# Borys v. Kijakazi

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · September 30, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11154146

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** September 30, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11154146

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding medical opinions that are inconsistent with and unsupported by the medical evidence are not persuasive or controlling
- affirming residual functional capacity assessment with “light work” functional limitation that did not engage in “task by task analysis,” but was well-articulated and supported “by substantial evidence on the record.”
- holding that substantial evidence standard is 19 unmet when ALJ fails to resolve conflicts created by countervailing evidence

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
SANDRA L. BORYS, : No. 3:23-CV-1041
Plaintiff : (Caraballo, M.J.)
Vv. ot
FRANK BISIGNANO,}! :
Commissioner of Social :
Security Administration, :
Defendant :
MEMORANDUM
Pending before the Court is the appeal by Plaintiff Sandra Borys
of the decision by the Commissioner of Social Security Administration
(“the Commissioner”) to deny her application for disability benefits. For
the reasons set below, the Commissioner’s decision is affirmed.
I. Introduction
Borys seeks judicial review of the Commissioneyr’s final decision to
deny her application for disability benefits under Title IT of the Social

1 Frank Bisignano became the Commissioner on May 7, 2025. Pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d) and Title 42, United States Code, Section 405(g),
Bisignano is substituted for Kilolo Kijakazi, a former Commissioner, as the
Defendant in this suit.

Security Act. The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Title 42, United
States Code, Section 405(g).
Borys challenges the three alleged errors that Administrative Law
Judge (“ALJ”) Gerard W. Langan committed when determining that she

was not disabled under the Social Security Act. Namely, Borys claims

that the ALJ: (1) made inadequate function-by-function assessments in
defining residual functional capacity; (2) lacked substantial evidence in
rejecting three treating physician opinions on her limitations to time-off
tasks, absences, and unscheduled breaks in formulating her residual
functional capacity; and (8) in step five of the sequential analysis, failed

to identify and resolve a conflict between vocational expert testimony
and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles “DOT”’) with regard to her
overhead reaching limitation. Doc. 8 at 8. The matter is fully briefed
and ripe for decision.
As explained below, ALJ Langan’s conclusion on each of the
challenged issues was supported by substantial evidence in the record,
coupled with sufficient reasoning to permit meaningful judicial review.
Accordingly, the Court affirms the Commissioner’s decision to deny
Borys’s claim for social security disability benefits.

II. Background
On April 22, 2020, Borys applied for social security disability
benefits, alleging complete disability from high cholesterol, depression,
anxiety, Barrett's esophagus, cervical fusion, limited upper extremity
movement, insomnia, restless leg syndrome, gastroesophageal reflux

disease, and Raynaud’s disease. Tr.2 83-84. The Social Security
Administration (“SSA”) denied Borys’s application on August 17, 2020.
Id. at 125-28. Borys requested reconsideration, id. at 129, but her
application was denied again on December 23, 2020. Jd. at 1382-84.
Borys accordingly requested a hearing on February 26, 2021. Id. at

135-36. The SSA granted the request and held an administrative
hearing. Id. at 20.
The hearing, held on October 15, 2021, id., concerned whether
Borys was disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act from
June 18, 2019, through December 31, 2024—the last date Borys was
eligible to receive social security disability insurance. Jd. at 22. ALJ
Langan evaluated clinical records, medical history, medical expert

2 The administrative record, referred to herein as “Tr.,” encompasses Docs. 7, 7-1,
7-2, 7-8, 7-4, 7-5, 7-6, 7-7, 7-8.

reports, vocational expert testimony, and Borys’s own testimony. Id. at

47-82.
Toward the end of the hearing, ALJ Langan asked Carmine
Abraham, a vocational expert, to assess whether alternative
employment options in the national economy exist for Borys. Jd. at 71—

79. Abraham first confirmed that Borys’s previous job (“a certified

nurse assistant”) was a “medium, semi-skilled” occupation. Id. at 73.
Then the ALJ asked the vocational expert to assume

an individual of the same age, education, past work
experience as that of [the] claimant[].... [The] hypothetical
individual [is] capable of performing light exertional work.
However, [the] hypothetical individual should avoid
unprotected heights|,] ... [and] avoid climbing ladders and
scaffolds but may occasionally climb ramps and stairs. [The]
hypothetical individual would be capable of occasional
exposure to temperature extremes, wetness, and vibration.
Id. at 73-74. When ALJ Langan then asked whether the hypothetical

person could perform Borys’s past job, Abraham answered that such
limitations precluded the occupation. Id. at 74.
Then, the ALJ asked the vocational expert to “provide
representative samples of occupations which exist in the national

economy that an individual with those same limitations and restrictions
would be capable of performing[.|” Jd. Abraham, clarifying that such a

person needs “light work,” testified that the person may work as a

garment folder, rental clerk, or a marker. Id.
The response prompted ALJ Langan to change the hypothetical by
adding that:
[The] hypothetical individual should avoid interaction with
the public[,| except for incidental contact such as providing
directions to a restroom or a department in a larger facility.
In addition, [the] hypothetical individual would be capable of
occasional interaction with coworkers and supervisors. ...
[The] hypothetical individual also should avoid occupations
which would require a fast production rate pace[,| such as that
found with respect to quotas, piecework, or timed work.
Id. at 74-75. The vocational expert opined that “rental clerk position
would be eliminated due to frequent interaction with the public,” and
stated that such a person would be able to work as a routing clerk. Id.

at 75.
Abraham’s answer prompted the ALJ to impose additional
conditions, namely that the hypothetical person
should be afforded the ability to alternate between sitting and
standing every 80 minutes. In addition, [the] hypothetical
individual should avoid use of the right upper extremity for
overhead activity. [The] hypothetical individual may make
occasional use of the left upper extremity for overhead
activity. Finally, [the] hypothetical individual should avoid
occupations which would expose her to noise above a level 3
noise intensity level.

