# Twin City Fire Insurance Company v. RK Family, Inc.

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · September 29, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11153885

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** September 29, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

TWIN CITY FIRE INSURANCE :
COMPANY, : Case No. 2:24-cv-2275-ALM
Plaintiff, :
: JUDGE ALGENON L. MARBLEY
v. :
: Magistrate Judge Kimberly A. Jolson
RK FAMILY, INC. and RK :
HOLDINGS, LLP d/b/a RURAL KING :
and SHAUN AMRINE, :
:
Defendants. :

OPINION & ORDER

This matter comes before this Court on Plaintiff Twin City Fire Insurance Company’s
(“Twin City”) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings against Defendants RK Family, Inc. (“RK
Family”), RK Holdings, LLP d/b/a Rural King (“Rural King”), and Shaun Amrine (“Amrine”)
(collectively, “RK Defendants”). (ECF No. 24). For the reasons stated below, the Motion is
DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
This insurance coverage action arises out of the sexual harassment of a minor employee,
Brian Norman, by his supervisor, Cameron Ford, at a Rural King store between December 2020
and May 2021. Plaintiff Twin City Fire Insurance Company (“Twin City”) issued the relevant
insurance policy to “RK Family, Inc.” for the policy period of March 31, 2022 to March 31, 2023.
(“ Policy”). (ECF No. 1-4.) The parties dispute whether, under that Policy, Twin City owes
coverage to the RK Defendants in connection with the Charge of Employment Discrimination
dually filed by Brian Norman before the Ohio Civil Rights Commission and the United States
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“the Charges”); and Norman’s civil lawsuit against
RK Holdings. See Norman v. RK Holdings, LLP et al., No. 2:22-cv-03704-ALM-EPD (S.D. Ohio,
filed Oct. 16, 2022) (hereinafter "Norman Lawsuit").
A. Criminal Proceedings
On June 10, 2021, Ford was indicted by a grand jury in Union County, Ohio on charges of
rape, sexual battery, and compelling prostitution as to Norman. (hereinafter the “Criminal

Proceeding”). (ECF No. 1 ¶ 8). On May 17, 2022, he pled guilty to multiple charges and was
sentenced to 23 to 26 years in prison following his guilty plea. (Id.) He is currently incarcerated.
(Id.).
B. Charges of Discrimination
On or about June 7, 2022, Norman brought Charges of Discrimination (“Charges”) before
the Ohio Civil Rights Commission and with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”). (ECF No. 1 ¶ 1). The Charges allege that, while employed by Rural
King in Marysville, Ohio, Norman was the victim of discrimination and sexual harassment over a
period of several months by his supervisor, Ford. (Id. ¶ 9). The Charges also allege that Ford’s

manager, Defendant Shaun Amrine, has known about the harassment since February 2021 but
allowed it to continue, resulting in Norman and nine other minor employees being harassed by
Ford. (Id.).
C. Norman Lawsuit
After receiving right-to-sue letters, Norman sued RK Defendants on October 16, 2022.
See Norman v. RK Holdings, LLP et al., No. 2:22-cv-03704-ALM-EPD (S.D. Ohio, filed Oct. 16,
2022) (hereinafter "Norman Lawsuit"). As alleged in the Complaint, beginning in January or
February 2020, “Ford began sexually harassing [Norman] during work hours and while
supervising Plaintiff by soliciting him to show Ford his genitals, and to allow Ford to touch his
genitals.” (ECF No. 1-2 ¶ 5). Ford's harassment “intensified during February and March 2020
with Ford sexually assaulting Plaintiff during work hours by grabbing Plaintiffs genitals[] and
offering Plaintiff significant amounts of money to see Plaintiffs genitals.” (Id. ¶ 6). According
to Norman, on or about March 5, 2021, he informed Defendant Shaun Armine—who also worked
for RK Defendants—about Ford's sexual harassment. (Id. ¶ 11). Armine allegedly instructed

Norman “to not tell anyone else about the harassment” and “took no immediate action against
Ford.” (Id.). Between March 7, 2021, and March 13, 2021, Ford continued to supervise Norman
“and continued to sexually harass and sexually assault [him] during work hours.” (Id. ¶ 12).
During that period, Armine allegedly called Norman while he was not working “and repeated his
instructions to not tell anyone else about Ford's behaviors.” (Id. ¶ 13). On March 16, 2021, Armine
“finally terminated Ford and reported his behavior to Police.” (Id. ¶ 14). The Complaint further
alleges that Ford had a history of harassing minor employees. (Id. ¶ 10). The Norman Lawsuit
seeks to hold RK Defendants liable for negligence and sexual harassment under Title VII, Ohio
Rev. Code § 4112, and Ohio common law. (Id. ¶¶ 16 – 26). For relief, Norman seeks compensatory

