# Ray v. Hamm

> District Court, N.D. Alabama · September 26, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11145323

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Alabama
- **Decided:** September 26, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
MIDDLE DIVISION

MELVIN RAY,
Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 4:24-cv-977-CLM

JOHN HAMM, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Inmate Melvin Ray sues 14 employees of the Alabama Department
of Corrections (“DOC”): Commissioner John Hamm; Classification
Director Angie Baggett: Wardens Phillip Mitchell, Christopher Webster,
and Darrel Fox; Correctional Lieutenants Monika Gadson, Roderick
Gadson, Derrick Dent, and Brandon Burns; Correctional Sergeants Keller
Speaks, Antonia Barnes, and JaJuan Howard; and Correctional Officers
Randall Billingsley and Cholleé Jackson. Defendants ask the court to
dismiss all counts. For the reasons explained below, the court GRANTS
IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendants’ motion (doc. 22).
BACKGROUND
Because Ray is defending against a motion to dismiss, the court
takes his pleaded facts as true. Crowder v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 963 F.3d
1197, 1202 (11th Cir. 2020)
A. Advocacy
Ray is in state custody. Ray describes himself as a nonviolent
advocate for inmates’ rights. Ray and fellow inmate Robert Council co-
founded the Free Alabama Movement (“FAM”), an organization dedicated
to protesting civil and human rights violations committed by or within
DOC. Ray claims his participation in FAM makes him a target for
inhumane and cruel treatment by DOC employees.
1
Until his recent transfer to Limestone, Ray was housed at St. Clair
Correctional Facility in Springville, Alabama. Beginning in February
2024, the Tennessee Student Solidarity Network (“TSSN”), an activist
group focusing on the civil rights of prisoners, started regularly protesting
outside of St. Clair in support of FAM and Ray.
B. Restrictive Housing
Ray claims that several Defendant abused him in retaliation for the
TSSN protests. Ray provides these examples.
• March 30, 2024
TSSN protested an Alabama prison construction site in mid-March
2024. A week later, Billingsley and Russell approached Ray as he was
praying in the “Spiritual Grounds” area outside of his H-Dorm cell in St.
Clair. Billingsley and Russell searched Ray and his immediate
surrounding area. Finding no contraband on his person, they detained
Ray while Monika Gadson, Speaks, and Barnes searched his living area.
According to Ray, Gadson, Speaks, and Barnes broke his
headphones, desecrated his religious items, and destroyed his property.
The search of Ray’s cell led to the discovery of a cell phone, which led to a
strip-search of Ray by Billingsley and Barnes. Ray claims Billingsley
planted the phone in his cell. Russell and Speaks subsequently detained
a handcuffed Ray in a restricted housing unit (“the RHU cage”) for nearly
five hours.
Ray claims that “[p]lacement in the RHU cage [] restricts a
prisoner’s movement even more so than solitary confinement and deprives
a prisoner of any privacy and or ability to use his personal property and
is typically used to punish prisoners.” (Id., ¶ 52). The housing unit had no
bathroom or running water. After Ray was cleared to leave the RHU cage,
Seals advised him against filing a grievance.
• April 1, 2024
Two days later, Roderick Gadson and Howard told Ray about an
2
ongoing DOC Law Enforcement Services Divisions (“LESD”) investigation
on Ray that resulted in “lock-up orders.” In response to Ray asking why
LESD was investigating him, R. Gadson responded “I don’t know . . . Just
cuff up.” (Doc. 21, ¶42). R. Gadson and Howard placed Ray in the RHU
cage for several hours before moving him to solitary confinement. Ray
remained in solitary confinement from April 1, 2024 until April 28, 2024.
Ray describes his solitary confinement cell as filthy and lacking
running water and lighting. While in solitary, Ray was only permitted one
shower per week and was denied access to basic cleaning supplies,
exercise, and his pre-approved vegetarian meals. According to Ray, he
carried out his solitary confinement in a racially segregated housing unit.
On April 17, 2024, Ray’s attorneys sent a cease-and-desist letter to St.
Clair citing DOC’s own 72-hour limit on holding prisoners in solitary
confinement without pending disciplinary charges. The letter, addressed
to St. Clair’s Wardens, also pointed out that inmates caught with
contraband are not usually subject to solitary confinement. Ray doesn’t
include the date St. Clair received the letter.
• April 13, 2024, April 20, 2024, and May 2–3, 2024
While Ray was in solitary confinement on April 13, 2024, TSSN held
another protest at St. Clair. Dent, Fester, Allan, and Russell moved Ray
from solitary to the RHU cage when the protest started where he
remained handcuffed until the protest ended. The same thing happened
on April 20, 2024: solitary confinement, TSSN protest starts, RHU cage,
TSSN protest ends, back to solitary confinement.
Ray experienced similar treatment on May 2, 2024 and May 3, 2024.
On May 2, 2024, Monika Gadson and Webster took Ray from his cell and
seated him in a chair in “the breezeway” during a TSSN protest. And on
May 3, 2024, Burns strip-searched Ray during a TSSN protest. “Several
officers” then took and destroyed Ray’s (non-contraband) property. (Id.,
¶59).

