# Brulinski v. Chateau GC, LLC

> District Court, E.D. New York · September 28, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11145943

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. New York
- **Decided:** September 28, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
------------------------------------x

MARIUSZ BRULINSKI AND KRYSTIAN
STOLARZ, individually and on behalf
of all other persons similarly MEMORANDUM & ORDER
situated, 22-CV-3238 (EK)(CLP)

Plaintiffs,

-against-

CHATEAU GC, LLC, PROGRESSIVE
MAINTENANCE, LLC, and PRESTIGE
EMPLOYEE ADMINISTRATORS, LLC,

Defendants.

------------------------------------x
ERIC KOMITEE, United States District Judge:
Plaintiffs Mariusz Brulinski and Krystian Stolarz
bring this putative class action against their former employers.
The case arises from a dispute about the compensation Brulinski
and Stolarz received for construction work on publicly funded
projects. They allege that the defendants’ failure to pay them
at the requisite hourly rate violated various federal statutes
(including the Fair Labor Standards Act and False Claims Act)
and state law.
Before the Court is the defendants’ motion to dismiss.
For the reasons set out below, that motion is granted.
Background
The following facts are taken from the amended
complaint, ECF No. 32, and presumed to be true unless otherwise
noted. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

The named plaintiffs are construction workers who live
and work in New York. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 4, 5, 21. The defendants
are New York business entities. Id. ¶¶ 6-8. Chateau GC, LLC is
a general contractor that provides residential construction and
renovation services. Id. ¶ 15.1 The plaintiffs worked for the
defendant entities on multiple publicly funded construction
projects in Brooklyn, including at (1) 1670 Pacific Street,
(2) 572 Warren Street, and (3) 360 Nostrand Avenue. Id. ¶ 39.
The Davis-Bacon Act (“DBA”) requires contractors on
federally funded construction projects to pay employees a
prevailing wage, as determined by reference to worker

classifications promulgated by the Department of Labor.
40 U.S.C. § 3142. The DBA was “designed to protect local wage
standards by preventing contractors from basing their bids on
wages lower than those prevailing in the area.” H. Comm. on

1 Plaintiffs do not describe the nature or conduct of Progressive
Maintenance, LLC or Prestige Employee Administrators, LLC with any
specificity, other than to say that: (1) Progressive sent the plaintiffs
their offers of employment, id. ¶ 33; (2) Prestige issued their payments, id.
¶ 38; and (3) the “Defendants,” collectively, executed employment contracts
with the plaintiffs, id. ¶ 18, and they “supervised, managed, and / or were
responsible for payment of wages to Plaintiffs.” Id. ¶ 36.
Educ. & Labor, 87th Cong., Legislative History of the Davis-
Bacon Act 1 (Comm. Print 1962).
Here, plaintiffs were hired as “[f]looring

[i]nstaller[s]” and received $79.21 per hour. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 33,
35. But they allege that this wage relied on an improper DBA
classification, and they would have been paid between $95 and
$104 per hour if the defendants had classified them properly.
Id. ¶ 36(c).2 They also invoke the New York State Prevailing
Wage Guidelines (“NYSPW”), as set out in Articles 8-A and 9 of
the New York Labor Law (“NYLL”). Id. ¶¶ 23-24; see NYLL.
§§ 226, 231. They list eight different NYSPW wage rates (within
four worker classifications) that, they contend, should have
applied to them because they performed “different types of
duties.” Am. Compl. ¶ 36.
Plaintiffs bring seven claims. Their federal claims

include (1) a claim for underpayment of wages under the Fair
Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201; Am. Compl.
¶¶ 128-42; (2) a claim under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C.
§ 3729; Am. Compl. ¶¶ 149-60; and (3) a claim for a declaratory
judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 161-63.
Plaintiffs also assert four state-law claims, for (1) breach of

