# State ex rel. Butler Cty. Children Serv. Bd. v. Sage

> Ohio Supreme Court · April 3, 2002 · 95 Ohio St. 3d 23

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11153017

## Case

- **Court:** Ohio Supreme Court
- **Decided:** April 3, 2002
- **Citations:** 95 Ohio St. 3d 23; 2002 Ohio 1494
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Cited by:** 6 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11153017

## Opinion text

[This decision has been published in Ohio Official Reports at 95 Ohio St.3d 23.]

THE STATE EX REL. BUTLER COUNTY CHILDREN SERVICES BOARD,
APPELLANT, v. SAGE, JUDGE, APPELLEE.
[Cite as State ex rel. Butler Cty. Children Serv. Bd. v. Sage, 2002-Ohio-1494.]
Mandamus sought to direct common pleas court judge not to disclose child abuse
records—Dismissal of complaint affirmed.
(No. 01-1668—Submitted February 5, 2002—Decided April 3, 2002.)
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Butler County, No. CA2001-07-164.
__________________
Per Curiam.
{¶ 1} In May 1999, James Hughes, Sharon Hughes, and their minor
daughter, Mary Hughes, filed a complaint in the Butler County Court of Common
Pleas alleging that appellant, Butler County Children Services Board (“BCCSB”),
and certain of its employees had committed defamation and various other tortious
acts. The plaintiffs filed a motion to compel BCCSB and the other defendants to
produce a protective-service referral form that BCCSB claimed was privileged.
The form included child-abuse allegations. The plaintiffs alternatively requested
that the common pleas court conduct an in camera inspection of the form to
determine whether it was privileged.
{¶ 2} After conducting an in camera inspection of the form, appellee, Butler
County Court of Common Pleas Judge Michael Sage, granted the motion to compel
disclosure of the form by entry dated July 12, 2001. The entry did not contain a
Civ.R. 54(B) express determination of no just reason for delay.
{¶ 3} On July 16, 2001, BCCSB filed a complaint in the Court of Appeals
for Butler County for a writ of mandamus or, in the alternative, a writ of prohibition
“directing the court not to disclose the child abuse records.” On July 18, 2001, the
court of appeals ordered Judge Sage not to release the form until August 2001 so
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

that BCCSB’s writ action could be resolved before that time. As the writ action
proceeded, BCCSB and the other defendants in the underlying action filed a notice
of appeal from Judge Sage’s July 12 entry.
{¶ 4} On August 1, 2001, the court of appeals dismissed the writ action.
The court of appeals reasoned that BCCSB had an adequate remedy by appeal to
challenge Judge Sage’s July 12 entry. This cause is now before the court upon
BCCSB’s appeal as of right.
{¶ 5} In its sole proposition of law, BCCSB contends that Judge Sage’s July
12, 2001 entry ordering BCCSB to release its confidential records during discovery
“is an order which is subject to an action in mandamus to challenge its validity.”
In the conclusion of its appellate brief, BCCSB claimed that “[a] reversal will allow
the Appellants to pursue an action in mandamus to challenge the validity of the trial
court’s order.” On appeal, BCCSB does not appear to specifically claim that the
court of appeals’ dismissal of its prohibition claim was erroneous.
{¶ 6} Regarding BCCSB’s mandamus claim, it requested a writ of
mandamus “directing the [common pleas] court not to disclose the child abuse
records.” “ ‘In general, if the allegations of a complaint for a writ of mandamus
indicate that the real objects sought are a declaratory judgment and a prohibitory
injunction, the complaint does not state a cause of action in mandamus and must be
dismissed for want of jurisdiction.’ ” State ex rel. Phillips v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of
Elections (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 535, 537, 757 N.E.2d 319, quoting State ex rel.
Grendell v. Davidson (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 629, 634, 716 N.E.2d 704; State ex rel.
Walker v. Bowling Green (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 391, 392, 632 N.E.2d 904.
BCCSB’s mandamus claim is merely an ill-disguised request for prohibitory
injunctive relief, i.e., to prevent Judge Sage from disclosing the child abuse records.
Therefore, the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction and properly dismissed the

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January Term, 2002

mandamus claim. See State ex rel. Forsyth v. Brigner (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 71,
72, 711 N.E.2d 684.1
{¶ 7} Moreover, even if BCCSB’s argument here were sufficiently broad to
encompass its prohibition claim, dismissal is additionally warranted for the
following reasons.
{¶ 8} As we have consistently held, “ ‘trial courts have the requisite
jurisdiction to decide issues of privilege; thus extraordinary relief in prohibition
will not lie to correct any errors in decisions of these issues.’ ” State ex rel. Abner
v. Elliott (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 11, 16, 706 N.E.2d 765, 769, quoting State ex rel.
Herdman v. Watson (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 537, 538, 700 N.E.2d 1270; State ex rel.
Children’s Med. Ctr. v. Brown (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 194, 196, 571 N.E.2d 724;
Rath v. Williamson (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 419, 583 N.E.2d 1308.
{¶ 9} Finally, BCCSB has an adequate remedy by immediate appeal of
Judge Sage’s July 12, 2001 entry and a motion to stay the order pending appeal.
Neither prohibition nor mandamus will issue if the relator has an adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law. State ex rel. Shimko v. McMonagle (2001), 92 Ohio
St.3d 426, 428, 751 N.E.2d 472.
{¶ 10} Notwithstanding BCCSB’s claims to the contrary, the July 12, 2001
entry that granted the provisional remedy ordering the discovery of the allegedly
privileged record did not need to comply with Civ.R. 54(B) to constitute a final
appealable order. A provisional remedy is a remedy other than a claim for relief.
Therefore, an order granting or denying a provisional remedy is not subject to the
requirements of Civ.R. 54(B). Bob Krihwan Pontiac-GMC Truck, Inc. v. Gen.
Motors Corp. (2001), 141 Ohio App.3d 777, 781-782, 753 N.E.2d 864; Premier
Health Care Serv., Inc. v. Schneiderman (Aug. 21, 2001), Montgomery App. No.

1. Even assuming that BCCSB is correct that the court of appeals erred in its specified rationale for
dismissal, this would not require reversal. See Johnson v. Timmerman-Cooper (2001), 93 Ohio
St.3d 614, 616, 757 N.E.2d 1153 (“we will not reverse a correct judgment based on an appellate
court’s erroneous rationale”).

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18795, unreported, 2001 WL 1479241; but, cf., Chambers v. Chambers (2000), 137
Ohio App.3d 355, 360, 738 N.E.2d 834.
{¶ 11} Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals properly dismissed
BCCSB’s action, and we affirm its judgment.
Judgment affirmed.
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.
__________________
Jack C. McGowan & Associates and Jack C. McGowan, for appellant.
__________________

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11153017. Public record. Not legal advice.