# Williams v. Venture Global Plaquemines, LLC

> District Court, E.D. Louisiana · October 1, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11154041

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** October 1, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

PATRICK WILLIAMS, et al. CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO. 25-779
VENTURE GLOBAL PLAQUEMINES, LLC, et al. SECTION: “G”(5)
ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is Defendants Venture Global LNG, Inc. and Venture Global Plaquemines
LNG, LLC’s (collectively, “VG Entities”) Rule 12(b)(6) Moton to Dismiss.1 In this litigation,
Plaintiffs Patrick Williams and Tevin Tobias (“Plaintiffs”) are suing Defendants Bigge Crane and
Rigging Co., Zachry Holdings, Inc., Venture Global Plaquemines LNG, LLC, Venture Global
LNG, Inc., and KZJV, LLC (collectively, “Defendants”) for damages related to a crane collapse
that occurred on April 16, 2024.2 In the instant motion, VG Entities argue that Plaintiffs have failed
to state a tort claim against them under Louisiana law. Plaintiffs oppose the motion.3 Considering
the motion, the memoranda in support and in opposition, the record, and the applicable law, the
Court grants the motion in part and denies the motion in part.
I. Background
Plaintiffs allege that on or about April 16, 2024 they were both employed by Brown Root
Industrial Services, LLC, and at that time they were working on a job site owned by VG Entities.4

1 Rec. Doc. 17.
2 Rec. Doc. 1-1; Rec. Doc. 31. Plaintiffs also named Zachry Construction Corp. as a defendant, but they
subsequently dismissed those claims.
3 Rec. Doc. 28.
4 Rec. Doc. 1-1 at 3.
Plaintiffs allege that Bigge Crane and Rigging Co. provided the cranes for said job site.5 At the
said time and place, Mr. Tobias was operating a crane and Mr. Williams was rigging the crane
when an “adjacent crane broke apart and collapsed.”6 Plaintiffs assert that they both had to quickly
move out of the way to avoid being struck.7 Plaintiffs allege that they both suffered “serious and
permanent disabling injuries” as a result of this incident.8 Plaintiffs state that the crane that

collapsed was being operated by Zachry Holdings, Inc., was previously red tagged for service, and
“collapsed the day it was put back into use.”9 Plaintiffs assert that VG Entities are at fault for the
injuries sustained because they intentionally and negligently failed to maintain the premises in a
reasonably safe condition, warn of the existence of a dangerous condition, place warning signs to
warn of the existence of a dangerous condition, adequately train their personnel on how to inspect
the premises for hazards, cure a known hazardous condition, or exercise the appropriate degree of
care.10
On March 5, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a Petition for Damages against Defendants in the 25th
Judicial District Court for the Parish of Plaquemines.11 Defendants removed the case to this Court
on April 21, 2025.12 VG Entities filed the instant Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss on May 19,

5 Id. at 4.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 6.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 4.
11 Rec. Doc. 1-1.
12 Rec. Doc. 1.
2025.13 Plaintiffs filed a Response14 in opposition of this motion on July 15, 2025. VG Entities
filed a Reply15 in support of their motion on July 18, 2025.
II. Parties’ Arguments
A. VG Entities’ Arguments in Support of Their Motion
VG Entities move the Court to dismiss the claims Plaintiffs raise against them.16 VG

Entities assert Plaintiffs have no cause of action against them under Louisiana law.17 VG Entities
argue that Plaintiffs has not identified any actions taken by VG Entities which support the
allegations against them.18 VG Entities assert that “under long-established Louisiana law,
allegations by Plaintiffs that the VG Entities failed to provide a safe place to work and/or the failed
to correct unsafe working conditions are, by definition, insufficient to establish an intentional
tort.”19
VG Entities also argue that “Plaintiffs have failed to plead sufficient facts to state a claim
for negligence against them.”20 VG Entities claim, “Plaintiffs failed to allege facts establishing
both the specific duty that the VG Entities owed Plaintiffs, as well as facts establishing how the
VG Entities breached the duty that they allegedly owed Plaintiffs.”21 VG Entities point out that

