# CHANG BARRIOS v. SHEPLEY

> District Court, D. Maine · September 29, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11147873

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. Maine
- **Decided:** September 29, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11147873

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding “unnecessary detention” of noncitizens “imposes substantial societal costs”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE

CARLOS AUGUSTO CHANG BARRIOS, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) 1:25-cv-00406-JAW
)
CRAIG SHEPLEY, et al., )
)
Respondents. )

ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Finding the government’s detention of a noncitizen violates due process, the
court grants the noncitizen’s petition for writ of habeas corpus and orders government
officials provide the noncitizen a bond hearing and release him pending the bond
hearing subject to release conditions.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Petitioner Carlos Augusto Chang Barrios brings an amended verified petition
for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 alleging that his immigration
detention violates the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and his Fifth
Amendment due process rights.
On August 6, 2025, Mr. Chang Barrios filed a verified petition for a writ of
habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and further sought, inter alia, a temporary
restraining order (TRO) preventing his transfer outside the District of Maine as well
as access to counsel. Emergency Verified Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Req. for
Emergency Injunctive Relief (ECF No. 1) (Pet.). Though Mr. Chang Barrios has filed
an amended verified petition for writ of habeas corpus dropping the access to counsel
claim, he maintains his detention is unlawful and seeks a writ ordering Joseph D.
McDonald Jr., in his official capacity as Sheriff of Plymouth County of Massachusetts
and warden of Plymouth County Correctional Facility (PCCF), Patricia H. Hyde in

her official capacity has New England Field Office Director for U.S. Immigration and
Customs, Madison Sheahan in her official capacity as Deputy Director of U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Todd Lyons, in his official capacity as
Acting Director of ICE, and Kristi Noem, in her official capacity as U.S. Secretary of
Homeland Security (jointly, Federal Respondents) to release him immediately. First
Am. Habeas Pet. and Compl. for declaratory and Injunctive Relief (ECF No. 25) (First

Am. Pet.).1
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2243, on August 7, 2025, the Court ordered Federal
Respondents to show cause within three days why Mr. Chang Barrios’s petition for a
writ of habeas corpus should not be granted. O.S.C. (ECF No. 3). The Court’s order
instructed the parties it would schedule a hearing on the matter upon receiving
Federal Respondents’ response, due by August 12, 2025. Id. at 2.
The next day, August 8, 2025, the Court held a telephone conference of counsel

to discuss Mr. Chang Barrios’s request for TRO preventing transfer from Maine and
ensuring access to his attorneys. Min. Entry (ECF No. 8). Following the telephone

1 Mr. Chang Barrios’s initial petition for writ of habeas corpus additionally named Craig
Shepley, in his official capacity as Deputy Chief Patrol Agent (DCPA) of the Houlton Sector, U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP), in the state of Maine, Peter R. Flores, in his official capacity as
Acting Commissioner of CBP, Diane J. Sabatino, in her official capacity as Acting Executive Assistant
Commissioner, Office of Field Operations, for CBP as defendants. Pet. at 3-4. Although Sheriff
McDonald is a state official, the Court refers to “Federal Respondents” collectively to remain consistent
with all other orders in this matter.
conference, the Court issued an order granting Mr. Chang Barrios’s request for a TRO
and temporarily enjoining Federal Respondents from removing Mr. Chang Barrios
from the District of Maine pending further order of this Court.2 Order on Mot. for

TRO at 1-10 (ECF No. 10).
At the August 8, 2025 conference, the Court additionally granted Federal
Respondents’ oral motion for extension of time to respond to the Court’s August 7,
2025 order to show cause, instructing Federal Respondents to file their response by
August 26, 2025, and instructing the Clerk of Court to schedule a status conference
with the parties at a time mutually convenient on August 29, 2025. Notice of Hr’g

(ECF No. 9).
On August 25, 2025, on motion of Federal Respondents and consented to by
Mr. Chang Barrios, the Court amended its August 8, 2025 TRO effective August 19,
2025 to allow Federal Respondents to transfer Mr. Chang Barrios to PCCF in
Massachusetts. Order on Mot. to Amend TRO (ECF No. 17). Federal Respondents
responded to the Order to Show Cause on August 27, 2025.3 Return and Response to
O.S.C. in Opp’n to Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 20) (Opp’n). On August

2 The Court also ordered the Federal Respondents to give him access to counsel. Order on Mot.
for TRO at 8. But Mr. Chang Barrios has since dropped the access to counsel issue. Compare Emer.
Verified Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Req. for Emer. Injunctive Relief (ECF No. 1) with First Am.
Compl.
3 At the August 8, 2025 conference, the Court additionally granted Federal Respondents’ oral
motion for extension of time to respond to the Court’s August 7, 2025 order to show cause, instructing
Federal Respondents to file their response by August 26, 2025, and instructing the Clerk of Court to
schedule a status conference with the parties at a time mutually convenient on August 29, 2025. Notice
of Hr’g (ECF No. 9). Next, on August 26, 2025, the Court granted Federal Respondents further
extension of time to respond. Order on Mot. to Extend Time to File Return/Resp. (ECF No. 19).
28, 2025, Mr. Chang Barrios filed a motion to extend and amend the TRO, Pet’r’s Mot.
to Extend and Amend TRO (ECF No. 21), which Federal Respondents did not oppose,
and the Court granted on August 29, 2025 following the status conference. Order on

Mot. to Extend and Amend TRO (ECF No. 23) (TRO Am. Order).
On September 5, 2025, Mr. Chang Barrios filed both an amended habeas
petition, First Am. Pet., and a response to Federal Respondents’ opposition. Pet’r’s
Reply to Gov’t’s Resp. to O.S.C. (ECF No. 26) (Pet’r’s Reply to Opp’n). On September
16, 2025, Mr. Chang Barrios filed a notice of additional relevant authority drawing
the Court’s attention to a precedential decision from the Board of Immigration

