# WARNER v. SHELL LEGACY HOLDINGS, LLC

> District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania · September 30, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11149554

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** September 30, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11149554

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that the district court abused its discretion in excluding an expert's opinion without conducting an in limine hearing focused on the Daubert reliability of his testimony
- recognizing the district court’s inherent discretion in interpreting and applying its own local rules
- holding tha “a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case 10 necessarily renders all other facts immaterial”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
STEPHEN L. WARNER, Executor )
of the Estate of GAGE W. ALLAM, )
etal., )
) Case No. 1:19-cv-326
Plaintiffs, )
)
Vv. )
)
SHELL LEGACY HOLDINGS, LLC, )
et al., )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION .
Susan Paradise Baxter, United States District Judge
This protracted litigation arises out of a former class action styled Walney, et al. v.
SWEPI LP, et al., No. 1:13-cv-102 (W.D. Pa.) in which class representatives Thomas J. Walney
and Rodney A. Bedow, Sr. alleged that SWEPI LP and its general partner Shell Energy Holding
GP, LLC breached the terms of certain Pennsylvania oil and gas leases by failing to pay bonus
monies that were allegedly owed to class members under the subject leases. On March 31, 2019,
the Court granted the Defendants’ motion to decertify the class after finding that the prerequisite
for class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) were no longer satisfied.
See Walney v. SWEPI LP, No. CV 13-102, 2019 WL 1436938 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2019).
Thereafter, many former class members continued the prosecution of their individual claims with
the filing of this civil action.
At this procedural juncture, the following Plaintiff-lessors continue to pursue their breach
of contract claims against Shell Legacy Holdings LLC (as successor in interest to SWEPI LP)
and Shell Energy Holding GP LLC (collectively, the “Defendants”): 1. Gage W. Allam (through

Executor Stephen Warner); 2. Jenine A. Anthony; 3. Sumner R. and Georgene Bemis; 4. Ronald
and Judy Bickel; 5. Clayton L. and Connie L. Blauser; 6. Dennis R. and Angela D. Boocks; 7.
Alma Lee Britt; 8. Warren Capenos (through executor Kathleen Barrett); 9. Barrett N. Clark and
Marcia L. Gordon; 10. John L. and Dianna J. Erwin; 11. Robert Evans; 12. Robert E. and Pamela
J. Exley; 13. Alfred L. and Robyn D. Freeman; 14. Florence R. Geibel; 15. Martin C. Geibel; 16.
Clarence R. & Janice R. Guillinger; 17. Malcom L. and Sandy J. Guiste; 18. Michael P. and Beth
A. Hutchinson; 19. Larry E. and Pamela J. Keverline; 20. Karen Latshaw; 21. Scott Michael
Lewis; 22. Stephen J. and Barbara L. Lewis; 23. David J. McCune, III and Lauren E. McCune;
24. Tracy L. Miliara; 25. Marc J. Rasschaert; 26. Rodgers Holdings; 27. Robert D. Shaffer; 28.
Carol Spellman Seltz (as Executor of the Estate of Harry J. Spellman and Helen M. Spellman);
29. Thomas J. Smerkar (through Executor Angela D. Books); 30. J ohn L. and Evelyn K. Stewart;
31. John P. and Barbara A. Yakimick; and 32. Richard Zink.
The parties have filed multiple cross-motions for summary judgment which are now ripe
for disposition. The Court’s rulings follow. '

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
SWEPI LP (“SWEPI’) was, at times relevant to this litigation, an oil and gas exploration
company that was engaged in leasing oil and gas interests from Pennsylvania landowners

The Court's subject matter jurisdiction is predicated on diversity of citizenship, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1332. Asa
federal court sitting in diversity, this court must apply the substantive law -- including the choice-of-law rules -- of
the state in which this court sits. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec.
Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941).
Here, the lease documents at issue were executed in Pennsylvania, by Pennsylvania landowners, and they involve
the purported conveyance of oil and gas rights existing under Pennsylvania law. As the parties agree that
Pennsylvania law applies to the disputed contractual claims, the Court will similarly apply Pennsylvania law. See
Schiavone Constr. Co. v. Time, Inc., 735 F.2d 94, 96 Gd Cir.1984) (‘The parties implicitly agree that New Jersey
law governs, and the district court applied New Jersey law. Inasmuch as New Jersey has an interest in the outcome
of this litigation ... we have no cause sua sponte to challenge that choice of law.”); 84 Lumber Co., LP. v. Bryan
Const. Co., Case No. 2:09-cv-1030, 2011 WL 666209, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Feb.14, 2011) (“In this case, the parties do
not dispute that Pennsylvania law applies to this case, and the Court need not engage in a choice of law analysis.”).

between 2011 and 2013. ECF No. 328, 43. SWEPI sometimes interacted directly with the
landowners but, at other times, it acted through contracted landmen, including Southeast Land
Services, LLC (“Southeast”), which was SWEPI’s principal independent contractor in Butler and
Venango Counties. ECF No. 329-1, Haney Decl., at (1.
As a general practice, SWEPI or its agents would initially identify individual landowners
who were believed to hold oil and gas rights and, if the landowner expressed an interest in
leasing its rights to SWEPI, the parties would then negotiate possible lease terms and bonus
payments. ECF No. 328, §4. Other companies were actively leasing in the same areas during
this time and, consequently, landowners would often negotiate with multiple oil and gas
companies at the same time they were negotiating with SWEPI or its contractors. Jd., (5; ECF
No. 329-1, Haney Decl. at §[ 6.
Once lease terms were negotiated, SWEPI or its agents would obtain a signed oil and gas
lease from the landowner and issue a bank draft that was drawn on Amegy Bank, NA
(“Amegy”), SWEPI’s bank. ECF No. 329-1, Haney Decl. at §4. The oil and gas lease consisted
of a pre-printed, form document with blank spaces for the date, the lessor’s identity, the premises
in question, and the relevant signatures. See, e.g., ECF No. 331-2 at 2-4. Additional
individualized terms were set forth in an addendum to the lease form. ECF No. 329-1, Haney
Decl. at (7. Because Pennsylvania is a race-notice state, and because landowners were often
negotiating with multiple oil and gas companies at the same time, SWEPI also obtained from
each landowner a signed Memorandum of Lease (“MOL”), which SWEPI would then record
while it conducted a title examination for the subject oil and gas rights. ECF No. 328, 95.
The amount of the negotiated lease bonus was not specified in the form lease or
addendum but was instead set forth in the bank draft issued to the landowner. ECF No. 329-1,

Haney Decl. at 98. The drafts typically provided that, upon Amegy’s receipt of the draft, SWEPI
would have 90 banking days (or sometimes fewer banking days) “for title examination and for
payment.” See, e.g., ECF No. 331-2 at 11. The drafts also contained language stating: “No
liability for payment or otherwise shall be attached to any of the parties hereto.” Jd.
After the form lease and the draft were exchanged and the MOL was recorded, SWEPI’s
agents would undertake an in-depth title search in the courthouse records to confirm that title to
the oil and gas interest was in the acreage amount represented, that the title was in the names of
the landowners who had signed the lease, and that no other problems existed anywhere in the
chain of title for the oil and gas interest. ECF No. 329-1, Haney Decl. at 10. To that end,
SWEPI contracted with Southeast in Pennsylvania to do exclusive title searches and other
research of title and then provide a confidential mineral interest ownership report and associated
title run sheets exclusively to SWEPI regarding each parcel that SWEPI leased from a
landowner. Jd. at 412. .
According to Ian Haney (“Haney”), who was SWEPI’s Land Representative and “area
focal point” in southwestern Pennsylvania, the title examination for each lease was a time-
consuming process that required substantial manual research at the courthouses in Butler and
Venango Counties. In the first part of 2012, dozens of other companies were also taking leases
from landowners and attempting to conduct title searches at the same time. Due to the resulting
congestion at the courthouse records office, the commissioners of Venango County imposed
restrictions on access to the recorder’s office in April 2012, limiting each company’s
representative to a maximum of 90 minutes per day. Haney states that, as a result of these
restrictions, SWEPI’s title searches in Venango County were delayed substantially and many

could not be completed within the time allowed by the bank drafts for title examination. ECF No|
329-1, Haney Decl. at 413.
SWEPI’s inability to complete courthouse title searches due to restrictions on courthouse
access in the Spring and Summer of 2012 was a substantial reason why many drafts in Venango □

County were canceled and not paid. In or about June 2012, SWEPI decided to stop taking new
leases in most of Venango County and to cancel any outstanding drafts that had not already been
paid. SWEPI’s decision was made for a combination of reasons, including the difficulties of
completing title searches and title evaluation on a timely basis and a decrease in the commodity
price of natural gas that made the Venango County area less attractive to SWEPI. Thereafter,
most Venango County drafts that had not already been paid were canceled and the leases
formally surrendered back to the landowners. Some of those leases also had title problems that
had been identified to the extent that SWEPI was able to complete some of the title searches.
ECF No. 329-1, Haney Decl. 420.
In cases where the title examination could be completed, the examination did not always
result in a finding that title was clean. Sometimes the title problems could be cured, e.g., by the
signing of a new lease reflecting the correct acreage and the correct ownership names, which
required cancellation of the bank draft and issuance of a new draft, if the landowner agreed.
Other times, the title could not be readily cured, and SWEPI would cancel the bank draft and
surrender the lease. In any case, SWEPI made its decision whether to cancel or pay the draft
prior to the due date on the instrument (usually 90 banking days). SWEPI or its contract
landmen would file written surrenders of the oil and gas lease in the county records. Once the
lease surrender was recorded, the landowner was typically notified by letter of the surrender and

could then re-lease the oil and gas rights to another company. ECF No. 329-1, Haney Decl. at
9914,18, 21.
The Plaintiffs in this action are among the landowners who signed lease forms and
MOLS for the benefit of SWEPI and who received bank drafts which were later cancelled. All
Plaintiffs assert a single cause of action for breach of contract relative to their respective
transactions.”

IL. THE TRANSACTIONAL DOCUMENTS
Several pre-printed form documents (the “Transactional Documents”) referenced above
inform the Court’s analysis of the disputed transactions. The Court previously summarized the
pertinent provisions of these documents as follows in the Walney class action:
A. The Form Lease Agreements
... Among the relevant documents are two materially identical lease agreements, i.e.,
“Paid Up Oil and Gas Lease, Rev. 06.09.2011” and “PA Paid Up Lease Rev. 05.01/2011” (ECF
Nos. 150-21 and 150-54, hereafter referred to collectively at times as the “Lease(s)” or the
“Lease Agreement(s)”).
The introductory clause of each form Lease stated: “This Lease Agreement is made and
entered into this [enter date] between [enter landowner's name] as Lessor (whether one or more),
and SWEPI LP, having an office at 190 THORN HULL ROAD, WARRENDALE,
PENNSYLVANIA 15086, as Lessee.” (ECF No. 150—21 (emphasis in the original).) Paragraph
1 of the Lease Agreement stated, in relevant part:
In consideration of the bonus consideration paid, the receipt of which is hereby
acknowledged, and in further consideration of the covenants and agreements herein
contained, Lessor does hereby grant, demise, lease and let exclusively to Lessee, its
successors and assigns, the lands hereafter described for the purpose of exploring for,
developing, producing and marketing oil, gas or other related substances produced in
association therewith ... in and under the following described land....
(id.) Paragraph 3 of the Lease established a primary lease term of five years which, at SWEPI's
option, could be extended if SWEPI made a specified extension payment, calculated on a “per
acre” basis, prior to the expiration of the primary term. (Id. § 3.) Paragraph 4 set forth the lessor's
entitlement to an 18% royalty payment for oil and gas produced and marketed from the leased

? Plaintiffs Ronald and Judy Bickel were issued two (2) drafts and assert separate claims on each draft. Plaintiff
Clarence R. Guilinger was likewise issued two (2) drafts and is pursuing separate claims for each draft. Plaintiff
Rogers Holdings was issued three (3) drafts and is pursuing claims on each draft.

premises. (Id. § 4.) Paragraph 10 of the Lease provided, in part, that: “Lessee at any time, and
from time to time, may surrender this lease as to all or any part thereof by recording an
appropriate instrument of surrender in the proper county and thereupon this lease and the rights,
rentals and obligations of the parties hereunder shall terminate as to the part so surrendered.”
(Id. { 10.) Paragraph 14 set forth a “force majeure” clause. (Id. { 14.) Paragraph 15 ensured that
“(njo default shall be declared against the Lessee for failure to make payment or perform any
conditions provided for herein unless the Lessee shall refuse or neglect to pay or perform the
same for sixty (60) days after having received written notice from Lessor.” (Id. § 15.) Paragraph
17 acknowledged:
This lease contains all of the agreements and understanding of the Lessor and Lessee
respecting the subject matter hereof and no implied covenants or obligations, or verbal
representations or promises have been made or relied upon by Lessor or Lessee
supplementing or modifying this lease or as an inducement thereto.
(Id. § 17.)
B. The Form Draft Instrument
Also relevant is the form draft instrument (hereafter, “Draft(s)” or “Draft
Instrument(s)”) that SWEPI issued to landowners in exchange for the signed Leases. Each Draft
Instrument contained standard language stating: “This draft when paid is payment in full for
lease or conveyance covering the following described land: [enter description].” (ECF No. 150—
30.) Each instrument contained the language “No Protest” and “Not a Cash Item.” (Id.) The
Drafts further provided that:
[t]he payor shall have _ banking days after receipt of this draft by the collecting bank,
whether accompanied by other papers or not, for title examination and for payment.
Neither forwarding bank nor payee(s) nor the grantor(s) of such lease or conveyance
may demand return of this draft or any accompanying papers prior to expiration of the
time fixed. Upon payment hereof collecting bank shall deliver this draft and any
accompanying papers to payor and remit payment to forwarding bank. No liability for
payment or otherwise shall be attached to any of the parties hereto.
(id.)
C. The Memorandum of Lease
‘The third standard document is the form MOL that class members executed and
delivered to SWEPI's landmen along with their signed Leases. The first two sentences of each
MOL state that: “THIS MEMORANDUM OF LEASE has been made to indicate the existence
of an Oil and Gas Lease (“Lease”) dated [ enter date] by and between [landowner] of [subject
property], as Lessor and SWEPI, LP ... as Lessee. Lessor did grant, demise, lease and let
exclusively to Lessee, its successors and assigns, the rights to explore, develop, produce, and
market oil and gas from [the subject property] subject to the provisions contained in the
\ Lease....” (ECF No. 150-23.) Paragraph 1 of the MOL further provides that:
The primary term of the Lease is for a period of Five (5) years commencing on the date
immediately set forth above and for so long thereafter as oil, gas or other substances
covered by the Lease are capable of being produced in paying quantities from the leased
premises or from lands pooled therewith or the Lease is otherwise maintained or

prolonged pursuant to the provisions contained in the Lease, including an extension of
term contained therein. Lessee may extend the primary term of the Lease for an
additional Five (5) years after the end of the primary term, thereby continuing the term
of the Lease to the end of the extended primary term.
(Id.) Elsewhere, the MOL acknowledges that its intended purpose is to “provid[e] notice in the
Recorders Office of [enter county] County, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, of the existence
of the Lease,” and it “shall not be considered in any way a modification or alteration of the
Lease.” (Id.)

