# Wine v. Merit Systems Protection Board

> District Court, N.D. California · September 24, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11145618

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. California
- **Decided:** September 24, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

1
2
3
4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
6
MITCHELL WINE,
7 Case No. 25-cv-03336-JCS
Plaintiff,
8
v. ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
9 DISQUALIFY JUDGE
MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION
10 BOARD, et al., Re: Dkt. No. 50
11 Defendants.

12
13 I. INTRODUCTION
14 Plaintiff has brought a Motion to Disqualify Judge Under 28 U.S.C. § 144 (“Motion”).
15 Section 144 provides, in relevant part:
16 Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files
a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter
17 is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in
favor of any adverse party, such judge shall proceed no further
18 therein, but another judge shall be assigned to hear such proceeding.
19 28 U.S.C. § 144. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 3-14, a request for disqualification under this
20 section is referred to the Clerk for random assignment to another judge only where the affidavit of
21 bias is “neither legally insufficient nor interposed for delay.” Civ. L. R. 3-14. For the reasons
22 stated below, the undersigned concludes that Plaintiff’s affidavit is legally insufficient and
23 therefore, that the Motion may properly be decided by the undersigned. The Court further
24 concludes that Plaintiff has not established that disqualification is warranted based on “personal
25 bias or prejudice[,]” for the reasons set forth below.
26 II. BACKGROUND
27 Plaintiff filed this case on April 15,2025, originally naming only the Merit System
1 0752- 18-0116-C-5. Dkt. no. 1, Compl. at ECF p. 1. On May 2, 2025, Plaintiff filed an amended
2 complaint seeking review of a different MSPB decision, in case number DA-1221-24-0451-W-1.
3 Dkt. no. 6, Amended Compl. at ECF p. 1. In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff sued not only
4 MSPB but also the U.S. Department of the Interior (“DOI”) and DOI Supervisor Chris Davidson
5 in his “personal and professional capacities”; U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)
6 and DHS Officer Adrian Henry in his “personal and professional capacities”; and the State of
7 Arkansas and Officer John Crisman in his “personal and professional capacities.” A summons
8 attached to Plaintiff’s “Proof of Service,” dkt. no. 8, also lists Arkansas Governor Sarah Sanders
9 as a defendant. Dkt. no. 8 at ECF p. 10.
10 On June 25, 2025, the “Federal Agency Defendants” (MSPB, DOI, Chris Davidson in his
11 official capacity, DHS, and Adrian Henry in his official capacity) asked the Court to continue the
12 deadlines for conducting a Rule 26(f) and ADR conference until after resolution of a motion to
13 dismiss it anticipated filing, citing judicial economy and failure to properly serve certain
14 defendants. Dkt. no. 10. The Court granted that request, stating that the dates of the parties’ Rule
15 26(f) conference, ADR process selection, initial disclosures under Rule 26(a) and General Order
16 71, and joint case management statement would be “determined based on the Court’s resolution of
17 Federal Agency Defendants’ forthcoming motion to dismiss.” The Court vacated the scheduled
18 Case Management Conference, stating that it would be “reset as necessary.” Dkt. No. 11 (“June
19 26 Scheduling Order”).
20 On July 8, 2025, Plaintiff brought a motion for relief from the Court’s June 26 Scheduling
21 Order, asserting that initial disclosures prior to the Court’s consideration of Defendants’ motions
22 to dismiss were “indispensable.” Dkt. no. 15 (“Initial Disclosure Motion”). In particular, he
23 asserted Defendants should by ordered to produce documents in connection with his allegation
24 that “the [Department of Justice](via the U.S. Attorney) is conflicted in this matter due to their
25 interest in maliciously prosecuting Plaintiff to conceal information in their possession related to
26 the early parole of convicted spy Tai Shen Kuo.” Initial Disclosure Motion at 2-3. The Court
27 denied the Initial Disclosure Motion without prejudice to Plaintiff’s renewal of his requests for
1 Between July 28, 2025 and August 5, 2025, three separate motions to dismiss were filed,
2 advancing a multitude of jurisdictional challenges. Dkt. nos. 22, 26, 29. Those motions were
3 noticed for hearing on September 2 and 10, 2025. Plaintiff then filed a Motion for Declaratory
4 Judgment and Injunctive Relief asking the Court to rule on the merits of his claims based on “all
5 pleadings to date.” Dkt. no. 36 (“Declaratory Relief Motion”). That motion was filed on August
6 10, 2025, with briefing to be completed by September 2, 2025. Based on the Court’s preliminary
7 review of the four pending motions, it concluded that there was significant overlap of issues and
8 that all of the motions should be heard together. Accordingly, on August 11, 2025, the Court set
9 all four motions for hearing on October 15, 2025 – the first available date on the Court’s calendar.1
10 Between August 13 and 15, 2025, Plaintiff sent four emails to Ms. Galang, Judge Spero’s
11 Courtroom Deputy, seeking legal advice about the case. On August 14, Ms. Galang responded in
12 an email stating:
13 I have informed Judge Spero that you seek clarification regarding the
initial disclosure obligations of some of the defendants in this case.
