# Kandan v. Burrows

> District Court, E.D. Louisiana · September 26, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11145351

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** September 26, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11145351

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- concluding that a district court abused its discretion by refusing to consider coworker testimony

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

UMA R KANDAN CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 24-2089

CHARLOTTE BURROWS ET AL. SECTION: (3)

ORDER AND REASONS
This lawsuit arises from Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”) Houston District Director Rayford Irvin’s selection of Michael Kirkland (a
male)1 rather than Uma Kandan (a female)2 for the position of Field Director for the
New Orleans Field Office (“NOFO”).3 EEOC filed a Motion in Limine to Exclude
Evidence (R. Doc. 47) relative to testimony (and any supporting exhibits) from three
EEOC employees that directly compares the qualifications of Kandan and Kirkland.4
EEOC also seeks to exclude testimony (and any supporting exhibits) relative to other
hiring and promotion decisions by Irvin in which he chose male candidates over
female candidates.5 For the following reasons, the motion is granted in part and
denied in part.

1 R. Docs. 35-2 at 1, 36.
2 R. Doc. 36-7.
3 R. Doc. 13, ¶¶ 1–5.
4 R. Doc. 47-1 at 1.
5 Id.
I. Potential Coworker Testimony
EEOC seeks to limit the testimony of three witnesses: Kevin C. Rung, Andrew
Kingsley, and Jennifer Ortiz Prather.6 The potential testimony arises from the

following contexts.
A. Kevin C. Rung, EEOC Supervisory Administrative Judge.
Rung is a GS-14 Supervisory Administrative Judge at the NOFO.7 His first-
line supervisor is Irvin.8 Rung has known Kandan as a NOFO colleague for
approximately 20 years.9 He has also known Kirkland as a NOFO colleague for
approximately 18 months.10 Rung was not involved in Kirkland’s selection as NOFO

Field Director but expressed surprise that Kandan was not chosen based on her
experience at EEOC, including as Acting Field Director.11
Rung is aware that Jennifer Mitchem, a female EEOC employee, complained
when Irvin chose Kirkland (then an outside candidate) rather than Mitchem for the
position of enforcement supervisor in 2021.12 Rung was familiar with Mitchem’s
background and experience.13 At the time, Rung had not yet had an opportunity to
work with Kirkland.14 Rung felt that Mitchem was “probably the better qualified

6 Id. at 3.
7 R. Doc. 47-2 at 1.
8 Id.
9 R. Doc. 55-2 at 17.
10Id. at 6.
11 R. Doc. 47-2 at 3.
12 R. Doc. 55-2 at 10.
13 Id. at 9–10.
14 Id. at 14.
candidate” than Kirkland given her knowledge of the law, background, and years of
experience.15
B. Andrew Kingsley, Special Assistant/Senior Attorney Advisor.

From 2016 to 2022, Kingsley was a trial attorney in the NOFO.16 For part of
that time, he was also the union representative.17 As a union representative, Kingsley
reviewed resumes relative to the enforcement supervisor position for which Kirkland
was selected in 2021.18
Kingsley noted that both candidates had served in the U.S. Army, but
Mitchem was a major (GS-12) equivalent), while Kirkland was a command sergeant

major (GS-6 equivalent).19 Kingsley also noted that Mitchem had more than 20 years
of experience at the agency, while Kirkland had never worked there and had “limited,
if any,” analogous experience.20 Finally, he noted that Mitchem had a bachelor’s
degree, while Kirkland’s resume listed no degree.21 He also characterized Mitchem
as among the most, and perhaps the most, capable and competent investigators.22
The disparity between Mitchem and Kirkland’s qualifications concerned Kingsley.23

15 Id. at 13–14.
16 R. Doc. 47-3 at 3.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
Based on their backgrounds and working with both individuals, Kingsley believes
Mitchem was “substantially more qualified” than Kirkland.24
Kingsley also had firsthand knowledge relative to the selection of Kirkland

over Kandan for the NOFO Field Director position.25 Kingsley notes that he was
familiar with Kirkland’s earlier resume from when he was first hired and that he
reviewed Kandan’s resume at her request.26 By Kingsley’s summary, Kandan was
multilingual and Kirkland was bilingual; Kandan had two or three master’s degrees
and Kirkland did not have a bachelor’s or master’s degree; Kandan had about 24 years
of experience at the agency while Kirkland had about two years of experience; and