Walney v. SWEPI, LP, 311 F. Supp. 3d 696, 703-05 (W.D. Pa. 2018), vacated in non-relevant
part, 596 F. Supp. 3d 544 (W.D. Pa. 2022).

I. THE PARTIES’ RESPECTIVE ARGUMENTS
The gravamen of this litigation concerns whether SWEPI owes each Plaintiff payment for
the bonus amounts that were negotiated relative to their leases. Underlying this larger dispute
are many subsidiary disagreements about, e.g., whether an enforceable agreement existed
between the parties, what documents comprise such an agreement, what the terms of the
agreement were, whether any obligation on SWEPI’s part to pay bonuses was excused or ever
arose in the first place, and whether the Plaintiffs’ chosen remedy is unavailable because of
existing title issues. Each side asserts that it is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.

A. Plaintiffs’ Position
Plaintiffs contend that the contracts at issue consist only of the signed lease forms along
with the personalized addenda. Plaintiffs regard the MOL and draft instruments as external to
the contract but still admissible evidence of the parties’ intent insofar as they do not contradict
the terms of the parties’ agreement.
Plaintiffs assert that each lease is an enforceable contract. They reason that SWEPI
manifested its intention to be bound by lease terms when it presented the form leases to the
landowners for execution and also when it accepted signed leases and recorded the

corresponding MOLs. Plaintiffs posit that the terms of the lease agreements are sufficiently
definite and are supported by mutual consideration, namely, a bonus payment, which was to be
paid contemporaneously with the landowners’ execution of the lease.
Plaintiffs deny that the terms of the draft modified the lease terms by delaying the time
for payment. They view the draft as a medium of payment, or a method of performance only, as
opposed to a document embodying contractual terms. Further, they insist that the “no liability”
language in the drafts must be strictly construed as affecting only the draft as a medium of
payment as opposed to negating SWEPI’s payment obligation.
Plaintiffs argue that SWEPI never properly rescinded the leases but, instead, cancelled
them. They insist that SWEPI’s stated reasons for doing so — namely, its inability to complete its
title search within the time periods contemplated in the draft and changing market conditions —

are invalid. And because Plaintiffs believe that the leases were not rescinded in a timely manner,
they insist that specific performance (in the form of full payment of the draft amounts) remains
the appropriate remedy.

B. Defendants’ Position
Defendants contend that the Transactional Documents did not give rise to any
enforceable contract between SWEPI and the Plaintiffs. They reason that, consistent with
applicable trade custom and usage, there could be no enforceable lease agreement unless and
until SWEPI first verified that the lessor had clean and marketable title to the subject oil and gas
interest and then paid the bonus amounts. Because those conditions did not occur, Defendants
insist that no binding contracts were formed. In addition, Defendants assert that none of the
remaining Plaintiffs had clean and marketable title, so the lease agreements failed for lack of
consideration.

To the extent enforceable agreements existed, Defendants assert that SWEPI’s obligation
to fund the drafts was excused. Defendants maintains that certain Plaintiffs never presented their
drafts to their banks and, as a result, SWEPI’s duty to pay was never triggered. Defendants
further insist that SWEPI’s surrender of the lease agreements and cancellation of the drafts was.
justified in every case because each of the remaining Plaintiffs lacked clean and marketable title
to the oil and gas interests they were attempting to lease. Further, Defendants contend that the
“No Liability” clause in the drafts permitted SWEPI to cancel the drafts for any reason, or for no
reason at all. Finally, Defendants posit that SWEPI was justified in refusing payment for those
Plaintiffs as to whom the title search could not be completed within the allotted time frame.
Assuming that enforceable contracts and contractual breach are established, Defendants
assert that Plaintiffs cannot recover the damages they seek as a matter of law. They contend that
Plaintiffs cannot recover through specific performance because they cannot convey clear and
marketable title to the oil and gas interests at issue. And even if that were not so, Defendants
argue, some damage claims are defeated by the lessor’s failure to mitigate damages, while other
claims fail because their alleged damages were fully mitigated.

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) requires the court to enter summary judgment “af
the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Thus, a defendant may obtain
summary judgment by pointing to the absence of a genuine fact issue on one or more essential
elements of the plaintiff's claim. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (holding tha
“a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case

10

necessarily renders all other facts immaterial”). A plaintiff may obtain summary judgment by
producing “credible evidence that would entitle [the plaintiff] to a directed verdict if not
controverted at trial.” Jn re Bressman, 327 F.3d 229, 237 (3d Cir. 2003) (cleaned up).
For purposes of Rule 56, “the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the
parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the
requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). A factual dispute is “genuine” only if the “‘evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”” Physicians Healthsource, Inc.
y. Cephalon, Inc., 954 F.3d 615, 618 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). Anda
fact is material only if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Id.
(quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). When determining whether a genuine issue of material fact
remains for trial, the court must “view all ‘the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party and draw all inferences in that party’s favor.’” Physicians Healthsource, Inc., 954 F.3d at
618 (quoting Stone v. Troy Constr., LLC, 935 F.3d 141, 147 n.6 (3d Cir. 2019)).
Relevantly, courts are permitted to resolve cross-motions for summary judgment
concurrently. Johnson v. Federal Exp. Corp., 996 F. Supp. 2d 302, 312 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (citing
authority); see Lawrence v. City of Phila., 527 F.3d 299, 310 (3d Cir. 2008) (considering cross-
motions for summary judgment under the Fair Labor Standards Act); 10A CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2720 (3d ed. 2014). “When
doing so, the court is bound to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party with respect to each motion.” Johnson, 996 F Supp.2d at 312; see Lawrence, 527 F.3d at
310 (noting that the rule for granting summary judgment “is no different where there are cross-
motions for summary judgment.”).

B. Local Rule 56
Local Rule 56 requires that a motion for summary judgment be accompanied by a
separately filed concise statement of material facts, which includes citations to the record
“supporting the party's statement, acceptance, or denial of the material fact[.]” LCvR 56(B)(1).
Plaintiffs have provided individualized, but materially similar, statements of fact in support of
their Rule 56 motions. Commonly, these concise statements do not provide any citation to
record evidence in support of the assertions at Paragraphs 8, 9, 14, and 15. Accordingly, the
Court will not consider these assertions by the Plaintiffs.
Local Rule 56 further provides that a nonmovant must submit a “separately filed concise
statement, which responds to each numbered paragraph in the moving party's Concise Statement
of Material Facts...” LCvR 56(C)(1). The rule states that “[a]lleged material facts set forth in
the moving party’s Concise Statement of Material Facts... , which are claimed to be
undisputed, will for the purpose of deciding the motion for summary judgment be deemed
admitted unless specifically denied or otherwise controverted by a separate concise statement of
the opposing party.” LCvR 56(E£).
Plaintiffs failed to file any responsive Concise Statement(s) of Material Fact in response
to Defendants’ concise statements at ECF Nos. 324 and 328, as required by Local Rule 56(C)(1).
Accordingly, for purposes of deciding Defendants’ Rule 56 motions, the Court will accept as
“admitted” those assertions in the Defendants' Concise Statement of Material Facts that are
factual, supported by the evidence, and alleged to be undisputed, unless the Court’s review of the
record counsels otherwise. The Court will not deem Defendants’ allegations “admitted” to the
extent they are unsupported by relevant evidence and/or to the extent they involve assertions of
contract interpretation or other legal matters reserved for the Court. See Weitzner v. Sanofi

12 □

Pasteur Inc., 909 F.3d 604, 613 (3d Cir. 2018) (recognizing the district court’s inherent
discretion in interpreting and applying its own local rules); Heckman v. N. Penn Comprehensive
Health Servs., No. 4:20-CV-01680, 2024 WL 2902169, at *2 (M.D. Pa. June 10, 2024) (noting
that “the proper sanction for violating Rule 56.1 is within the district court's discretion”).

V. DISCUSSION
A. Governing Legal Principles
Under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff must establish the following to satisfy a claim for
breach of contract: “(1) the existence of a contract, including its essential terms; (2) a breach of a
duty imposed by the contract; and (3) resultant damages.” Kapotas y. CTP Funding, LLC, No.
2:24-CV-01995, 2025 WL 2250003, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 6, 2025). Oil and gas leases are in the
nature of contracts and, therefore, they are controlled by principles of contract law. T.W. Phillip
Gas & Oil Co. v. Jedlicka, 42 A.3d 261, 267 (Pa. 2012).
The ultimate goal of contract interpretation is to determine the parties’ intent as expressed]
in the contract's language. Standard Venetian Blind Co. v. Am. Empire Ins. Co., 469 A.2d 563,
566 (Pa. 1983); Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 282 and n.50 (3d Cir. 2014).
Where the language of the agreement is clear and unambiguous, courts must give effect to its
plain meaning. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Sartno, 903 A.2d 1170, 1174 (Pa. 2006);
Blunt, 767 F.3d at 282 n.50. Contract terms are ambiguous “‘if they are subject to more than one
reasonable interpretation when applied to a particular set of facts.” Commonwealth ex rel. Kane |

v. UPMC, 129 A.3d 441, 463 (Pa. 2015) (quotation omitted). “When. . . an ambiguity exists,
parol evidence is admissible to explain or clarify or resolve the ambiguity, irrespective of
whether the ambiguity is patent, created by the language of the instrument, or latent, created by
extrinsic or collateral circumstances. Kripp v. Kripp, 849 A.2d 1159, 1163 (Pa. 2004). “While

13

ambiguous contracts are interpreted by the court as a matter of law, ambiguous writings are
interpreted by the finder of fact.’” Dressler Family, LP v. PennEnergy Resources, LLC, 276 A.3
729, 737 (Pa. Super Ct. 2022) (quoting Kripps, 849 A.2d at 1163)).
In ascertaining contractual intent, courts must be guided by the plain meaning of the
language employed by the parties rather than their “silent intentions.” Jedlicka, 42 A.3d at 267.
“Courts are not to assume that the language contained in a contract was chosen carelessly or that
the parties were ignorant of the meaning of the language they utilized.” Kmart of Pennsylvania,
LP vy. MD Mall Assocs., LLC, 959 A.2d 939, 944 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008). Further, courts must
interpret contracts to give effect to all their provisions. Commonwealth ex rel. Kane, 129 A.3d at
464 (“[O]ur Court will not interpret one provision of a contract in a manner which results in
another portion being annulled.’’) (quotation omitted).
While bearing these general principles in mind, the Court also recognizes that “every
agreement is made and to be construed with due regard to the known characteristics of the
business to which it relates . . . and hence, the language used in a contract will be construed
according to its purport in the particular business, although this results in an entirely different

- conclusion from what would have been reached had the usual meaning been ascribed to those
words.” Camp Ne’er Too Late, LP v. SWEPI, LP, 185 F. Supp. 3d 517544 (MD. Pa. 2016)
(ellipsis in the original; citation and quotation marks omitted). Relevantly, “[if{nstruments
conveying property rights in minerals such as oil and gas are executed in the context of an
industry that is highly technical in nature and employs district terminology used by those
involved in the business.” Jacobs v. CNG Transmission Corp., 332 F. Supp. 2d 759, 764 (W.D.
Pa. 2004). Thus, “Tajn understanding of the historical development of the industry is essential in
making an informed assessment concerning the intent of the parties in employing the language

14

utilized in a particular instrument.” Id.; see Chambers v. Equinor USA Onshore Props. Inc., No.
3:18-CV-00437, 2024 WL 4109340, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 6, 2024) (“[W]hen interpreting oil and
gas production leases, courts typically defer to the historical understanding of the terms used,
prior judicial decisions, and experts in the oil and gas field to interpret the lease terminology.”)
(citing Wiser v. Enervest Operating, L.L.C., 803 F. Supp. 2d 109, 117 (N.D.N.Y. 2011)).