Id. at 75—76. Those additional limitations led the vocational expert to

state that the available numbers of garment folder, marker, and routing
clerk positions would decrease by about 50 percent. Jd. at 76. Then the
ALJ asked whether Abraham’s opinions were “consistent with the
Dictionary of Occupational Titles and its related publications.” Id. The
vocational expert responded by stating that “[t]he differences would one
be in regard to the claimant’s past work ... based upon the physical
requirements as the claimant described ... and in the file information,”
and “in regard to alternating of positions, the reduction of the numbers,

as well as overhead activities.” Id. at 76—77.
Based on the evidence, the ALJ denied Borys’s disability claim on
November 380, 2021, finding that she was not disabled during the period
at issue. Id. at 17-35. ALJ Langan reached that conclusion by
employing a five-step analytical process required under the Social
Security Act to evaluate disability insurance and supplement security
income claims. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).
The process requires sequential consideration of: (1) whether the
claimant is engaged in substantial gainful work activity; (2) the medical
severity of the claimant’s impairments; (8) whether the impairment

meets or equals a defined list of impairments; (4) a comparison between
the claimant’s past relevant work and residual functional capacity, Le.,
the most work that a claimant can perform despite his or her
limitations, see id. § 404.1545(a); and (5) an assessment of the
claimant’s residual functional capacity and his or her age, education,
and work experience. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)G)-(v). Should a claimant
proceed past the first three steps, the Commissioner will not find the
claimant disabled when he or she can perform past relevant work under
the third step or adjust to other work under the fourth step. Id.
§ □□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□ (6), (g).
Applying that analysis, the ALJ first determined that Borys last

met the insurance requirements of the Social Security Act, see id.
§ 404.130, on October 15, 2021. Tr. 22. ALJ Langan also found that
Borys did not engage in substantial gainful activity between her alleged
disability onset date of June 13, 2019, through December 31, 2024. Id.

at 22-23.
At the second step of the analysis, the ALJ found that Borys
suffered from seven severe impairments: degenerative disc disease in
the cervical spine, status-post anterior cervical discectomy and fusion at

C4 and C6, restless leg syndrome, Raynaud’s disease, depression, and

anxiety. Id. at 23. ALJ Langan also acknowledged that Borys suffered
from bursitis, infraspinatus, supraspinatus, and calcific tendinitis;
tendinopathy; chronic kidney disease; lumbar degenerative disc disease;
hypercholesterolemia; gastroesophageal reflux disease; insomnia; and
Barrett's esophagus. Jd. But because “there is no medical evidence of

record to indicate that these conditions have more than minimally
affected her ability to perform work related activities, when properly
treated,” he deemed them “non-severe impairments.” Id.
Moving to the third step of the analysis, the ALJ determined that
Borys’s impairments failed to meet or medically equal one of the

impairments listed in the SSA’s regulations. Id.
Regarding Borys’s cervical conditions and restless leg syndrome,
ALJ Langan found that “they do not satisfy the requisite laboratory,
clinical, and/or diagnostic requirements for listing level severity.” Id.
As for the claimant’s Raynaud’s disease, the ALJ noted that she “does

not suffer from gangrene or ischemia with digital ulcerations that
preclude the claimant from ambulating effectively or from effectively
performing fine or gross dexterous movement in the hands.

Accordingly, the undersigned concludes that the claimant’s condition
does not satisfy the criteria of listing level severity.” Jd. Finally, as to
Borys’s anxiety and depression, ALJ Langan determined that neither
impairment was severe enough. Id. at 25-27. In sum, Borys did not
automatically qualify as disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(111).
Accordingly, the ALJ proceeded to determine Borys’s residual
functional capacity before addressing the final two steps in the
sequential analysis. ALJ Langan noted that “the claimant’s statements
concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these

symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and
other evidence in the record....” Tr. 29. Instead, based on the medical
evidence of record, the ALJ concluded that:
the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform
light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except the
claimant: should avoid exposure to unprotected heights. She
could occasionally climb ramps and stairs, but never climb
ladders and scaffolds. She could tolerate occasional exposure
to extreme cold temperatures, wetness, and vibrations. She
should avoid interaction with the public, except for incidental
contact. She could engage in occasional interaction with co-
workers and _ supervisors. She should avoid fast
production/pace rate work. She should be afforded the ability
to alternate between sitting/standing every 30 minutes. She
should avoid use of her right upper extremity for overhead
activity. She could occasionally use her left upper extremity

for overhead activity. She should avoid occupations that
- would expose her to noise above level 3 noise intensity level.
Id. at 27.
In reaching that residual functional capacity determination, ALJ
Langan considered Borys’s own testimony and other medical evidence

on her physical impairments. During the hearing, Borys complained
that not only did she lose mobility in her neck after a surgery performed
by Dr. Alan Gillick, but she also gets headaches that “goes down into
[her] back.” Id. at 57. She also mentioned that her “hands and .. . feet
swell.” Id. Borys testified that she drives locally, “maybe once or twice

every two weeks ... to the pharmacy or post office.” Id. Also, the
claimant mentioned that cannot use a vacuum cleaner, id. at 60, and
that she could do some light chores (such as folding laundry, buying

grocery, and light cooking), albeit with assistance from other family
members. Id. at 60, 246-47. Further, Borys once reportedly climbed a

tree while camping with her husband. Id. at 857.
An opinion by Dr. Gillick, who performed a cervical fusion on
Borys on July 25, 2019, id. at 423, reported that Borys had “some
discomfort but her pain [wa]s much improved form preoperatively.” Id.