2 Plaintiffs allege they should have been classified as “Carpenter[s]
(Building and Residential),” “Carpenter[s] — Timberm[e]n,” or “Tile Layer[s]”
— classifications with prevailing wages from $95 to $104 per hour. Am.
Compl. ¶ 36(c). The complaint does not indicate which plaintiffs — named or
unnamed — should have been paid according to each of these classifications.
contract; (2) relief as “Third Party Beneficiaries of State
Prevailing Wage Contracts;” (3) unpaid wages under the New York
Labor Law; and (4) quantum meruit. They seek to prosecute a

collective action on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 93-97.
The federal claims must be dismissed for the reasons
set forth below. Given that, the Court will decline
supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims.
Legal Standard
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a
complaint must plead facts sufficient “to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570.3 A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

The Court must accept all factual allegations in the
complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the
plaintiffs’ favor. See Lundy v. Cath. Health Sys. of Long
Island Inc., 711 F.3d 106, 113 (2d Cir. 2013). At the same
time, the Court is “not bound to accept as true a legal

3 Unless otherwise noted, when quoting judicial decisions this order
accepts all alterations and omits all citations, footnotes, and internal
quotation marks.
conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678.
Discussion
A. The Complaint Fails to State a Claim under the FLSA

Plaintiffs’ FLSA claim is not a model of clarity. In
a classic example of shotgun pleading, they cite virtually every
provision in the statute.4
Nevertheless, the Court understands the plaintiffs to
allege a violation of the FLSA’s minimum-wage requirement. See
Am. Compl. ¶ 134 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 215(a), which prohibits
violations of 29 U.S.C. § 206, the FLSA minimum wage provision).5
This is because the FLSA claim is premised on the defendants’
alleged failure to pay the plaintiffs “proper wages.” Id.
¶ 132. Indeed, the complaint’s factual recitations focus
primarily on the wage rate that the plaintiffs allege they
should have received, see, e.g., id. ¶¶ 23, 36-37, rather than

on the number of hours worked, faulty recordkeeping, or child
labor issues (which would fall under other FLSA provisions cited
in the complaint). Importantly, the plaintiffs do not allege

4 See Am. Compl. ¶ 134 (alleging violations of “FLSA 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et
seq., including 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) and § 215(a), as well as 29 U.S.C.
§§ 201 et seq., including 20 U.S.C. § 211(c) and § 255(a)”).
5 The complaint also cites 20 U.S.C. § 207, which governs overtime pay.
Am. Compl. ¶ 134. But the complaint simultaneously alleges that no plaintiff
worked overtime. Id. ¶ 45 (“Plaintiffs did not work overtime.”). The Court
therefore does not read the complaint to allege a violation of Section 207.
Lundy, 711 F.3d at 114 (“In order to state a plausible FLSA overtime claim, a
plaintiff must sufficiently allege 40 hours of work in a given workweek as
well as some uncompensated time in excess of the 40 hours.”).
that the defendants failed to pay the federal minimum wage, but
rather the federal and state prevailing wages (as set forth in
the DBA and NYSPW).

The FLSA claim fails for the reasons set out below.
1. Plaintiffs Cannot State an FLSA Claim Based on
the DBA

To the extent the plaintiffs’ FLSA claim is predicated
on their alleged misclassification under the DBA, it cannot
survive.
The DBA does not provide a private right of action.
Chan v. City of New York, 1 F.3d 96, 102 (2d Cir. 1993).
Instead, it is “enforced administratively by the contracting
federal agency and the [Department of Labor].” United States ex
rel. Krol v. Arch Ins. Co., 46 F. Supp. 3d 347, 350 (S.D.N.Y.
2014). To surmount this obstacle, the plaintiffs attempt to
shoehorn their alleged DBA misclassification into an FLSA claim.
This strategy is impermissible. A plaintiff cannot
use the FLSA to “circumvent” the DBA’s administrative
enforcement mechanism. Grochowski v. Phoenix Const., 318 F.3d
80, 87 (2d Cir. 2003). Indeed, the FLSA “does not address
liability for underpayment of hours at prevailing wage rates” at
all. Id.; see also Sobczak v. AWL Indus. Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d
354, 360 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (citing Grochowski). Under the DBA,
“an aggrieved employee is limited to those administrative
[enforcement] mechanisms set forth in the text of the statute.”
Grochowski, 318 F.3d at 87. Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ FLSA
claim — to the extent it is premised on the allegation that the

plaintiffs were not paid proper prevailing wages under the DBA —
is dismissed. Id.
2. Plaintiffs Fail to State an FLSA Claim Based on
State-Law Prevailing Wages