B. What Are the Relevant Contractual Documents?
As an initial matter, the Court must determine what documents comprise the alleged
contracts. As noted, the parties disagree on this point.
Plaintiffs posit that the contracts consist solely of the signed lease forms, together with
their addenda. In support of this view, they cite Paragraph 17 of the form lease, which states that
the lease “contains all of the agreements and understanding of the Lessor and Lessee respecting
the subject matter hereof and no implied covenants or obligations, or verbal representations or
promises have been made or relied upon by Lessor or Lessee supplementing or modifying this
lease or as an inducement thereto.” See, e.g., ECF No. 331-2 at 4.

Plaintiffs also point to Paragraph 1 of the Lease, which refers to “bonus consideration
paid, the receipt of which [the lessor] hereby acknowledged .... See, e.g., ECF No. 331-2 at 2
(emphasis added). Plaintiffs interpret this language as a straightforward promise by SWEPI to
pay the bonus monies either before or upon the landowner’s execution of the lease, in the form o
legal tender. Because SWEPI did not do so, Plaintiffs conclude that SWEPI breached the lease
terms and is liable for the bonus amounts as a matter of law.
As for the drafts, Plaintiffs insist they cannot be considered part of the contract because
the landowners did not sign the drafts or any document agreeing to the draft provisions. Even if
they had done so, Plaintiffs argue, the draft provisions cannot stand because their effect would be

15

to annul the lease provisions referring to “bonus consideration paid, the receipt of which is
hereby acknowledged.” Plaintiffs thus deny that the drafts afforded SWEPI a delayed period for
title examination or a waiver of its liability under the leases; “title examination” and “no
liability” clauses, they argue, were unilaterally inserted into the draft by SWEPI and unsupported
by separate consideration. Plaintiffs thus view the drafts as merely parol documents whose terms
should be read as setting forth the means of performance -- i.e., pertaining to payment of the
draft, rather than payment of the bonus.
Defendants have consistently denied that any enforceable contracts exist between SWEPI
and the remaining Plaintiffs. But to the extent any enforceable agreements do exist, Defendants
argue that they are, at most, conditional contracts consisting of the form lease agreements, the
lease addenda, and the drafts. To that end, Defendants note that all of the Transactional
Documents were exchanged contemporaneously as part of the same transaction. And rather than
varying the terms of the lease agreement, Defendants argue, the drafts supply essential
contractual terms.?
On this initial point, the Court concludes that Defendants have the better argument.
Pennsylvania courts have held that, “‘[w]here several instruments are made as part of one
transaction they will be read together, and each will be construed with reference to the other; and
this is so although the instruments may have been executed at different times and do not in terms
refer to each other.’” Jeddo Coal Co., 2017 WL 937737, at *4 (quoting Huegel v. Mifflin Const.
Co., 796 A.2d 350, 354-55 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002)); see Kroblin Refrigerated Xpress, Inc. v.
Pitterich, 805 F.2d 96, 107 (3d Cir. 1986) (“It is a general rule of contract law that where two

3 Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs are judicially estopped from asserting that the drafts are not part of
the contractual documents, as they previously took the opposite position. The Court need not address
whether Plaintiffs are estopped from making the arguments in their briefs because, as explained in more
detail below, the Court rejects Plaintiffs’ argument on the merit.
16

writings are executed at the same time and are intertwined by the same subject matter, they
should be construed together and interpreted as a whole, each one contributing to the
ascertainment of the true intent of the parties.”).
As the Court previously observed in the Walney class action, “the Transactional
Documents were typically signed and exchanged contemporaneously as part of a singular
transaction between SWEPI and the various [landowners].” Walney v. SWEPI LP, 311 F. Supp.
3d 696, 708 (W.D. Pa. 2018). That fact remains true in this litigation. See ECF No. 329-1,

Haney Decl. at 94; see also ECF No. 442 at 22.
In addition, as the Court noted in Walney,
the [Transactional Documents] reference one another. The Leases expressly
acknowledge the lessor's receipt of a “bonus” in an unspecified amount. . . . The
Draft Instruments indicated that, when funded, they would constitute “payment in
full for lease or conveyance” covering the specific parcel in question... .. Each
MOL was expressly intended to provide public notice of the existence of the
corresponding oil and gas lease[.]
311 F. Supp. 3d at 708. Thus, given that the form leases and drafts “refer to each other” and
were “exchanged contemporaneously as part of a singular transaction,” id., this Court
“will construe the writings together for the purpose of ascertaining the parties’ intent[,]” just as
the Court did in the Walney class action. Id. The Court adheres to this view, notwithstanding the
integration clause in Paragraph 17 of the lease. See Kropa v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., 609
F.Supp.2d 372, 378 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (predicting that “the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would
not strictly apply the parol evidence rule where two contracts must be read together and only one
has an integration clause”), on reconsideration in part, 716 F. Supp. 2d 375 (M.D. Pa. 2010);
Amin v. Lammers, No. Civ. A. 94-5980, 1995 WL 231048, at *4 (E.D. Pa. April 18, 1995)
(“[T]he presence of integration clauses in the separate agreements is not a bar to the agreements

17

being construed together when the agreements are part of the same business transaction.”)
(citations omitted); see Walney, 311 F. Supp. 3d at 708 n.8.
Nor is it dispositive that the Plaintiffs did not personally “execute” the drafts or sign a
document separately agreeing to the draft provisions. SWEPI, of course, did execute the drafts
through its agents, and it is clear from the context of the transaction as a whole that the draft was
intended to be the medium through which bonus payments would be made. In fact, if the drafts
were not included as a part of the contractual agreement, the leases would generally fail to state
an essential term -- namely, the bonus amount that SWEPI allegedly agreed to pay. See Azer Sci.
LLC y. Quidel Corp., No. 24-1022, 2025 WL 2319653, at *2 (3d Cir. Aug. 12, 2025) (noting that
a contract’s “essential terms” include the “‘time or manner of performance, price to be paid, or
the like’”’) (quoting Lombardo v. Gasparini Excavating Co., 123 A.2d 663, 666 (Pa. 1956)).
Accordingly, the Court will construe the Transactional Documents together as a whole in
ascertaining the parties’ intent. See Kroblin Refrigerated Xpress, Inc., 805 F.2d at 107.

C. Is There an Enforceable Contract?
The Court must next determine whether the lease agreements at issue were enforceable
contracts. Under Pennsylvania law, a contract is formed where “(1) ‘both parties manifested an
intention to be bound by the agreement’; (2) ‘the terms of the agreement are sufficiently definite
to be enforced’; and (3) ‘there was consideration.’” Azer Sci. LLC, 2025 WL 2319653, at *2
(quoting ATACS Corp. v. Trans World Commc'ns, Inc., 155 F.3d 659, 666 (3d Cir. 1998)
(applying Pennsylvania law) and citing Channel Home Ctrs., Div. of Grace Retail Corp. v.
Grossman, 795 F.2d 291, 299 (3d Cir. 1986) (same)). Here, Defendants contest the first and
third elements. The Court finds that Defendants’ challenge based on an alleged failure of
consideration lacks merit; therefore, that element is satisfied. However, as to the first element,

18

the Court finds that there is a genuinely disputed material issue of fact as to whether the parties
manifested a mutual intent to be contractually bound.

1. Was There Mutual Intent to be Contractually Bound?
In the Walney class action, the Court found that the requisite contractual intent could be
inferred from the language of the Transactional Documents and the conduct of the parties.
Although this Court later reopened that issue to allow for further discovery on the issue of
industry custom and usage as it pertains to contractual intent, the undersigned remains of the
view that one could reasonably interpret the Transactional Documents as manifesting the parties’
intent to enter into a binding contract as of the date the documents were exchanged. As was true
in the Walney class action,
each [plaintiff], upon signing and delivering their Leases and MOLs, was given a
Draft, signed by SWEPI's agent, in the amount of the negotiated bonus payment.
As discussed, each Lease was, by its own terms, expressly “made and entered into”
by the parties as of the date that the Transactional Documents were signed and
exchanged, and each Lease specifically stated that the lessor “does hereby grant,
demise, lease and let exclusively to Lessee ... the lands hereafter described...” (ECF
No. 150-21.) Each MOL similarly acknowledged “the existence of an Oil and Gas
Lease” whose primary term commenced on the same date that the Lease Agreement
was executed. (ECF No. 150-23.) In addition, each MOL expressly stated that
“Lessor did grant, demise, lease and let exclusively to Lessee ... the rights to
explore, develop, produce, and market oil and gas from the premises described
below subject to the provisions contained in the Lease ...” (Id.)
311 F. Supp. 3d at 721. Taken together, this language and the contemporaneous exchange of the
Transactional Documents can reasonably be viewed as evidence of mutual contractual intent.
Defendants, however, deny that there was a mutual intent to be contractually bound. The
argue that, pursuant to Pennsylvania custom and usage, no enforceable contract could exist until
SWEPI: (i) verified the lessor’s clean and marketable title to the subject oil and gas interests, and

19

(ii) paid the bonus amount. Because those things did not happen, SWEPI argues, no binding
contracts were formed.
In support of this argument, Defendants point to the unrebutted report of Attorney Lisa
McManus, whom they have proffered as an expert in Pennsylvania oil and gas industry custom
and practice. The record reflects that Ms. McManus has practiced law in Pennsylvania since
1990, with a focus in the area of oil and gas law dating back to 2007. ECF No. 329-2 at 7-8. In
the course of her career, Ms. McManus has performed hundreds of real estate title searches,
certified hundreds of titles, reviewed hundreds of oil and gas title abstracts, and issued
approximately 200 title opinions for oil and gas in this Commonwealth. Jd. Her clients have
included both major and independent oil and gas companies, and she currently serves as General
Counsel and Vice-President, Legal for Pennsylvania General Energy Company, LLC. She is
also an Executive Board Member and Secretary of the Marcellus Shale Coalition, the largest
shale trade association in Pennsylvania. Id. at 8-9. Among other activities, Ms. McManus has
authored numerous articles on oil and gas law and has frequently lectured and planned
continuing legal education programs regarding oil and gas law for the Pennsylvania Bar Institute.
Id. at 9.
In her expert report, Ms. McManus opines that custom and practice exists in the
Pennsylvania oil and gas industry as to matters of title, leasing and payment to lessors. ECF No.
329-2 at 7. In relevant part, she attests to the following, as it relates to the custom and practice o
using draft instruments to pay lease bonuses:
Sight drafts are commonly utilized by oil and gas exploration and development
companies to pay “bonus” consideration due under an oil and gas lease, although many other
operators employ orders of payment. Although the draft states that it is payable to the named
payee, a draft is not a check. Rather, it is an order to pay a specified amount to a payee by a
specified date. Unlike a check, a sight draft typically contains contingencies that must occur
before the bank is authorized to release the funds, such as approval of the lease and/or
verification of title."

20

In the context of oil and gas leasing transactions, the draft names the lessor as the
payee and the lessee as the drawee. The lessor endorses the draft and deposits it with his or
her bank, which is known as the forwarding bank. The draft is not funded immediately.
Rather, the forwarding bank sends the draft to the lessee’s bank, which acts as the collecting
bank and holds the draft until the lessee, as drawee, either pays the draft or the time for
payment expires.
It is understood and custom in the industry that when a purchaser uses a sight draft
with language imposing a condition of approval of title or geology, that language creates a
condition precedent to the formation of a contract. In other words, no enforceable lease exists
until the condition precedent is either performed or waived. Many drafts further include “no
liability” exculpatory language that provides that if the draft is not paid within the set time,
the collecting bank shall return the same to the forwarding bank, and no liability for payment
shall attach to any of the parties. Such effect cuts both ways, as either lessor or lessee could
- refuse to consummate the transaction. Because recording is required to provide public notice
of the existence of a potential encumbrance of the oil and gas interest, the recording of a
memorandum of the lease does not alter the lease’s conditional nature or impose liability on
the lessee if the draft is later dishonored.
As prior landowner counsel, I consistently advised my clients not to accept a draft
from a lessee because a draft generally allows the lessee to refuse to fund it, thereby rendering
the lease a nullity.!! My advice to clients was to obtain an order of payment setting a definite
date upon which payment was to be made with no conditions other than defensible title. Since
at least 2009, a multitude of mineral owner blogs, forums, and other online resources
(including attorney websites) have provided similar advice, and the drawbacks to the usage of
drafts in the oil and gas lease context have been generally known or easily ascertained by those
entering oil and gas leases.
Moreover, since the advent of the development of the Marcellus Shale, numerus
attorneys and consultants in Pennsylvania have advertised their services as including oil and
gas representation, including providing advice on oil and gas leases... .
Attorneys who provide such advice would know or should know the limitations on the use of
drafts and should counsel their clients regarding those risks.
ECF No. 329-2 at 19-22 (internal footnotes omitted).
Plaintiffs argue that the Court should not consider the Defendants’ custom and usage
evidence. They lodge three reasons for disregarding Ms. McManus’ report: (i) her opinion
constitutes a conclusion of law that is solely within the purview of this Court, (ii) her report fails
to comply with the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2) and Federal Rule of
Evidence 702, and (iii) Defendants have not shown that Plaintiffs were aware of the custom and
usage that Ms. McManus identifies.