13 Rec. Doc. 17.
14 Rec. Doc. 28.
15 Rec. Doc. 33.
16 Rec. Doc. 17-1.
17 Id. at 1.
18 Id. at 3.
19 Id. at 5.
20 Id. at 7.
21 Id.
Plaintiffs have merely alleged that they were working on a jobsite owned by VG Entities.22 VG
Entities assert that they cannot be found liable because the conclusory legal conclusions of
negligence in the Complaint is insufficient to establish a duty or breach of said duty to Plaintiffs.23
B. Plaintiffs’ Arguments in Opposition
Plaintiffs “concede that the complained of injuries were not the result of an intentional tort

by the VG Entities.”24 However, Plaintiffs maintain they have stated a cognizable claim for
negligence in the Petition.25 Alternatively, Plaintiffs request an “opportunity to amend the Petition
to cure any deficiencies.”26
Plaintiffs argue that the duty VG Entities allegedly had “was that of a property owner.”27
Plaintiff alleges this duty was argued in the Petition with specificity and particularity when they
stated they were “working at a job site” for VG Entities.28 Plaintiffs cite Terese v. 1500 Lorene,
LLC, to assert that “. . . the owner of a facility has an independent duty to exercise reasonable care
for the safety of those on the premises, including employees of independent contractors.”29 Hence,
Plaintiffs contend that the duty element of a negligence claim is met against VG Entities.30

22 Id. at 8.
23 Id.
24 Rec. Doc. 28 at 1.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 2.
28 Id. (quoting Rec. Doc. 1-1 at 3).
29 Id. at 3 (quoting Terese v. 1500 Lorene, LLC, No. 09-4342, 2010 WL 4702369, at *3 (E.D. La. 2010)).
30 Id.
Plaintiffs allege they have plead “several ways in which the VG Entities failed to conform
to the appropriate standard of conduct of a property owner.”31 These failures include,
failing to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition . . . failing to warn
of the existence of a dangerous condition . . . failing to place warning signs to warn
of the existence of a dangerous condition . . . failure to adequately train their
personnel on how to properly and routinely inspect the premises . . . and failing to
cure a known hazardous condition . . .32

Plaintiffs argue these allegations are factually supported in the Petition where they state, “the crane
that collapsed…was previously ‘red tagged’ for service by Zachry Construction Corporation
and/or Bigge Crane and collapsed the day it was put back into use.”33 Plaintiffs assert the Court
should infer that VG Entities, as the property owners, owed a duty to Plaintiffs to warn of the
unreasonably dangerous condition of the crane on its property, inspect the premises and the
equipment thereon, and cure a known hazardous condition on its property, yet failed to do so.34
C. VG Entities Arguments in Reply
VG Entities point out that Plaintiffs have conceded that there is no cognizable intentional
tort claim.35 Hence, the intentional tort claim should be “dismissed with prejudice.”36 As to the
negligence claims, VG Entities argues that Plaintiffs have not plead specific facts with regards to
any alleged negligent act by VG Entities.37 “In other words, the plaintiffs have not alleged when,

31 Id.
32 Id. (quoting Rec. Doc. 1-1 at 4).
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Rec. Doc. 33 at 1.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 2.
where, what, why, or how any specific actions of the VG Entities caused the crane collapse.”38 VG
Entities claims the Petition only alleges specific negligent acts by other Defendants and these acts
should not be imputed onto them.39 VG Entities asserts that the only alleged fact in the Petition
related to them is that they “owned the premises.”40 VG Entities concludes by stating the “generic
conclusions in paragraph 7 of the petition” are “unwarranted factual inferences” that the Court

should disregard.41
III. Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that an action may be dismissed for
“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”42 A motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim is “viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted.”43 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’”44 “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.”45 A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff has pleaded facts that allow
the court to “draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.”46

38 Id.
39 Id. at 3–4.
40 Id. at 4.
41 Id.
42 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
43 Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982).
44 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
45 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
46 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
On a motion to dismiss, asserted claims are liberally construed in favor of the claimant,
and all facts pleaded are taken as true.47 However, although required to accept all “well-pleaded
facts” as true, a court is not required to accept legal conclusions as true.48 “While legal conclusions
can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.”49
Similarly, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements” will not suffice.50 The complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, but it
must offer more than mere labels, legal conclusions, or formulaic recitations of the elements of a
cause of action.51 That is, the complaint must offer more than an “unadorned, the-defendant-
unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”52 From the face of the complaint, there must be enough factual
matter to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence as to each element of
the asserted claims.53 If factual allegations are insufficient to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level, or if it is apparent from the face of the complaint that there is an “insuperable”
bar to relief, the claim must be dismissed.54