14 He has asked me to advise you that any requests for clarification must
be filed as a formal motion, consistent with the requirements of the
15 Court’s Local Rules.
16 Plaintiff responded with another email seeking legal advice, to which Ms. Galang responded
17 (correctly): “I cannot give you any legal advice. Any request to the court must be made by formal
18 motion on the docket. Thank you.” At this point, Plaintiff began sending Ms. Galang a series of
19 improper emails.
20 On August 15 at 12:21 pm, Plaintiff sent an email to Ms. Galang stating:
21 Ms. Galang,
Thank you for the response. Actually, you're paid by tax dollars to
22 provide me with legal advice on such matters. What law, rule, or court
guidance are you citing to in order to make the false claim that you
23 "...cannot give..." me legal advice? Please provide your citations in
reply to this email.
24 Thank you,
25
1The Court also inadvertently set the initial case management conference on that date, contrary to
26
its ruling in the June 26 Scheduling Order that the initial case management conference would be
scheduled after the motions to dismiss were decided. The Court corrected that error in its
27
September 11, 2025 order, docket no. 45, in which it moved the case management conference to
Mitch Wine
1
2 On August 16 at 5:54 pm, Plaintiff sent Ms. Galang an email stating:
3 Ms. Galang, this is not a trick question. Why are you prohibited from
providing me with legal advice? Where did you get that advice?
4 Because, if it came from Judge Spero, we might need to have a
conference.
5
Opposing counsels, y'all want to opine. Or?
6
On August 16 at 7:36 pm Plaintiff sent Ms. Galang another email, stating:
7 I have requested legal advice, and my tax dollars fund your salary.
You've claimed you cannot provide legal advice notwithstanding my
8 payments to you. Please explain.
9
10 On August 15, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion for “immediate” clarification regarding
11 service of process on the individual defendants. Dkt. no. 38 (“Immediate Clarification Motion”).
12 As the Court explained in an order issued three days later, that motion was not in compliance with
13 the Court’s Civil Local Rules. Dkt. no. 39 (August 18 Order”). Nonetheless, the Court ordered
14 that the individual defendants file a response to the motion. August 18 Order at 1-2. The Court
15 also ordered:
. . . Plaintiff may not seek legal advice from Court staff. If Plaintiff
16 desires legal advice regarding the prosecution of his case he must
retain an attorney to advise him. Court staff are not authorized to
17 provide legal advice to litigants. Furthermore, Plaintiff’s excessive
and improper emails impose a significant burden on the Court and
18 will no longer be permitted. Going forward, Plaintiff is prohibited
from emailing or telephoning Courtroom Deputy Jenny Galang for
19 any reason. Any future communications with the Court must be made
in filed documents. Further, Plaintiff may only file a document in this
20 case if he has a reasonable and good faith belief that it is permitted
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Civil Local Rules
21 of this Court.
22 Id. at 2. On September 11, 2025, the Court denied the Immediate Clarification Motion, declining
23 to decide whether service on the individual defendants was proper and noting that although it was
24 denying the motion, Plaintiff would not be barred from “asserting arguments concerning the
25 propriety of service on the individuals in future motion practice so long as the arguments are
26 raised only in a proper motion or opposition brief that is filed in accordance with the schedule of
27 this case, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Civil Local Rules of this Court and the Court’s
1 In the meantime, Plaintiff continued to email the Court demanding rulings and other
2 actions in this case. On September 2, 2025 and September 10, 2025, he sent emails to
3 JCSPO@cand.uscourts.gov – a mailbox to be used only for proposed orders and courtesy copies
4 of filed documents. Plaintiff’s September 10 email requested that a hearing be set on September
5 16 or 17, bypassing the requirements of this Court’s Civil Local Rules governing administrative
6 motions and motions to expedite. And on September 11, 2025, Plaintiff sent an email to the Chief
7 Judge of this Court complaining that the case was “in limbo” due to the undersigned’s “inaction.”
8 On September 16, 2025, Plaintiff sent another email to the JCSPO mailbox demanding a ruling on
9 the Declaratory Relief Motion.