at 426. On October 14, 2019, the claimant was “struggling with some

10

neck discomfort” and “a lot of pain in the right shoulder area.” Jd. at
427. The physician also observed that Borys felt “pain with attempted
overhead range of motion, either in flexion or abduction. [He] could not
reproduce pain with internal or external rotation.” Id. Then, on
November 20, 2019, Dr. Gillick noted that Borys reported “pain with
gentle flexion and extension and right and left rotational movements.
[Borys’s] upper extremity motor, sensation and reflexes are normal.
Good circulation.” Id. at 429.
About three months later, on February 29, 2020, Dr. Gillick
observed that Borys continued to “struggle[] with overhead range of
motion of the right shoulder but really had minimal relief with an
injection.” Id. at 481. By September 28, 2020, the claimant’s “upper
extremity motor and sensation and reflexes were normal],]” but she
continued to suffer “pain with any attempted overhead range of
motion[.}”’ Jd. at 1276. Similarly, on December 28, 2020, Borys
complained of “pain with attempted overhead range of motion|,] both in
flexion and abduction|,]” id. at 1298, and received significant relief from

an injection. Id. at 1297. On April 19, 2021, the same physician noted
that Borys’s “right shoulder... show[ed] minimal tenderness but

11

significant restriction in range of motion|,] particularly abduction and
flexion secondary to pain[.]” Jd. at 1281. Dr. Gillick also noted that an
injunction offered relief for several weeks. Id.
Such examinations enabled Dr. Gillick to provide his opinion on
Borys’s residual function capacity on May 138, 2020. Id. at 1312-21.
Relevantly, the doctor stated that Borys: (1) could occasionally lift and

carry up to 10 pounds; (2) could never reach or handle; (8) could sit for
six hours, and stand or walk for about four hours in an eight-hour
workday; (4) must change her position every 30 minutes; (5) must be
“off-task” for about 20% of an eight-hour working day; (6) must take an
unscheduled break every two hours; and (7) must take about four to five
absences each month. Jd. at 1314-16.
Similarly, Dr. Sean McCall noted on October 3, 2019, that Borys
was “[p]rogressing well[]” after her cervical fusion. Id. at 458-59. On
October 12, 2020, Borys reported to the same doctor that she
experienced “tremendous difficulty postoperatively from her neck

surgery with arm weakness and pain.” Jd. at 952-58. Based on such
observations, Dr. McCall opined that Borys: (1) could occasionally lift
and carry up to 10 pounds; (2) could never reach, handle, or finger

12

frequently; (3) could sit for two hours, and stand or walk for about two

hours in an eight-hour workday; (4) must change her position every 15

to 30 minutes; (5) must be “off-task” for more than 20% of an eight-hour
working day; (6) must take an unscheduled break every 15 to 30

minutes; and (7) must take an indefinite number of absences each
month. Jd. at 1810-11. Then, on March 29, 2021, id. at 1413, after

examining Borys, Dr. McCall recorded that Borys’s neck was “supple”
but “non-tender,” and showed “no adenopathy, .. . bruits, .. . [jugular
vein distention], ... nodularity, [or] stridor.” Jd. at 1417.
Dr. Samuel Grodofsky, who examined Borys for her neck pain on

at least six occasions, continuously noted Borys’s complaint of neck

pain. Jd. at 406 (April 21, 2020), 408 (April 28, 2020), 413 (May 21,
2020), 416 (June 1, 2020), 1044 (July 6, 2020), 1048 (October 20, 2020).
At the same time, in each of those visits, Borys demonstrated a “5/5

power in all upper extremity muscle groups],|” as well as stable pain.
Id. at 408, 411, 414, 417, 1045, 1049. Based on such observations, on
May 18, 2020, Dr. Grodofsky opined that Borys could: (1) could
occasionally lift and carry up to 10 pounds; (2) could never reach,
handle, or finger; (8) could sit for two hours, and stand or walk for about

13

two hours in an eight-hour workday; (4) must change her position every
15 minutes; (5) must be “off-task” for more than 20% of an eight-hour
working day; (6) must take an unscheduled break every 15 to 30
minutes of working; and (7) must take an indefinite number of absences
each months. Jd. at 13804—07.
Also relevant to ALJ Langan’s assessment of Borys’s residual
functional capacity were the materials provided by Dr. Gaye Gustitus, a

state agency consultant who examined Borys on July 20, 2020. Id. at
83-98. Dr. Gustitus determined that Borys could: (1) occasionally lift
and carry up to 20 pounds, and frequently lift and carry up to ten
pounds; (2) sit for up to six hours, and stand or walk for up to six hours
in an eight-hour workday; (8) occasionally climb ramps and stairs, but

never ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; (4) occasionally perform some
posturing activities, such as stooping or crouching; (5) occasionally
reach overhead; and (6) avoid exposure to wetness, extreme cold,
vibrations, and industrial hazards (including machinery and heights).
Id. at 92-938. Dr. Robert Czwalina, another state agency consultant
who examined Borys on December 21, 2020, reached the same
conclusions. Jd. at 111—15, 121.