21

As to the first objection, the undersigned does not construe Ms. McManus’ report as an
attempt to interpret the leases that are presently before the Court or to specifically opine on their
enforceability. Instead, the Court accepts Ms. McManus testimony only as a statement as to how
conditional sight drafts with “no liability” clauses are customarily treated by parties to a
Pennsylvania oil and gas lease. The existence and scope of an industry usage are considered
factual issues. See, e.g., Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 732 n.4 (1988); Restatement
(Second) of Contracts §219, Comment a and §222(2); Trustees of Univ. of Pa. v. St. Jude
Children’s Research Hosp., 982 F. Supp. 2d 518, 537 (E.D. Pa. 2013). Moreover, expert
testimony is appropriate to establish custom or usage in a case involving alleged contractual
breach. See, e.g., Borden v. Mainline Conveyor Systems, Inc., Civil Action No. 4:23-CV-1486,
2025 WL 2045736, *4 (M.D. Pa. July 21, 2025) (noting that testimony from an expert in a
particular industry may be admissible if the expert is testifying to “customs and practices of a
particular industry”; however, “an expert may not testify as to the law governing the case or as to
legal duties arising out of a specific contract’’) (citations omitted); Chambers v. Equinor USA
Onshore Properties Inc., Civil Action No. 3:18-cv-437, 2024 WL 4109340, *5 (M.D. Pa. Sept 6,
2024) (“[W]hen interpreting oil and gas production leases, courts typically defer to the historical
understanding of the terms used, prior judicial decisions, and experts in the oil and gas field to
interpret the lease terminology.”’); General Refractories Co. v. First State Ins. Co., 94 F. Supp.
3d 649 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (court relying on expert testimony regarding insurance industry usage to
resolve ambiguity in an insurance policy). Thus, the undersigned finds that Ms. McManus’
report on these matters does not improperly stray into the area of contractual interpretation

reserved for this Court.

22

Plaintiffs’ second objection is that Ms. McManus’ opinions lack a proper factual
foundation, and thereby violates Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as well as
Federal Rule of Evidence 702. Rule 26(a)(2) addresses expert disclosures and provides that an
expert report must contain, among things, “the facts or data considered” by the expert witness in
forming her opinions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(ii). Rule 702 allows a witness “qualified as
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education” to “testify in the form of an
opinion or otherwise” if the proponent can show it is “more likely than not” that:
(a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and
(d) the expert’s opinion reflects a reliable application of the principles and methods to the
facts of the case.
Fed. R. Evid. 702. While Ms. McManus bases her report on her “education and extensive
professional experience involving real estate title, oil and gas title, and abstracting], ECF No.
329-2 at 23, Plaintiffs object that “she posits no facts evidencing that she, or anyone else in the
industry, has relied on this custom in an actual transaction.” ECF No. 443 at 4.
Plaintiffs’ second objection lacks merit. In essence, Plaintiffs are raising a Daubert?
challenge under the guise of a Rule 56 argument. “[T]he Third Circuit has cautioned courts that
expert challenges under Daubert require full development of the facts and evidence to provide
the parties with a full opportunity to be heard on the issue.” Est. of Borroto v. CFG Health Sys.,
LLC, 751 F. Supp. 3d 443, 468 (D.N.J. 2024) (citing In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litigation,
916 F.2d 829, 855 (3rd Cir. 1990) (holding exclusion of expert evidence provided grounds to set

4 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
23

aside grant of summary judgment where plaintiffs did not have an in limine hearing and were
denied oral argument on evidentiary issues) and Padillas v. Stork-Gamco, Inc., 186 F.3d 412,
417-18 (Gd Cir. 1999) (holding that the district court abused its discretion in excluding an
expert's opinion without conducting an in limine hearing focused on the Daubert reliability of his
testimony)). Here, no Daubert motion or motions in limine have been filed in connection with
this case, and Plaintiffs’ Rule 56 arguments on the matter are extremely truncated. Accordingly,
it would be inappropriate to exclude Ms. McManus’ report at this juncture on the basis of the
very limited record before the Court. For these reasons, the Court will not discount Ms.
McManus’ expert report on the basis of Plaintiffs’ Rule 702 challenge. To the extent Plaintiffs’
arguments concern the weight, rather than the admissibility, of Ms. McManus’ opinions, the
Court simply notes that “at the summary judgment stage the judge's function is not himself to
weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a
genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty-Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986).
To that end, the Court considers Plaintiffs’ third objection to Defendants’ custom and
usage evidence -- namely, that the evidence should be rejected because Defendants have failed to
establish Plaintiffs’ awareness of the alleged custom or usage. Defendants dispute that Plaintiffs’
awareness of the custom or usage is necessary or relevant.
“In the law of contracts, custom in the industry or usage in the trade is always relevant
and admissible in construing commercial contracts and does not depend on any obvious
ambiguity in the words of the contract.” Sunbeam Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 781 A.2d 1189
1193 (Pa. 2001). “If words have a special meaning or usage in a particular industry, then
members of that industry are presumed to use the words in that special way, whatever the words

24

mean in common usage and regardless of whether there appears to be any ambiguity in the
words.” Id.
In the Walney class action, the Court stated that “this rule of construction has application
only where both parties to the contract are familiar with the particular trade usage by virtue of
being engaged in a particular industry, or otherwise have reason to know of it.” Walney, 311 F.
Supp. 3d at 718 (citing authority), on reconsideration, 2018 WL 4076919 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 27,
2018). The Court was unable to draw any conclusive inferences regarding the class members’
awareness of the proffered industry customs and usages; therefore, the Court determined that the
evidence as to custom and usage was not dispositive. Jd. at 719.
Here, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ knowledge of the custom and usage discussed by
Ms. McManus is irrelevant. They cite to Carey v. Bright, 58 Pa. 70, 82 (1868) and Roe v. Chief
Exploration & Dev. LLC, 2013 WL 4083326 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 13, 2013), neither of which the
Court views as particularly strong authority for Defendants’ position, as the issues of actual or
constructive knowledge were neither challenged nor addressed in those cases.
Yet it is apparent from this Court’s own research that the rule as stated in the Walney
class action is the correct one -- fo wit, the parties must at least have reason to know of the
custom or usage (i.e., constructive knowledge) before the custom or usage will be applied as the
presumptively intended contractual term. See, e.g., B.P. Apparel, Inc. v. Hunt, No. 97-4095,
1999 WL 551892, *5 (E.D. Pa. June 16, 1999) (“In attempting to base a contract term or
provision upon an industry custom or practice, the [moving party] has the burden of providing
evidence that clearly establishes either that the other party has actual knowledge of the custom or]

that the custom or practice is so notorious, well established, and reasonable that the other party
should have such knowledge.”) (citing Jacobson v. Leonard, 406 F. Supp. 515, 520-21 (E.D. Pa.

25

1976) and Leslie v. Pennco, 470 A.2d 110, 113-14 (Pa. Super Ct. 1983)); see also Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 220, Comment b (1981) (“[A] party who asserts a meaning based on
usage must show either that the other party knew of the usage or that the other party had reason
to know of it.”); 12 Williston on Contracts § 34:16 (4th ed.) (“At common law, there is no
general presumption that the usages of a particular trade or business are known to those not in
that trade or business.[ | ... Consequently, proof of actual knowledge on the part of one outside
the trade or business is necessary,| ] unless it has such notice of the custom or usage that the
other party reasonably believes the custom or usage is known.[ ]”) (internal footnotes and
citations to authority omitted); accord Holiday Homes of St. John, Inc. v. Lockhart, 678 F.2d
1176, 1185 n.8 (3d Cir. 1982) (citing the rule: “if A ... used or understood the words in a
particular sense and asserts that B ..., without having actual knowledge, had reason to know A's
usage and meaning, the only way to establish such ‘reason to know’ is to convince the court that
a ‘reasonable’ man in B's position under exactly similar circumstances would in fact have known
A's usage and meaning. A's evidence must show the common usage of other men in like
circumstances.”) (quoting 3 A. Corbin, Contracts § 538, at 73 (1960)).
The parties’ constructive knowledge -- or “reason to know” -- of a particular usage may
arise from their engagement in a particular industry or from a general notoriety and acceptance
of the usage or custom in question. See Sunbeam Corp., 781 A.2d at 1193 (“If words have a
special meaning or usage in a particular industry, then members of that industry are presumed to
use the words in that special way ... .”); Doyle v. Atlantic Refining Co., 53 A.2d 68, 70-71 (Pa.
1947) (plaintiffs who asserted an industry custom had to establish “a custom that was certain,
reasonable, distinct, uncontradicted, continued, and so notorious as to be probably known to all
parties”); Leslie v. Pennco, Inc., 470 A.2d 110, 113 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (“Evidence of an

26

industry custom or usage which is notorious, well-established and reasonable is always a relevan
consideration in determining the intent of the contracting parties. ”’); Lancaster Transportation
Co. v. New York & New Brunswick Auto Express Co., Inc., 146 A.2d 150, 151 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1958) (A custom proven to be certain, continuous, uniform, notorious and reasonable must be
presumed to have been known and acted upon by the parties . . . .”); Restatement (Second of
Contracts) § 222(1) (defining “Usage of Trade” as “a usage having such regularity of observance
in a place, vocation, or trade as to justify an expectation that it will be observed with respect to a
particular agreement ... .”); accord 13 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. §1303 (West) (defining
“usage of trade” as “any practice or method of dealing having such regularity of observance in a
place, vocation or trade as to justify an expectation that it will be observed with respect to the
transaction in question”).
As noted, issues pertaining to the existence and scope of customs and usages are factual
questions for the jury to decide. See Trustees of Univ. of Pa., 982 F. Supp. 2d at 538 (summary
judgment denied where the evidence gave rise to a question of fact as to what the trade usage
was and whether it affected the parties’ understanding of the contractual terms); Simon Wrecking
Co., Inc. v. AIU Ins. Co., 530 F. Supp. 2d 706, 715 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (“Whether a custom or trade
usage exists is ordinarily a question for the jury.”) (citing Albus v. Toomey, 116 A. 917, 918 (Pa.
1922)); Lancaster Transportation Co., 146 A.2d at 152 (whether the rights and liabilities of the
parties under the circumstances was controlled by industry custom was a factual question for the
jury).
In this case, Defendants have presented evidence sufficient to support a genuine issue of
fact as to whether the parties contracted with reference to the industry customs referenced in Ms.
McManus’ report. If a jury decides that the parties intended the “title examination” clause in the

27

drafts to function as a condition precedent to contract formation, with “no liability” for
nonpayment, that construction would support Defendants’ argument that the lease agreements
were not binding contracts. For this reason alone, Plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgment:
must be denied.
At the same time, however, the Court cannot determine as a matter of law that the alleged
custom of treating “title examination” and “no liability” clauses in this manner were so well-
established, notorious and reasonable as to presumptively supply the terms of the contracts in
this case. Instead, those inherently factual assessments must be made by the jury. An additional
consideration that may impact the jury’s determination concerning constructive notice is the fact
that some of the remaining Plaintiffs were represented by attorneys when they signed their
leases. And if the Defendants’ evidence regarding the custom and usage of draft instruments is
not accepted as supplying the contractual terms, the Transactional Documents can reasonably be
interpreted as evidencing an intent by SWEPI and the Plaintiffs to be contractually bound by the
lease terms, as discussed above. Moreover, the Court previously determined in both the Walney

|| class action and in this case that the title examination clause in the drafts could reasonably be
viewed as creating a condition pertaining to SWEPI’s duty of performance rather than the
formation of the contract. See ECF No. 86 at 17-22; Walney, 311 F. Supp. 3d at 724-25.
For these reasons, there remains a genuinely disputed issue of fact concerning the parties’
intent to be bound by the lease agreements, so the Court cannot grant Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment on that basis.

□ 2. Was There a Failure of Consideration?
Defendants next contend that the lease agreements are unenforceable because there was a
failure of consideration. To that end, Defendants have presented documentary evidence showing

28

that some type of encumbrance existed as to each of the parcels and/or oil and gas estates in
question. ECF No. 328, $§50-535 and ECF No. 327 at 12-14. Defendants posit that the
consideration to be provided by Plaintiffs was clear and marketable title to their mineral rights,
and the consideration to be provided by SWEPI was the payment of the draft amounts after a full
and complete title examination to confirm that clean title existed. Because each lease interest
was encumbered, Defendants argue, the exchange of consideration did not occur.
Under Pennsylvania law, a “failure” of consideration “‘occurs when the consideration
bargained for does not pass, in whole or in part, to the promisor.’” Victaulic Co. v. HiTherm,
LLC, No. CV 21-5077, 2024 WL 1468820, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 4, 2024) (quoting McGuire v.
Schneider, Inc., 534 A.2d 115, 118 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987), aff'd, 548 A.2d 1223 (Pa. 1988)).
“(T]he defense of failure of consideration ‘does not contradict the terms of the instrument, but
shows that the consideration contemplated was never received.’” Jd. (quoting McGuire, 534 A.2
at 119). A failure of consideration can be partial or complete. Jd. at *6-7. While a complete
failure of consideration excuses the other party's obligation to render further performance under
the contract, a partial failure of consideration does not excuse the other party's performance.
Maritz Inc. v. Holy Redeemer Hosp. & Med. Ctr., Inc., 1993 WL 460796, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 3,
1993). Instead, a partial failure of consideration “is merely ground for abatement of damages
unless it goes to the root of the contract.” Jd. (cleaned up).
Here, Defendants are-essentially arguing a complete failure of consideration based on the
encumbrances that existed at the time of the Plaintiffs’ leasing arrangements. To support their
argument, they rely on the expert report of Ms. McManus. ECF No. 329-2. However, the Court
does not read the McManus report as supporting Defendants’ broad assertion that every Plaintiff
promised to convey marketable title.