Appeals (BIA) and a relevant order from a sister district in the First Circuit. Pet’r’s
Notice of Additional Relevant Authority (ECF No. 27). The Court, in accordance with
28 U.S.C. § 2243, held a hearing on September 18, 2025. Min. Entry (ECF No. 28)
(Hr’g Min. Entry). Because both parties agreed that the proceeding presented only
issues of law, Mr. Chang Barrios was not present.4 Id.
II. THE FACTUAL RECORD5
Carlos Augusto Chang Barrios is a 35-year-old indigenous Guatemalan citizen

who, after surviving the Guatemalan genocide, fled Guatemala approximately 17
years ago. First Am. Pet. ¶ 1; Pet’r’s Reply to Opp’n. at 1-2. He entered the United

4 28 U.S.C. § 2243 provides that “[u]nless the application for the writ and return present only
issues of law the person to whom the writ is directed shall be required to produce at the hearing the
body of the person detained.”
5 For the purposes of Mr. Chang Barros’ petition for writ of habeas corpus, the Court reviews
the relevant facts as pleaded in his first amended verified petition, First Am. Pet., Federal
Respondents’ response to the August 7, 2025 order to show cause, Opp’n, and Mr. Chang Barrios’s
response to Federal Respondents’ opposition. Pet’r’s Reply to Opp’n.
States “without inspection or contact with immigration official” at the age of 17. First
Am. Pet. ¶ 1. Prior to his detention, he resided in Lawrence, Massachusetts where
he worked as a carpenter and regional leader of a national immigrant rights work

organization. Id. ¶ 19. Mr. Chang Barrios “has no criminal record and has never
been arrested anywhere in the world.” Id. ¶ 1.
On July 29, 2025, CBP agents encountered Mr. Chang Barrios following a
traffic stop in Maine, took him into custody, and brought him to a CBP facility in
Rangeley, Maine. First Am. Pet. ¶ 2. There, pursuant to §287 of the INA, codified at
8 U.S.C. § 1357(a), CPB served Mr. Chang Barrios with a Form I-200 Warrant for

Arrest of Alien, an administrative warrant, “alleging he was taken into custody
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), section 236” of the INA. Id.; Opp’n at 3; Pet’r’s Reply
to Opp’n, Attach. 5 Warrant for Arrest of Alien.6 CBP then served Mr. Chang Barrios
with a Notice to Appear (NTA), charging him with removability under 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as a noncitizen “present in the United States who has not been
admitted or paroled” and ordering him to appear in Chelmsford, Massachusetts
before an immigration judge on August 28, 2025. Opp’n at 3; Pet’r’s Reply to Opp’n,

Attach. 4 Notice to Appear. The NTA form gives CBP officers the option to designate
a noncitizen in removal proceedings as “arriving alien[,]” an “alien present in the
United States who has not been admitted or paroled[,]” or “admitted to the United

6 Where immigration laws use the term “alien,” this Court prefers the term “noncitizen,” which
in this context has a nearly identical meaning. See, e.g., Xirum v. Bondi, 141 F.4th 345, 351 (1st
Cir. 2025) (using noncitizen and alien interchangeably). To minimize alterations, this Court keeps
whichever term is used in the original statute or case but uses noncitizen to replace pronouns where
appropriate.
States.” Notice to Appear. CBP did not designate Mr. Chang Barrios as an “arriving
alien.” Id. Finally, a CBP agent issued a Notice of Custody Determination under 8
U.S.C. § 1226(a), INA §236(a), in which the officer elected to detain Mr. Chang

Barrios pending final administrative determination in his case and, in acknowledging
receipt of his custody determination, Mr. Chang Barrios requested review by an
immigration judge. First Am. Pet. ¶ 2; Opp’n at 3; Pet’r’s Reply to Opp’n at 3; id.
Attach. 1 Notice of Custody Determination.
On August 8, 2025 this Court issued an order granting Mr. Chang Barrios’s
request for a TRO and temporarily enjoining Federal Respondents from removing Mr.

Chang Barrios from the District of Maine. Order on Mot. for TRO at 1-10. On August
19, 2025, with Mr. Chang Barrios’s consent, he was moved to PCCF in Massachusetts
and transferred to ICE custody. Opp’n at 4. On August 25, 2025, this Court amended
the TRO effective August 19, 2025 to account for Federal Respondents transfer of Mr.
Chang Barrios to PCCF in Massachusetts. First Am. Pet. ¶ 2; Opp’n at 4.
Once ICE assumed custody of Mr. Chang Barrios, Federal Respondents
changed the basis on which he was detained and stated: “ICE maintains mandatory

detention authority to hold Mr. Chang Barrios without bond pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(2)[,]” INA §235(b)(2). Opp’n at 2. Despite reclassifying Mr. Chang Barrios’s
detention, Federal Respondents filed his request for bond hearing—which he had
requested on July 29, 2025 upon receipt of the Notice of Custody Determination—in
the Chelmsford Immigration Court on August 22, 2025. First Am. Pet. ¶ 7. Later
that day, the Chelmsford Immigration Court issued a hearing notice, setting Mr.
Chang Barrios’s bond redetermination hearing7 for August 28, 2025. Id. On August
27, 2025, Federal Respondents uploaded to the Chelmsford Immigration Court a
marked-up version of the July 29, 2025 notice of custody determination with a line

drawn across the page and the word “cancelled” written. Pet’r’s Reply to Opp’n
Attach. 8 Altered Notice of Custody Determination. Federal Respondents do not claim
that any substitute or amended document was served on Mr. Chang Barrios stating
the basis for his detention. The Immigration Judge subsequently announced she
would reschedule the hearing, and, on September 5, 2025, the Immigration Judge set
a rescheduled hearing for September 11, 2025. First Am. Pet. ¶ 8. However, before