14

The cumulative evidence on Borys’s residual functional capacity
led ALJ Langan to disagree with her pertinent testimony. Id. at 29.
More specifically, the ALJ determined that:
[a]lfter reviewing all of the evidence, the undersigned
concludes that the claimant has the residual functional
capacity to perform work activity at a range of a light
exertional level with limitations resulting from her
impairments. The above residual functional capacity
assessment is supported by and consistent with the objective
medical evidence, including the measurable findings upon
clinical examination. The claimant reported complaints of
multiple physical and mental health problems. The existence
of her problems and resultant symptomatology are supported
somewhat by the objective evidence of record, but not to the
extent as alleged by the claimant. Limitations to exertional,
postural, mental, and environmental factors have been
included to address the claimant’s well-supported objective
deficits of record. The residual functional capacity is
consistent with the claimant’s activity level as indicated. The
objective evidence does not support a finding that the
claimant is more severely limited than stated above. In light
of the evidence of record, the above residual functional
capacity gives the claimant the benefit of the doubt but still
does not preclude her from performing work activity.
Id. at 29, 38.
In sum, based on the evidence on Borys’s physical impairments,
the ALJ concluded that her “the claimant’s statements concerning the
intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not

15

entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the
record[.]” Jd. at 29.
Having determined Borys’s residual functional capacity and
rejected several grounds for further limitation, ALJ Langan proceeded
to the fourth step of the analysis to determine whether she was disabled
within the meaning of the Social Security Act. Id. at 33. Here, the ALJ
compared Borys’s past relevant work and residual functional capacity,
finding that she was unable to perform her prior employment as a
warehouse worker. Jd. at 33-34.
Finally, in the fifth step of the sequential analysis process, ALJ
Langan considered Borys’s age, education, work experience, and
residual functional capacity to perform light work, concluding that
Borys was “capable of making a successful adjustment to other work
that exists in significant numbers in the national economy.” Jd. at 35.
Here, the ALJ leveraged testimony provided by Abraham that a person
fitting Borys’s parameters could meet the requirements of
“representative occupations” such as a folder, a marker, or a routing
clerk. Id. at 34-35. ALJ Langan further noted that:
Pursuant to SSR 00-4p, ... the vocational expert’s testimony
was generally consistent with the Dictionary of Occupational

16

Titles. However, in terms of the way the jobs identified by the
vocational expert, regarding both the physical and cognitive
aspects of these jobs (including the reduction in job quantities
available), any divergence from the Dictionary of
Occupational Titles was formulated based upon the vocational
expert’s knowledge and experience in this field Gncluding
observations and literature reviews) ....
Id. at 35. As a result of this analysis, ALJ Langan determined that
Borys was not disabled and denied her application for disability benefits

on November 30, 2021. Id. at 17-19. Borys unsuccessfully appealed the
denial to the SSA’s Appeals Council. Jd. at 1-3. The instant appeal to
the Court followed.
Borys initiated this action with the Court on June 23, 2023.
Doc. 1. The Commissioner provided the requisite transcripts from the
disability proceedings on August 21, 2023. Docs. 7-8. The parties then
filed their respective briefs. Docs. 8, 17-18. The parties also consented

to magistrate judge jurisdiction on June 30, 2023. Docs. 5, 19.
Borys alleges three errors warranting reversal or remand. Doc. 8

at 8. Specifically, Borys alleges that the ALJ: (1) performed an
inadequate function-by-function assessment; (2) “failed to provide any
reason for rejecting” limitations proposed by “three separate treating

17

physician[s]”; and (8) erred in his analysis of the fifth step under the
sequential analysis as to her overhead reaching limitations. Id.
III. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Review of the Commissioner’s decision denying a claimant’s
application for social security disability benefits is limited to
determining whether the factual findings of the final decisionmaker are
supported by substantial evidence in the record. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);
Johnson v. Comm’ of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 200 (8d Cir. 2008).
Substantial in this context is “more than a mere scintilla of evidence
but may be less than a preponderance.” Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d
1211, 12138 (8d Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). Put more pointedly, it is
“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988)
(quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1988)). In an
adequately developed record, this can mean “something less than the
weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent
conclusions from the evidence does not prevent [ALJ Langan’s decision]

18

from being supported by substantial evidence.” Consolo v. Fed. Mar.
Commn., 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966) (citations omitted).
Under this deferential standard, “[f]actual findings which are
supported by substantial evidence must be upheld.” Ficca v. Astrue,
901 F. Supp. 2d 533, 536 (M.D. Pa. 2012) (citations omitted); 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(¢). This court’s role is not to reweigh the evidence and make
factual determinations, but to simply review the record and ensure that
the ALJ provided “a discussion of the evidence and an explanation of
reasoning for his conclusion sufficient to enable meaningful judicial
review.” Diaz v. Comm’ of Soc. Sec., 577 F.3d 500, 504 (8d Cir. 2009)
(citations and quotations omitted). An ALJ meets that standard by
stating “in his decision which evidence he has rejected and which he is
relying on as the basis for his finding.” Schaudeck v. Comm’ of SSA,
181 F.3d 429, 438 (8d Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). Moreover, when
there is countervailing evidence, an ALJ must “give some reason for
discounting the evidence she rejects.” Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422,
429 (8d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted); Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058,
1064 (8d Cir. 1998) (holding that substantial evidence standard is

19

unmet when ALJ fails to resolve conflicts created by countervailing
evidence).
Here, ALJ Langan’s factual findings were supported by
substantial evidence in the record, and the reasoning underlying those
conclusions was sufficiently articulated to permit judicial review.
B. Function-by-Function Assessment in Formulation of
the Residual Functional Capacity
Borys first contends that ALJ Langan did not provide an
explanation for his alleged decision to exclude sitting, standing, and
walking limitations from her residual functional capacity, and that the
failure violated his duty to conduct an adequate function-by-function
assessment. Doc. 8 at 14-18. According to Borys, not only does this

error frustrate meaningful judicial review, but, because the inclusion of
such functional limitations may have impacted the vocational expert’s
testimony on her employment prospects, it was not harmless. Id. A
review of the record, however, finds that ALJ Langan included sitting,
standing, and walking limitations in Borys’s residual functional
capacity, and conducted an adequate function-by-function assessment
in compliance with the applicable regulations.