Kandan had lived in New Orleans for 24 years while Kirkland had never lived there.27
Kingsley described both candidates as hardworking and sociable.28 He was “very
surprised” when Irvin chose Kirkland.29 The “drastic disparity” in Kandan and
Kirkland’s qualifications concerned Kingsley such that he reported it to the agency’s
Office of Civil Rights.30 Kingsley was told that he could not submit a complaint in his
capacity as a bystander.31 Kingsley avers that he does not know that gender, race, or

24 R. Doc. 55-1 at 8.
25 R. Docs. 55-1 at 13–15, 5 5-1 at 16–20.
26 Id.
27 R. Doc. 47-3 at 4–5. Kingsley explained that the Field Director position required
the candidate to be the “public face of the agency in that locality.” R. Doc. 55-1 at 18–
19.
28 R. Doc. 47-3 at 5.
29 R. Doc. 55-1 at 16.
30 R. Doc. 47-3 at 5; see also R. Doc. 55-1 at 21 (noting office’s name change).
31 R. Doc. 47-3 at 5.
national origin was the reason for Kirkland’s selection, but Kingsley is also not aware
of any legitimate reason for Irvin’s decision.32
Kingsley also noted in connection with Kandan’s discrimination claim that he

has observed that women are treated less favorably than men and held to a different
standard in both the NOFO and Houston District Office.33 Kingsley has heard EEOC
staff refer to Irvin and his managers as a “boys’ club.”34 Kingsley has observed Irvin
and other male managers in the NOFO and the Houston District Office “permit men
to speak and behave aggressively” in meetings, while expressing dissatisfaction
toward or disciplining women who do the same.35 According to Kingsley, “Women are

expected to be demure, yet by being demure, they are considered incapable of being
effective leaders.”36 Since Kingsley started at the agency in 2016, the Houston district
director, two deputy directors, three field directors, and two systemic coordinators
have all been men.37 Kingsley reports that Kandan and other women at the agency
were “distraught” when they learned that Kandan had not been selected.38

32 Id. at 6.
33 R. Doc. 47-3 at 6, 8.
34 R. Doc. 47-3 at 6.
35 Id. at 9.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 6.
38 R. Doc. 55-1 at 21.
C. Jennifer Ortiz Prather, EEOC Supervisory Attorney.
Ortiz Prather is an EEOC attorney in the Houston District Office.39 She has
been with the agency since 2010.40 Her second-line supervisor is Irvin.41

Ortiz Prather believes that Irvin has provided almost no professional
development opportunities to qualified females.42 In 2019, Ortiz Prather filed a
complaint when Irvin did not allow her to apply for the GS-15 Deputy position in
Houston.43 She states that Irvin has been on notice since at least that date relative
to the lack of professional development opportunities afforded to females.44
In 2023, Ortiz Prather applied for a Deputy Director position but was not

selected.45 She reports that, like Kandan, she has “many more years of service” than
the selected male candidate.46 Ortiz Prather states that neither Kandan nor herself,
despite years of service and positive ratings, have been offered development and
promotion opportunities and that Irvin consistently selects males.47 Ortiz Prather
states that the disparity is “incredibly striking.”48 Ortiz Prather believes that Irvin
would have provided Kandan with professional development opportunities if she were
male.49 She feels similarly relative to two other female EEOC employees (Marina

39 R. Doc. 47-4 at 1.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 3.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 4.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id.
Guerra and Elizabeth Henderson).50 According to Ortiz Prather, the lack of
development opportunities has resulted in a “slew” of female candidates leaving the
Houston office to pursue EEOC positions elsewhere.51 When Ortiz Prather discussed

that one such candidate had done well elsewhere, Irvin allegedly responded, in effect,
that he would never have hired her and that it was a mistake.52
According to Ortiz Prather, Irvin told her that Kandan was “barely” qualified
for her position.53 Ortiz Prather further reports that Irvin made comments about
Kandan’s accent and complained about her use of leave to visit family in India.54 Ortiz
Prather notes that Irvin made these comments “without seeming to have any fear”

relative to his behavior.55 She reports being shocked that his behavior did not seem
to rise to the level to be addressed.56 Ortiz Prather states that Irvin questioned
Kandan’s management abilities, in response to which Ortiz Prather questioned Irvin
about whether he had given Kandan guidance or opportunities that he provided to
less qualified males.57 Ortiz Prather believes that the NOFO Field Director selection
would have been different if Kandan had been given similar professional development
opportunities.58 Ortiz Prather believes that Irvin intentionally disseminated negative