damages, punitive damages, and “[a]n injunction prohibiting Rural King from hiring minors as
employees in the State of Ohio and all other States. injunctive relief.” (ECF No. 1-2 at 6).
D. Twin City Insurance Policy
Twin City issued the relevant insurance policy, No. KB 0435776-22, to “RK Family, Inc.,”
effective from March 31, 2022 to March 31, 2023. containing an Employment Practices Liability
Coverage Part, which provides, in part, as follows:
EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES COVERAGE LIABILITY PART
I. INSURING AGREEMENTS
(A) Employment Practices Liability
The Insurer shall pay Loss on behalf of the Insureds
resulting from an Employment Practices Claim first made
against the Insureds during the Policy Period or Extended
Reporting Period, if applicable, for an Employment
Practices Wrongful Act by the Insureds.
***
II. DEFINITIONS
***
“Claim” means any:
(1) Employment Practices Claim . . .
“Employment Practices Claim” means any of the
following if made by or on behalf of an Employee, an
applicant for employment with an Insured Entity, or an
Independent Contractor:
(1) a written demand for monetary damages or other civil
non-monetary relief commenced by the receipt of such
demand, including, without limitation, a written demand
for employment reinstatement;
(2) a civil proceeding, including an arbitration or other
alternative dispute resolution proceeding, commenced
by the service of a complaint, filing of a demand for
arbitration, or similar pleading;
(3) a formal administrative or regulatory proceeding,
including, without limitation, a proceeding before the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or similar
governmental agency, commenced by the Insured’s
receipt of a notice of charges, formal investigative order
or similar document, or by the Insured’s having evidence
of a filing related thereto; or
(4) a criminal proceeding commenced by the return of an
indictment or similar document.
***
“Employment Practices Wrongful Act” means any:
(1) wrongful dismissal, discharge, or termination of
employment (including constructive dismissal,
discharge, or termination), wrongful failure or refusal to
employ or promote, wrongful discipline or demotion,
failure to grant tenure, negligent employment
evaluation, or wrongful deprivation of career
opportunity including giving of negative or defamatory
statements in connection with an employee reference;
(2) Sexual or other workplace harassment, including, but not
limited to, workplace bullying, same gender sexual
harassment, quid pro quo and hostile work environment;
(3) employment discrimination, including discrimination
based upon age, gender, race, color, national origin,
religion, creed, marital status, sexual orientation or
preference, gender identity or expression, genetic
makeup, or refusal to submit to genetic makeup testing,
pregnancy, disability, HIV or other health status,
Vietnam Era Veteran or other military status, or other
protected status established under federal, state, or local
law;
(4) Retaliation;
(5) breach of any oral, written, or implied employment
contract, including, without limitation, any obligation
arising from a personnel manual, employee handbook,
or policy statement;
(6) employment-related defamation (including libel and
slander) or misrepresentation;
(7) employment-related violation of the Family and Medical
Leave Act, Age Discrimination in Employment Act and
the Equal Pay Act;
(8) employment-related; false arrest or imprisonment and
malicious prosecution; or
(9) any other employment-related tort occurring in the
workplace other than those mentioned below in this
definition.
* * *
“Wrongful Act” means any actual or alleged: (1)
Employment Practices Wrongful Act; or (2) Third Party
Wrongful Act.

(ECF No. 1 ¶ 12; ECF No. 1-4 at 33).
The COMMON TERMS AND CONDITIONS of the Twin City Policy provide, in part,
as follows:
II. COMMON DEFINITIONS
***
Interrelated Wrongful Acts means Wrongful Acts that
have as a common nexus any fact, circumstance, situation,
event, or transaction, or series of causally connected facts,
circumstances, situations, events or transactions.
***
X. INTERRELATIONSHIP OF CLAIMS
***
All Claims based upon, arising from or in any way related
to the same Wrongful Act or Interrelated Wrongful Acts
shall be deemed to be a single Claim for all purposes under
this Policy first made on the earliest date that:

(A) any of such CLAIMS was first made, regardless of
whether such date is before or during the Policy Period;

(ECF No. 1-4 at 12, 18). Pursuant to this Policy, RK Defendants demanded that Twin City defend
and indemnify the RK Entities against the Charges and the Norman Lawsuit. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 14).
Twin City denies that it owes any defense or indemnity obligation with respect to the Charges and
the Norman Lawsuit under the Twin City Policy. (Id. ¶ 15).
E. Procedural History
Twin City filed its Complaint on May 9, 2024, seeking a judicial declaration that it owes
no coverage to the RK Defendants in connection with the Charges and the Norman lawsuit. (ECF
No. 1). On August 29, 2024, the RK Defendants filed an Amended Answer, in which they asserted
counterclaims for breach of contract and declaratory judgment. (ECF No. 13). On February 19,

2025, Twin City filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF No. 24), which RK
Defendants opposed (ECF No. 25). On August 29, 2024, RK Defendants filed an Amended
Answer, in which they asserted counterclaims for breach of contract and declaratory judgment.
(ECF No. 13). On February 19, 2025, Twin City filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
(ECF No. 24), which RK Defendants opposed (ECF No. 25). This matter is now ripe for
resolution.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), “[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early
enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c).