90

When crafting a claimant’s residual functional capacity and
assessing whether a claimant can perform their past work at step four
of the sequential evaluation process, an ALJ must explain which level of
work the claimant is currently capable of performing. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)—(iv), 404.1545(a)(5)(i)—Gi); Heckler v. Campbell,
461 U.S. 458, 460-62 (1983). The Social Security regulations include a
tiered series of work capacities, ranging from “sedentary work” to “very
heavy work.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a)-(e). Relevant here are the
regulations that define “light work,” which expressly address sitting,
standing, and walking:
Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time
with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10
pounds. Even though the weight lifted may be very little, a
job is in this category when it requires a good deal of walking
or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with
some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls. To be
considered capable of performing a full or wide range of light
work, you must have the ability to do substantially all of these
activities. If someone can do light work, we determine that he
or she can also do sedentary work, unless there are additional
limiting factors such as loss of fine dexterity or inability to sit
for long periods of time. .
Id. § 404.1567(b).
In determining Borys’s residual functional capacity, ALJ Langan
concluded that she was limited to performing “light work as defined in

91

20 CFR 404.1567(b),” a category that by definition limits her to no more
than “frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds[,]”
and a “good deal of walking or standing” during the workday. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1567(b). The regulations further instruct that “[flrequent’ means
occurring from one-third to two-thirds of the time. Since frequent
lifting or carrying requires being on one’s feet up to two-thirds of a
workday, the full range of light work requires standing or walking, off
and on, for a total of approximately 6 hours of an 8-hour workday.” SSR
83-10, 1983 WL 31251, at *6 (1983). Thus, by limiting Borys to light
work, ALJ Langan found that Borys was, at a minimum, limited to
walking off and on for approximately 6 hours of the workday. See id.;
20 C.F-.R. § 404.1567(b).
The ALJ then proceeded to list further limitations on Borys’s
ability to perform certain activities, including her ability to sit and
stand. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b). As highlighted by the
Commissioner, Doc. 17 at 28, the ALJ explicitly provided that Borys
“should be afforded the ability to alternate between sitting/standing
every 30 minutes.” Tr. 27. The Social Security regulations expressly
provide for the incorporation of this type of limitation where “the

99

medical facts lead to an assessment of RFC which [is] compatible with
the performance of either sedentary or light work except that the person
must alternate periods of sitting and standing. The individual may be

able to sit for [some] time, but must then get up and stand or walk for
awhile before returning to sitting.” SSR 88-12, 1983 WL 31258, at *4
(1983). The ALJ accordingly provided special limitations to
accommodate Borys’s more limited ability to sit and stand, which were

more restrictive than the definition of “light work.” See id.
Borys relies on SSR 96-8p to assert that ALJ Langan’s findings

were in error. Doc. 8 at 15-18. Specifically, Borys leverages the
“Exertion Capacity” section of the ruling, which provides, in pertinent
part, that:
Each function must be considered separately (e.g., “the
individual can walk for 5 out of 8 hours and stand for 6 out of
8 hours’), even if the final RFC assessment will combine
activities (e.g., “walk/stand, lift/carry, push/pull”). Although
the regulations describing the exertional levels of work and
the Dictionary of Occupational Titles and its related volumes
pair some functions, it is not invariably the case that treating
the activities together will result in the same decisional
outcome as treating them separately.
Social Security Ruling (SSR) 96—-8p, 61 Fed. Reg. 34474, 34477 (July 2,
1996).

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Conducting a “function-by-function assessment” requires that an
ALJ “articulate how the evidence in the record supports the RFC
determination, discuss the claimant’s ability to perform sustained work-
related activities, and explain the resolution of any inconsistencies in
the record.” Brooks v. Saul, 2019 WL 7048794, *7 (E.D. Pa. 2019)
(quoting Bencivengo v. Comm’ of Soc. Sec., 251 F.8d 158 (8d Cir.
2000)). This does not mean, as Borys seems to urge, that the ALJ must
“make specific, written findings on dozens of individual work function
categories.” Jd. Rather, it simply means the ALJ’s “RFC determination
must include an explanation of the substantial evidence upon which it
relies.” Id.
The limitation findings an ALJ makes during a residual functional
capacity assessment are subject to the general duty of articulation
standard set forth above. See Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 41
(3d Cir. 2001) (“[T]he ALJ’s finding of residual functional capacity must
‘be accompanied by a clear and satisfactory explication of the basis on
which it rests.” (quoting Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700 (8d Cir. 1981))).
This means that well-articulated residual functional capacity
assessments supported by substantial evidence are permitted to

D4.

include, in the absence of or in addition to their individually tailored
limitation findings, ones pulled from the regulation’s tiered series of
work capacities. See Chiaradio v. Comm’ of Soc. Sec., 425 F. App’x
158, 161 (8d Cir. 2011) (affirming residual functional capacity
assessment with “light work” functional limitation that did not engage
in “task by task analysis,” but was well-articulated and supported “by
substantial evidence on the record.”).
That is precisely what ALJ Langan did here, enumerating a
comprehensive discussion of the substantial evidence upon which his
residual functional capacity determination relied. The ALJ’s discussion
included consideration of symptom allegations, clinical records,
examination evaluations, treatment records, and opinion evidence; in
other words, it addressed all the pertinent evidence of record. Tr. 27—
33. ALJ Langan explained that, based on certain evidence—
specifically, treatment notes; history of treatment and pain; and some
limitations in performing daily activities—Borys, in addition to
standard light work limitations, required individualized exertional,
postural, mental, and environmental limitations. Jd. at 27. Those
additional restrictions, coupled with the inherent limitations of the

