jury Tr. at 110:6—-8; Dkt. No. 67-13 at 1.
In sum, as explained in the analysis of the fair trial claim, there is a genuine issue of material
disputed fact—regarding whether Irvine and Breen fabricated evidence and forwarded known false
evidence to prosecutors—that could allow a reasonable jury to conclude that there is sufficient
evidence to rebut the presumption of probable cause. See Manganiello, 182 F. Supp. 3d at 162.
Finally, given that there is a disputed material fact as to probable cause, there is also a disputed
material fact as to malice. Boyd v. City of New York, 336 F.3d 72, 78 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Once we
find an issue of material fact as to probable cause, the element of malice also becomes an issue of
material fact as well. A lack of probable cause generally creates an inference of malice.”) (citing
Ricciuiti, 124 F.3d at 131).
For all of these reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is denied in its entirety.
IV. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that Defendants the City of Syracuse, Detective Terrell Irvine, and Patrol
Officer Jacob Breen’s motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56, Dkt. No. 67 is
DENIED; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk shall serve a copy of this Memorandum-Decision and Order on
the parties in accordance with the Local Rules.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: September 30, 2025 {Aa
U.S. District Judge

10 Plaintiff also relies on the Syracuse Citizen Review Board findings that he argues sustained his
allegations against Irvine and Breen. As explained above this evidence is not considered.
22

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11154177. Public record. Not legal advice.