# Swain v. Cook County Sheriff's Department

> District Court, N.D. Illinois · September 26, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11145590

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** September 26, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

DORIAN SWAIN,

Plaintiff, NO. 1:23-CV-03980

v. Judge Edmond E. Chang

COOK COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPART-
MENT, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Dorian Swain was a police officer with the Cook County Sheriff’s Department,
but he now brings this employment-discrimination suit against the Department,
Sheriff Thomas Dart, several other Sheriff’s Department employees, the Cook County
Merit Board and its members and Cook County. R. 42, Second Am. Compl.1 All De-
fendants move to dismiss, arguing that certain defendants cannot be liable under the
claims that Swain has presented and that Swain otherwise fails to adequately state
a claim for relief. See R. 48, Sheriff’s Department Defs.’ Mot.; R. 55, Merit Board Defs.’
Mot. For the reasons explained below, the Board Defendants’ motion is granted in
full and the Sheriff Defendants’ motion is granted in large part. The only remaining
claims are the Title VII disparate treatment and Title VII retaliation claim against
the Sheriff’s Department.

1Citations to the record are “R.” followed by the docket entry number and, if needed,
a page or paragraph number. This Court has federal-question jurisdiction over this case un-
der 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
I. Background
In deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court accepts well-pleaded facts as true
and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). After almost a decade of
solid performance as a correctional officer, Dorian Swain was promoted to a police
officer. Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 20–22. Around a year after he was promoted, several
supervisors accused Swain of violating several Sheriff’s Department policies and pro-
cedures, allegedly out of the blue. Id. ¶¶ 20–22, 24–27. So, a few months later, Swain
filed an internal complaint against those officers, alleging harassment and racial dis-
crimination (Swain is a Black man). Id. ¶¶ 5, 28.

Things allegedly got worse for Swain after he filed the internal complaint. Not
only did he lose his police-officer responsibilities, his job duties also substantially
changed overall. Second Am. Compl. ¶ 28. As a police officer, he was assigned to re-
spond to emergency and non-emergency calls for assistance and to patrol assigned
areas for crime. Id. ¶ 23. After he filed the complaint, however, Swain was relegated
to collecting recyclables in the warehouse and completing clerical work. Id. ¶¶ 29, 31–

33. Swain noticed that other employees like him who had behaved similarly but did
not report their supervisors did not have their job responsibilities changed. Id. ¶¶ 39–
40. A key difference between Swain and those employees is that Swain is Black and
the other employees are not. Id. ¶ 39.
A few months after Swain was assigned to complete clerical work, Swain sued
the Defendants in federal court, at first only naming the Cook County Sheriff’s
2
Department, alleging that the Department discriminated against him on the basis of
his race and retaliated against him for filing an internal complaint about the discrim-
ination. Id. ¶ 34; R. 2, Am. Compl. Then, two months later, Swain learned that his

employment was terminated for allegedly violating Cook County Department of Cor-
rections policies. Second Am. Compl. ¶ 35. Swain received the notice of termination
from the Cook County Sheriff’s Merit Board, an administrative agency tasked to in-
vestigate the enforcement of the Sheriff’s Department’s rules. 55 ILCS 5/3-7002,
7015; Second Am. Compl. ¶ 36.
In the meantime, Swain filed two charges with the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission—one in April 2022 and the other in December 2023. Sheriff Defs.’

Mot. at 3–4. The first charge alleged that Swain was discriminated and retaliated
against based on his sex and age. Id. at 3. It also explained that he was “subjected to
different terms and conditions of employment, including but not limited to discipline
and reassignment.” Id. The second charge again described the discrimination and
retaliation that Swain had experienced and then added that he was fired for engaging
in a protected activity. Id. at 3–4. The second charge also explained that white em-

ployees who engaged in similar misconduct to him but who did not engage in pro-
tected activity were not fired. Id. Swain received a Notice of Right to Sue letter on
this charge in July 2024. Id. at 4.
After receiving his Right to Sue letter, Swain amended the complaint, tacking
on a claim for that he was fired for engaging in a protected activity, in violation of the
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., a claim that he
3
was retaliated against in violation of the First Amendment, and a claim that he was
denied equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. Second Am. Compl.
¶¶ 48–59. This time, Swain named several defendants, including the Cook County