29

Relevantly, Ms. McManus opines that the “lessor’s primary obligation under an oil and
gas lease is to convey to the lessee the hydrocarbons and the ability to access them.” ECF No.
329-2 at 12. She acknowledges that “[fJailure of title can have enormous financial
consequences” for the lessee, because deficiencies “may prevent the development of the oil and
gas estate, divest the lessee of its rights in the oil and gas estate, or significantly diminish the
ability of the lessee to develop the tract[.]” Jd. However, Ms. McManus also acknowledges that
not every encumbrance defeats the purpose of hydrocarbon exploration and development. On
the contrary, she states that “most operators do not require the lessor’s title to be perfect in
normal leasing situations,” but
where deficiencies are discovered that would create a reasonable doubt affecting the
property’s value or pose an unreasonable risk of litigation, operators will generally
- void the lease prior to its becoming operative by not paying the lease “bonus”, unless
other business considerations indicate a reason to affirm the leasing arrangement,
accept the lease and risks inherent with the defect, and pay the lease bonus”. In some
cases, a lessee will attempt to “cure” deficiencies that appear of record and affirm the
lease; however, the lessee is not required to engage in curative actions if deficiencies
appear of record that would render the title unmarketable. If title deficiencies appear
and no reason exists to accept a business risk in waiving the deficiencies, the lessee
generally records a surrender and declines to pay the “bonus”.
Id. at 15.
Ms. McManus implies that it is industry custom for the /essee to assume responsibility
for ensuring marketable title. ECF No. 329-2 at 12. She states that the “/essee must confirm that
no party other than the lessor can claim ownership of the oil and gas rights being leased.” Id.
(emphasis supplied). To that end, “the lessee must obtain a full title examination to discover
existing deficiencies and evaluate the risk of loss when they are discovered.” Jd. Additionally,
“the lessee must obtain assurance that the person from whom it is acquiring the lease has the
power and authority to grant the rights therein.” Id.

30

That is precisely what occurred here, inasmuch as SWEPI expressly reserved a period
“for title examination and for payment” in each draft and included a general warranty provision
in the form lease.> See Lease Agreement 416 (“Lessor hereby generally warrants and agrees to
defend the title to the leased premises. .. .”). But a general warranty is not a warranty against all
encumbrances. “By the covenant of warranty, the grantor promises to compensate the grantee
for any monetary losses occasioned by the grantor's failure to convey the title promised in the
deed,” Juniata Valley Bank vy. Martin Oil Co., 736 A.2d 650, 661 n. 7 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999), a
situation that does not pertain here.°

5 Defendants contend in their reply brief that this Court previously rejected the argument that the leases only
conveyed a general warranty. ECF No. 450 at 4 (citing Mem. Op. dated March 31, 2022, ECF No. 86, at 13). This
assertion is inaccurate. In fact, the Court expressly deferred ruling on Plaintiffs’ claim that they had conveyed only a
general warranty in the form leases. See ECF No. 86 at 21 n.5. Further, the Court rejected Defendants’ argument
that common law necessarily imposed on Plaintiffs the burden of establishing marketable title, since the rights and
obligations of the parties had to be determined by reference to the lease terms. Jd. at 21. This discussion occurred in
the context of a dispute about which party would bear the ultimate burden of proof relative to title. Assuming -- only
for the sake of argument -- that Defendants were correct in claiming that Plaintiffs had affirmatively covenanted □
marketable title, the Court noted that title defects might be viewed as a failure of consideration, as to which
Defendants would bear the burden of proof. However, the Court made no definitive ruling on the matter at that
time, and the Court finds nothing in its prior memorandum opinion that presently contradicts its observations about
the warranties included in the subject leases, or their impact on the issue of consideration.
6 Defendants contend that a mere cloud on title is sufficient to establish a constructive eviction of an oil and gas
lease and breach of a lease’s general warranty provision. In support of this rule, they cite Derrickham Co. v. Brown,
451 A.2d 477 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982). Based on the circumstances of that case, the Pennsylvania Superior Court in
Derrickham agreed with the trial court’s determination that a cloud on the lessor’s title relieved the lessee of any
affirmative duty it may have had, during the pendency of a quiet title action, to drill for oil or make ongoing rental
payments. Further, based on the express terms of the lease, the Superior Court rejected the argument that the cloud
on title suspended the running of the lease term during the pendency of the litigation. 451 A.2d at 479-80. It does
not appear that Derrickham has been widely cited in this Commonwealth for the proposition that a cloud on the
lessor’s title constitutes a breach of a general warranty clause in an oil and gas lease. Cf 4 Kuntz, Law of Oil and
Gas §52.2 (“It has been said that an eviction or its equivalent is required for a breach of the covenant of warranty
and that the presence of a cloud on the title does not constitute a breach.”) (citing cases). Even if a cloud on title
could be considered a constructive eviction, however, the remedy that SWEPI bargained for was the lessor’s defense
of title and/or compensation for any monetary losses occasioned by the lessor’s failure to convey clean title. See
Lease at 916; Juniata Valley Bank, 736 A.2d at 661 n.7. That situation does not pertain here. Accordingly, in the
absence of more broadly recognized authority on the point, this Court is not prepared to predict that the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court would adopt the rule of Derrickham as it pertains to Defendants’ arguments
concerning the failure of consideration in this case.

3]

Moreover, some twenty-four (24) Plaintiffs ’ in this case signed overriding lease addenda
with even more narrow warranty provisions, which state that “Lessor warrants title to said
property only in respects that the title is good to the best of Lessor’s knowledge and Lessee
agrees that no claims will be made against Lessor pertaining to warranty of title.” See, e.g., ECF
No. 331-2 at 8, 922; see generally ECF No. 443 at 12. And in the case of Rogers Holdings, the
title waiver provision states that “Lessor makes no warranty or representation whatsoever with
regard to title or rights to the leased premises or the oil and gas or other constituents subject to
this lease. Lessee acknowledges by acceptance of this lease that it has conducted sufficient
investigation to satisfy itself as to title and oil and gas rights associated with the leased premises
and Lessee assumes all risk and title failures without any recourse against Lessor.” ECF No.
394-2 at 12, JS; id. at 14, 4/7.
In sum, Defendants insist that all Plaintiffs promised marketable title to SWEPI;
however, the Court finds no support for that proposition, either in Ms. McManus’ report or in the
lease documents themselves. Thus, Defendants have not established, as a matter of law, that the
leases are unenforceable due to a failure of consideration.’ And because the Transactional

7 These include Plaintiffs: Jenine A. Anthony; Sumner R. and Georgene Bemis; Ronald and Judy Bickel; Clayton L.
and Connie L. Blauser; Warren Capenos (through executor Kathleen Barrett); Barrett N. Clark and Marcia L.
Gordon; John L. and Dianna J. Erwin; Robert Evans; Robert E. and Pamela J. Exley; Alfred L. and Robyn D.
Freeman; Florence R. Geibel; Martin C. Geibel; Clarence R. & Janice R. Guillinger; Malcom L. and Sandy J.
Guiste; Michael P. and Beth A. Hutchinson; Larry E. and Pamela J. Keverline; Karen Latshaw; David J. McCune,
I and Lauren E. McCune; Tracy L. Miliara; Marc J. Rasschaert; Carol Spellman Seltz (as Executor of the Estate of
Harry J. Spellman and Helen M. Spellman); Thomas J. Smerkar (through Executor Angela D. Books); John P. and
Barbara A. Yakimick; and Richard Zink.
8 Defendants filed a separate motion for summary judgment directed against Plaintiff the Estate of Warren Capenos,
Clarence R. and Janice R. Guilinger, Michael P. and Beth A. Hutchinson, and John P. and Barbara A. Yakimick,
based on the assertion that these Plaintiffs lacked clear title at the time of the purported conveyances. ECF No. 322.
Each one of these Plaintiffs had lease addenda with the provision clarifying that they were warranting title only to
the best of their knowledge and that SWEPI was waiving any recourse against them related to warranty of title
issues. Based on these provisions, the Court rejects Defendants’ argument that the leases are unenforceable due to a
failure of consideration.

32 :

Documents can be reasonably viewed as evidencing the Plaintiffs’ conveyance of an oil and gas
interest in return for a binding (albeit conditional) promise on the part of SWEPI to pay the
bonus amounts,’ the Court finds that the element of consideration is satisfied.

D. Have Plaintiffs Established a Contractual Breach?
Assuming that the lease agreements are enforceable contracts, the Court must next
address whether Plaintiffs can adduce evidence of a contractual breach. Plaintiffs posit that a
breach occurred when they did not receive immediate payment upon providing their signed
leases. Defendants assert that, for several reasons, any contractual obligation they had to fund
the draft instruments was excused. We address each point in turn.

1. Plaintiffs’ Theory of Contractual Breach
Plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgment are predicated on the theory that only the
leases and the lease addenda comprised the contractual documents and, under the terms of these
documents, Plaintiffs were entitled to receive an immediate monetary payment in exchange for
their signed leases. They refer to the language in the Paragraph 1 of the lease forms, which state
that the Plaintiffs were conferring leasing rights “‘[i]n consideration of the bonus consideration
paid, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged[.]” In Plaintiffs’ view, SWEPI breached the
lease agreements when SWEPI failed to pay the bonus amounts at or before the time that the
signed lease documents were given to SWEPI’s agents. Plaintiffs contend that any issues
relating to deficiency of title, including encumbrances, were waived upon SWEPI’s physical

° The Court so found in the Walney class action. See 311 F. Supp. 3d at 710 (stating that the Transactional
Documents could reasonably be viewed as “provid[ing] valid consideration to each class member in the form of a
conditional promise of future payment”); id. at 720 (court concluding that “the Transactional Documents evidence a
binding promise on the part of SWEPI to pay the Drafts in accordance with the time period specified in each Draft,
subject only to SWEPI’s verification of clean title within that time frame.”). As explained further herein, the Court
concurs with this view.
33

acceptance of the leases. Citing Medusa Portland Cement Co. v. Lamantina, 44 A.2d 244, 246
(Pa. 1945), Plaintiffs contend that the leases became binding, and title passed to SWEPI, □

immediately upon the execution and delivery of the instruments to SWEPI’s agents.
The Court rejects this theory as untenable based on the lease documents and the record as
whole. As an initial point, Plaintiffs’ theory is at odds with the Court’s determination both here
and in the Walney class action that the drafts comprise a part of the putative contractual
agreement. Unlike Plaintiffs, the Court does not believe that the draft provisions can reasonably
be eliminated as contractual terms. Secondly, while the Court recognizes that oil and gas leases
involve the conveyance of a property interest, an oil and gas lease is in the nature of a contract
under Pennsylvania law, and the contractual terms are therefore paramount. Shedden v.
Anadarko E. & P. Co., L.P., 136 A.3d 485, 490 (Pa. 2016); In re Powell, No. 3:13-CV-35, 2015
WL 6964549, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 10, 2015). The undersigned finds, as did the Court in the
Walney class action, that “bonus consideration paid” most logically refers to SWEPI’s
contemporaneous conferment of the draft, which expressly stated that, “when paid,” it would
constitute “payment in full” for the associated lease. 311 F. Supp. 3d at 710. Third, Plaintiffs’

_|| proposed interpretation does not comport with the “known characteristics of the particularized
nature of the oil and gas industry,” Camp Ne’er Too Late, 185 F. Supp. 3d at 544, in which oil
and gas developers rely on title examinations as a foundation for evaluating complex and costly
investment decisions. See McManus Report, ECF No. 329-2 at 12-15; Haney Decl., ECF No.
329-1 at 8-9. Finally, a resort to the relevant extrinsic evidence confirms the parties’
understanding that SWEPI was reserving its right to examine title and could refuse payment
based on the results of its examination. Among other things, the record shows that each lessor

34

received an instruction letter confirming that the “draft allows 90[!°] banking days for title
examination and the transfer of funds to your bank.” See, e.g., 331-2 at 13. For these reasons,
the Court finds Plaintiffs’ proposed interpretation of the contractual documents and theory of the
contractual breach to be untenable.
On the other hand, the Court finds that the Transactional Documents can reasonably be
viewed as evidencing a binding, yet conditional, promise on the part of SWEPI to pay the bonus
amounts in exchange for the signed leases. The Court expounded at length on this theory in the
Walney class action. See 311 F. Supp. 3d at 709-25. In its March 31, 2022 Memorandum
Opinion, this Court acknowledged that it could not definitively opine on the meaning and effect
of the draft language or the enforceability of the leases, given issues of fact pertaining to industry
usage and custom. ECF No. 86 at 17. However, the Court noted it was inclined to view the
“title examination” clause as Judge Conti did, “evidencing a promise by SWEPI ‘to pay the
bonus amounts by the end of the time period specified in the Draft, unless it determined within
that time that the lessors lacked sufficiently clean title to the underlying gas and oil interests.’”
| Id. (citing 311 F. Supp. 3d at 710). The Court went on to clarify that SWEPI bore the burden of
establishing title defects. Jd. at 18-20. Consequently, Plaintiffs could demonstrate a prima facie
contractual breach by demonstrating either that (1) SWEPI had repudiated the leases outside of
the time frame permitted by the draft; or that (2) SWEPI had repudiated the lease for reasons
unrelated to defective title. Id. at 20. Upon consideration of all arguments raised in the latest
summary judgment filings, the undersigned remains of the view that this is a reasonable
interpretation of the Transactional Documents.