50 Id. at 3.
51 Id. at 3–4.
52 Id. at 6.
53 Id. at 2.
54 Id. at 3.
55 Id. at 5.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 3.
58 Id.
information about Kandan because he wanted to perpetuate a negative view of her at
the agency.59
Ortiz Prather believes that Kirkland was not qualified for the Field Director

position, including because of his communication skills, legal knowledge, and
background, such that both Ortiz Prather and other staff felt shocked at his
selection.60 She suspects that Kirkland was given the questions and answers before
his panel interview.61 Ortiz Prather doubts that Kirkland could have scored more
highly than Kandan without additional help or support, which was not available to
female employees.62

Ortiz Prather also testified that Irvin required her to interview for a promotion
while Ortiz Prather was traveling internationally with her family while on planned
leave.63 She was told that she had to interview while abroad because a selection was
imminent.64 She believes that Irvin knew that the interview would be difficult for
Ortiz Prather given technological limitations associated with being out of the office.65
According to Ortiz Prather, Irvin, with help from Shanita Williams, was in control of
interview logistics and denied her request for a schedule change given the imminent

nature of the selection—but then waited to choose until two weeks after Ortiz Prather

59 Id. at 6.
60 R. Doc. 55-3 at 10–11.
61 R. Docs. 55-3 at 22, 24–25.
62 R. Doc. 55-3 at 27.
63 Id. at 12.
64 Id. at 13.
65 Id.
had returned to the office.66 Ortiz Prather believes it would have been easy for her
interview to occur after she returned from leave.67
Finally, Ortiz Prather states that there were numerous complaints about Irvin

prior to his transfer from Phoenix to Houston and that he has been found “guilty” of
different discrimination, harassment, and retaliation.68 She alleges that Irvin
harbors and has acted on an employment preference for males.69 She identified
multiple males (including one who served on Kirkland and Kandan’s interview panel)
whom she believes Irvin has groomed for leadership opportunities and has selected
over more qualified females.70

II. The Federal Rules of Evidence do not support a blanket prohibition
on testimony comparing Kandan and Kirkland’s qualifications or
discussing the possible presence of discrimination.

EEOC does not seek to exclude coworker testimony discussing each candidate’s
qualifications.71 EEOC does seek, however, to exclude testimony that would compare
Kandan or Kirkland’s “relative fitness for the NOFO Field Director position.”72 EEOC
relies on Rules 602, 701, 702, and 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.73
With respect to Rule 602, which requires that a lay witness have personal
knowledge, EEOC maintains that Rung, Ortiz-Prather, and Kingsley’s beliefs about
66 Id. at 13–14.
67 Id. at 14.
68 Id. at 18.
69 Id. at 20.
70 Id. at 20–21.
71 R. Doc. 58 at 2–3.
72 Id. at 1.
73 R. Doc. 47-1 at 3–5.
what “would make someone a successful Field Office Director” are not reliable
because none of them have worked in or supervised that role.74 Moreover, EEOC
maintains, these employees lack the “full set of facts” upon which to base such

beliefs.75 These arguments can be made through cross-examination, however.76
Provided that the witnesses’ beliefs reflect personal knowledge of the candidates,
there is no basis to exclude this testimony under Rule 602.
Similarly, EEOC’s challenge under Rules 701 and 702 lacks merit. Rule 701
allows the admission of fact witness opinions when they are rationally based on the
witness’s perception and “helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or

to determining a fact in issue,” provided that the opinions are not based on specialized
knowledge within the scope of Rule 702. Fed. R. Evid. 701. “Courts generally hold
admissible under Rule 701 evidence in the form of lay opinion testimony in
discrimination cases when given by a person whose position with the defendant entity
provides the opportunity to personally observe and experience the defendant's
policies and practices.” Gossett v. Oklahoma ex rel. Bd. of Regents for Langston Univ.,
245 F.3d 1172, 1179 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing e.g., Hansard v. Pepsi–Cola Metro.