Sheriff’s Department, the sheriff, Thomas Dart in his individual and official capacity,
officers John Webb, Cameron Pon,2 and Theodore Stajura in their individual capaci-
ties, the Cook County Sheriff’s Merit Board and its members in their individual ca-
pacities, and Cook County. Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 6–19.
The Sheriff’s Department, as well as officers Webb, Pon, Stajura plus Cook
County, together move to dismiss the complaint. Sheriff Defs.’ Mot. In sum, the Sher-
iff Defendants argue that the claims against Webb, Pon, and Stajura should be dis-

missed because they were not named in Swain’s EEOC charge, so the claims against
them are unexhausted. Id. at 1–2. The Sheriff Defendants also argue that the remain-
ing claims should be dismissed because they are too vague and conclusory to state a
claim for relief. Id. at 2. The Merit Board and its individual members also move to
dismiss, seeking to join the arguments in the Sheriff Defendants’ motion. Board Defs.’
Mot. at 2. The Board Defendants also assert that its members are entitled to absolute

immunity, the Board itself is protected by immunity under the Illinois Tort Immunity
Act, 745 ILCS 10/2-101, et seq., and (alternatively) the allegations fail to state a claim
for relief. Id. at 2–7.

2The Sheriff Defendants explain that Lieutenant Cameron Pon, a former investigator,
conducted part of Swain’s investigation, but the complaint mistakenly named “Ernst” who
was not involved in Swain’s investigation. Sheriff Defs.’ Mot. at 2 n.2.
4
II. Legal Standard
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint generally need only
include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled

to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This short and plain statement must “give the de-
fendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (cleaned up).3 The Seventh Circuit has
explained that this rule “reflects a liberal notice pleading regime, which is intended
to ‘focus litigation on the merits of a claim’ rather than on technicalities that might
keep plaintiffs out of court.” Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 580 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002)).

“A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Hallinan v. Fraternal Ord. of Police
of Chi. Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2009). “[A] complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (cleaned up). These allegations
“must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550

U.S. at 555. The allegations that are entitled to the assumption of truth are those
that are factual, rather than mere legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79.

3This Opinion uses (cleaned up) to indicate that internal quotation marks, alterations,
and citations have been omitted from quotations. See Jack Metzler, Cleaning Up Quotations,
18 Journal of Appellate Practice and Process 143 (2017).
5
III. Analysis
A. Title VII Race Discrimination
Swain brings claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e, et seq., against all Defendants. He alleges that the Defendants discriminated
against him by reassigning him from police work to clerical work, and for firing him
after he reported the alleged discrimination. Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 45–50. The Board
Defendants move to dismiss the Title VII claims against it and the individual Board
members because neither the Merit Board nor its members are Swain’s “employer”
for purposes of Title VII. R. 56-1, Board Def. Supp. Br. at 2–4. And the Sheriff De-
fendants ask the Court to dismiss the claims against Webb, Pon, and Stajura because

those officers are not named in either EEOC charge that Swain filed. Sheriff Defs.’
Mot. at 6–7. Both arguments are correct.
First, the Title VII claims against the Board Defendants must be dismissed
because only Swain’s “employer” can be liable under Title VII, and the Merit Board
is not his employer under Title VII. See Hearne v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chicago, 185
F.3d 770, 777 (7th Cir. 1999); Bless v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 2015 WL 890370, at

*6 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 2015) (dismissing First Amendment retaliation claims brought
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a merit board because the plaintiff did not sue his
employer). As the Board Defendants argue, it is the Sheriff’s Department—not the
Board—that is Swain’s employer for Title VII purposes. The Board is an adjudicatory
body rather than an employer. See Bless, 2015 WL 890370, at *6 (citing Averhart v.
Sheriff of Cook Cnty., 752 F.3d 1104, 1106 (7th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (explaining
6
that the plaintiff failed to “explain[] how the Merit Board, as an adjudicatory board
and not his employer, could be liable for his employment deprivation). So the Board
and its members cannot be held liable for any Title VII claim because they are not

Swain’s “employer.”
Second, the Title VII claims against Webb, Pon, Stajura, and Sheriff Dart (in
his individual capacity) must be dismissed for an independent reason: these Defend-
ants were not named in either of Swain’s EEOC charges. Before bringing a Title VII
claim in federal court, a plaintiff is required to first exhaust administrative remedies
by filing a charge with the EEOC and receiving a right to sue letter. Rush v. McDon-
ald’s Corp., 966 F.2d 1104, 1110 (7th Cir. 1992). After receiving the notice, a plaintiff