“For purposes of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, all well-pleaded material allegations of
the pleadings of the opposing party must be taken as true, and the motion may be granted only if
the moving party is nevertheless clearly entitled to judgment.” JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v.
Winget, 510 F.3d 577, 581 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Southern Ohio Bank v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 479 F.2d 478, 480 (6th Cir. 1973)). But a court “need not accept as true
legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences.” Id. at 581–82 (quoting Mixon v. Ohio, 193
F.3d 389, 400 (6th Cir. 1999)). A Rule 12(c) motion “is granted when no material issue of fact
exists and the party making the motion is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Paskvan v. City
of Cleveland Civil Serv. Comm'n, 946 F.2d 1233, 1235 (6th Cir. 1991).
III. LAW & ANALYSIS
Plaintiff argues that it is entitled to judgment on the pleadings, because the Norman
Lawsuit, the Charges, and the Criminal Proceedings constitute a single “Employment Practices
Claim” arising from the same “Wrongful Acts” or “Interrelated Wrong Acts” and made outside the
Twin City Policy period. (See generally ECF No. 24). Defendants oppose, arguing that: (1) under

governing Ohio law, the Policy is ambiguous; (2) the State of Ohio’s Indictment was not asserted
on behalf of Mr. Norman or Mr. Amrine as to render it an “Employment Practices Claim” under
the Policy; and (3) the Indictment, Charge, and Lawsuit are not “Interrelated Wrongful Acts
pursuant to the Policy.” (See generally ECF No. 25). Both parties rely on Ohio law in their
briefing. (See ECF No. 24-1 at 9 n.3 (noting no substantive difference between Ohio law—where
the alleged harassment occurred, the underlying criminal proceedings, Charges, and Norman
lawsuit were filed—and Illinois law, where the Policy was issued); ECF No. 25 at 7–9).
“It is axiomatic that an insurer may maintain a declaratory judgment action to determine
its rights and obligations under a contract of insurance. A liability insurer's obligation to its insured

arises only if the claim falls within the scope of coverage.” Florists' Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ludy
Greenhouse Mfg. Corp., 521 F. Supp. 2d 661, 670–71 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (quoting Cincinnati
Indem. Co. v. Martin, 85 Ohio St.3d 604, 605, 710 N.E.2d 677 (1999) (citation omitted)). In Ohio,
insurance policies are generally interpreted by applying rules of construction and interpretation
applicable to basic contract law. Id. (citing City of Sharonville v. Am. Employers Ins. Co., 109
Ohio St.3d 186, 187, 846 N.E.2d 833 (2006)). Language in a contract of insurance reasonably
susceptible of more than one meaning will be construed liberally in favor of the insured and strictly
against the insurer. Faruque v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 31 Ohio St.3d 34, 508 N.E.2d
949, syl. ¶ 1 (1987). Nonetheless, only ambiguous provisions are to be strictly construed against
the insurer. Florists' Mut. Ins. Co., 521 F. Supp. 2d at 670–71 (citing GenCorp, Inc. v. Am. Intern.
Underwriters, 178 F.3d 804, 818 (6th Cir.1999)). This “general rule of liberal construction,”
moreover, “cannot be used to create an ambiguity where one does not exist.” Monticello Ins. Co.
v. Hale, 284 F.Supp.2d 898, 901 (S.D. Ohio 2003) (citations omitted). “If the terms of a policy
are clear and unambiguous, a court must enforce the contract as written, giving words used in the

contract their plain and ordinary meaning.” Id.
This Court will first determine whether the term “Employment Practices Claim” is
ambiguous. If the term is ambiguous, this Court will construe the ambiguity liberally in favor of
the insured (Defendants) and strictly against the insurer (Plaintiff). Florists' Mut. Ins. Co., 521 F.
Supp. 2d at 670–71. If the term is clear and unambiguous, however, this Court will give the words
their plain and ordinary meaning and enforce the policy as written.
As relevant here, the Policy defines “Employment Practices Claim” as “any of the
following if made by or on behalf of an Employee, an applicant for employment with an Insured
Entity, or an Independent Contractor”:

(1) a written demand for monetary damages or other civil
non-monetary relief commenced by the receipt of such
demand, including, without limitation, a written demand
for employment reinstatement;

(2) a civil proceeding, including an arbitration or other
alternative dispute resolution proceeding, commenced
by the service of a complaint, filing of a demand for
arbitration, or similar pleading;

(3) a formal administrative or regulatory proceeding,
including, without limitation, a proceeding before the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or similar
governmental agency, commenced by the Insured’s
receipt of a notice of charges, formal investigative order
or similar document, or by the Insured’s having evidence
of a filing related thereto; or
(5) a criminal proceeding commenced by the return of an
indictment or similar document.