10 On September 12, 2025, Plaintiff filed a letter asking the Court to decide his Declaratory
11 Relief Motion on the papers without waiting for the scheduled October 15 hearing, asserting that
12 oral argument was not necessary. Dkt. no. 47. The Court denied the request, stating:
13 Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), “[i]n the Judge’s discretion, or
upon request by counsel and with the Judge’s approval, a motion may
14 be determined without oral argument . . . .” Based on its preliminary
review of the extensive briefing on Plaintiff’s motion and the three
15 pending motions to dismiss, the Court declines to exercise its
discretion to vacate the motion hearing at this time.
16
17 Dkt. no. 48.
18 On September 18, 2025, Plaintiff sent another email to the Chief Judge asserting that
19 “Judge Spero is refusing to rule on the matter or provide any further guidance on what information
20 he is lacking that would be presented in oral arguments” and asking that the undersign be
21 “direct[ed] . . . to the docket for rulings.” The Court then issued an order prohibiting “further
22 harassing email communications with the Court.” Dkt. no. 49. The Court pointed to its August 18
23 Order stating that “Plaintiff’s excessive and improper emails impose a significant burden
24 on the Court and will no longer be permitted.” Id. The Court noted that that Order expressly
25 required that “[a]ny future communications with the Court must be made in filed documents” and
26 found that Plaintiff’s continued emails violated this Court’s August 18 Order and rose to the level
27 of harassment. Id.
1 against him, citing the fact that the Court has not yet opened up discovery in the case and has
2 deferred the initial case management conference until after the motions to dismiss are decided, for
3 which he contends there is “no good cause” and shows “blatant bias.” He further asserts that the
4 undersigned is biased against him based on its description of his emails to the Court as
5 “harassing[,]” which he calls “baseless defamation.”
6 III. DISCUSSION
7 Under Section 144, “personal bias or prejudice” is established only if the alleged bias or
8 prejudice “stems from an extrajudicial source and not from conduct or rulings made during the
9 course of the proceeding.” Toth v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 862 F.2d 1381, 1387–88 (9th Cir.
10 1988). In Toth, for example, the affidavit of bias stated that the presiding judge had observed in
11 open court that a litigant’s attorney’s “credibility with the judge [was] ‘about zero[]’ ” and that
12 “this counsel ha[d] been violating every court order of the magistrate and his court orders.” Id.
13 The court of appeals found that the affidavit was legally insufficient because the “bias or prejudice
14 alleged arose from conduct during the judicial proceeding.” Id. Accordingly, the court affirmed
15 the order of the presiding judge denying the litigant’s motion to disqualify. Id.
16 Here, all of the examples of bias cited by Plaintiff in his affidavit arise from conduct or
17 rulings in this case. In particular, he points to the Court’s rulings that discovery should await
18 resolution of the motions to dismiss as a matter of judicial efficiency, its order refusing to exercise
19 its discretion at this time to decide the Declaratory Relief Motion without a hearing and take the
20 scheduled motion hearing off calendar, and orders addressing Plaintiff’s improper conduct with
21 respect to emails to Court staff related to this action. He also apparently alleges bias on the basis
22 that the motion hearing was continued approximately one month to allow the Court to consider the
23 extensive briefing that has been filed by multiple defendants on the pending motions to dismiss,
24 which raise jurisdictional challenges that must be decided before the Court can consider granting
25 any relief on Plaintiff’s Declaratory Relief motion. In sum, Plaintiff has pointed to no bias or
26 prejudice stemming from an extrajudicial source. Therefore, the affidavit of bias is legally
27 insufficient.
1 IV. CONCLUSION
2 For the reasons stated above, the Motion is DENIED.
3 IT IS SO ORDERED.
4
5 Dated: September 24, 2025
6
J PH C. SPERO
7 nited States Magistrate Judge
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11145618. Public record. Not legal advice.
