# Columbia Toledo Corp. v. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Revision

> Ohio Supreme Court · August 21, 1996 · 76 Ohio St. 3d 361

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11150116

## Case

- **Court:** Ohio Supreme Court
- **Decided:** August 21, 1996
- **Citations:** 76 Ohio St. 3d 361; 1996 Ohio 383
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Cited by:** 2 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11150116

## Opinion text

[This opinion has been published in Ohio Official Reports at 76 Ohio St.3d 361.]

COLUMBIA TOLEDO CORPORATION, APPELLANT, v. LUCAS COUNTY BOARD OF
REVISION ET AL., APPELLEES.
[Cite as Columbia Toledo Corp. v. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Revision, 1996-Ohio-383.]
Taxation—Real property valuation—Appeal to Board of Tax Appeals dismissed
when R.C. 5715.19(A)(2) not complied with.
(No. 95-2676—Submitted June 27, 1996—Decided August 21, 1996.)
APPEAL from the Board of Tax Appeals, No. 94-K-815.
__________________
{¶ 1} Columbia Toledo Corporation (“Columbia”), appellant, filed a
complaint with the Lucas County Board of Revision (“BOR”) to contest its real
property tax valuation for the tax year 1993. Prior to the filing of its 1993
complaint, Columbia had filed a complaint for the tax year 1991. The three-year
interim period for Lucas County covered the tax years 1991, 1992 and 1993.
{¶ 2} The only witness appearing before the BOR on behalf of Columbia
was Les Fleckenstein, an administrative assistant with Columbia Sussex
Corporation, the owner of Columbia.
{¶ 3} The BOR dismissed Columbia’s complaint for failure to comply with
R.C. 5715.19(A)(2), which permits the filing of only one complaint within a three-
year interim period unless certain criteria are met. Columbia appealed the BOR’s
decision to the Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA”). The county filed a motion with the
BTA to dismiss the appeal because the complaint was the second Columbia had
filed within the same three-year interim period, and the complaint failed to comply
with R.C. 5715.19(A)(2). The BTA treated the county’s motion to dismiss as a
request to affirm the BOR’s decision. The BTA affirmed the BOR’s decision,
stating that Columbia had not complied with R.C. 5715.19(A)(2) when it filed its
complaint with the BOR.
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

{¶ 4} This cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right.
__________________
Baker & Hostetler and George H. Boerger, for appellant.
Anthony G. Pizza, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and Andrew J.
Barone, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellees Lucas County Board of
Revision and Lucas County Auditor.
__________________
Per Curiam.
{¶ 5} The statute in question, R.C. 5715.19(A)(2), provides:
“No person, board, or officer shall file a complaint against the valuation or
assessment of any parcel that appears on the tax list if it filed a complaint against
the valuation or assessment of that parcel for any prior tax year in the same interim
period, unless the person, board, or officer alleges that the valuation or assessment
should be changed due to one or more of the following circumstances that occurred
after the tax lien date for the tax year for which the prior complaint was filed and
that the circumstances were not taken into consideration with respect to the prior
complaint:
“* * *
“(d) An increase or decrease of at least fifteen per cent in the property’s
occupancy has had a substantial economic impact on the property.” (Emphasis
added.)
{¶ 6} R.C. 5715.19(A)(2) provides that no second complaint shall be filed
in the same interim period by the same person, board or officer for the same
property “unless” certain allegations are made. The complaint in question was the
second complaint filed in the same interim period on the same property. In
Gammarino v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Revision (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 388, 390, 643
N.E.2d 1143, 1144, we held that the BTA should have granted the auditor’s motion
to dismiss because in his second complaint Gammarino had “failed to assert the

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January Term, 1996

applicability of any of the circumstances enumerated in R.C. 5715.19(A)(2)(a)
through (d).”
{¶ 7} When Columbia filed its complaint against valuation for the tax year
1993, it answered the question on the complaint form as to why the increase or
decrease was justified by stating: “The income from this property does not justify
the current taxable value (see letter & data attached).” Attached to the complaint
were four pages of data printout of profit and loss statements for the years 1990
through 1993, a one page-summary describing the property, and a one-page letter
that summarized and listed selected financial data for the years 1988 through 1993.
No occupancy data was set forth in the letter. The letter merely stated that “[the]
property has been suffering from low occupancy over the years and the problem
has continued from 1990 [t]hrough 1993 as indicated by the financial analysis for
the property from 1988 through 1993.”
{¶ 8} It is Columbia’s contention that the data and attachments to the
complaint were sufficient to allege that it was filing under R.C. 5715.19(A)(2)(d)
because the data, if analyzed, would disclose that there had been an increase or
decrease in the property’s occupancy of at least fifteen percent that had a substantial
economic impact on the property. We disagree.
{¶ 9} Contrary to Columbia’s contention, it is not the responsibility of a
county board of revision to analyze raw data submitted by a taxpayer to determine
whether any of the circumstances enumerated in R.C. 5715.19(A)(2) is applicable.
The statute clearly places the burden on the taxpayer to allege one of the enumerated
circumstances in order to file a second complaint in the same interim period. After
the taxpayer has alleged at least one of the circumstances set forth in R.C.
5715.19(A)(2), then a county board of revision may undertake to analyze the data
to verify the taxpayer’s allegations.
{¶ 10} The language of R.C. 5715.19(A)(2) is very simple and it is very
clear—there can be no second appeal in the same interim period unless one of the

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SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

enumerated circumstances is alleged. In Am. Restaurant & Lunch Co. v. Glander
(1946), 147 Ohio St. 147, 34 O.O. 8, 70 N.E.2d 93, we held in paragraph one of the
syllabus: “Where a statute confers the right of appeal, adherence to the conditions
thereby imposed is essential to enjoyment of the right conferred.” Likewise, in this
case, the failure to meet the requirement of alleging at least one of the four
circumstances set forth in R.C. 5715.19(A)(2) deprived the county board of revision
of the jurisdiction to hear the second complaint filed in the same interim period.
{¶ 11} Based on the foregoing we find the decision of the Board of Tax
Appeals to be reasonable and lawful, and it is therefore affirmed.
Decision affirmed.
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and
STRATTON, JJ., concur.
__________________

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11150116. Public record. Not legal advice.