3
C. Disciplinary Hearing
Ray received a disciplinary citation on April 3, 2024, for possessing
the cellphone Billingsley found in Ray’s cell. As evidence of possession,
several St. Clair officers claimed Ray was alone in the location Billingsley
found the phone, allegedly proving the phone must have belonged to Ray.
In response, Ray listed three people (Leon Bond, Ricky Rankin, and
Edmond Brown) that were praying with him in the Spiritual Grounds on
April 30, 2024. Ray claims that Monika Gadson and Jackson threatened
his named witnesses to steer clear of Ray’s disciplinary proceedings.
Ray’s disciplinary hearing was held on April 17, 2024, with Jackson
serving as the disciplinary hearing officer. At the hearing, Jackson
allegedly stated that Ray’s witnesses couldn’t be called because “Ray had
failed to provide the complete first and last name of each witness and
therefore correctional officers could not locate the three witnesses.” (Id., ¶
65). Ray, of course, disputes Jackson’s characterization and asserts he was
denied the opportunity to present any witnesses or question any officer
who testified against him. Ray also claims Monika Gadson lied during the
hearing and that Jackson found him guilty of contraband possession as
pretext for his continued housing in solitary confinement.
D. Transfer
Ray was transferred without request from St. Clair to Limestone on
May 30, 2024. According to Ray, he was transferred to quell the weekly
TSSN protests at St. Clair. At the same time Ray moved from St. Clair to
Limestone, ADOC transferred FAM co-founder Robert Council from
Limestone to St. Clair. Though Ray and Council have been friends for
years, ADOC insists on labeling them “enemies,” thus prohibiting the two
men from being housed in the same facility.

4
E. Lawsuit
In his complaint, Ray pleads these nine claims:
Requested
Count Who What Why
Relief
In their official capacities,
Injunction
Hamm and Baggett retaliated
ordering transfer
First against Ray’s speech by
Hamm, back to St. Clair
I Amendment transferring him to Limestone
Baggett and removal of
Retaliation and designating him as an
enemy
enemy of Robert Council.
designation

Mitchell violated Ray’s First
Amendment rights by, in his
Injunctive relief to
official capacity, subjecting Ray
First prevent continued
to a pattern or practice of abuse
II Mitchell Amendment retaliation upon
(e.g., solitary confinement,
Retaliation transfer back to
placement in the cage,
St. Clair
unwarranted searches, and so
on).
Injunctive relief
Mitchell, in his official capacity,
against use of the
Eighth violated the Eighth Amendment
RHU cage as
III Mitchell Amendment by unjustly punishing Ray
punishment when
Violation through handcuffing and
Ray returns to St.
placing him in the RHU cage.
Clair
Mitchell, in his official capacity, Injunctive relief
violated Ray’s Due Process against use of the
Fourteenth
rights by (unjustly and without RHU cage as
IV Mitchell Amendment,
process) holding him in the RHU punishment when
Violation
cage to offend Ray’s bodily Ray returns to St.
autonomy. Clair
Webster,
Ray experienced retaliation for
Fox,
his support of FAM and the
Mitchell,
TSSN protest from Defendants
M. Gadson,
in their individual capacities by
Dent,
First (1) placement in RHU cage, (2)
Burns,
V Amendment harassing searches and property Damages
Speaks,
Retaliation destruction, (3) solitary
Barnes,
confinement without due
R. Gadson,
process, and (4) unsanitary
Howard,
conditions within solitary
Billingsley,
confinement.
Jackson
5
Webster,
Fox,
Defendants in their individual
Mitchell,
capacities violated the Eighth
M. Gadson, Eighth
Amendment by unjustly
VI Dent, Amendment Damages
punishing Ray through
Speaks, Violation
handcuffing and placing him in
Barnes,
the RHU cage.
R. Gadson,
Howard
Without a meaningful
opportunity to contest
Billingsley, Fourteenth
detainment, Defendants kept
VII M. Gadson, Amendment, Damages
Ray in solitary confinement and
Jackson Violation
lied during his disciplinary
hearing.
Webster,
Fox,
Mitchell,
Defendants violated Alabama
M. Gadson,
law through the extreme and
VIII Dent, IIED Damages
outrageous repeated use of the
Speaks,
RHU cage.
Barnes,
R. Gadson,
Howard
M. Gadson,
Speak, Defendants violated Alabama
IX Barnes, Conversion law by maliciously destroying Damages
Dent, Ray’s property.
Burns
Defendants ask the court to dismiss all claims.
STANDARD
Because this is a Rule 12 motion, the court accepts the allegations
in Ray’s complaint as true and construes them in the light most favorable
to Ray. Lanfear v. Home Depot, Inc., 697 F.3d 1267, 1275 (11th Cir. 2012).
The ultimate question is whether all of Ray’s allegations, when accepted
as true, “plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). If the facts as pleaded could entitle Ray to
relief, then the court must deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss. If,
however, the court accepts all of Ray’s pleaded facts as true, and Ray still
would not be entitled to relief, then the court must grant the motion.
6
DISCUSSION
Before it can reach the merits, the court must deal with two
ancillary issues: fictitious party pleading and Ray’s requested relief. The
first is easily dispatched: Fictitious party practice is generally not allowed
in federal court, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a); Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d
734, 738 (11th Cir. 2010), so the court dismisses all claims against the two
fictitious Defendants, “LESD Agent John Doe 1” and “Desk Clerk Jane
Doe 2.” (Doc. 21, pp. 1, 20, 24, 29). The relief-related issues, however,
warrant their own discussion section.
A.