Plaintiffs alternatively assert that they were
underpaid relative to the NYSPW. Am. Compl. ¶ 36(a)-(b). This
does not save their FLSA claim.
To be sure, at least one district court has held that
Grochowski does not preclude an FLSA claim based on the state
(rather than federal) prevailing wage. See Sobczak, 540 F.
Supp. 2d at 360-61. In Sobczak, the court relied on the fact
that the New York prevailing wage law, unlike the DBA, allows a
private right of action as well as administrative enforcement.
Id.
But Sobczak was about the FLSA’s overtime provision,
and therefore does not apply in a case where, as here,
plaintiffs have expressly disclaimed overtime work. Am. Compl.
¶ 45. The FLSA requires overtime pay at one-and-a-half times
the “regular rate” of payment. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). And the
Sobczak court held that one could determine this “regular rate”
by reference to a state prevailing wage. 540 F. Supp. 2d at
358-61. The minimum-wage provision of the FLSA, however, never
mentions a “regular rate” of payment. Instead, it sets a
concrete minimum wage of $7.25 an hour. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1).

So, while the overtime provision leaves the benchmark wage rate
ambiguous, and thereby creates space for state law to fill the
gap, the minimum-wage provision contains no such ambiguity and
leaves no such gap. That means that Sobczak’s reasoning does
not apply here, even if (as we assume) its holding is a correct
statement of law.
In any event, the plaintiffs have not plausibly
alleged that state law should apply to the relevant contracts at
all. The complaint alleges that the projects at issue were
“publicly financed projects, i.e. city, state and federal
projects,” Am. Compl. ¶ 16, or “publicly financed projects
covered by the provisions of New York Labor Law and various
federal laws.” Id. ¶ 18. But it never specifies which

government entity funded which projects. So, the assertion that
New York’s prevailing wages should have applied to these
contracts, see id. ¶ 23, 27, 36, is a “conclusory allegation[]”
or a “legal conclusion[] masquerading as [a] factual
conclusion[]” — neither of which the Court need accept on a
motion to dismiss. Faber v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 648 F.3d 98,
104 (2d Cir. 2011).
The fact that the complaint itself described the
relevant projects as federally funded reinforces the Court’s
conclusion. For example, the complaint states that “most, if

not all, of [the relevant] job sites were Section 8 housing
projects.” Am. Compl. ¶ 39. Section 8 is a federal program.
People’s Hous. Dev. Corp. v. City of Poughkeepsie, 425 F. Supp.
482, 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). Thus, as in Grochowski, “the present
contracts between the defendants and the [New York City Housing
Authority] were federally funded and, as such, are governed by
the prevailing wage requirements set forth in the DBA, not by
[Section] 220 of the [NYLL].” 318 F.3d at 86. Indeed, the
complaint admits as much, pleading that the “[d]efendants are
subject to the Davis-Bacon Act . . . for certain and / or all
project worksites.” Am. Compl. ¶ 152.6 Plaintiffs’ generic
invocation of state law cannot suffice to state an FLSA minimum-

wage claim.