Mr. Chang Barrios’s bond redetermination hearing took place, the BIA issued a
precedential decision, discussed further below, that foreclosed the Immigration
Judge’s ability to hold a custody redetermination hearing. See Matter of Yajure
Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec 216 (B.I.A. 2025).
III. THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS
A. Mr. Chang Barrios’s Amended Motion for Writ of Habeas
Corpus
Mr. Chang Barrios claims he is wrongly being held subject to mandatory
detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), § 235(b)(2) of the INA. First Am. Pet. ¶¶ 9-10.
Mr. Chang Barrios alleges first that Federal Respondents’ decision to keep him in
custody without “an opportunity for timely custody redetermination or bond hearing
. . . violates his right to due process[,]” id. ¶ 31, and second that Federal Respondents

7 This Order uses the terms “bond hearing” and “bond redetermination hearing”
interchangeably to refer to any hearing in which the Immigration Judge considers any aspect of a
noncitizen’s detention or conditions of release pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226.
application of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) to him “violates the INA[,]” id. ¶ 37, “because he
has entered the U.S. more than 17 years ago.” Id. ¶ 36. In support of his due process
claim, he asserts that he “has unquestionably strong ties and deep connections to the

United States and is entitled to access to basic rights.” Id. ¶ 27 Citing Supreme Court
precedent in support of his due process claim, Mr. Chang Barrios asserts he “has
unquestionably strong ties and deep connections to the United States and is entitled
to access to basic rights”. Id.
B. Federal Respondents’ Response to the Order to Show Cause
Federal Respondents counter that ICE maintains mandatory detention

authority to hold Mr. Chang Barrios without bond pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2),
§ 235(b)(2) of the INA, and even if the Court alternatively concluded that Mr. Chang
Barrios is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), § 236(a) of the INA, Mr. Chang Barrios
could avail himself of the due process protections under that provision. Opp’n at 2.
Therefore, Federal Respondents argue, Mr. Chang Barrios’s “detention does not
violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.” Id.
IV. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction
Federal Courts have “an unflagging duty to ensure that it has jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the cases it proposes to adjudicate.” Am. Policyholders Ins. Co.
v. Nyacol Prods., Inc., 989 F.2d 1256, 1258 (1st Cir. 1993). The INA “channels
immigration claims through the administrative process and sharply limits judicial
review while that process is ongoing.” Sicha v. Bernal, No. 1:25-cv-00418, 2025 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 169007, at *10 (D. Me. Aug. 29, 2025). The relevant statute is §
1252(b)(9), the claims-channeling provision, which provides:
Judicial review of all questions of law and fact, including interpretation
and application of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from
any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the
United States . . . shall be available only in judicial review of a final
order under this section. Except as otherwise provided in this section,
no court shall have jurisdiction, by habeas corpus under section 2241 of
title 28 or any other habeas corpus provision . . . to review such an order
or such questions of law or fact.

8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9). The First Circuit explained that § 1252(b)(9):
aims to consolidate “all questions of law and fact” that “arise from’ either
an “action” or a “proceeding” brought in connection with the removal of
an alien. Importantly, the statute channels federal court jurisdiction
over “such questions of law and fact” to the courts of appeals and
explicitly bars all other methods of judicial review, including habeas.

Aguilar v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 510 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2007).8
As Judge Nancy Torresen recently noted, “the question of whether [Petitioner’s]
claims ‘aris[e] from’ removal proceedings . . . is less straightforward than the

8 In a recent opinion addressing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Chief Judge Lance E.
Walker observed:
I use Aguilar as the standard for my analysis even though, post-Aguilar, the Supreme
Court interpreted section 1252(b)(9). See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018).
Jennings produced three separate interpretations of section 1252(b)(9). A plurality
concluded that the legal questions associated with the assessment of a prolonged
detention claim did not “arise from” removal proceedings. Id. at 840 (Alito, J.)
(plurality opinion). A concurrence suggested section 1252(b)(9) strips jurisdiction over
claims that arise from any “congressionally authorized portions of the deportation
process that necessarily serve the purpose of . . . removal.” Id. at 854 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part). A dissent concluded jurisdiction is unaffected by section 1252(b)(9)
where petitioners do not challenge an order of removal. Id. at 876 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). None of these interpretations are binding, nor has the First Circuit had
an opportunity to address them. As such, Aguilar is the controlling precedent.
Rodrigues De Oliveira v. Joyce, No. 2:25-cv-00291, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125776, at *5 n.6 (D. Me.
July 2, 2025). The Court agrees with Chief Judge Walker that Aguilar is the controlling precedent
and adheres to this standard.
Government suggests.” Mboko v. Joyce, No. 25-cv-00240, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
114925, at *6 n.6 (D. Me. June 17, 2025). In Aguilar, the First Circuit observed that
Congress’s use of “arising from” in § 1252(b)(9) means the jurisdiction-stripping

impact of the statute is not “limitless in its scope.” Aguilar, 510 F.3d at 10 (“[T]hese
words cannot be read to swallow all claims that might somehow touch upon, or be
traced to, the government’s efforts to remove an alien”). The First Circuit therefore
concluded that § 1252(b)(9) did not strip federal courts of jurisdiction over “claims
that are independent of, or wholly collateral to, the removal process. Among others,
claims that cannot effectively be handled through the available administrative