Relief-related Issues

1. Needs-Narrowness-Intrusiveness Test (Counts I-IV)
In his prayer for relief, Ray asks the court to:
• Order Defendants to transfer him back to St. Clair;
• Order Defendants not to designate Ray and Council as
enemies;
• Order Defendants not place Ray in solitary confinement
when protestors are outside his facility;
• Order Defendants not to search Ray’s body or possessions
when protestors are outside his facility;
• Order Defendants not to desecrate Ray’s religious
materials when protestors are outside his facility; and,
• Order Defendants not to file disciplinary charges against
Ray without due process when protestors are outside his
facility.
(Doc. 21, p. 35). Defendants argue that the court must dismiss Counts I-
IV because these requests violate the needs-narrowness-intrusiveness
test of the Prison Litigation Reform Act. (Doc. 23, p. 10).
7
While Defendants may ultimately be right about the PLRA, the
court cannot dismiss Counts I-IV on this ground (at least not yet). Rule 8
doesn’t require Ray to plausibly allege a form of relief; it only requires Ray
to plausibly allege facts that could state a claim for relief. As the Eleventh
Circuit recently explained,
[r]equesting an improper remedy is not fatal to a claim. A
complaint is sufficient if it alleges facts that establish that
the plaintiff is entitled to any relief that the court can grant.
That a plaintiff might misconceive his remedy does not
warrant dismissal of the complaint unless he is entitled to
no relief under any state of facts. . . . Although these
precedents pre-date Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, that
decision did not disturb the rule that requesting an improper
remedy is not fatal to a claim. Twombly replaced the “no set
of facts” standard with the requirement that complaints
must state “plausible” claims. But Twombly did not change
the rule that a district court must consider whether a
complaint that seeks an improper remedy might warrant
another form of relief.
A.W. by and Through J.W. v. Coweta County Sch. District, 110 F.4th 1309,
1315 (11th Cir. 2024) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Here,
Ray requests damages in addition to injunctive relief, (doc. 21, p. 35–36),
and there will be plenty of time for remedy arguments if this case
proceeds. So for now, the court does not find that the needs-narrowness-
intrusiveness test warrants dismissal of any count.
2. Injunctive Relief Claims Against Mitchell (Counts II-IV)
Ray’s requested relief, however, does warrant dismissal of his
claims against Mitchell (i.e., Counts II-IV). In each of these counts, Ray
sues Mitchell only in his official capacity as St. Clair’s warden. See (doc.
21, ¶¶ 89, 104, 109).