10 Some Plaintiffs received drafts with a shorter time period for title examination and payment, as with the following
individuals: Robert Evans (30 days); Robert and Pamela Exley (30 Days); Robert Shaffer (30 days); Clarence and
Janice Guilliger (45 and 60 days respectively), John and Barbara Yakimick (60 days). For present purposes,
however, these discrepancies are immaterial.
35

Plaintiffs argue, however, that they have demonstrated a contractual breach with respect
to nearly all of the subject leases because, in their view, only five of SWEPI’s notices of
cancellation were timely. Plaintiffs submit that SWEPI was obligated to communicate its intent
to cancel the leases “clearly and unambiguously,” ECF No. 443 at 17 (citing Dougherty v. TEV.
Pharms. USA, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13255, *25 (E.D. Pa 2008)), and they assert that SWEPI’s
earliest notice occurred with the transmission of its cancellation letters. 7d. Plaintiffs go on
argue that, in all but five instances, the date of the cancellation letter was too late, because it
occurred outside of the timeframe established in the drafts.
This argument is unavailing in that the Court previously determined that SWEPI could
effectively reject the leases by cancelling the drafts within the time frames stated thereon. See
ECF No. 86 at 22-23. The record establishes that all drafts were cancelled within the time
frames stated on the instruments, and Plaintiffs do not contend otherwise. Accordingly, whether
SWEPI timely rejected the Plaintiffs’ leases is not a genuinely disputed issue of fact.
Having thus addressed Plaintiffs’ theory regarding contractual breach, the Court turns to
the Defendants’ arguments.

2. Defendants’ Theory That Any Obligation to Pay the Drafts Was Excused
Assuming, without conceding, that the lease agreements are enforceable, Defendants
posit several reasons why any obligation that SWEPI had to fund the drafts was excused. We
consider each argument in turn.
i) FAILURE TO PRESENT THE DRAFTS
Defendants first assert that summary judgment is warranted as to four Plaintiffs who did
not present their drafts to their banks. Defendants explain that the period for title examination
and payment was triggered only when a lessor presented their draft, as signed by them on the

36

back, to Amegy Bank for payment. The Court agrees that, pursuant to the express terms of the
draft, the time period for title examination and payment commenced upon Amegy Bank’s receipt
of the signed instrument from Plaintiffs’ “forwarding” banks. For any Plaintiff who never
presented their draft to their own bank, the drafts were never forwarded to Amegy Bank, and the
designated period for payment never commenced. Consequently, no payment due date could
ever have arrived, and SWEPI could not have breached a payment obligation. See Walney, 311
F. Supp. 3d at 730. Defendants assert that this is the case for Clayton L. and Connie L. Blauser
(the “Blausers”), Malcom and Sandy Guiste (the “Guistes”), Rogers Holdings, and Richard Zink.

The Blausers
Defendants submitted evidence that the Blausers never presented their draft to Amegy
Bank through their own forwarding bank or otherwise. See ECF No. 328, 9122-26; ECF No.
329-8. The Blausers testified to that effect, and SWEPI also points to a letter from Amegy Bank
indicating that it could not locate specific drafts, including drafts for “Clayton L and Connie L.”
ECF No. 329-1 at 505. Plaintiffs attempted to counter this evidence by asserting that the
submission of the Blausers’ draft is shown “by copies of the Collection Letter activity between
[their] bank and Amegy Bank, whereby the Draft is shown to have been received by SWEPI’s
bank [Appx 9].” ECF No. 443. However, the documentation submitted by Plaintiffs pertains to,
and bears the signature of, Leroy E. and Elizabeth M. Blauser, not Clayton L. and Connie L.
Blauser. No explanation is given for this discrepancy. Because Plaintiffs have not shown the
existence of a genuinely disputed fact concerning the failure of Clayton and Connie Blauser to
present their draft for payment, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the Blausers’
claim.

37

The Guistes
Defendants adduced evidence that the Guistes never presented their draft to Amegy Bank
through their own forwarding bank or otherwise. See ECF No. 328, {9287-90 and n.1; ECF No.
329-18. Plaintiffs purported to counter this issue by pointing to a record obtained from SWEPI
during discovery that supposedly showed a bank due date for the Guistes’ draft. See ECF No.
443 at 17; ECF No. 444-10. The document does not bear any indication of the Guistes’ name,
however, and does not give rise to a genuinely disputed issue of material fact. Accordingly,
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the Guistes’ claim.

Rodgers Holdings
In their Concise Statement of Material Facts, ECF No, 328, Defendants asserted the
following facts concerning Rodgers Holdings. On January 30, 2012 Rodgers Holdings purported|
to lease the oil and gas rights in three parcels to SWEPI and received three drafts in connection
with these transactions. See ECF No. 328, §§ 416-17; see ECF No. 329-27. Rodgers Holdings is
a purported Pennsylvania partnership, and not all of the partners signed the documentation to
lease the subject oil and gas rights to SWEPI. Jd., §418. The three drafts given to Rodgers
Holdings were returned on June 11, 2012, one day before their due date, with a notation that
those drafts were to be replaced with new drafts. Id., §419. Rodgers Holdings was informed that
it needed to sign additional paperwork in order to get the replacement drafts, but it did not do so
after one of the partners passed away. Jd., $420. Rodgers Holdings never signed the Unanimous
Written Consent of the Partners that SWEPI had presented to it. /d., 9421. Rodgers Holdings’
replacement Drafts were never presented to Amegy Bank for payment. Id., 423.
Plaintiffs did not file a responsive statement but asserted in their brief that “Rodgers
Holdings evidences its submission of its Drafts by copies of the Collection Letter activity

38

between its bank and Amegy Bank.” ECF No. 443 at 17 (citing to Pls’ Appendix 11 at ECF No.
444-11). The referenced documents appear to be the original drafts that had been issued to
Rodgers Holdings. They bear the notation that they were being returned because they were to be
replaced by new drafts. Nothing in Plaintiffs’ response indicates that there is a genuinely
disputed issue concerning the failure of Rodgers Holdings to present operable drafts to Amegy
Bank. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the claims asserted by
Rodgers Holdings.
Richard Zink
Defendants assert that Plaintiff Richard Zink was issued a draft in connection with his
lease which was returned and replaced with a second draft that provided SWEPI an additional 60
days for title review. See EF No. 328, 99520-22; ECF No. 329-33. It is this second draft that
Defendants claim was never presented to Amegy, precluding the commencement of SWEPI’s
time frame for title examination and payment. But Defendants’ own exhibits show that Mr. Zink
denied being consulted about an extension of time and also denied ever being offered a
replacement draft or receiving one. Jd. While SWEPI’s exhibits include a copy of the
replacement draft, it is unsigned. See ECF No. 328, 9§52e; ECF No. 329-33 at 6. The Court
cannot say on the basis of this evidence that no genuine dispute exists concerning the question of
whether Mr. Zink received a replacement draft and failed to forward such draft to Amegy.
Accordingly, the Court will not grant Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as it pertains to
Mr. Zink’s claim.
(il) TITLE AS A CONDITION OF PERFORMANCE
Defendants next contend that SWEPI’s obligation to fund the drafts was excused because
it was expressly conditioned on SWEPI’s ability to verify clean and marketable title, and this

39

condition did not occur. Defendants conclude that, “[i]f SWEPI could not complete its titles
search, or if SWEPI was able to conduct a title search and found that title was unclean, then in
both instances its obligation to pay was never triggered and was excused.” ECF No. 327 at 21.
This argument blurs an important distinction that this Court previously drew in its March
31, 2022 ruling. Whereas “SWEPI interprets the [title examination] clause to mean that it would
not fund the drafts unless it could first verify, within the agreed upon number of banking days,
that the lessor had clean title to the property interest being conveyed,” 2022 WL 976806, at *9,
this Court interpreted the clause as meaning that “SWEPI promised to fund the drafts upon
expiration of the specified number of banking days, unless it rescinded the lease in the interim
because of unclean title.” Id. (emphasis in the original). The distinction, though subtle, places
the risk of an incomplete title examination on SWEPI rather than the Plaintiffs, which is
consistent with the fact that: (a) SWEPI issued the draft with the title examination clause, (b)
SWEPI had a business interest in completing the title examination process, and (c) SWEPI was
the party in control of the title examination process. Thus, the Court rejects SWEPI’s proposed
interpretation of the lease terms whereby Plaintiffs must prove that SWEPI successfully
completed its title examination and verified clean and marketable title as a condition to receiving
payment.
Defendants next assert that, “[a]s to each and every Plaintiff for which SWEPI was able
to complete a title examination within the allotted time period provided for in the Draft, SWEPI
surrendered the lease for title related issues.” ECF No. 327 at 25. Defendants do not delineate
individual cases in their brief but instead refer generally to their concise statement of material
facts, which provides factual detail pertaining to each disputed transaction.

40

The Court has reviewed Defendants’ concise statement in detail and makes the following
observations. First, Defendants assert in their concise statement of facts that, “where SWEPI
surrendered leases and cancelled drafts, it kept meticulous records of the reason the lease was
surrendered and the draft cancelled.” ECF No. 328, 413. Second, based on the declaration of I
Haney, Defendants assert that certain remarks appearing on each draft indicate the reason the
draft was returned unpaid.
For example, Defendants assert that “[t]he return reason of ‘Title Failure’ covered a
variety of title problems that would be an impediment to SWEPI obtaining clean title to the oil
and gas interest that is the subject of the lease.” ECF No. 328, §15 (citing Declaration of Ian
Haney at { 19). Similarly, “[t]he return reason of ‘Cancelled per Land Department Directive’
indicated that title issues had been identified during the course of a title search.” ECF No. 328,
{17 (citing Declaration of Ian Haney at { 22). The foregoing remarks appear on drafts issued to
Plaintiffs Gage Allam (through Executor Stephen Warner, ECF No. 328 at 952, ECF No. 329-4);
Ronald and Judy Bickel (ECF No. 328 at 110, ECF No. 329-7), Alma Lee Britt (ECF No. 328
at 9157, ECF No. 329-10); Barrett Clark and Marcia Gordon (ECF No. 328 at 4189, ECF No.
329-12), Alfred and Robyn Freeman (ECF No. 328 at 246, ECF No. 329-16), Michael and Beth
Hutchinson (ECF No. 328 at 9310, ECF No. 329-19), Stephen and Barbara Lewis (ECF No. 328
at 363, ECF No. 329-23), Marc Rasschaert (ECF No. 328 at 407, ECF No. 329-26), Carol
Spellman Seltz (Executor of the Estate of Harry and Helen Spellman, ECF No. 328 at 474, ECF
No. 329-30), and John and Evelyn Stewart (ECF No. 328 at 487, ECF No. 329-31).
As to Plaintiffs Bickel, Britt, and Spellman Seltz, the Court perceives no genuinely
disputed issue of fact concerning Defendants’ assertion that, for reasons related to title
deficiencies, the Plaintiffs’ leases were rejected and the drafts cancelled prior to the deadlines

Al

stated in the drafts. Accordingly, Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate a breach of these lease
agreements, even assuming they are enforceable contracts. Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment will be granted as to these Plaintiffs.
The Court reaches a different conclusion with respect to Plaintiffs Allam, Clark/Gordon,
Freeman, Hutchinson, Stephen and Barbara Lewis, Rasschaert, and Stewart. As to these
Plaintiffs, the record shows that SWEPI sent cancellation letters advising that the leases were
being surrendered, and the title examination process abandoned, “[d]ue to difficulties arising
from restrictions placed upon Southeast Land Services at the Venango County Courthouse...
[c]oupled with a depressed natural gas price environment[.]” See ECF No. 444-6 at 1, 12, 17,
19, and 22; see also ECF No. 424 at 911, ECF No. 428 at 11. The Court finds that this
conflicting evidence is sufficient to create a genuinely disputed issue of material fact as to

|| whether SWEPI breached the leases by surrendering them for reasons unrelated to its discovery
of defective title.
Defendants also assert in their concise statement of material fact that “[t]he return reasons
of ‘Venango County- Title Not Complete’ and ‘Venango County- Reprioritization No Redraft’
indicated either a title issue had been identified and/or the inability to verify title due to the
courthouse restricting access to records.” ECF No. 328, 916 (citing Declaration of Ian Haney at
§20). This occurred with the drafts issued to Plaintiffs Jenine Anthony (ECF No. 328 at 69,
ECF No. 329-5), Dennis and Angela Boocks (ECF No. 328 at 4144, ECF No. 329-9), Warren
Capenos (through executor Kathleen Barrett, ECF No. 328 at §173, ECF No. 329-11), Robert
Evans (ECF No. 328 at 218, ECF No. 329-14), Florence Geibel (ECF No. 328 at 473, ECF No.
329-5), Martin Geibel (ECF No. 328 at 777, ECF No. 329-5), Clarence and Janice Guillinger
(ECF No. 328 at §§265 and 272, ECF No. 329-17), Larry and Pamela Keverline (ECF No. 328 at

