# State ex rel. Gabriel v. Youngstown

> Ohio Supreme Court · June 19, 1996 · 75 Ohio St. 3d 618

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11153227

## Case

- **Court:** Ohio Supreme Court
- **Decided:** June 19, 1996
- **Citations:** 75 Ohio St. 3d 618; 1996 Ohio 445
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Cited by:** 4 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11153227

## Opinion text

[This opinion has been published in Ohio Official Reports at 75 Ohio St.3d 618.]

THE STATE EX REL. GABRIEL ET AL., APPELLEES, v. CITY OF YOUNGSTOWN ET
AL.; OHIO COUNCIL 8, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND

MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO, ET AL., APPELLANTS.
[Cite as State ex rel. Gabriel v. Youngstown, 1996-Ohio-445.]
Criminal law—Drug offenses—R.C. 2925.03(M), 2925.11(F)(1) and 9225.23(H)
do not violate the due process or equal protection provisions of the Ohio
or United States Constitution.
(No. 95-1378—Submitted April 30, 1996—Decided June 19, 1996.)
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Mahoning County, No. 89 C.A. 179.
__________________
{¶ 1} In December 1989, three environmental health sanitarians employed
in the Youngstown City Health District filed a complaint in the Court of Appeals
for Mahoning County. The sanitarians alleged that in September 1989, the board
of health for the health district passed a resolution granting them each a $3,000
salary increase retroactive to January 1989. According to the sanitarians, despite
the board’s request that legislation be prepared to enact the retroactive wage
increase, the Youngstown City Council failed to pass the necessary ordinances.
The sanitarians requested that the court of appeals issue a writ of mandamus to
compel (1) the city council members to enact the required ordinances, (2) the
president of the city council and the mayor to approve the legislation, and (3) the
city finance director to pay the wages pursuant to the ordered legislation. The court
of appeals issued an alternative writ.
{¶ 2} In March 1990, the court of appeals, on motion of respondents city
officials, joined appellants, Ohio Council 8, American Federation of State, County
and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO (“AFSCME”), AFSCME Regional Director
Thomas Nowel, and AFSCME Local 2312 President Sylverio Caggiano, as
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respondents. Appellants filed motions to dismiss or for summary judgment. The
sanitarians also moved for summary judgment. In December 1991, the court of
appeals overruled appellants’ motion for summary judgment and granted the
sanitarians’ motion in part. The court of appeals held that employees of the city
board of health such as the sanitarians were state employees who were not bound
by the collective bargaining agreement between the city and AFSCME. The court
of appeals thus concluded that the collective bargaining agreement’s grievance and
arbitration procedure did not preclude the sanitarians’ mandamus action.
{¶ 3} In 1995, after the parties filed evidence, the court of appeals denied
the writ and granted judgment in favor of appellants and the city official
respondents on the basis that the board of health failed to timely submit appropriate
forms for sufficient appropriations to cover the approved wage increases. However,
the court of appeals reiterated its December 1991 ruling that the sanitarians, as
employees of the city board of health, were state employees not within the
bargaining unit of the collective bargaining agreement between Youngstown and
AFSCME.
{¶ 4} This cause is now before the court upon AFSCME, Nowel, and
Caggiano’s appeal as of right. Although AFSCME and these union officials filed
a merit brief, none of the other parties in the court of appeals action filed a brief.
__________________
Ronald H. Janetzke, Special Counsel to the President, and R. Sean Grayson,
General Counsel, for appellants.
__________________
Per Curiam.
{¶ 5} Appellants assert in several propositions of law that the court of
appeals erred in several respects. As a preliminary matter, since appellants are
appealing from a judgment which denied the writ they were contesting, it must be
determined if they possess standing to appeal.