47 Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intel. & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164 (1993); see also
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322–23 (2007).
48 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79.
49 Id. at 679.
50 Id. at 678.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Lormand v. U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 257 (5th Cir. 2009).
54 Carbe v. Lappin, 492 F.3d 325, 328 n.9 (5th Cir. 2007); Moore v. Metro. Hum. Serv. Dist., No. 09-6470,
2010 WL 1462224, at * 2 (E.D. La. Apr. 8, 2010) (Vance, J.) (citing Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007)).
IV. Analysis
A. Intentional Tort Claims
Here, VG Entities assert that Plaintiffs’ allegations are “insufficient to establish an
intentional tort.”55 Plaintiffs concede that the damages here were “not the result of an intentional
tort by VG Entities.”56 Therefore, the Court dismisses Plaintiffs’ intentional tort claims against VG

Entities.
B. Negligence Claims
Under Louisiana law, a plaintiff asserting negligence must prove:
(1) the defendant had a duty to conform his conduct to a specific standard of care,
that is, the duty element, (2) the defendant’s conduct failed to conform to the
appropriate standard of care, that is, the breach element, (3) the defendant's
substandard conduct was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injuries, that is, the cause-
in-fact element, (4) the defendant’s substandard conduct was a legal cause of the
plaintiff’s injuries, that is, the scope-of-duty element, and (5) actual damages, that
is, the damages element.57

VG Entities argue that Plaintiffs have not alleged facts establishing a duty owed to
Plaintiffs or a breach of that duty. Specifically, VG Entities asserts that their ownership of the job
site where the injury occurred is not enough to establish a duty to Plaintiffs. Generally, property
owners are not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor working on the property.58
However, “the owner of a facility has an independent duty to exercise reasonable care for the safety
of those on the premises, including employees of independent contractors.”59 VG Entities do not

55 Rec. Doc. 17-1 at 5.
56 Rec. Doc. 28 at 1.
57 Shelley v. Hilcorp Energy Co., No. 22-1345, 2023 WL 4235563, at *5 (E.D. La. June 28, 2023) (citing
Nagle v. Gusman, 61 F. Supp. 3d 609, 620 (E.D. La. 2014)).
58 See Terese, 2010 WL 4702369, at *3.
59 Id. (citing Dupre v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 20 F.3d 154, 157 (5th Cir. 1994)).
dispute their alleged ownership of the property where Plaintiffs were injured, or that Plaintiffs
were independent contractors working on said property. Plaintiffs’ specific allegations of VG
Entities’ failure to maintain or inspect the premises to ensure the property was reasonably safe
raises a plausible duty owed to Plaintiffs and a plausible breach of such a duty. Thus, Plaintiffs
have satisfied the pleading standard for their negligence claims against VG Entities.

VG Entities argue the pleading standard has not been met because Plaintiffs’ claims are
conclusory and no reasonable inference of negligence can be drawn from the facts alleged.60 VG
Entities analogize Shelley v. Hilcorp Energy Co. to the case at bar.61 In Shelley, the court dismissed
the plaintiff’s claims because the allegations within were “speculative, conclusory, and unspecific
to any individual defendant.”62 However, there are notable differences between the facts here and
those in Shelley. Here, Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding VG Entities’ negligence do have some
overlap with the allegations made against other defendants. However, there are specific allegations
made only against VG Entities such as “negligently failing to maintain the premises in a reasonably
safe condition[,]” “negligently failing to place warning signs to warn of the existence of a

dangerous condition[,]” and “failure to adequately train their personnel on how to properly and
routinely inspect the premises[.]”63 Further, the allegations here differ from those in Shelley
because here the injury occurred on premises owned by VG Entities, while in Shelley the damage
occurred on a navigable waterway.64 Hence, the allegations here are specific to VG Entities as the
owners of the property where the injury occurred. For these reasons, Plaintiffs have stated a claim

60 Rec. Doc. 33 at 2.
61 Id.
62 Shelley v. Hilcorp Energy Co., No. 22-1345, 2023 WL 4235563, at *5 (E.D. La. June 28, 2023).
63 Rec. Doc. 1-1 at 4.
64 Rec. Doc. 28 at 3; Shelley, 2023 WL 4235563, at *1.
against VG Entities for negligence under Louisiana law.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants Venture Global Plaquemines LNG, LLC
and Venture Global LNG, Inc.’s Rule 12(b)(6) Moton to Dismiss® is GRANTED IN PART and
DENIED IN PART. The motion is GRANTED to the extent it seeks dismissal of Plaintiffs’
intentional tort claims. The motion is DENIED in all other respects.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the intentional tort claims raised against the VG
Entities are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, this Ist day of October, 2025.

KARMEL J alte BROWN A
UNITED STATES’DISTRICT JUDGE

6 Rec. Doc. 17.
10

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11154041. Public record. Not legal advice.