# Disciplinary Counsel v. Lawlor

> Ohio Supreme Court · July 18, 2001 · 92 Ohio St. 3d 406

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11152389

## Case

- **Court:** Ohio Supreme Court
- **Decided:** July 18, 2001
- **Citations:** 92 Ohio St. 3d 406; 2001 Ohio 195
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Cited by:** 2 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11152389

## Opinion text

[This decision has been published in Ohio Official Reports at 92 Ohio St.3d 406.]

OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. LAWLOR.
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Lawlor, 2001-Ohio-195.]
Attorneys at law—Misconduct—Indefinite suspension—Conviction for converting
funds of a corporation—Practicing law while registered inactive and
while under interim suspension.
(No. 00-2281—Submitted March 14, 2001—Decided July 18, 2001.)
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 00-26.
__________________
Per Curiam.
{¶ 1} On May 30, 1996, we suspended respondent, Patrick M. Lawlor of
Broadview Heights, Ohio, Attorney Registration No. 0041717, from the practice of
law for an interim period, having been advised that respondent pled guilty to a
felony and was sentenced to two years in prison. In re Lawlor (1996), 75 Ohio
St.3d 1500, 664 N.E.2d 1296.
{¶ 2} On April 17, 2000, relator, Disciplinary Counsel, filed a two-count
complaint charging that respondent had violated several rules of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Respondent answered, and the matter was referred to
a panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the
Supreme Court (“board”).
{¶ 3} Based on testimony and stipulations, the panel found that although
respondent was admitted to the bar in 1989, he never actively engaged in the
practice of law and on February 9, 1996, was put on inactive status by the Supreme
Court at his request. A month earlier, on January 19, 1996, respondent pled guilty
to the charge of “attempted aggravated grand theft,” a third degree felony. The plea
arose out of respondent’s conversion of $180,000 while he was treasurer of the
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

Cleveland Grays, a nonprofit men’s club. On April 15, 1996, the Cuyahoga County
Common Pleas Court sentenced respondent to two years in prison and ordered him
to pay restitution to the club. At the time of the sentencing hearing, respondent had
paid only $25,000 of the restitution ordered.
{¶ 4} The panel concluded that respondent’s conduct that resulted in the
felony conviction violated DR 1-102(A)(3) (engaging in illegal conduct involving
moral turpitude), 1-102(A)(4) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit, or misrepresentation), and 1-102(A)(6) (engaging in conduct adversely
reflecting on the lawyer’s ability to practice law).
{¶ 5} The panel also found that on May 19, 1999, while registered inactive
and while under interim suspension by virtue of our order of May 30, 1996,
respondent was president and majority shareholder of COB Clearinghouse
Corporation, a defendant in a civil action in the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas
Court. On that day, respondent filed an answer and counterclaim on behalf of the
corporation, signing it “Patrick M. Lawlor, JD, President, COB Clearinghouse
Corp.” On July 15, 1999, COB Clearinghouse filed a “First Amended Answer and
Counterclaim” signed by attorney Mark L. Wakefield.
{¶ 6} The panel concluded that by representing a corporation while
suspended from the practice of law, respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(5) (engaging
in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice), 1-102(A)(6) (engaging in
conduct adversely reflecting on the lawyer’s ability to practice law), and 3-101(B)
(practicing in a jurisdiction where doing so is in violation of the regulations of the
profession in that jurisdiction). Because respondent initially represented falsely
that he believed he was a codefendant in the action against COB Clearinghouse and
had filed an answer and counterclaim in that case on his own behalf, the panel found
that he also violated DR 1-102(A)(4).
{¶ 7} The panel recommended that respondent be indefinitely suspended
from the practice of law and that no petition for reinstatement be entertained until

2
January Term, 2001

respondent makes full restitution to the Cleveland Grays. The board adopted the
findings, conclusions, and recommendation of the panel.
{¶ 8} We accept the findings, conclusions, and recommendation of the
board. Respondent’s felony conviction for converting the funds of a corporation of
which he was treasurer would alone warrant disbarment. Disciplinary Counsel v.
Madden (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 238, 730 N.E.2d 379; Disciplinary Counsel v.
Bertram (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 113, 707 N.E.2d 464.
{¶ 9} However, having reviewed the record, we note that relator delayed
nearly four years after our interim suspension of respondent in 1996 to bring a
disciplinary action based on respondent’s felony conviction. Gov.Bar R.
V(4)(D)(2) states that no disciplinary investigation “shall be extended beyond one
year from the date of the filing of the grievance.” Although Gov.Bar R. V(4)(D)(3)
provides that an investigation that extends beyond one year is prima facie evidence
of unreasonable delay, no evidence was presented here that the rights of the
respondent to a fair hearing have been violated. Most of the pertinent facts have
been stipulated to by the parties. Nevertheless, we believe that some mitigation of
the penalty is appropriate because of the delay.
{¶ 10} Turning to the second count, we note that R.C. 4705.01 prohibits
anyone from practicing law or commencing or defending an action in which he is
not a party concerned unless he has been admitted to the bar by order of the
Supreme Court. Since Union Savings Assn. v. Home Owners Aid, Inc. (1970), 23
Ohio St.2d 60, 52 O.O.2d 329, 262 N.E.2d 558, we have consistently held that a
corporation may not maintain an action through an officer who is not a licensed
attorney. Cf. Worthington City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of
Revision (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 156, 707 N.E.2d 499. Although respondent was
admitted to the bar of Ohio, he had not only voluntarily taken inactive status, but
we had suspended him indefinitely from the practice. His filing a pleading on
behalf of a corporation, no matter how great his interest in the corporation,

3
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

constituted the practice of law. Respondent therefore engaged in the practice of
law in violation of our rules, and he was also in contempt of an order of this court.
{¶ 11} Respondent is hereby indefinitely suspended from the practice of
law in Ohio and is further prohibited from reinstatement until he has made full
restitution to the Cleveland Grays. Costs are taxed to respondent.
Judgment accordingly.
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.
__________________
Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Stacy Solochek Beckman,
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator.
Christopher J. Mallin, for respondent.
__________________

4

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11152389. Public record. Not legal advice.