“may bring only those claims that were included in her EEOC charge, or that are like
or reasonably related to the allegations of the charge and growing out of such allega-
tions.” Chaidez v. Ford Motor Co., 937 F.3d 998, 1004 (7th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up).
For a claim to be “like or reasonably related” to the EEOC charge, the charge and
complaint “must, at minimum, describe the same conduct and implicate the same
individuals.” Cheek v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 497, 501 (7th Cir. 1994) (emphasis

in original). Here, Swain’s EEOC charge did not name those individual defendants,
so there is an additional reason to dismiss the Title VII claims against them.

7
1. Title VII Disparate Treatment (Count 1)
What remains are the Title VII claims against the Sheriff’s Department.4
Turning to the merits, to successfully bring a Title VII disparate treatment claim
based on race, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that he “(1) is a member of a protected

class, (2) he was subjected to an adverse employment act, and (3) there is a link be-
tween those two.” Cole v. Bd. of Trs. of N. Ill. Univ., 38 F. Supp. 3d 925, 931 (N.D. Ill.
2014). At the pleading stage for employment-discrimination cases, generally speak-
ing, a plaintiff need not support the third element with detailed factual allegations
so long as he alleges that the first two elements are linked by racial animus. Luevano
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 722 F.3d 1014, 1028 (7th Cir. 2013). That is, the plaintiff
must at least allege that the Defendants selected “a particular course of action at

least in part because of its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.” Alston v. City
of Madison, 853 F.3d 901, 907 (7th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up).
At the pleading stage, not much is needed in an employment-discrimination
case of this kind. It is true that the Second Amended Complaint is not nearly as clear
as it could be, especially because it typically lumps all of the Defendants together.
But Swain does allege that he “performed his job well,” and yet he was stripped of his

4Swain appears to mistakenly believe that the Cook County Sheriff’s Department is a
division of Cook County, R. 60, Pl.’s Rep. at 14–15, when instead it is, as a matter of law, a
separate municipality. With that formal legal separateness, there is no substantive allega-
tion leveled against Cook County, so to the extent Swain wanted to assert a claim against
the County itself, none exists. Cook County is dismissed from the case for now. If Swain wants
to add an indemnification claim against Cook County, then he may propose to do so by seek-
ing leave to amend (again) the operative complaint.
8
police powers and his job duties changes substantially starting in February 2022.
Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 21, 29. Instead of performing sworn-officer duties, Swain was
relegated to “work in the warehouse to collect recyclables,” and then in January 2023,

he was assigned to do “clerical work.” Id. ¶¶ 31–32. He ultimately was fired for vio-
lating Department of Corrections policies, but other Caucasian employees who en-
gaged in comparably serious violations were not fired. Id. ¶ 39. It is true that discov-
ery might show otherwise, that is, that there are no comparators as alleged by Swain,
or that there was a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the reassignment and
the firing. But the case is at the pleading stage. So, although the allegations and their
connections to one another are not as clear as they could have been, given the notice

pleading for employment-discrimination cases, the race-discrimination claim may
move forward as to the Sheriff’s Department.
2. Title VII Retaliation
Swain also alleges that the Sheriff’s Department violated Title VII by firing
him in retaliation for filing an internal complaint about the discrimination that he
had experienced. Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 28, 35–36, 38–44. To plausibly allege a Title

VII retaliation claim, Swain must assert facts suggesting that “(1) he engaged in a
protected activity, (2) he suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) there is a
link between the two.” Cole, 38 F. Supp. 3d at 931. Here again, given the expansive-
ness of the notice-pleading standard in employment cases, the retaliation claim may
move forward against the Sheriff’s Department. Swain first connects the removal of
police powers—which happened on February 16, 2022—to the filing of the internal
9
complaint of discrimination on December 30, 2021, which is relatively close in time.
Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 28–29. Then he connects the filing of the Amended Complaint
in this case, on August 15, 2023, with his firing on October 12, 2023, id. ¶¶ 34–35,

again relatively close in time to one another. Again, discovery might very well under-
mine the claim, but it is sufficiently pleaded.
B. Immunity of Board Members and of the Board
Next, Swain brings two constitutional claims arising from the firing. Second
Am. Compl. ¶¶ 51–59. First, he alleges that the Defendants violated his First Amend-
ment rights by firing him after he filed an internal complaint and an Amended Com-
plaint in federal court. Id. ¶¶ 51–54. Swain also alleges that the Defendants violated