process fall within that purview.” Id. at 11.
As Chief Judge Walker recently observed, “[a]lthough one would expect that a
dispute over the propriety of detention pending removal proceedings would be
something other than collateral to the removal process, that is not the way it turns
out in practice.” De Oliveira, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125776, at *7 (citing Demore v.
Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 516-17 (2003) (hearing habeas claim because it challenged the
“statutory framework that permits detention without bail” rather than an exercise of

discretion by the Secretary)); Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 33 (1st Cir. 2021)
(same, “cabin[ing] the discretion granted [to the Attorney General] through the
constitutional restraints applicable to all government action,” while preserving the
Attorney General’s ability to exercise discretion “within those limits”). In that case,
Chief Judge Walker concluded he had jurisdiction over a petitioner’s habeas claim,
explaining:
I see this case as following the same jurisdictional line as Kim and
Hernandez-Lara. The record before me simply fails to depict any
reasoned exercise of discretion by the Attorney General or her designee
other than the discretion exercised by the officers in relation to the
decision to arrest the Petitioner. Furthermore, and in any event,
Petitioner here challenges the legality of a regulation that has deprived
her of a bond hearing before an immigration judge, such that her habeas
challenge is focused on the “statutory framework” that subjects her to
mandatory detention without the possibility of release on bond. Kim,
538 U.S. at 517.

Id. at *7-8. The Court reaches the same determination here, for similar reasons
explained by Judge Walker. Here, Mr. Chang Barrios challenges Federal
Respondents’ decision to detain him under § 1225(b)(2) subject to mandatory
detention without a bond hearing or the possibility of release on bond in violation of
his Fifth Amendment right to due process. Thus, Mr. Chang Barrios’s challenge is
focused on the “statutory framework” pursuant to which he is currently detained. See
Kim, 538 U.S. at 517; accord De Oliveira, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125776, at *8.
Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes it has jurisdiction over Mr. Chang
Barrios’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus and turns to the merits of Mr. Chang
Barrios’s petition.
B. The Merits
The Court begins with background on the statutory scheme encompassing
mandatory and discretionary detention under §§ 1225 and 1226, respectively. Next,
the Court explains why the facts of Mr. Chang Barrios’s case, plain text of the
relevant statutes, the overall statutory scheme, and interpreting caselaw
demonstrate that Mr. Chang Barrios, as a noncitizen present in the United States for
seventeen years, is not “seeking admission” and thus cannot be detained subject to
mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A). Finally, this Court addresses why Due
Process demands of the Fifth Amendment require Federal Respondents accord him
the right to a bond hearing.

1. Statutory Framework
Section 1225 applies to “applicants for admission,” defined as a noncitizen
“present in the United States who has not been admitted” or “who arrives in the
United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Applicants for admission “fall into one of two
categories, those covered by § 1225(b)(1) and those covered by § 1225(b)(2).” Jennings
v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018) (plurality opinion). Relevant here is

§ 1225(b)(2).9 Under § 1225(b)(2) “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for
admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that [the] alien seeking
admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall
be detained” for the duration of removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Thus,
§ 1225(b)(2) creates a mandatory detention scheme. See Jennings, 583 U.S. at 297
(2018) (“[N]either § 1225(b)(1) nor § 1225(b)(2) says anything whatsoever about bond
hearings”).

By contrast, § 1226 governs the “usual removal process” with an evidentiary
hearing before an immigration judge. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591

9 Section 1225(b)(1) subjects arriving noncitizens and “certain other” noncitizens “initially
determined to be inadmissible due to fraud, misrepresentation, or lack of valid documentation” to
expediated removal proceedings. Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287; 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), (iii).
Noncitizens subject to expedited removal can avoid removal with successful asylum claims. However,
if a noncitizen detained under § 1225 does not indicate an intent to apply for asylum, express a fear of
persecution, or is “found not to have such a fear,” he is detained until removed. Id. §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i),
(B)(iii)(IV).
U.S. 103, 108 (2020). Section 1226(a) gives immigration authorities power to issue
an administrative warrant and either continue detention for removal proceedings or
release the noncitizen on “bond . . . or conditional parole.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1)-(2).

Section 1226(a) thus “establishes a discretionary detention framework for
noncitizens.” Gomes v. Hyde, No. 1:25-cv-11571, 2025 Dist. LEXIS 128085, at *4-5
(D. Mass. July 7, 2025). However, § 1226’s discretionary detention regime has one
exception: immigration authorities “shall take into custody” any noncitizen involved
in certain enumerated criminal activities. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1). None of those
criminal activities is at issue here.

The Supreme Court has explained, albeit in a plurality decision, that “U.S.
immigration law authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens seeking
admission into the country under §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2),” “[i]t also authorizes the
Government to detain certain aliens already in the country pending the outcome of
removal proceedings under §§ 1226(a) and (c).” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289 (emphasis
supplied); see also id. at 288 (explaining that, “once inside the United States” a
noncitizen “present in the country may still be removed” under “Section 1226”)