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January Term, 1996

{¶ 6} “Appeal lies only on behalf of a party aggrieved by the final order
appealed from. Appeals are not allowed for the purpose of settling abstract
questions, but only to correct errors injuriously affecting the appellant.” Ohio
Contract Carriers Assn. v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1942), 140 Ohio St. 160, 23 O.O.
369, 42 N.E.2d 758, syllabus; Ohio Domestic Violence Network v. Pub. Util.
Comm. (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 438, 439, 605 N.E.2d 13, 14.
{¶ 7} Appellants and various city officials were parties to the mandamus
action filed in the court of appeals. The court of appeals determined in part that
city board of health employees are employees of a state agency who are not covered
by the collective bargaining agreement between the city and AFSCME. If not
appealed, the court of appeals’ determination might be res judicata, thereby
precluding AFSCME from bargaining on behalf of city board of health employees.
See, generally, Grava v. Parkman Twp. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 379, 653 N.E.2d 226,
syllabus (“A valid, final judgment rendered upon the merits bars all subsequent
actions based upon any claim arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was
the subject matter of the previous action.”). Therefore, appellants are aggrieved
and possess the requisite standing to contest the foregoing determination by the
court of appeals.
{¶ 8} Appellants also challenge the court of appeals’ failure to grant their
motions to dismiss or for summary judgment based on their arguments that the
sanitarians failed to exhaust their contractual and administrative remedies.
However, since judgment on the sanitarians’ mandamus claim for retroactive wage
increases was ultimately denied in favor of appellants and the respondents city
officials, the court need not issue an advisory opinion to discuss whether additional
reasons supported denial of the requested mandamus relief. See, e.g., Joyce v. Gen.
Motors Corp. (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 93, 96, 551 N.E.2d 172, 174 (reviewing court
is generally not authorized to review a correct judgment merely because erroneous
reasons for the judgment were given); Tschantz v. Ferguson (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d

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131, 133, 566 N.E.2d 655, 657 (“[T]his case presents no issue of public importance
worthy of an advisory opinion from this court.”). Therefore, we do not address
these latter contentions.
{¶ 9} The court of appeals’ determination that city board of health
employees are state employees is consistent with precedent. See, generally,
Johnson’s Markets, Inc. v. New Carlisle Dept. of Health (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 28,
33, 567 N.E,2d 1018, 1023-1024; St. Bernard Bd. of Health v. St. Bernard (1969),
19 Ohio St.2d 49, 48 O.O.2d 57, 249 N.E.2d 888, paragraph two of the syllabus;
State ex rel. Mowrer v. Underwood (1940), 137 Ohio St. 1, 17 O.O. 298, 27 N.E.2d
773. Appellants contend that Johnson’s Markets should be “clarified,” since the
General Assembly never intended city health departments and city health districts
to be state agencies for labor relations purposes.
{¶ 10} In Harrison v. Judge (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 766, 591 N.E.2d 704,
appellant AFSCME raised the same argument. See 199 Ohio Supreme Court Briefs
and Records (5th Series), case No. 91-1106, AFSCME’s Nov. 15, 1991 brief, at 27-
29. We rejected AFSCME’s contentions in this regard and adopted the court of
appeals’ determination in Harrison that the city health district, and the board of
health formed thereunder, are state agencies, and that employees of the board of
health are governed by state law. Id., 63 Ohio St.3d at 768, 591 N.E.2d at 705-706.
Therefore, the court of appeals in the case at bar did not err in concluding that
employees of the Youngstown Board of Health are state employees. In effect, the
board of health is a separate entity from the city, and the board’s employees are
subject to state law. Id.; see, also, State ex rel. Fenwick v. Finkbeiner (Feb. 25,
1994), Lucas App. No. L-93-367, unreported, 1994 WL 67868, reversed on other
grounds, State ex rel. Fenwick v. Finkbeiner (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 457, 650 N.E.2d
896.
{¶ 11} The court of appeals further determined that employees of the
Youngstown Board of Health are not within the bargaining unit of the collective