‘ 42

9324, ECF No. 329-20), Karen Latshaw (ECF No. 328 at 4338, ECF No. 329-21), Scott Michael
Lewis (ECF No. 328 at 9351, ECF No. 329-22), David J. McCune, III and Lauren McCune (ECF
No. 328 at 9374, ECF No. 329-24), Tracy Miliara (ECF No. 328 at 4390, ECF No. 329-25),
Robert Shaffer (ECF No. 328 at §443, ECF No. 329-28), Thomas Smerker (ECF No. 328 at
4461, ECF No. 329-29), and John and Barbara Yakimick (ECF No. 328 at 502 (ECF No. 329-
32).
As to this group of Plaintiffs, Defendants are equivocal about the reason for the draft
cancellations and lease surrenders. Based on the current record, the Court cannot definitive
determine whether the cancellations were due to a title defect that had been positively identified
or simply the inability of SWEPI’s agents to complete the title examination process. While the
former circumstance would excuse SWEPI’s payment obligation, the latter would not (as we
discuss further, infra). Thus, Defendants have not demonstrated the absence of a genuine
material facts relating to the alleged breach of those leases.
Defendants also make the fallback argument that, regardless of the reason SWEPI may
have articulated for its lease surrenders, SWEPI was well within its rights to refuse payment
because discovery has revealed an encumbrance on each remaining oil and gas interest at issue.
Under general contract principles, a party’s duty to perform is excused if the other party to the
contract has committed a material breach. Pheasant Ridge Dev. Corp. v. Fulton Fin. Corp., No.
2356 EDA 2023, 2025 WL 1013370, at *11 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2025) (citing McCausland v.
Wagner, 78 A.3d 1093, 1101 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013)). But for the reasons previously discussed,
the general warranties in the form leases provided only promises to indemnify and defend
SWEPI against losses that might be occasioned by the lessor’s failure to convey clean title,
circumstances which did not occur in this case. See ECF No. 331-2 at 4, Lease (16. see also

43

Juniata Valley Bank, 736 A.2d at 661 n.7. Accordingly, the Court will not grant Defendants’
motion for summary judgment on the basis that Plaintiffs materially breached their lease
agreements.

(iii) = THE “No LIABILITY” CLAUSES IN THE DRAFTS
Defendants next argue that any payment obligation they may have had was excused
based on the “no liability” language in the drafts. Pointing to the McManus report, Defendants
posit that the “no liability” clause meant that no liability would attach to any party if the drafts
were not paid. Defendants conclude that, “[e]ffectively, SWEPI was entitled to terminate the
lease agreements with Plaintiffs for any reason and refuse to consummate the transaction.” ECF
No. 327 at 26.
As discussed, the customs and usage evidence upon which Defendants rely involves
triable issues for the jury. Accordingly, the Court will not grant Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment on this basis.

(iv) | SWEPI’s INABILITY TO COMPLETE ITS TITLE SEARCHES
Defendants also contend that SWEPI’s obligation, if any, to fund the drafts was excused
as to numerous Plaintiffs whose title examinations could not be completed within the time frame
indicated on the draft, due to congestion at the Venango County Courthouse.'! Defendants argue

According to Defendants, SWEPI kept “meticulous” records of the reason why the lease were surrendered and the
drafts cancelled. ECF No. 328, 413. The return reasons of “Venango County-Title Not Complete” and “Venango
County- Reprioritization No Redraft” were indicative of SWEPI’s inability to complete its title search within the
allotted number of banking days. See ECF No. 327 at 27; ECF No. 328, 16.
Defendants represent that
[t]he following is a list of those Plaintiffs for whom SWEPI was unable to timely complete a title
search due to the extraneous circumstances at the Venango County Courthouse: Jeanine A. Anthony;
Rodney S. Bedow, Sr. (Walney case); Ronald and Judy Bickel (both Drafts); Clayton L. and Connie
L. Blauser; Dennis Ray and Angela D. Boocks; Warren Capenos; Barrent N. Clark and Marcia L.
Gordon; Robert R. Evans; Florence R. Geibel; Martin C. Geibel; Larry E. and Pamela J. Keverline;
44

that, in those cases, SWEPI’s duty of performance was rendered impracticable because it was
unable, through no fault of its own, to exercise its right to verify clean title.
Defendants’ argument implicates the doctrine of impossibility.'? “Under Pennsylvania
contract law, impossibility of performance ‘means not only strict impossibility but
impracticability because of extreme and unreasonable difficulty, expense, or loss involved.’”
Leonard v. Sec'y Pennsylvania Dep't of Hum. Servs., No. 24-1179, 2024 WL 5182623, at *2 (3d
Cir. Dec. 20, 2024) (quoting West v. Peoples First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 106 A.2d 427, 432
(Pa. 1954)). “For an agreement to be impracticable, there must be a supervening event the non-
occurrence of which was a basic assumption of the parties.” /d. (citing Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 261, cmt. b (Am. L. Inst. 1981) and 9795 Perry Hwy. Mgmt., LLC v. Bernard, 273
A.3d 1098, 1104 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2022) (quoting the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 261)).

Scott Michael Lewis; Marc J. Rasschaert; Robert D. Shaffer; Carol Spellman Seltz; and Thomas J.
Smerkar. SOF Jf 64-87, 101-119, 120-138, 139- 151, 168-183, 184-197, 213-227, 319-332, 346-
357, 402-415, 438-455, 456-468, 469-481.
ECF No. 327 at 27-28.
The Court’s review of Defendants’ concise statement and supporting evidence suggests that their list contains
some discrepancies. Specifically, the Bickels and Carol Spellman Seltz should be excluded from this list, as the
evidence shows their drafts were timely cancelled due to title defects. See ECF No. 328, 4110 and ECF No. 329-7
(Bickels); ECF No. 328, 4474 and ECF No. 329-30 (Spellman Seltz). Also, the Court has previously determined
that the Blausers failed to present their draft to Amegy and, consequently, the time for title examination and
payment never commenced. See ECF No. 328, (122-26; ECF No. 329-5.
The evidence also suggests, however, that some additional Plaintiffs may be among those whose drafts were
cancelled because of SWEPI’s inability to timely complete a title examination in Venango County. These include
Clarence and Janice Guillinger (See ECF No. 328, 49265, 272; ECF No. 329-17); Karen Latshaw (ECF No. 328,
338; ECF No. 329-21); David McCune, III and Lauren McCune (ECF No. 328, 1374; ECF No. 329-24); Tracy
Miliara (ECF No. 328, 9390; ECF No. 329-25); and John and Barbara Yakimick (ECF No. 328, 502; ECF No. 329-
32).
Defendants state in their brief: The Court previously determined that Defendants may viably argue the defense
based on the doctrine of impossibility for those Plaintiffs for whom title searches could not be completed due to
congestion at the Venango County Courthouse.” ECF No. 327 at 27 (citing Walney v. SWEPI LP, 1:13-cv-102
(W.D. Pa.) (Mem. Op. dated Mar. 31, 2019, ECF No. 249, at 20-21). In the referenced opinion, which addressed
SWEPI’s motion to decertify the class, the Court found only that the doctrine remained a potentially viable defense
and, because it potentially impacted only a portion of the class, that defense “counsel[ed] against a finding that
issues common to the class predominate over individual issues.” The Court did not at that time reach any decision
concerning the merits of SWEPI’s “impossibility” defense.
45

“Traditionally, the doctrine of impracticability has been applied in three types of cases: (1) cases
involving the ‘supervening death or incapacity of a person necessary for performance’; (2) cases
involving the ‘supervening destruction of a specific thing necessary for performance’; and (3)
cases involving a ‘supervening prohibition or prevention by law.’” /d. (quoting Restatement
(Second) Contracts §261, cmt. a.). “The question is generally considered to be one of law rather
than fact, for the court rather than the jury.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Introductory
Note to Chapter 11, Impracticability of Performance and Frustration of Purpose (1981).
Notably, the form leases include a “Force Majeure” provision addressing circumstances
where SWEPI might be “prevented from complying with any expressed or implied covenant” of
the lease “as a result of any cause whatsoever beyond the control of [SWEPI],” including an
“order or regulation of the government[.]” See Lease §14. In those situations, the lease provided
that “while so prevented, [SWEPI’s] obligation to comply with such covenant shall be suspended
for so long as compliance is thus prevented and for six (6) months thereafter.” Jd. Neither
Plaintiffs nor Defendants have referenced this provision, presumably because they do not view it

as pertaining to SWEPI’s payment obligation. Assuming the clause does apply, there is no
evidence that SWEPI attempted to invoke it or otherwise extend the time “for title examination
and for payment” relative to the leases at issue. Instead, SWEPI merely terminated its title
examinations and cancelled the drafts. A party claiming impracticability “is expected to use
reasonable efforts to surmount obstacles to performance . . . , and a performance is impracticable
only if it is so in spite of such efforts.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 261 (1981); see
Prusky v. Reliastar Life Ins. Co., 474 F. Supp. 2d 695, 700 (E.D. Pa. 2007). Here, SWEPI
waived any right it may have had to extend the time for title examination under the Force
Majeure provision.

46

Assuming that the Force Majeure clause does not apply to SWEPI’s payment obligations,
it is SWEPI who should bear the risks associated with its unsuccessful title searches. Here, the
alleged supervening obstacle came in the form of restrictions that county commissioners placed
on access to the register and recorder’s offices in the Venango County Courthouse. To be clear,
these restrictions did not preclude title searching altogether; they merely imposed limitations on
the time during which title searchers could access the public records. Under the circumstances
here, it is fair to place the risk of loss associated with these events on SWEPI. For one, SWEPI
supplied the contractual terms pertaining to title examination and could have included additional
language affording itself greater protection against unforeseen impediments. Second, as between
lessor and lessee, SWEPI had the stronger interest in obtaining fulsome title searches. Third,
SWEPI and its agents controlled the title examination process, both by conducting the actual
searches and by deciding how many signed leases to accept. All of these considerations lead the
Court to conclude that SWEPI should bear any risk of loss associated with the courthouse
restrictions.
The Court also notes, based on SWEPI’s cancellation letters, that market forces may have
played a role in SWEPI’s decision to surrender the Venango County leases. But the continuation
of existing market conditions is not ordinarily a “basic assumption” on which a contract is made;
thus, “mere market shifts . .. do not usually effect discharge under the rule.” Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 261 comment b (1981); see also Harrison v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp.,
110 A.3d 178, 184 (Pa. 2015) (noting that the “speculative nature of oil and gas extraction
inherently requires the assumption of large risks” and determining that “such business judgments
are commonplace and do not warrant shifting the risk of litigation from multimillion-dollar
corporations to small landowners such as [the plaintiff lessor]’”).

AT

For these reasons, the Court finds that SWEPI’s payment obligations were not excused b
the restrictions that were placed on title searches at the Venango County Courthouse in April of
2012 or by the general congestion that occurred during times relevant to this lawsuit. The Court
will deny Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as it relates to this particular defense.

E. Plaintiffs Who Requested a Surrender of Their Leases
Defendants assert in their concise statement of material fact that Plaintiffs’ Sumner and
Georgene Bemis, John and Dianna Erwin, and Robert and Pamela Exley requested a surrender o
their leases, which SWEPI honored. See ECF No. 328 at Ff 92-93, 202-204, and 233-34, ECF
Nos. 329-6, 329-13, and 329-15. The evidence indicates that SWEPI cancelled the drafts in each
case within the time frames stated on the instruments. See ECF No. 328 at {ff 93, 204, 232.
Plaintiffs did not dispute the Defendants’ assertions concerning the Plaintiffs’ requests for the
surrender of these leases and, in fact, their own documentation supports Defendants’ assertions.
See, e.g., ECF Nos. 444-6 at 5, 15, 27.
Under Pennsylvania law, the parties to a contract may agree to rescind the agreement by
mutual assent. See In re Bridgeport Fire Litig., 8 A.3d 1270, 1282 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010) ([A]
contract can be repudiated by mutual agreement of all parties to it.”) (citing Kirk v. Brentwood
Manor Homes, Inc., 159 A.2d 48 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1960)). A rescission “need not be expressed in
words but may be inferred from the parties’ acts and declarations[.]” Johnston v. Johnston, 499
A.2d 1074, 1077 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985). Although the rescission of a contract must be supported
by consideration, a surrender of mutual rights by the parties generally satisfies this requirement.
See Fedun v. Mike's Cafe, Inc., 204 A.2d 776, 781 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1964), aff'd, 213 A.2d 638 (Pa.
1965).

48

Whether or not the parties have agreed to rescind an agreement is typically a factual
issue. See Johnston, 449 A.2d at 1077 (citing Kirk, 159 A.2d at 51). Here, however, there
appears to be no genuine dispute concerning the fact that the Bemises, Erwins, and Exleys
rescinded their lease agreements with SWEPI by mutual assent. Accordingly, as this issue was
not expressly raised in Defendants’ motion, the Court will direct Plaintiffs to show cause why
summary judgment should not be entered in Defendants’ favor relative to the claims of these
Plaintiffs.