(emphasis supplied)).
Once arrested under § 1226(a), immigration authorities make an
individualized initial custody determination after which they have discretion to
release a noncitizen if the noncitizen can “demonstrate to the satisfaction of the officer
that such release would not pose a danger to property or persons, and that the alien
is likely to appear for any future proceeding.” 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8) (2025). If the
immigration officer opts for continued detention, the noncitizen may seek review of
that decision at a bond hearing before an immigration judge. 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d)(1)
(2025). At a bond hearing, the government bears the burden of proving “by clear and

convincing evidence that [the noncitizen] poses a danger to the community” or “by
preponderance of the evidence that [the noncitizen] poses a flight risk”. Hernandez-
Lara, 10 F.4th at 41. An immigration judge’s decision to continue detaining a
noncitizen may be appealed to the BIA. 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d)(3).
2. Applicability of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
Because § 1225(b)(2) requires mandatory detention and 8 U.S.C § 1226(a)

entitles Mr. Chang Barrios to a bond hearing with possibility of release pending
immigration proceeding, it is dispositive to Mr. Chang Barrios’s habeas petition to
determine which statute applies. The question is whether § 1225(b)’s provision for
mandatory detention of noncitizens “seeking admission” applies to someone like Mr.
Chang Barrios who has been residing in the United States for more than two years.
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). The Court concludes that § 1225(b) is inapplicable to Mr.
Chang Barrios based on the facts of his case, the plain text of the relevant statutes,

the overall statutory scheme, and interpreting caselaw.
a. Facts of Mr. Chang Barrios’s Arrest and Detention
Federal Respondents’ own detention documentation—the arrest warrant, the
NTA, and notice of custody determination—consistently classified Mr. Chang Barrios
as subject to detention on a discretionary basis under § 1226(a), which undermines
Federal Respondents’ claim that Mr. Chang Barrios is subject to mandatory detention
under § 1225(b). During the July 29, 2025 traffic stop, CBP served on Mr. Chang
Barrios an administrative warrant, which declares “Carlos Augusto Chang Barrios .
. . is within the country in violation of the immigration laws and is therefore liable to

being taken into custody as authorized by section 236 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act” which is codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Warrant for Arrest of Alien.
CBP served Mr. Chang Barrios with a NTA, charging him with removability under 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as a noncitizen “present in the United States who has not
been admitted or paroled.” Notice to Appear. As mentioned above, the NTA form
gives immigration authorities the option to designate a noncitizen in removal

proceedings as “arriving alien[,]” an “alien present in the United States who has not
been admitted or paroled[,]” or “admitted to the United States,” and, significantly,
CBP did not designate Mr. Chang Barrios as an “arriving alien.” Id. Further, a CBP
agent issued a Notice of Custody Determination under 8 U.S.C. 1226(a) in which the
officer elected to detain Mr. Chang Barrios pending final administrative
determination in his case. Notice of Custody Determination.
This Court’s first indication that Mr. Chang Barrios’s detention classification

had been changed came in Federal Respondents’ Response to Order to Show Cause,
which indicated that on or about August 19, 2025, when Mr. Chang Barrios went into
ICE custody, Federal Respondents took the position that he was now being detained
pursuant “mandatory detention authority to hold Petitioner without bond pursuant
to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).” Opp’n at 2. Despite reclassifying Mr. Chang Barrios’s
detention on or about August 19, 2025 when ICE took custody, Federal Respondents
filed his request for bond hearing on August 22, 2025 in the Chelmsford Immigration
Court. First Am. Pet. ¶ 7. On August 27, 2025, Federal Respondents uploaded to the
Chelmsford Immigration Court a marked-up version of the July 29, 2025 notice of

custody determination with a line drawn across the page and the word “cancelled”
written. Altered Notice of Custody Determination. The effect of the marked-up notice
of custody determination is unclear, but the Court takes it as evidence of Federal
Respondents’ changed position. However, Federal Respondents do not claim that any
substitute or amended document was served on Mr. Chang Barrios stating a new
basis for his detention.

It remains unexplained what authority Federal Respondents rely on in
changing the basis for Mr. Chang Barrios’s detention. Even if the Federal
Respondents proposed a justification, post hoc rationalizations are
disfavored. Cf. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 591 U.S. 1, 22,
24, (2020) (holding that, under arbitrary and capricious review in the administrative
law context, “[t]he basic rule here is clear: An agency must defend its actions based
on the reasons it gave when it acted,” not on “impermissible post hoc

rationalizations”). The facts of Mr. Chang Barrios’s detention support that he was
not mandatorily detained as a noncitizen “seeking admission” § 1225(b), but rather
as someone “already in the country,” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288-89, pursuant to
Federal Respondents’ discretionary authority under § 1226(a). See Jimenez v. FCI
Berlin, No. 25-cv-00326, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176165, at *13 (D.N.H. Sept. 8, 2025)
(noting government’s position that habeas corpus petitioner is detained under § 1226
“ignores the statutory authority that the government itself relied on for [petitioner’s]
initial release and his recent arrest”); Romero v. Hyde, No. CV 25-11631, 2025 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 160622, at *16 (D. Mass. Aug. 19, 2025) (same, noting “abstract statutory

interpretation issues raised by this case must be considered against the backdrop of
one uncontestable fact—Petitioner has always been treated by Respondents as
subject to discretionary detention under section 1226, rather than mandatory
detention under section 1225”); Benitez v. Francis, No. 25 CIV. 5937, 2025 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 153952 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025) (same, finding that § 1226(a) applies where
government respondents consistently treated habeas corpus petitioner as already in

the country and subject to § 1226(a) discretionary authority but changed basis for
petitioner’s detention as “seeking admission” pursuant to § 1225(b) during litigation).
b. Plain Text and statutory scheme
Independent of Federal Respondents’ own detention documentation
consistently classifying Mr. Chang Barrios as subject to discretionary detention
under § 1226(a), the plain text and overall statutory scheme compel the same
conclusion: Mr. Chang Barrios should be subject to discretionary detention under 8

U.S.C. § 1226(a) and therefore entitled to a bond hearing to challenge his custody
determination pending immigration proceedings.
The language of §§ 1225 and 1226 compels this result. “We begin, as always,
with the text of the statute” interpreted “according to its ‘plain meaning at the time
of enactment.’” United States v. Winczuk, 67 F.4th 11, 16 (1st Cir.
2023) (quoting Tanzin v. Tanvir, 592 U.S. 43, 48 (2020)). A “Court must read the
words Congress enacted ‘in their context and with a view to their place in the overall
statutory scheme.’” Turkiye Halk Bankasi A.S. v. United States, 598 U.S. 264, 275
(2023) (quoting Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989)). The

mandatory detention provision reads:
[i]n the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the
examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking
admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the
alien shall be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a of this title.