25

“light work” definition, were consistent with the evidence and
physicians’ opinions in the record that the ALJ deemed persuasive. Id.

at 27-33. The Court refrains from reweighing those factual
determinations. See Diaz, 577 F.3d at 504.
ALJ Langan also found that, because the record lacked sufficient
evidence supporting Borys’s allegations of pain after surgery and of an
impaired ability to perform daily functions, no additional limitations
beyond those already outlined were necessary. Tr. 27-30. That well-
articulated “explication of the basis on which” ALJ Langan’s function-
by-function assessment relied was substantially supported by the
evidence of record, id. at 88—98, 100-21, 406-18, 426-31, 458-63, 952—
58, 1044-50, 1276-81, 1297-98, 1802-07, 1309-11, 1312-21, 1413-21,
comports with the mandates of SSR 96-8p, and does not give rise to any
analytical error. See Fargnoli, 247 F.3d at 41.
Borys further argues that the supposedly factually analogous
matters of Barbour v. Kijakazt, 2021 WL 4478332 (M.D. Pa. 2021), and
Mattox v. Kijakazi, 2023 WL 5943135 (M.D. Pa. 2023), militate in favor
of remand here. Docs. 13 at 16-18; 18 at 7-8. A review of Barbour and

26

Mattox finds that those nonbinding cases are inapposite to the facts now

before the Court.
In Barbour, the Court rejected an ALJ’s residual functional

capacity determination because “the inadequacies in the ALJ’s function-

by-function assessment, and evaluation of the medical opinion evidence”
frustrated meaningful judicial review. 2021 WL 4478332, at *5.
Specifically, the ALJ made no specific findings regarding the claimant’s
ability to stand and walk, despite lingering record inconsistencies
concerning those functional capacities. Jd. This, the Court found, was
significant because it may have impacted the testimony elicited from

the vocational expert. Id. at *6.
Likewise, in Mattox, the Court remanded a disability benefits
denial because the administrative decision had inadvertently and
materially mischaracterized a medical opinion on which it relied when
fashioning the claimant’s residual functional capacity limitations.

2023 WL 5943185, at *7. The Court found that not only did this error
frustrate judicial review, but it was harmful because, similar to the
facts in Barbour, it had a potential impact on the testimony delivered
by the vocational expert. Id. at *8.

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Here, unlike the circumstances in Barbour and Mattox, ALJ
Langan accurately summarized the medical opinions he considered
when fashioning the claimant’s residual functional capacity limitations
in the areas of walking, standing, and sitting, Tr. 830-33, and made
specific findings regarding the claimant’s ability in those areas, both
through a residual functional capacity assessment of light work, and
additional specific limitations. Jd. at 27. Accordingly, since ALJ
Langan’s function-by-function assessment in his residual functional
capacity determination was premised on substantial evidence and was
sufficiently articulated to permit judicial review, it will be left
undisturbed.
C. Evaluation of Medical Opinions provided by Drs.
Gillick, McCall, and Grodofsky
Borys further contends that ALJ Langan erred in rejecting the
medical opinions of treating physicians Drs. Gillick, McCall, and
Grodofsky. Doc. 8 at 18-24. But Borys’s disagreement with the ALJ’s

assessment of those opinions does not warrant remand where, as here,
that evaluation comported with all applicable regulatory requirements.
The three doctors all opined that Borys needs some non-exertional
limitations. Dr. Gillick opined that Borys: (1) must be “off-task” about

98

20% of an eight-hour working day; (2) must take an unscheduled break

every two hours; and (8) must take about four to five absences each
month. Tr. 1316. Likewise, both Drs. McCall and Grodofsky stated that
Borys: (1) must be “off-task” for more than 20% of an eight-hour
working day; (2) must take an unscheduled break every 15 to 30
minutes; and (8) must take an indefinite number of absences each
month. Jd. at 1306, 1311.
Borys takes umbrage with the ALJ’s decision to credit the
opinions of Drs. Gustitus and Czwalina, two state agency consultants,

over those provided by the three treating physicians. Doc. 8 at 18-24.
She correctly observes that Drs. Gustitus and Czwalina did not
establish non-exertional limitations regarding off-task time,
unscheduled breaks, and monthly absences. Jd. at 19. Borys concludes
that, as ALJ Langan found the state agency consultants’ opinions are
“largely persuasive,” Tr. 33, but determined that the statements
provided by the three treating physicians were “unpersuasive,” id. at
32, without providing any explanation, the administrative decision

warrants aremand. Doc. 8 at 18—24.

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Under the current regulation, medical opinions are not entitled to

any specific weighting, and are instead evaluated for persuasiveness.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a)—-(b). An ALJ determines the persuasiveness of

a prior medical finding or medical opinion by assessing five factors: (1)
supportability; (2) consistency; (8) relationship with the claimant; (4)
specialization; and (5) other factors. Id. § 404.1520c(a)-(c). The factors
related to the substance of medical opinions—supportability and
consistency—are the “most important factors.” Id. § 404.1520c(b)(2).
Examining supportability entails a review of the opinion’s basis in
relevant “objective medical evidence and supporting explanations
presented by a medical source.” Id. § 404.1520c(c)(1). Consistency is
assessed based on how consistent a finding or opinion is “with the
evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical sources in the
claim[.]” Id. § 404.1520c(c)(2).
The Court of Appeals explained that, when weighing the record,

an ALJ “cannot reject evidence for no reason or the wrong reason” and

must explain “why probative evidence has been rejected ... so that a
reviewing court can determine whether the reasons for rejection were
improper.” Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 706-07 (8d Cir. 1981). This