6 Although the plaintiffs do not attach the contracts underlying this
dispute to the complaint, the defendants have attached to their briefing
contracts for the three New York City Housing Authority (“NYCHA”) projects
identified in paragraph thirty-nine of the complaint. See Mot. to Dismiss,
Exs. 1-3, ECF Nos. 43-2, 43-3, 43-3. The contracts clearly identify the
projects as federally funded. Id. The defendants have also attached a
supplemental agreement stating that the Davis-Bacon Act applies to the NYCHA
Section 8 housing contracts. Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. 4, at 3, ECF No. 43-4.
Because the complaint “relies heavily upon [the] terms and effect” of these
contracts, they are properly considered “integral to the complaint” such that
they may be considered on a motion to dismiss. Chambers v. Time Warner,
Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2002). Plaintiffs do not contest the
validity or authenticity of these contracts in their opposition.
B. The False Claims Act Count is Dismissed

The False Claims Act (“FCA”) establishes liability for
anyone who “knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a
false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval,” 31 U.S.C.
§ 3729(a)(1)(A), or “knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made
or used, a false record or statement material to a false or
fraudulent claim.” Id. § 3729(a)(1)(B). The statute permits a
private party — a relator — to file a qui tam action challenging
fraudulent claims on the government’s behalf. United States ex
rel. Wood v. Allergan, Inc., 899 F.3d 163, 166 (2d Cir. 2018).
Plaintiffs’ FCA claim fails because they did not satisfy the
procedural requirements for filing a qui tam FCA action, and
because they did not plead their FCA claim with particularity.
1. Plaintiffs Failed to Follow the FCA’s Procedural
Requirements

The FCA establishes procedures that relators must
follow before stepping into the government’s shoes. Among other
things, relators must serve a “copy of the complaint and written
disclosure of substantially all material evidence and
information the person possesses” on the government, which can
then decide whether to intervene in the case. 31 U.S.C.
§ 3730(b)(2). The relator must also file the complaint “in
camera, [and] under seal for at least 60 days” — “not [to] be
served on the defendant until the court so orders.” Id.
These requirements serve several purposes. First,
they give the government time to determine whether to intervene.
United States ex rel. Pilon v. Martin Marietta Corp., 60 F.3d

995, 998–99 (2d Cir. 1995). Second, they “prevent defendants
from having to answer the complaints without knowing whether the
government or relators would pursue the litigation.” Id. at
999. Third, they permit a defendant to seek a “speedy and
valuable settlement with the government” before the underlying
allegations become public. Id.
A relator’s “failure to comply with the [FCA’s] filing
and service provisions” requires dismissal with prejudice,
because such failure “irreversibly frustrates the congressional
goals underlying” the statute. Id. at 1000. Here, the
plaintiffs concede that they did not follow these procedural
requirements. See Pls.’ Mem. in Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss 2, 15-

16, ECF No. 43-6. The original complaint was neither filed
under seal nor initially served on the government. Id. at 15.
While the plaintiffs ultimately did serve the original and
amended complaints on the government, this occurred only after
the defendants were involved in the case. Id. So, the FCA
claim is dismissed with prejudice.
2. Plaintiffs Did Not Plead their FCA Claim with
Specificity

Even if the plaintiffs had complied with the FCA’s
procedural requirements (which they did not), their claim would
still fail for want of specificity under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 9(b).
FCA claims are subject to the specificity requirements
of Rule 9(b). Gold v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 68 F.3d 1475, 1476-
77 (2d Cir. 1995); United States ex rel. Ladas v. Exelis, Inc.,
824 F.3d 16, 26 (2d Cir. 2016). Rule 9(b) requires that “[i]n
alleging fraud or mistake, a party [] state with particularity
the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 9(b). “To satisfy this Rule, a complaint alleging fraud must
(1) specify the statements that the plaintiff contends were
fraudulent, (2) identify the speaker, (3) state where and when
the statements were made, and (4) explain why the statements
were fraudulent.” Exelis, 824 F.3d at 25.
The amended complaint does not comport with Rule 9(b).
It alleges only that (1) “Defendants submitted fraudulent and /
or false certified payrolls and Certificates of Compliance with
the intention that the false documents be material to the