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January Term, 1996

bargaining agreement between the city and AFSCME due to the employees’ status
as state employees. Local 2312 of AFSCME is the deemed certified bargaining
agent for certain employees of Youngstown. The deemed certified bargaining unit
contained employees of the city health board, including sanitarians.1 Subsequent
collective bargaining agreements between the city and AFSCME also included
health board employees in the bargaining unit.
{¶ 12} In Harrison, supra, 63 Ohio St.3d at 770-771, 591 N.E.2d at 707, we
adopted the court of appeals’ opinion, which held:
“The trial court properly determined that the board [of health] and Barberton
are separate political entities. However, the trial court did not have the power to
alter the existing employee bargaining unit, as the structure of a bargaining unit
may only be altered by SERB. We cannot find, nor are we directed to, any authority
which prohibits the board and Barberton from entering into joint negotiations with
AFSCME and the existing bargaining unit. The trial court erred in determining that
the board may engage in exclusive negotiations with its employees. Until the board,
Barberton, AFSCME, or the employees in the existing bargaining unit request that
SERB change the structure of the present bargaining unit and/or the exclusive
representative, the board and Barberton must jointly observe the status quo with
regard to the existing employee bargaining unit with AFSCME as the exclusive
representative of such unit.”
{¶ 13} Similarly, in the instant case, the court of appeals erred in concluding
that Youngstown Board of Health employees are not within the bargaining unit
covered by the applicable collective bargaining agreements between the city and

1. “Also known as a ‘historical unit,’ a deemed certified collective bargaining agent is the employee
representative who bargained with the employer on behalf of public employees in a collective
bargaining relationship that predated the passage of the Ohio Collective Bargaining Act. Rather
than being certified by SERB according to the normal certification procedure provided for under the
Act, such units were ‘deemed certified’ by the grandfather clause of Section 4(A) of Am.Sub.S.B.
No. 133, and are treated as if they had been certified normally.” State ex rel. Brecksville Edn. Assn.
v. State Emp. Relations Bd. (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 665, 666, 660 N.E.2d 1199, 1200, fn. 1.

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AFSCME. No member of the Youngstown Board of Health ever complained about
the city’s representation of it in negotiations with AFSCME concerning the board’s
employees. In addition, there is no evidence of a challenge by another employee
organization to AFSCME’s representation of Youngstown Board of Health
employees or any joint petition by the board and AFSCME to alter the bargaining
unit. See Ohio Council 8, Am. Fedn. of State, Cty. & Mun. Emp., AFL-CIO v.
Cincinnati (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 677, 635 N.E.2d 361, syllabus (“*** Pursuant to
Section 4[A] [of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 133], adjustments or alterations to deemed
certified collective bargaining units are not permitted until challenged by another
employee organization.”); Brecksville, supra (State Employment Relations Board
has jurisdiction to consider joint petition by the public employer and public
employee representative for amended certification of the deemed certified
collective bargaining unit).
{¶ 14} Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals insofar
as it held that employees of the Youngstown Board of Health are not within the
bargaining unit covered by the collective bargaining agreement between
Youngstown and AFSCME. In all other respects, the judgment of the court of
appeals is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed in part
and reversed in part.
MOYER, C.J, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and COOK, JJ., concur.
DOUGLAS and STRATTON, JJ., concur separately.
__________________

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January Term, 1996

DOUGLAS, J., concurring.
{¶ 15} I concur in the judgment of the majority and, in particular, in the
majority’s finding that the employees of the Youngstown Board of Health are
members of the bargaining unit covered by the collective bargaining agreement
between Youngstown and AFSCME. However, I write separately because if this
is so, and it is, then the sanitarians are subject to the grievance and arbitration
procedures set forth in the collective bargaining agreement and, accordingly,
mandamus would not be available to them. I believe the majority, to be consistent
with its finding of bargaining-unit membership, should have denied mandamus
relief.
STRATTON, J., concurs in the foregoing concurring opinion.
__________________

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11153227. Public record. Not legal advice.