20

does not mean, however, that the ALJ must undertake an exhaustive

discussion of all of the evidence. See, e.g., Fargnoli, 247 F.3d at 42; Hur

v. Barnhart, 94 F. App’x 130, 188 (8d Cir. 2004) (“There is no
requirement that the ALJ discuss in her opinion every tidbit of evidence
included in the record.”).
Here, ALJ Langan found the treating physicians’ opinions
unpersuasive because they lacked significant support in and were
inconsistent with the weight of the evidence. The ALJ explained that
those statements “overestimate[d] the claimant’s degree of limitation,”
and noted that Borys’s “physical examination findings more consistently
revealed more mild to moderate symptoms. ... Because the claimant’s

signs, symptoms, and residual ability are more consistent with an
individual who retains a light residual functional capacity, this opinion,

an opinion that suggests complete disability, is found to be
unpersuasive.” Tr. 32.
Further, ALJ Langan explained his reasoning for finding the
opinions provided by Drs. Czwalina and Gustitus more persuasive:
the medical evidence of record, inclusive of the physical
examination findings and the objective evidence, supports the
limitation to light work suggested by Drs. Czwalina and
Gustitus. Throughout the period of review, the claimant has

27

experienced sufficiently documented symptomatology that
has restricted the claimant’s ability to work and to address
her daily household/personal tasks .... Her care, save her
cervical spinal surgery, remains largely conservative with
medication management. Accordingly, the undersigned finds
that these opinions are largely persuasive.
Id. at 33.
Those analyses readily meet ALJ Langan’s regulatory duty to
consider the consistency and supportability of the two branches of
opinions, in arriving at the conclusion that the treating physicians’
statements were unpersuasive. See, e.g., Jones v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d
125, 129 (8d Cir. 1991) (holding medical opinions that are inconsistent
with and unsupported by the medical evidence are not persuasive or
controlling); Wright v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 675, 683 (8d Cir. 1990) (same).
Furthermore, this Court’s role is not to reweigh the evidence to make its

own factual determinations. Chandler v. Comm’ of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d
356, 359 (3d Cir. 2011).
Borys raises seven additional arguments in contending that the
ALJ made a reversible error, Doc. 8 at 19-24, but none prevail. They
are:
1. ALJ Langan “only discussed the ... opinions as it pertains to
the ability to perform ‘light work,” which “has nothing to do

89

with the need for time off task, absences from work, or
unscheduled breaks|]”;
2. The ALJ failed to cite evidence that is inconsistent with the
opinions provided by Drs. Gillick, McCall, and Grodofsky;
3. ALJ Langan failed to explain how Borys’s daily activities are
inconsistent with the treating physicians’ opinions;
4. The ALJ incorrectly stated that the treating physicians’
opinions provide for complete disability;
5. ALJ Langan’s analysis is backward, as he “pre-determined
[Borys’s] activities to be consistent with light work and then
compared to the opinions to this pre-determination|]”;
6. The ALJ “necessarily relied upon his own lay
reinterpretation of the evidence to reject the treating source
opinions,” as the state agency consultants did not opine on
Borys’s “limitations in time off task, absences from work,
and unscheduled breaks|]”; and
7. ALJ Langan “gave no reason for rejecting the opinions
regarding the limitations in time off task, absences from
work, and unscheduled breaks,” which were provided by the
three treating physicians.
Id.
Two of the seven averments, the first and sixth, rest on the
additional limitations as to time-off tasks, absences from work, and
unscheduled breaks. Id. at 20-21. Those accommodations, as discussed
above, fail to provide grounds for remand.
Three of the other five considerations stretch the record. For
example, Borys’s second and third arguments claim that ALJ Langan

33

found some of the medical opinions inconsistent, Doc. 8 at 20-21,
though the ALJ merely said that he found that evidence “unpersuasive.”
Tr. 32. In any event, the ALJ detailed his reasoning for finding those
opinions unpersuasive, when compared to the objective evidence of
record. Jd. Her fourth contention is that the ALJ stated incorrectly
that the medical materials provided by Drs. Gillick, McCall, and
Grodofsky “provide for ‘complete disability,” Doc. 8 at 21, when they
merely outline “specific functional limitations.” Id. But, as the
Commissioner correctly notes, Doc. 17 at 15 n.4, this statement was
based on the comments that Borys remains “incapable of sedentary
work.” Tr. 1802, 1312. As sedentary work is the lowest of the tiered
series of work capacities set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a)-{e), any
opinion that a claimant is unable to perform such work logically leads to

an interpretation of complete disability.
Borys’s remaining two arguments also fail to establish that
remand is warranted. Specifically, Borys’s fifth contention is that the.
ALJ’s “analysis is backwards,” as he allegedly “pre-determined [her]
activities to be consistent with light work and then compared to the
opinions to this pre-determination.” Doc. 8 at 21. Her seventh

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argument is that “the reports of non-examining sources are generally
given less weight than those of examining and treating sources.” Jd. at
22 (citations omitted). Both arguments fail to undermine the
substantial evidence on which ALJ Langan issued his decision, and this
Court’s ability to conduct meaningful judicial review. See Sponheimer

v. Comm’ of Soc. Sec., 734 F. App’x 805, 808-09 (8d Cir. 2018) (quoting
Reefer v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 376, 380 (8d Cir. 2008)) (holding that
judicial courts “defer to [ALJ’s] credibility determination” when
substantial evidence outweighs complaints “not otherwise supported by
the record.”); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a) (declaring that ALJ does
“not defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling
weight, to any medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical
finding(s), including those from... medical sources.”).
Therefore, because ALJ Langan evaluated the medical opinions
pursuant to his regulatory duty to gauge persuasiveness, his findings
will not be disturbed.
D. Conflict between Vocational Expert Testimony and
DOT
In her third and final challenge, Borys attacks ALJ Langan’s
alleged failure to consider that Borys “can never use her right... arm