Bottling Co., 865 F.2d 1461, 1466–67 (5th Cir. 1989). And “[c]ourts often have
permitted lay witnesses to express opinions about the motivation or intent of a
particular person if the witness has an adequate opportunity to observe the

74 R. Doc. 58 at 2.
75 Id.
76 For example, during his deposition, Kingsley made clear that he was not involved
in Kandan’s selection process and “there is likely information that I did not see.” R.
Doc. 58 at 3.
underlying circumstances.” Hansard v. Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co., 865 F.2d 1461,
1466 (5th Cir. 1989).
The anticipated coworker testimony presented by Kandan relative to

candidate qualifications and potential reasons for Irvin’s decision will counter the
anticipated testimony presented by EEOC that Kirkland was the more qualified
candidate and that discrimination did not affect Irvin’s decision. See Brooks v.
Barnhart, 78 F. App’x 52, 59 (10th Cir. 2003) (concluding that a district court abused
its discretion by refusing to consider coworker testimony). Moreover, allowing
Kandan and Kirkland’s coworkers to explain their observations of the two candidates

while prohibiting the use of comparison adjectives would impose an artificial and
confusing constraint on the testimony. See id. at 58–59 (concluding that it was an
abuse of discretion to allow coworkers to testify only as to their surprise at an
employment decision without allowing them to explain why they were surprised).
Rules 701 and 702 permit coworkers to compare candidates and testify as to their
subjective beliefs as to discrimination so long as the witness can establish a factual
foundation for those beliefs. See Haun v. Ideal Indus., Inc., 81 F.3d 541, 548 (5th Cir.

1996) (“Vander Pan's opinion testimony that Ideal was phasing out older workers was
based on his perception and helped the jury determine whether Ideal
discriminated.”).
EEOC’s alternative argument that the evidence should be excluded under Rule
403 also fails. EEOC argues that there is a risk of prejudice because a jury might find
an EEOC employee’s testimony about alleged discrimination particularly persuasive
given EEOC’s mission.77 “Merely because the testimony is adverse to the opposing
party does not mean it is unfairly prejudicial.” EEOC v. Manville Sales Corp., 27 F.3d
1089, 1094 (5th Cir. 1994) (quotation omitted). Moreover, the possibility that a juror

may find EEOC employees especially persuasive applies with equal force to both
sides’ witnesses. And, to be clear, this case does not involve any formal determination
by EEOC that discrimination occurred. To the contrary, the parties seek to present
competing testimony from EEOC employees in their individual coworker capacities.
Compare with Guerra v. N. E. Indep. Sch. Dist., 496 F.3d 415, 419 (5th Cir. 2007)
(“Second, the EEOC evidence spoke directly to the ultimate issue in the case. It would

likely have prejudiced the jury since the EEOC made its own factual determination
that age discrimination occurred.”). Finally, the record reflects that these three
witnesses have different perspectives from that of Malcom Medley, who served as the
NOFO Field Director before Kirkland’s selection, such that their testimony will not
be improperly duplicative of his testimony. United States v. Fields, 483 F.3d 313, 356
(5th Cir. 2007) (“Rule 403 does not ban per se all duplicative evidence. It is not
required that each piece of evidence admitted have an entirely unique theory of

relevancy.”).

77 R. Doc. 47-1 at 5.
III. Whether to admit evidence of Irvin’s prior selections of male
applicants over female applicants requires a case-by-case analysis.

EEOC seeks to exclude evidence of other times when Irvin selected a male
applicant over a female applicant.78 EEOC challenges the relevance of this evidence
because Kandan has not brought a pattern-and-practice or hostile-work-environment
claim.79 Whether Irvin previously chose male candidates over female candidates is
relevant, however, to Kandan’s contention that Irvin’s decision to select Kirkland
rather than Kandan is discriminatory. See Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator Co., 513 F.3d
1261, 1286 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[Plaintiff] and coworkers Jemison and Thomas were
discriminated against by the same supervisor, Farley, so the experiences of Jemison
and Thomas are probative of Farley's intent to discriminate.”).
The Fifth Circuit has held that “other-acts evidence may be relevant and
admissible in a discrimination case to prove an employer’s intent or pretext.”

Ferguson v. Extraco Mortg. Co., 264 F. App’x 351, 352 (5th Cir. 2007). A history of
hiring or promoting males over females may be probative of intent, plan, motive,
knowledge, and absence of mistake or accident. Alaniz v. Zamora-Quezada, 591 F.3d
761, 774–75 (5th Cir. 2009) (concluding that a district court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting evidence that a box had a “particular modus operandi in
making sexual overtures to female subordinates”); Hitt v. Connell, 301 F.3d 240, 249–
50 (5th Cir. 2002). Similarly, “behavior toward or comments directed at other

employees in the protected group” is one type of circumstantial evidence that can