his right to Equal Protection by firing him based on his race. Id. ¶¶ 55–59. The Board
Defendants argue that the Board and its individual officers enjoy quasi-judicial im-
munity because their duties are judicial in nature. Board Defs.’ Mot. at 4–5. The
Board Defendants also argue that because the Board is a public entity and its mem-
bers are public employees, the Board and its Members are also shielded by the Illinois
Tort Immunity Act, 745 ILCS 10/2-101. Id. at 5–7. As discussed next, the Board’s

individual members do enjoy absolute immunity, but the Board is not shielded from
suit by the Illinois Tort Immunity Act.
The Board’s individual members are entitled to absolute immunity. “Absolute
immunity is available to members of quasi-judicial adjudicatory bodies when they
perform duties that are functionally comparable to those of a judicial officer, regard-
less of the identity of the actor.” Capra v. Cook Cnty. Bd. of Rev., 733 F.3d 705, 709
10
(7th Cir. 2013) (cleaned up). In Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978), the Supreme
Court established six considerations for analyzing whether quasi-judicial immunity
applies. Those are “(1) the need to assure that the individual can perform his func-

tions without harassment or intimidation; (2) the presence of safeguards that reduce
the need for damages actions as a means for controlling unconstitutional conduct; (3)
the insulation from political influence; (4) the importance of precedent; (5) the adver-
sarial nature of the process; and (6) the correctability of error on appeal.” Heyde v.
Pittenger, 633 F.3d 512, 517 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Butz, 438 U.S. at 512)).
Those factors counsel in favor of conferring quasi-judicial immunity for Board
members. The Board’s hearing process is very much like a judicial proceeding—offic-

ers are entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard and present evidence.
55 ILCS 5/3-7012. And the Board’s function of reviewing disciplinary actions deserves
insulation from harassment or intimidation because it is “inherently controversial
and likely to result in disappointed parties and, unless checked, a multitude of law-
suits,” like the very lawsuit before this Court. Heyde, 633 F.3d at 519 (analyzing the
Butz factors). Finally, Illinois law provides the opportunity to appeal from unfavora-

ble Board decisions. See id. So the individual Board members are immune from this
lawsuit.
The Board, as an entity, however, does not enjoy quasi-judicial immunity. It is
well established that municipal entities—entities like the Board—are not entitled to
absolute immunity. E.g., Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 701 (1978)
(“[M]unicipal bodies sued under § 1983 cannot be entitled to an absolute immunity,
11
lets our decision that such bodies are subject to suit under § 1983 be drained of mean-
ing.” (cleaned up)); Hernandez v. Sheahan, 455 F.3d 772, 776 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[U]nits
of government are not entitled to immunity in suits under § 1983” in part because

immunities are “personal defenses designed to protect the finances of public officials
whose salaries do not compensate them for the risks of liability”); Capra, 733 F.3d at
711–12 (denying absolute immunity for the Cook County Board of Review). The same
principle applies here, so the Board is not entitled to quasi-judicial immunity.
The Board also asserts that the Illinois Tort Immunity Act, 745 ILCS 10/1-101,
shields it from suit in this case. Merit Board Defs.’ Mot. at 5–7. The Merit Board is
mistaken. That statute was enacted to “protect local public entities and public em-

ployees from liability arising from the operation of government.” 745 ILCS 10/1-
101.1(a). But the Tort Immunity Act only protects local public entities from lawsuits
arising under state law. Indeed, federal law is supreme to state laws, see Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 3 (1824), so a state law cannot protect a defendant from a federal
claim, like a § 1983 lawsuit. Thomas ex rel. Smith v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff, 401 F. Supp.
2d 867, 875 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (citing Anderson v. Vill. of Forest Park, 606 N.E.2d 205,

211 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)). So the Board is not entitled to any kind of immunity against
the § 1983 claims. As explained next, however, the federal constitutional claims are
dismissed in any event.
C. First Amendment Retaliation
Section § 1983 provides, in relevant part, that “[e]very person who … sub-
jects … any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
12
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured .…” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In Monell, the
Supreme Court held that local governmental entities are “persons” under Section