85

for overhead activity and can only occasionally use her left arm for
overhead activity.” Doc. 8 at 9-14 (citation omitted). According to
Borys, each of the jobs identified by the vocational expert—a folder, a
marker, and a routing clerk position—“requires frequent or constant
reaching” under DOT, and neither DOT nor the Selected
Characteristics of Occupations, a complementary text to DOT,
distinguishes “between overhead reaching and reaching in other
directions.” Jd. at 10. Therefore, Borys surmises, the ALJ failed to
resolve the apparent conflict between the vocational expert's testimony
and DOT, warranting a remand. Id. at 11, 14. This position, however,
does not yield any relief.
Under the current regulatory framework governing the fifth step
of the sequential analysis, when an ALJ “determine[s] that unskilled,
sedentary, light, and medium jobs exist in the national economy ... ,
[he or she] will take administrative notice of reliable job information
available from various governmental and other publications,” including
DOT. 20C.F.R. § 404.1566(d)(1).
Regarding vocational expert testimony and potential conflicts, the
regulatory framework provides that:

26

Occupational evidence provided by a [vocational expert]...
generally should be consistent with the occupational
information supplied by the DOT. When there is an apparent
unresolved conflict between [vocational expert] . . . evidence
and the DOT, the adjudicator must elicit a reasonable
explanation for the conflict before relying on the [vocational
expert] ... evidence to support a determination or decision
about whether the claimant is disabled. At the hearings level,
as part of the adjudicator’s duty to fully develop the record,
the adjudicator will inquire, on the record, as to whether or
not there is such consistency.
Social Security Ruling, SSR 00—4p, 65 Fed. Reg. 75759, 75760 (Dec. 4,
2000).
Notably, “[nJeither the DOT nor the [vocational expert]...
evidence automatically “trumps” when there is a conflict.” Jd. Instead,
the ALJ “must resolve the conflict by determining if the explanation
given by the [vocational expert] .. . is reasonable and provides a basis
for relying on the [expert’s] . . . testimony rather than on the DOT
information.” Jd. This means that the ALJ must: “(1) ask, on the
record, whether the [vocational expert’s] testimony is consistent with
the DOTI;] (2) ‘elicit a reasonable explanation’ where an inconsistency
does appear|;| and (8) explain in its decision ‘how the conflict was
resolved.” Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 617 (8d Cir. 2014) (quoting
Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 127 (8d Cir. 2002)).

387

Here, the Court is unconvinced that this case should be remanded
for two reasons. First, the ALJ need not “inquire into conflicts” if “the
DOT and testimony of the vocational expert w[ere| not necessarily
inconsistent....” Burns, 312 F.3d at 128 (footnote omitted). A
corollary is that no reversible error exists if DOT lacks discussions of a
certain limitation in its job descriptions, and thus does not contradict an
expert’s testimony. See Sanborn v. Comm’ of Soc. Sec., 618 F. App’x
171, 177 (8d Cir. 2015). As Borys herself acknowledges, neither DOT

nor its companion text distinguish between types of reaching or
“address overhead reaching specifically.” Doc. 8 at 10. Thus, any
limitations that she has on overhead reaching does not necessarily
contradict the generalized reaching requirements of a folder, marker, or
routing clerk under the DOT. See Sanborn, 613 F. App’x at 177.
Borys argues that the analogous case of Fariss v. Berryhill, No. 17-
CV-1741 (M.D. Pa. 2017), favor remand here. Docs. 8 at 9-13. In
Fariss, the issue was the evident discrepancy between the frequencies of
reaching that were established by DOT and the ALJ. Fariss v.
Berryhill, No. 17-CV-1741, report & recommendation at 14-15 (M.D.
Pa. Apr. 17, 2017) (“each position cited by VE... requires more than

88

‘occasional’ reaching, while the ALJ limited Plaintiff to occasional
overhead reaching.” (citing Pearson v. Colvin, 810 F.3d 204 (4th Cir.
2015))), report and recommendation adopted, order (M.D. Pa. May 7,
2019). In the instant case, the alleged conflict involves the types of
reaching defined by DOT and ALJ Langan. Doc. 8 at 10. As explained
above, the two sources do not create a clear contradiction. The ALJ
thus was not required to reconcile his findings with DOT. See Burns,
312 F.3d at 128; Sanborn, 613 F. App’x 177.
Second, to the extent any conflict does exist, ALJ Langan met his
duties during and after the hearing. The ALJ asked on record whether
Abraham’s opinions have “been consistent with the Dictionary of
Occupational Titles and its related publications.” Tr. 76. Abrahams
stated that her opinions conflicted “in regard to alternating of positions,
the reduction of the numbers, as well as overhead activities,” as those
requirements “were ... based upon evaluating representative examples
such as the ones [she] provided [that day] within the economy.” Jd. at
76-77. The ALJ accordingly reasoned that the expert testimony “was
generally consistent with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles,” and
that “any divergence from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles was

389

formulated based upon the vocational expert’s knowledge and
experience in this field Gncluding observations and literature reviews)
.... Id. at 35. Thus, the ALJ fulfilled his duties of inquiring about

any potential conflicts, eliciting a reasonable explanation on the record,
and explaining the basis of his resolution in the decision. See Burns,
312 F.3d at 127-28.
Therefore, since ALJ Langan’s determination at the fifth step of
the sequential analysis was founded on substantial evidence, the Court
will not disturb the Commissioner's decision on this ground. .
IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, the Court affirms the Commissioner’s decision. A
separate order shall be issued.

Date: September 30, 2025 S/ Phillip J. Caraballo
Phillip J. Caraballo
United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11154146. Public record. Not legal advice.