(ECF No. 1 ¶ 12; ECF No. 1-4 at 33).
Twin City first argues that the Norman Lawsuit qualifies an “Employment Practices
Claim” under the first section of the Twin City Policy definition, “because the suit was filed by
Mr. Norman, an employee of the RK Defendants, and is a civil proceeding that was commenced
by the filing and service of the complaint.” (ECF No. 24-1 at 11). It further contends that the
“Charges likewise qualify as an ‘Employment Practices Claim’ under subsection two because they
are administrative proceedings which were commenced by Mr. Norman with a filing before the
Ohio Civil Rights Commission . . . and, upon information and belief, dually filed with the United
States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and were received by the RK Defendants.”
(Id.). Finally, according to Twin City, the Criminal Proceedings constitute an “Employment
Practices Claim” under subsection three of the Twin City Policy, “as it was initiated by the State
of Ohio on behalf of the people of the State and all Mr. Ford’s victims, including Mr. Norman, an

employee of RK.” (Id.).
RK Defendants take issue with the last point. Specifically, they counter that “[a]lthough
Mr. Norman was a former employee of Rural King, the Indictment against Mr. Ford was not made
by or on behalf of Mr. Norman.” (ECF No. 25 at 10). As such, they contend that “the criminal
proceeding does not meet the definition of an ‘Employment Practices Claim’” and thus cannot be
one that is “interrelated” with the Norman Lawsuit or the Charges. (Id.)
At this stage, this Court cannot conclude as a matter of law that the Indictment qualifies as
a Claim “by or on behalf of” Mr. Norman under the Policy to qualify as an “Employment Practices
Claim” such that it may be “interrelated” with the Norman Lawsuit or the Charges. On the one
hand, the Policy expressly includes “a criminal proceeding commenced by the return of an
indictment” within the definition of Claim. On the other hand, the threshold qualifier is that the
Claim be made “by or on behalf of an Employee.” Because a criminal indictment is brought by the
State in its sovereign capacity, see Collyer v. Darling, 98 F.3d 211, 222 (6th Cir.1996); Mercer v.
Lexington Fayette Urban County Gov't., 52 F.3d 325 (6th Cir.1995), it arguably does not depend

on an employee’s decision to initiate or pursue relief as to be made “by or on behalf” of Mr.
Norman.
Resisting this conclusion, Twin City contends that there is no ambiguity because the Sixth
Circuit has interpreted the phrase “on behalf of” as meaning “in the interest of; as the representative
of; for the benefit of.” (See ECF No. 24-1 at 11 (citing Platt v. Bd. of Commissioners on
Grievances & Discipline of Ohio Supreme Ct., 894 F.3d 235, 247 (6th Cir.2018) (holding that the
words “on behalf of” in provision which provides “that a judge or judicial candidate shall not
‘[m]ake speeches on behalf of a political party or another candidate for public office’” does not
render the rule unconstitutionally vague, agreeing with the district court that this language “is not

difficult to understand and would provide an ordinary person fair notice of what conduct is
prohibited”) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
But a criminal indictment being brought “on behalf of” the State of Ohio does not render
it clear and unambiguous that it was brought “on behalf of” Mr. Norman to qualify as an
“Employment Practices Claim,” as defined in the Policy. The term “on behalf of” is undefined in
the contract and therefore ambiguous. See Salon XL Color & Design Grp., LLC v. W. Bend Mut.
Ins. Co., 517 F. Supp. 3d 725, 729–30 (E.D. Mich. 2021) (finding that insurance policy which
states that it will cover “direct physical loss or damage” but does not define “loss” or “damage”
render the terms “in this contract is ambiguous, and ambiguities in an insurance contract are
construed in favor of the insured”).
Accordingly, because the terms of the Policy are unambiguous, this Court construes the
ambiguity against Plaintiff. Accordingly, its motion for judgment on the pleadings is DENIED.
(ECF No. 24).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is
DENIED. (ECF No. 24).
IT IS SO ORDERED.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
DATED: September 29, 2025

12

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11153885. Public record. Not legal advice.