8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).
“Seeking admission” is in the present tense. While undefined in the statute, it
“necessarily implies some sort of present-tense action.” Martinez v. Hyde, No. CV 25-
11613, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141724 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025). It is a blackletter
rule of statutory construction that “Congress’ use of a verb tense is significant in
construing statutes.” United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 333 (1992). Further,
reading together two of the statue’s phrases—“an applicant for admission” who is
“seeking admission”—gives the impression that “the noncitizen is actively engaged in
the exercise of being admitted to the United States, rather than currently residing
here and seeking to stay.” Chafla v. Scott, No. 2:25-cv-00437, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
184909, at *17 (D. Me. Sept. 21, 2025). Moreover, as mentioned above, this
interpretation coheres with Federal Respondents’ own detention documentation. See
Notice to Appear. NTA form gives immigration authorities the option to designate a
noncitizen in removal proceedings as “arriving alien[,]” an “alien present in the
United States who has not been admitted or paroled[,]” or “admitted to the United
States,” and, significantly, CBP did not designate Mr. Chang Barrios as an “arriving
alien.” Id.
If § 1225(b)(2)(A) applied to each “applicant for admission,” the phrase “seeking

admission” would be surplusage. The canon against surplusage “urges courts to give
each word meaning.” Ardente v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 744 F.3d 815, 819 (1st Cir.
2014). Under the broad interpretation, all noncitizens within the United States—
including those already present and having resided in the United States for several
years—can be subject to mandatory detention. By that logic, § 1225(b)(2)(A) must be
read with the terms “seeking admission” struck from the statute. Id. (“[I]n the case

of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer
determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled
to be admitted, the alien shall be detained . . ..”); see Benitez, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
153952, at *18 (conducting a surplusage analysis of section 1225(b)(2)(A)). While Mr.
Chang Barrios was never lawfully admitted to the United States, “it does not follow
that he continues to be actively ‘seeking’ such lawful entry at this time” because he
has, in fact, “already ‘entered’ the country (albeit unlawfully).” Id. at *19. Instead,

“one would say that [he] had entered unlawfully but now seek[s] a lawful means of
remaining there.” Id. at *21.
Adopting the position that § 1225’s provision for mandatory detention of
noncitizens “seeking admission” applies those who are arrested on a warrant while
residing in the United States would also render recent amendments to § 1226
superfluous. See Gomes, 2025 Dist. LEXIS 128085, at *19 (stating “[s]uch an
interpretation, which would largely nullify a statute Congress enacted . . ., must be
rejected”). In January 2025, Congress passed an amendment, the Laken Riley Act,
to § 1226(c), the sole exception to § 1226(a)’s discretionary detention framework.

Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (“Except as provided in subsection (c) . . . the Attorney
General . . . may”), with id. § 1226(c)(1) (“The Attorney general shall take into custody
any alien who . . .”). The Laken Riley Act, codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E),
mandates detention for a noncitizen who (i) is inadmissible because he is present in
the United States without being admitted or paroled, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A),
obtained documents or admission through misrepresentation or fraud, id. §

1182(a)(6)(C), or lacks valid documentation, id. § 1182(a)(7) (the “inadmissibility
criterion”); “and” (ii) “is charged with, is arrested for, is convicted of, admits having
committed, or admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of any
burglary, theft, larceny, shoplifting, or assault of a law enforcement officer offense, or
any crime that results in death or serious bodily injury to another person,” (the
“criminal conduct criterion”). 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E)(i)-(ii). In other words, a
noncitizen is subject to mandatory detention under § 1226(c)(1)(E) only where both

the inadmissibility criterion and the criminal conduct criterion are satisfied.
Were inadmissible noncitizens already subject to mandatory detention under §
1225(b)(2), regardless of whether they have met the criminal conduct criterion, the
Laken Riley Act would be redundant—imposing mandatory detention for noncitizens
already subject to it. “When Congress acts to amend a statute, we presume it intends
its amendment to have real and substantial effect.” Stone v. I.N.S., 514 U.S. 386, 397
(1995). To have a real and substantial effect, the Laken Riley Act must have created
mandatory detention authority for noncitizens present in the United States charged
with certain enumerated crimes because the other mandatory detention provisions of

the INA did not apply to those noncitizens. See Chafla, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
184909, at *21 (finding “[i]t is therefore safe to presume that Congress’s amendment
to section 1226(c) . . . was necessary because the existing provisions of the INA did
not subject those same noncitizens to mandatory detention”); Francisco T. v. Bondi,
No. 25-CV-03219, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179562, at *8 (D. Minn. Aug. 29, 2025)
(“[I]nterpreting section 1225(b)(2) as applying to noncitizens who have already

entered the country and are not currently seeking admission into the country, as
Respondents urge, would render meaningless a recent amendment to section 1226 by
the Laken Riley Act (LRA)”).
During the hearing on September 18, 2025, Federal Respondents suggested to
this Court that it consider new precedent from the BIA persuasive. That opinion,
Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec 216 (B.I.A. 2025), adopted the position that
noncitizens present in the United States without admission are “seeking admission”

for purposes of § 1225(b)(2), and therefore must be detained without a bond hearing.
Not only is the decision at odds with principles of statutory interpretation just
discussed, but this Court declines to follow the BIA opinion for two additional reasons:
first, this Court is not bound by agency interpretations, especially those in conflict
with well-reasoned decisions by other federal courts, see discussion infra Section
IV.B.2.c, and second, it contravenes longstanding federal policy on interpretation and
application of §§ 1225(b) and 1226(a).
First, this Court does not defer to the BIA decision. Loper Bright Enters. v.

Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 400 (2024) (noting “agencies have no special competence in
resolving statutory ambiguities,” but “[c]ourts do”). “[C]ourts must exercise
independent judgment in determining the meaning of statutory provisions,” and they
“may not defer to an agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is
ambiguous.” Loper Bright Enters., 603 U.S. at 394, 413. Under Skidmore, the
“weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness

evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier
and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if
lacking power to control.” Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944); see also
Chafla, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184909, at *22 (applying Skidmore and Loper Bright
to analyze the Yajure Hurtado decision); Aceros v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv-06924, 2025 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 179594, at *23 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2025) (same). The BIA’s current
position is not only inconsistent with earlier pronouncements but also with the well-

reasoned consideration of district courts. See discussion infra Section IV.B.2.c.
Second, it would contravene decades of precedent to adopt the position that
any noncitizen present in the country without admission is subject to mandatory
detention without bond hearing, no matter how long that person has resided inside
the United States, a fact the BIA itself acknowledges in Yajure Hurtado. 29 I. & N.
Dec. at 225. Until recently, the Executive Branch applied § 1226(a) to noncitizens
without documentation already present in the United States. The relevant
implementing regulations declared: “Despite being applicants for admission, aliens
who are present without having been admitted or paroled (formerly referred to as

aliens who entered without inspection) will be eligible for bond and bond
redetermination.” 62 FED. REG. 10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 1997). During Supreme Court
oral arguments in Biden v. Texas, the Solicitor General stated “DHS’s long-standing
interpretation has been that 1226(a) applies to those who have crossed the border
between ports of entry and are shortly thereafter apprehended.” Transcript of Oral
Argument at 44:24–45:20, Biden v. Texas, 597 U.S. 785 (2022) (No. 21-954); see

Chafla, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184909, at *24 (citing the same); Martinez, 2025 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 141724, at *12 n.9 (same). Further, the Jennings plurality determined
“§ 1226 applies to aliens already present in the United States” and thus
“creates a default rule for those aliens” and “also permits the Attorney General to
release those aliens on bond.” 583 U.S. at 303.
c. Consensus in recent caselaw
Recent opinions in this District by Chief Judge Walker and Judge Neumann

have rejected an interpretation of § 1225(b)’s provision for mandatory detention of
noncitizens “seeking admission” that applies to noncitizens—like Mr. Chang
Barrios—who have been residing in the United States for more than two years in
light of the relevant statutory text and overall statutory scheme. De Oliveira, 2025
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125776; Chafla, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184909. Nearly all district
courts agree. See, e.g., Aceros, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179594; Sampiao v. Hyde, No.
1:25-cv-11981, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175513 (D. Mass. Sept. 9, 2025); Jimenez, 2025
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176165; Francisco T, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179562; Lopez-Campos
v. Raycraft, No. 2:25-cv-12486, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169423 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29,

2025); Diaz v. Mattivelo, No. 1:25-cv-12226, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166667 (D. Mass.
Aug. 27, 2025); Romero, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160622; Maldonado v. Olson, No. 25-
cv-3142, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158321 (D. Minn. Aug. 15, 2025); Rosado v. Figueroa,
No. CV-25-02157, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156344 (D. Ariz. Aug. 11, 2025), R&R
adopted sub nom.; Rocha Rosado v. Figueroa, No. CV-25-02157, 2025 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 156336 (D. Ariz. Aug. 13, 2025); Benitez v. Francis, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

153952; Martinez, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141724; Gomes, 2025 Dist. LEXIS 128085;
Vazquez v. Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239 (W.D. Wash. 2025).
Thus, this Court concludes that § 1225(b) does not apply to Mr. Chang Barrios
as a noncitizen who has been present in the country for nearly seventeen years and
that 1226(a) governs his detention.
3. Due Process
A court may grant a writ of habeas corpus to a petitioner who demonstrates

his detention violates the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. §
2241(c)(3). The petitioner must prove illegal detention by a preponderance of the
evidence. De Oliveira, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125776, at *8 (citing Aditya W.H. v.
Trump, 782 F. Supp. 3d 691, 703 (D. Minn. 2025) (collecting authority)). Mr. Chang
Barrios brings his habeas petition for violation of his Due Process rights under the
Fifth Amendment and the Court thus considers the merits of this claim.
The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. am. V. While “[i]t is
well established that certain constitutional protections available to persons inside the

United States are unavailable to aliens outside of our geographic borders,” Zadvydas
v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001), the Fifth Amendment’s due process protections
among them, United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 269 (1990), “once an
alien enters the country, the legal circumstance changes, for the Due Process Clause
applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether their
presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at

693 (citing, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982)).
Federal Respondents argue that “to the extent § 1226 were found to apply . . .
Petitioner’s detention would therefore be authorized by statute and regulation, with
no basis for the Court to order his release.” Opp’n at 10. Federal Respondents further
admit that if Mr. Chang Barrios is “found to be detained under § 1226, he could seek
a bond hearing to contest such detention.” Id. However, Mr. Chang Barrios remains
wrongly detained under § 1225(b)(2) and thus is unable to obtain a ruling from an

immigration judge on the merits, as his counsel explained at the September 18, 2025
hearing. Hr’g Min. Entry.
Because Petitioner is rightfully subject to discretionary detention under §
1226(a), “[h]e is, accordingly, entitled to the full procedural safeguards of the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.” Sampiao, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175513,
at *25. To determine whether detention violates procedural due process, courts apply
the three-part test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See Chafla,
2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184909, at *29 (analyzing procedural due process challenge to
the detention of noncitizen held pursuant § 1226(a) using the Mathews test);