F. Have Plaintiffs Established Recoverable Damages?
Defendants next argue that Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claims fail because they are not
entitled to the damages they seek through specific performance. They posit that, under
Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff cannot “enforce specific performance of a contract in favor of a
vendor of real estate unless he is able to offer marketable title which is beyond reasonable
uncertainty.” ECF No. 327 at 28 (quoting Swain v. Fidelity Ins., Trust & Safe Deposit Co., 54
Pa. 455, 458 (Pa. 1867). The term “marketable title,” they say, includes good and “indubitable
title” in the property being conveyed. Jd. (citing Swayne v. Lyon, 67 Pa. 436, 439 (Pa. 1871)).
Defendants insist that Plaintiff cannot convey clean and marketable title to SWEPI in exchange
for specific performance via payment of the draft because each and every Plaintiff had an
encumbrance on their title at the time they signed their lease agreement, and those encumbrances
still exist. Moreover, several Plaintiffs no longer own the oil and gas rights they purported to
lease to SWEPT in or around 2012. Consequently, Defendants argue, Plaintiffs are without a
viable remedy and summary judgment should be entered against them.
This Court previously addressed the issue of the proper measure of damages in its March
2022 ruling on certain issues of law. Previously, the Court considered the Pennsylvania Supreme □

49

Court’s decision in Bafile v. Borough of Muncy, 588 A.2d 462, 464 (Pa. 1991), as it pertained to
the three remedies traditionally available to a seller when a buyer defaults under an agreement of
sale for real property. As the court recounted in Bafile, a nonbreaching seller can “sue a
defaulting party for damages, measured as the contract price minus the fair market value at the
time of the breach less any payments received,” or “request specific performance of the
contract,” or “commence a contract action for the purchase price of the real property and other
damages, conditioned upon the transfer of the property.” 588 A.2d at 464. The Court initially
adopted this model on the theory that the subject leases were akin to executory contracts for the
purchase of real estate. See ECF No 86 at 13-14.
On further reflection, the Court finds this analogy to be problematic, as the putative
contracts in this case were “paid up” oil and gas leases. “A paid-up oil-and-gas lease is a contract
for mineral rights in which the lessee (i) pays the lessor a lump-sum initial payment in return for
the option to extract oil and gas from the land for a set period of time without any commitment to
actually do so and (ii) agrees to provide other compensation to the lessor, often in the form of
royalties, in return for any oil and gas actually extracted from the land.” Slamon v. Carrizo
(Marcellus) L.L.C., No. 23-1394, 2024 WL 4602673, at *1 (3d Cir. Oct. 29, 2024); see also
KEM Res., LP v. Deer Park Lumber, Inc., 310 A.3d 142, 144 n.1 (Pa. 2024) (“[A] paid-up oil
and gas lease is ‘[a] mineral lease that does not provide for delay-rental payments and does not
subject the lessor to any covenant to drill. In effect, the lessor makes all delay-rental payments,
and perhaps a bonus, when the lease is signed.’”) (quoting Paid-up Lease, Black's Law
Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (second alteration in original)). The contemplated transfers were for

a five-year primary term, commencing on the dates the leases were signed. Those five-year
periods have now expired.

50

Under Pennsylvania law, if a party breaches a contract but otherwise substantially
performs, the breaching party may still enforce the contract, and the non-breaching party may no
suspend performance. See Pheasant Ridge Dev. Corp. v. Fulton Fin. Corp., 339 A.3d 363 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2025). Here, the Plaintiffs substantially performed their obligations by delivering
signed lease agreements and MOLs to SWEPI and, therefore, they were entitled to enforce the
lease agreements on the terms agreed to. Alternatively, to the extent the principles of Bafile
apply, the Court agrees with the Plaintiffs’ position that the attempted transfers occurred when
the signed leases and MOLs were delivered, allowing Plaintiffs to now sue for the full amount of
the bonuses.
In arguing that Plaintiffs lack a viable remedy, Defendants largely reassert their argument
concerning the alleged failure of consideration. Defendants claim that the only consideration
given by the Plaintiffs was their promise to grant title to their oil and gas rights which, according
to Defendants, did not occur. Defendants point to the lease language, by which the lessors did
“grant, demise, lease and let exclusively” to SWEPI the oil and gas rights associated with their
respective properties. They argue that, by statute, these words constituted a promise by Plaintiffs
not only of ownership, but also a lack of encumbrances. See ECF No. 327 at 28-29 (citing 21
P.S. §4). And those covenants, Defendants say, were breached upon execution of the lease. Id.
at 29 (citing Juniata Valley Bank v. Martin Oil Co., 736 A.2d at 660-61 n. 7).
The Court has previously addressed Defendants’ failure-of-consideration argument and
will not rehash it here at length. The Court will note, however, that the statutory provision relied
upon by Defendants pertains to the conveyance of “land” and states the following:
The words “grant and convey,” or either one of said words, in any deed or
instrument in writing for conveying or releasing land hereafter executed, shall be
adjudged an express covenant to the grantee, his heirs and assigns; to wit, That the
grantor was seized of an indefeasible estate in fee simple in the property conveyed,

51

freed from incumbrances done or suffered from the grantor, as also for quiet
enjoyment against the grantor, his heirs and assigns, unless limited by express
words contained in such deed.
21 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 4 (West) (emphasis supplied). Here, of course, the form leases contained
only general warranties, by which “the grantor promises to compensate the grantee for any
monetary losses occasioned by the grantor's failure to convey the title promised in the deed,”
Juniata Valley Bank, 736 A.2d at 661 n.7, a situation that did not occur here. And, as previously
noted, certain Plaintiffs had even more limited clauses in their superseding lease addenda,
warranting good title only to the best of their knowledge, and acknowledging SWEPI’s waiver o
any right to make an affirmative claim against them.
In sum, the Court finds no merit in Defendants’ claim that the Plaintiffs have failed to
establish a basis for recoverable damages in the case of a contractual breach. Defendants’
motion for summary judgment will therefore be denied as to this issue.

G. Have Defendants Shown a Failure to Mitigate?
This Court previously determined that Plaintiffs had a duty to mitigate their damages.
ECF No. 86 at 15. However, Pennsylvania law treats mitigation of damages as an affirmative
defense for which Defendants have the burden of proof. Prusky v. ReliaStar Life Ins. Co., 532 F.
3d 252, 258 (3d Cir. 2008).
Here, Defendants seek summary judgment against certain Plaintiffs whom they claim
mitigated their damages in whole or in part. They also seek summary judgment against certain
Plaintiffs whom they claim failed to take any reasonable steps to mitigate their damages.
To prove a failure to mitigate, Defendants must show: “(1) what reasonable actions the
plaintiff ought to have taken, (2) that those actions would have reduced the damages, and (3) the
amount by which the damages would have been reduced.” Prusky, 532 F. 3d at 258-59 (citation

52

omitted). “Damages that could have been ‘avoided with reasonable effort without undue risk,
expense, burden, or humiliation will be considered ... as not being chargeable against the
defendant.’” Jd. (quoting WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 64:27, at 195). In other words,
where a party who is damaged by a contractual breach fails to take reasonable steps to mitigate
his damages, the “amount recoverable by the damaged party must be reduced by the amount of
losses which could have been avoided by the party’s reasonable efforts to avoid them.” Turner
Constr. Co. v. First Indemn. of Am. 829 F. Supp. 752, 761 (E.D. Pa. 1993). “Reasonableness “is
to be determined from all the facts and circumstances of each case and must be judged in the
light of one viewing the situation at the time the problem was presented.” Prusky, 532 F.3d at
259 (quoting In re Kellett Aircraft Corp., 186 F.2d 197, 198 (3d Cir.1950)).
(a)
Defendants contend that eight Plaintiffs (Anthony, Britt, the Bickels, Clark/Gordon, the
Freemans, the Geibels, Miliara, and Rodgers Holdings, Inc.) should be barred from receiving all
or part of their damages because they failed to mitigate their damages despite having a
reasonable opportunity to do so. Defendants posit that each of these Plaintiffs admitted they
were either affirmatively approached by another company about leasing their oil and gas rights
| and yet refused to enter into a lease, or they took no steps to re-lease their oil and gas rights
despite being aware that other companies in the area were looking to enter into leases.
Defendants have presented evidence that certain Plaintiffs who did mitigate their damages
received between $1,000 to $3,500 per acre.
The Court has reviewed the portion of the record relevant to these particular Plaintiffs.
As to Rodgers Holdings, the Court agrees that there is compelling evidence indicating that this
Plaintiff failed to take reasonable steps to re-lease its gas and oil interests, which could have

53

resulted in a partial mitigation of its alleged losses. Specifically, the evidence shows that,
following the surrender of its leases by SWEPI, Rodgers Holdings was offered $1,000 an acre to
lease the oil and gas rights to the same three parcels involved in the SWEPI leases. Rodgers
Holdings turned the new offer down, believing that it was too low. ECF No. 320, 49153-154;
ECF No. 321-14 at 19-21. Had Rodgers Holdings accepted the offer and re-leased its oil and gas
rights, it would have mitigated its alleged damages by $160,400 (i.e., 160.4 acres x $1,000 =
$160,400). However, the point is moot in light of the Court’s prior determination that Rodgers
Holdings never presented operable drafts to SWEPI, thereby excusing any payment obligation
that SWEPI might have had under its leases with Rodgers Holdings.
As to the other Plaintiffs that Defendants have identified (i.e. Anthony, Britt, the Bickels,
Clark/Gordon, the Freemans, the Geibels, and Miliara), the Court finds that the evidence is not
so compelling and unequivocal as to justify entry of summary judgment relative to SWEPI’s
affirmative defense. “Whether a plaintiff has met the duty to mitigate damages is a question of
fact, and therefore properly reserved for the jury where there is a genuine dispute of material
over plaintiff's mitigation efforts.” Gates v. Aramark Campus, LLC, No. CV 21-1081, 2022 WL
245303, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 24, 2022). And a determination of “reasonableness” is inherently
factual and must be based on an assessment of all relevant circumstances. See Prusky, 532 F.3d
at 259. On this record, a factfinder might conclude that the Plaintiffs failed to take reasonable
steps to mitigate their damages, but the factfinder would not be compelled to reach that
conclusion.
Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the issue of mitigation will
be denied without prejudice as to Plaintiffs Anthony, Clark/Gordon, Freeman, Geibel, and
Miliara. The motion will be dismissed as moot as it relates to Rodgers Holdings. The motion

54

will also be dismissed as moot as it relates to Ronald and Judy Bickel and Alma Lee Britt,
because the Court has determined that summary judgment is appropriately entered against those
Plaintiffs on other grounds.
(b)
Defendants argue that certain other Plaintiffs (the Bemises, the Guillingers, the
Yakimicks, and Richard Zink) fully mitigated their damages by re-leasing to Halcon Energy the

same oil and gas rights they purported to lease to SWEPI. Here, the record shows that Halcon
Energy paid each of these Plaintiffs $250 per acre more than SWEPI was willing to pay. See
ECF No. 320, 98-48. Defendants move for summary judgment against Plaintiffs Bemis,
Guillinger, Yakimick and Zink on the grounds that these Plaintiffs are precluded from seeking
further damages in this case.
Plaintiffs concede that the claims of the Bemises, the Yakimicks and Richard Zink are
fully set-off. As for the Guillingers, the record shows that they are suing on two separate drafts
relating to two different leases: one pertaining to property in Mineral Township in Venango
County and the other pertaining to property located in Victory Township. See ECF No. 328,
9259-285. Defendants are alleging only that the Guillingers fully mitigated their alleged
damages relative to the Mineral Township lease, ECF No. 320, ff 18-29, and Plaintiffs concede
that this claim has been fully set-off.
The only matter on which the parties disagree is whether or not the Plaintiffs who are
fully mitigated can nevertheless pursue claims for prejudgment interest which, according to
Plaintiffs, should accrue from the date of the alleged breach to the date of mitigation.
Defendants deny that Plaintiffs are entitled to prejudgment interest on any mitigated losses. They
reason that, where the nonbreaching party has suffered no loss, “zero multiplied by any

55

prejudgment interest rate is still zero.” ECF No. 466 at 2. They insist that any award of
prejudgment interest is contrary to Pennsylvania law, which holds that the theory behind
contractual damages is “to make the non-breaching party whole again, not to provide him with a
windfall.” Bellefonte Area Sch. Dist. v. Lipner, 473 A.2d 741, 744 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984).
Under Pennsylvania law, a nonbreaching party to a contract may recover interest on the
amount due under the contract as a form of damages, even where a right to interest is not
specifically addressed in the contract’s terms. See TruServ Corp. v. Morgan’s Tool & Supply
Co., Inc., 39 A.3d 253, 263 (Pa. 2012). The purpose of awarding prejudgment interest is “to
compensate an aggrieved party for detention of money rightfully due him or her, and to afford
him or her full indemnification or compensation for the wrongful interference with his or her
property rights.” Jd. (citing 25 C.J.S. Damages, §80). “The allowance of interest as an element
of damages is not punitive, but is based on the general assumption that retention of the money
benefits the debtor and injures the creditor. Jd. (citing 25 C.J.S. Damages, §80). Relevantly, the
Pennsylvania Supreme C

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11149554. Public record. Not legal advice.