Government’s decision to pay and / or approve Defendants’
(false) claims for payment,” Am. Compl. ¶ 156; and (2)
“Defendants failed to comply with the obligations imposed by the
Davis-Bacon Act and thereby violated the FCA by failing to pay
Plaintiffs and all others . . . the required wages per the
correct worker classification.” Id. ¶ 157. These allegations

do not identify which defendants made the challenged claims,
which government entity received them, when or where the claims
were made, which representations were false, or why they were
false. “[A] relator cannot circumscribe the Rule 9(b) pleading
requirements by alleging a fraudulent scheme in detail and
concluding, that as a result of the fraudulent scheme, false
claims must have been submitted.” United States ex rel.
Polansky v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 04-CV-704, 2009 WL 1456582, at *5
(E.D.N.Y. May 22, 2009). This is nevertheless the approach that
the complaint takes.
Finally, to the extent the plaintiffs intended to
marshal their alleged misclassification as the false claim at

issue, that cause of action, too, would fail. Many courts have
ruled that the Department of Labor has “sole jurisdiction to
determine whether a laborer was properly classified.” Krol, 46
F. Supp. 3d at 354; see also United States v. Dan Caputo Co.,
152 F.3d 1060, 1062 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Regulations under the
Davis–Bacon Act set forth procedures for the administrative
resolution of classification disputes . . . . Accordingly,
deferral to the [Department of Labor] with respect to
classification determinations is proper under the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction.”); United States ex rel. Windsor v.
DynCorp, Inc., 895 F.Supp. 844, 852 (E.D. Va. 1995) (“[T]he
Department of Labor has sole responsibility for resolving

classification disputes under the Davis–Bacon Act . . . .”).
This, too, warrants dismissal of the FCA claim.
C. The Declaratory Judgment Claim is Dismissed as
Duplicative

The plaintiffs also seek a declaration that “the
practices complained of [in the Amended Complaint] are unlawful”
under the FLSA, NYLL, and FCA. Am. Compl. ¶ 163. They are not
entitled to such a declaration.
The Declaratory Judgment Act (“DJA”) “created an
opportunity, rather than a duty, to grant [declaratory] relief
to qualifying litigants.” Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S.
277, 288 (1995). In deciding whether to grant a declaratory
judgment, a court must consider “(1) whether the judgment will
serve a useful purpose in clarifying or settling the legal
issues involved; and (2) whether a judgment would finalize the
controversy and offer relief from uncertainty.” Duane Reade,
Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 411 F.3d 384, 389 (2d
Cir. 2005). Courts may also consider other factors, such as
“whether there is a better or more effective remedy” than a
declaratory judgment. Dow Jones & Co. v. Harrods Ltd., 346 F.3d
357, 360 (2d Cir. 2003).
The plaintiffs essentially seek a declaration that
they are entitled to relief under the FLSA, NYLL, and FCA.
However, “a declaratory judgment will not serve a useful purpose

when the claim is duplicative of another claim in the same
action.” MSR Tr. v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC, No. 21-CV-3089, 2022
WL 3441613 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 2022) (collecting cases), report
and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 17689839 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15,
2022); City of Perry, Iowa v. Procter & Gamble Co., 188 F. Supp.
3d 276, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (“Courts generally reject a DJA
claim when other claims in the suit will resolve the same
issues.”). Because the declaratory judgment claim raises no
issues distinct from those in the preceding claims, it is
dismissed as duplicative.
D. Supplemental Jurisdiction Over the State Law Claims
Is Declined

The plaintiffs rely solely on the Court’s federal-
question jurisdiction. And the federal claims in this case have
been dismissed. So, the Court will not exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the state-law claims. Royal Canin U. S. A.,
Inc. v. Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22, 31–32 (2025). Those claims
are dismissed without prejudice.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss is
granted. The FCA claim is dismissed with prejudice, while the
remaining federal claims are dismissed without prejudice. The
state-law claims are also dismissed without prejudice. The
Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to enter judgment and

close this case.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Eric Komitee
ERIC KOMITEE
United State

s District Judge

D ated: September 28, 2025
Brooklyn, New York

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11145943. Public record. Not legal advice.