78 R. Doc. 47-1 at 6.
79 Id. at 7.
support an inference of discrimination. Hasan v. Foley & Lardner LLP, 552 F.3d 520,
529 (7th Cir. 2008) as corrected (Jan. 21, 2009). Finally, evidence that Irvin
“discriminated against women in the past could help undermine” the evidence that

his decision was the product of a neutral and fair interview-panel process. See Vance
v. Union Planters Corp., 209 F.3d 438, 445 (5th Cir. 2000). Thus, this evidence is
relevant under Fifth Circuit law.
In the alternative, EEOC argues that this evidence is inadmissible under Rule
403. EEOC relies primarily on Wyvill v. United Companies Life Ins. Co., 212 F.3d 296
(5th Cir. 2000). In Wyvill, the Fifth Circuit set forth certain criteria relative to

determining whether evidence of discrimination against other employees is
admissible in a pattern-or-practice case. Wyvill, instructs:
This court and others have held that testimony from former employees
who had different supervisors than the plaintiff, who worked in different
parts of the employer's company, or whose terminations were removed
in time from the plaintiff's termination cannot be probative of whether
age was a determinative factor in the plaintiff's discharge.

212 F.3d at 302 (citation omitted). As EEOC recognizes, however, Kandan’s case does
not involve a pattern-or-practice claim. And, in any event, Wyvill’s framework
supports the admission of most of the other-acts evidence at issue in EEOC’s motion.
In contrast to the evidence held inadmissible in Wyvill, the selection decisions at issue
in this case were made by the same supervisor (Irvin), the employees worked within
the Houston or New Orleans offices (which interface with one another), and the
selection decisions were close in time to Kirkland’s selection over Kandan. Further,
“the key question is not whether” Kandan and the nonparties against whom Irvin
allegedly discriminated are similar “in every way,” but whether those other instances
of discrimination are relevant “in the context of the facts and arguments” in this case.
See Dindinger v. Allsteel, Inc., 853 F.3d 414, 425 (8th Cir. 2017) (quotation omitted).

In Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379, 388 (2008), the
Supreme Court set forth a framework for assessing the admissibility of other-acts
evidence.80 In that case, the “District Court excluded testimony by nonparties
alleging discrimination at the hands of supervisors of the defendant company who
played no role in the adverse employment decision challenged by the plaintiff.” Id. at
380. In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court held that it is reversible error to

impose a per se bar on evidence of discrimination by other supervisors (i.e., not the
supervisor who prompted a plaintiff’s claim). Id. at 388. Justice Thomas explained,
“The question whether evidence of discrimination by other supervisors is relevant in
an individual ADEA case is fact based and depends on many factors, including how
closely related the evidence is to the plaintiff's circumstances and theory of the case.”
Id. Given that the Supreme Court has rejected a per se bar under these
circumstances, there can be no question that it would be reversible error to impose

such a bar in a case like this one where the other-acts evidence implicates the same
supervisor.

80 This framework addresses a “very different kind of evidence” than that used to
show differential treatmen t as part of a prima facie case. See Sprint/United, 552 U.S.
at 386. Here, rather than showing that Irvin treated her differently than someone
not in her protected class, Kandan is attempting to show that Irvin discriminated
against other members of Kandan’s protected class. See id.; see also Cox v. Kansas
City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., 473 S.W.3d 107, 122–23 (Mo. 2015).
To determine the relevance of nonparty discrimination evidence under
Mendehlsohn, courts consider factors including the identities of the nonparties, the
nature and substance of the alleged discrimination, and its temporal proximity to the

challenged decision. See Griffin v. Finkbeiner, 689 F.3d 584, 595 (6th Cir. 2012)
(internal citation omitted). Thus, where other-acts evidence involves “the same place,
the same time, [and] the same decision makers,” it is more likely to be admissible. See
Bennett v. Nucor Corp., 656 F.3d 802, 812 (8th Cir. 2011). “[W]hether the witness and
the plaintiff were treated in a similar manner, and whether the witness and the
plaintiff were otherwise similarly situated” are also relevant considerations. Elion v.