Sampiao, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175513, at *26 (same); Hernandez-
Lara, 10 F.4th at 27-28 (same). Under Matthews, a court must weigh the following
three factors: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action”; (2)
“the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and
(3) “the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and

administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
a. Private Interest
Mr. Chang Barrios’s liberty interests are at stake. He asserts “the most
elemental of liberty interests—the interest in being free from physical detention by
[the] government.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004). Once arrested
under § 1226(a), immigration authorities make an individualized initial custody

determination after which they have discretion to release the noncitizen on bond, to
release them on their own recognizance, or to keep them detained. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
If the immigration officer opts for continued detention, the noncitizen can seek review
of that decision at a bond hearing before an immigration judge. 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d)(1)
(2025). However, denying Mr. Chang Barrios’s the opportunity to challenge his
detention determination is tantamount to denying due process. See Hernandez-Lara,
10 F.4th at 28 (“[T]he government’s exercise of its power to detain immigrants
pending removal is subject to important constitutional limitations.” (quotation
modified)). “‘[D]ue process requires the government to either (1) prove by clear and

convincing evidence that [a noncitizen] poses a danger to the community or (2) prove
by the preponderance of the evidence that [they] pose[] a flight risk’ in order to impose
detention throughout the period of removal proceedings, including appeals.” De
Oliveira, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125776, at *16 (quoting Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th
at 41). Federal Respondents have not given Mr. Chang Barrios the bond
redetermination hearing he is guaranteed, let alone met their burden for continued

detention. Mr. Chang Barrios has clearly established that the first Matthews factor
weighs in his favor.
b. Risk of Erroneous Deprivation
The second Mathews factor is “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
[Petitioner’s] interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards.” 424 U.S. at 335. The risk of
erroneous deprivation is large where, as here, Federal Respondents have made no

showing that Mr. Chang Barrios presents any public safety or flight risk.
Accordingly, the second Mathews factor also weighs heavily in favor of Mr. Chang
Barrios.
c. Government Interest
Finally, the third Mathews factor considers the “Government’s interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” 424 U.S. at 335.
Federal Respondents do not raise any governmental interest favoring Mr. Chang
Barrios’s continued detention without bond hearing. See Chafla, 2025 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 184909, at *34 (identifying governmental interest in favor of immigration
habeas petitioners’ continued detention without a hearing as an “across-the-board
application of an inapplicable statute”). In fact, the public interest weighs against
detention without a hearing. See Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 33 (finding
“unnecessary detention” of noncitizens “imposes substantial societal costs”). Thus,
the third Matthews factor weighs against Federal Respondents.

C. Temporary Restraining Order
The current TRO is scheduled to remain in effect until October 1, 2025. TRO
Am. Order at 3. Under Granny Goose Foods v. Brotherhood of Teamsters & Auto
Trust Drivers, 415 U.S. 423, 433 (1974), there is some question as to whether the
Court, absent the consent of the parties, may extend the TRO beyond October 1, 2025.
The Court therefore ORDERS the Federal Respondents and Mr. Chang Barrios’s
counsel to consult and inform the Court by the end of the day on October 1, 2025 of

their respective positions regarding an extension of the injunction insofar as it
prohibits the Federal Respondents from the District of Massachusetts pending
further order of this Court.
V. CONCLUSION
Federal Respondents have unconstitutionally deprived Mr. Chang Barrios of
his Fifth Amendment right to due process holding him without completing a bond
hearing during the pendency of his immigration proceedings. Mr. Chang Barrios has
resided in the Unites States for nearly seventeen years and is not “seeking admission”
for purposes of § 1225(b)(2)’s mandatory detention provision.

Although the Court could order Mr. Chang Barrios released pending the bond
hearing without condition, the Court will allow the Federal Respondents to
immediately propose conditions for release that will assure Mr. Chang Barrios’s
appearance at the to be scheduled bond hearing. There is nothing in this record that
remotely suggests that Mr. Chang Barrios is a danger to society, so the only proper
interim release conditions should be directed solely to assuring his appearance at the

bond hearing, which in Mr. Chang Barrios’s case should be minimal. The Court
expects the Federal Respondents to act quickly in formulating whatever conditions
they deem essential, and Mr. Chang Barrios to act quickly in responding. If there are
disagreements, the Court will resolve them no later than Friday, October 3, 2025.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Carlos Augusto Chang Barrios’s First
Amended Habeas Petition and Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (ECF
No. 25) and ORDERS the Government and Mr. Chang Barrios to propose a minimal

set of release conditions pending a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). The
Court further enjoins Federal Respondents from denying Mr. Chang Barrios a bond
hearing on the basis that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) applies to him and ORDERS Federal
Respondents shall provide Mr. Chang Barrios with a bond hearing in accordance
with 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2) within fourteen days of the date of this order. Finally, the
Court ORDERS Federal Respondents and Mr. Chang Barrios to file a status report
by Friday, October 3, 2025 concerning his continued detention and a second status
report within five days of his bond hearing, stating whether he has been granted
bond, and, if his request for bond was denied, the reasons for that denial.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ John A. Woodcock, Jr.
JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated this 29th day of September, 2025

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11147873. Public record. Not legal advice.