1983. Monell, 436 U.S. at 688–89. To establish municipal liability, Swain must allege
that “an express policy causing the loss, a widespread practice constituting custom or
usage that caused the loss, or causation of the loss by a person with final policymak-
ing authority.” Kujawski v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Bartholomew Cnty., Ind., 183 F.3d 734,
737 (7th Cir. 1999) (cleaned up). To establish liability against a municipal actor in
their individual capacity, Swain must adequately allege “personal involvement in the
alleged constitutional deprivation ….” Palmer v. Marion Cnty., 327 F.3d 588, 594 (7th

Cir. 2003). In other words, Swain must sufficiently plead that “the conduct causing
the constitutional deprivation occur[ed] at [the individual’s] direction or with his
knowledge and consent.” Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1995)
(cleaned up). But, in most cases, if there is no underlying constitutional violation,
then there is no municipal liability. Horton v. Pobecky, 883 F.3d 941, 964 (7th Cir.
2018).

Here, Swain has failed to adequately allege a First Amendment retaliation
claim. To survive the motion to dismiss the First Amendment retaliation claim, Swain
must adequately allege that “(1) his speech was constitutionally protected; (2) he has
suffered a deprivation likely to deter free speech; and (3) his speech was at least a
motivating factor in [Defendants’] actions.” Kidwell v. Eisenhauer, 679 F.3d 957, 964
(7th Cir. 2012). But beyond that, the First Amendment right to free speech for public
13
employees is subject to an important limit. “[T]he First Amendment protects a public
employee’s right, in certain circumstances, to speak as a citizen addressing matters
of public concern.” Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 417 (2006). “For a public em-

ployee’s speech to be protected under the First Amendment, the employee must show
that (1) he made the speech as a private citizen, (2) the speech addressed a matter of
public concern, and (3) his interest in expressing that speech was not outweighed by
the state’s interests as an employer in promoting effective and efficient public ser-
vice.” Swetlik v. Crawford, 738 F.3d 818, 825 (7th Cir. 2013) (cleaned up). But if a
public employee reports misconduct as directed by official policy, either to a supervi-
sor or an external oversight body, then the employee speaks pursuant to his official

duties—and his speech is not protected. Tamayo v. Blagoevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1091
(7th Cir. 2008).
Here, Swain engaged in unprotected speech. He filed an internal complaint
with the Sheriff’s Department reporting the alleged discrimination that he experi-
enced at his job at the hands of his supervisors. Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 10–11. Based
on these allegations, then, Swain was speaking pursuant to his official duties, so there

is no viable First Amendment retaliation claim. So the First Amendment retaliation
claim is dismissed as to all of the Defendants.
D. Equal Protection
Finally, Swain alleges that the Defendants violated his Fourteenth Amend-
ment equal protection rights by subjecting him to inferior job assignments and firing
him on the basis of race. Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 39–43. On the equal protection claim,
14
however, the facts are not concrete enough to understand who did what, and what
specific facts give rise to a plausible inference of race discrimination on the part of
particular actors and municipalities. It is one thing to rely on Title VII’s pleading-

stage leniency in employment-discrimination cases when Title VII renders employ-
ers—as entities—liable for the decisions of their agents. But Section 1983 requires
(a) personal conduct to hold individual defendants liable and (b) some specific basis
for municipal liability under the familiar standards of Monell. None of that is ade-
quately pleaded by Swain as to any Defendant. Of course there is no heightened
pleading standard under Section 1983. Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intel-
ligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993). But only well-pleaded factual

allegations receive the presumption of truth. McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d
611, 615 (7th Cir. 2011). For the equal-protection claim, the operative complaint falls
short. But the dismissal is without prejudice to proposing an amended pleading that
adequately states an equal protection claim against specific defendants.

15
IV. Conclusion
The Sheriff Defendants’ motion to dismiss, R. 48, is granted in large part and
denied in part. The only remaining claims are the Title VII disparate treatment and
Title VII retaliation claim against the Sheriff’s Department. No claims have been

asserted against Cook County itself. The Merit Board Defendants’ motion to dismiss,
R. 55, is granted in full. The parties shall confer on a proposed discovery schedule and
file a joint status report by October 10, 2025.
ENTERED:

s/Edmond E. Chang
Honorable Edmond E. Chang
United States District Judge

DATE: September 26, 2025

16

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11145590. Public record. Not legal advice.