Jackson, 544 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2008).
The Court is cognizant of EEOC’s concern that allowing other-acts evidence of
alleged discrimination by Irvin will result in mini-trials.81 While this concern “is
legitimate,” acting on it in every case “would tend to exclude any ‘other acts’ evidence,
regardless of how closely related it is to the plaintiff's circumstances.” Griffin, 689
F.3d at 600. The Supreme Court’s decision in Mendelsohn prohibits this approach.
The Court will address evidence of other discrimination on an incident-by-incident

basis.
The earliest prior incident on which Kandan relies is Irvin’s decision in 2019
not to allow Ortiz Prather to apply for the GS-15 Deputy Director position in
Houston.82 According to Ortiz Prather, Irvin told her that she was not qualified for

81 See id. at 8.
82 R. Doc. 47-4 at 3.
that position and (later similarly stated to Ortiz Prather that Kandan was “barely”
qualified for her own position).83 Instead, Irvin selected a male candidate, Travis
Nicholson.84 Both the 2019 incident and the 2023 events underlying this lawsuit

involve the same decisionmaker (Irvin) selecting a candidate for whom he would be a
supervisor. Both incidents also involve Irvin’s assessment that a female candidate
was less qualified for the position than a male candidate. And both incidents appear
to involve a situation in which the female candidate had significantly more years of
agency experience than the male candidate. The factual parallels between the alleged
discriminatory incidents militates against the moderate temporal gap.

Beyond involving an alleged discriminatory selection, an additional strand of
facts links the 2019 selection to Kandan’s case. Nicholson was a member of Kandan’s
interview panel and had exchanged previous communications with Irvin relative to
Kandan’s readiness (or lack thereof) to serve as an acting or permanent Field
Director.85 Nicholson had known Kirkland for about 30 years and been stationed with
him in the military.86 Ortiz Prather believes that Nicholson may have provided
Kirkland with the panel interview questions or other information that would have

compromised the neutrality of the process.87 The current record supports allowing
evidence of Irvin’s decisions in 2019 relative to the selection of Nicholson as Deputy
Director.

83 Id. at 2.
84 R. Doc. 35-8, ¶¶ 2, 7.
85 Id., ¶¶ 3, 8.
86 R. Doc. 44-1 at 4.
87 R. Doc. 55-3 at 22–25.
The next incident at issue is Irvin’s decision to hire Kirkland rather than
Mitchem as a Supervisory Investigator in 2021.88 In doing so, Irvin hired a male
candidate over a female candidate with greater agency experience.89 In addition,

Mitchem’s experience in the military appears to have been more extensive (or at a
higher level) than Kirkland’s.90 This is relevant to addressing Irvin’s potential
reliance on military experience as a factor in promoting Kirkland rather than
Kandan. Finally, the selected candidate (Kirkland) is the same candidate selected
over Kandan in this case. Kandan’s narrative that Irvin groomed and promoted
Kirkland on a discriminatory basis renders further relevance to the 2021 decision.

The final incident discussed in detail in the briefing is Irvin’s selection of a
male candidate for Deputy Director of the Houston District in 2023 over Ortiz
Prather.91 Here, Ortiz Prather was subject to the panel interview process while on
pre-approved and long-planned leave.92 This may be analogous to the process that
Kandan underwent. Moreover, the decision was made close in time to Irvin’s decision
to hire Kirkland as Field Director. Thus, evidence relative to this incident also
survives the Rule 403 balancing test on this record. EEOC’s motion in limine is denied

as to Irvin’s 2019, 2021, and 2023 selection decisions as set forth above.
The record, including the briefing, contains passing references to other alleged
instances of discriminatory selections by Irvin, including before his transfer to

88 R. Docs. 47-1 at 6, 35-3 at 2.
89 R. Docs. 55-1 at 5, 35-2 a t 1, 36.
90 R. Doc. 55-1 at 6.
91 R. Docs. 47-4 at 3–4, 47-1 at 7.
92 R. Doc. 55-3 at 14.
Houston. The record does not contain sufficient information, however, to undertake
the requisite individualized assessment of these other incidents. Thus, EEOC’s
motion in limine is granted as to alleged discriminatory selection decisions that are
not analyzed above.
Much of the above analysis is based on the evidence and argument submitted
in connection with the briefing, rather than the evidence that will be developed at
trial. This ruling is provisional and may be revisited depending on the evidence
developed at trial. See Adams v. Mem'l Hermann, 9738 F.3d 348, 351 (5th Cir. 2020)
(“Evidence thus has force beyond any linear scheme of reasoning, and as its pieces
come together a narrative gains momentum ....”) (quoting Old Chief v. United States,
519 U.S. 172, 187 (1997)).
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that EEOC’s Motion in Limine (R. Doc. 47) is GRANTED
IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Kandan may introduce evidence of Irvin’s 2019,
2021, and 2023 selection decisions but is precluded from introducing evidence of any
other allegedly discriminatory selection decisions.
New Orleans, Louisiana, September 26, 2025.

EVA J. DOSSIER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

19

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11145351. Public record. Not legal advice.