8
In Count I, Ray alleges that he was wrongly moved from St. Clair
to Limestone and asks the court to order he be sent back to St. Clair.
Counts II-IV assume Ray’s success on Count I, meaning that Ray’s claims
depend on him being sent back to St. Clair. Specifically, Ray asks the court
to order Mitchell, in his official capacity as St. Clair’s warden, to ensure
that Ray doesn’t suffer further retaliation after his return to St. Clair.
(Doc. 21, p. 16–20).
Defendants argue Counts II–IV are moot because Ray is not housed
at St. Clair. (Doc. 23, p. 13–14). The court agrees. As pleaded, Ray is not
an inmate at St. Clair and there’s no imminent plan for him to return to
St. Clair absent a court order. Even if Ray does return to St. Clair, there
is no guarantee Mitchell will still be warden or that retaliation is a
continued risk. Accordingly, Counts II–IV do not present a live
controversy over which the court has jurisdiction. See Soliman v. U.S. ex
rel. INS., 296 F.3d 1237, 1242 (11th Cir. 2002). And for the same reasons,
the “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception to mootness
doesn’t apply. Id. (“[T]he exception can be invoked only when [] there [is]
a reasonable expectation or a demonstrated probability that
the same controversy will recur involving the same complaining party
. . .”). The court will therefore dismiss Counts II–IV for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.
B.
Federal claims
That leaves the court with Counts I and V-IX. The court starts with
Ray’s federal claims to determine whether Ray pleads any claims that
invoke the court’s original jurisdiction. And within those claims, the court
starts with Ray’s claim that seeks prospective injunctive relief because
qualified immunity does not apply.
Count I: First Amendment Retaliation (injunctive relief)
1. Allegation: In his first count, Ray pleads that certain Defendants
transferred him from St. Clair to Limestone in retaliation for Ray
9
exercising his First Amendment rights. Among other things, Ray alleges
that he and Council co-founded FAM to challenge inmates’ conditions of
confinement. To chill their speech, Ray alleges that Defendants wrongly
tagged him and Council as “enemies” so that they would have to be housed
in different facilities, thus requiring Ray be transferred out of St. Clair
when Council transferred in on the same day. As relief, Ray asks the court
order Hamm and Baggett remove the “enemy” label and transfer Ray back
to St. Clair.
2. Analysis: The court finds that Ray sufficiently pleads a retaliation
claim. “To state a §1983 First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff
generally must show: (1) []he engaged in constitutionally protected
speech, []; (2) the defendant’s retaliatory conduct adversely affected that
protected speech and right to petition; and (3) a causal connection exists
between the defendant's retaliatory conduct and the adverse effect on the
plaintiff's speech and right to petition.” DeMartini v. Town of Gulf Strean,
942 F.3d 1277, 1289 (11th Cir. 2019). If he proves his alleged facts, Ray
could show that (a) he and Council engaged in constitutionally protected
speech and association (b) Defendants’ acts that separated the two men
would likely deter others from exercising their First Amendment rights,
and (c) Defendants took those actions because Ray was exercising his
rights. See Turner v. Williams, 65 F.4th 564, 580 (11th Cir. 2023) (“A
plaintiff suffers adverse action if the defendant’s allegedly retaliatory
conduct would likely deter a person of ordinary firmness from the exercise
of First Amendment rights.”). So the court denies Defendants’ motion to
dismiss Count I.
Count V: First Amendment Retaliation (money damages)
In Count V, Ray alleges multiple acts of retaliation on different days
involving different defendants. So the court breaks down the allegations
by event type and date to determine whether any result in a viable claim.

10
1. Holding Cage allegations
1. Sufficiently pleaded: According to Ray, St. Clair’s restricted
housing unit (RHU) walk yard has a holding cell that Ray describes as a
“small, metal, confined cage with no running water or bathroom.” (Doc.
21, ¶ 39). Ray alleges that some combination of Defendants placed him in
an RHU cage or otherwise mistreated him during and/or in retaliation for
TSSN protests outside St. Clair on these dates:
• March 30, 2024: Ray alleges that when TSSN
protestors arrived at about 12:15pm, five Defendants
(Monika Gadson, Speaks, Barnes, Billingsley, and
Russell) locked him in an RHU cage for five hours.
These defendants released Ray from the cage as soon
as the protest ended.
• April 13, 2024: Ray alleges that when TSSN protestors
arrived at about 12:15pm, four Defendants (Dent,
Hester, Allen, and Russell) took him from his cell and
locked him in an RHU cage for three hours. These
defendants released Ray from the cage as soon as the
protest ended.
• April 20, 2024: Ray alleges that when TSSN protestors
arrived at about 12:00pm, multiple unnamed officers
took him from his cell and locked him in an RHU cage
for one hour. These defendants released Ray from the
cage as soon as the protest ended.
• May 3, 2024: Ray alleges that immediately after a
TSSN protest ended, 8 to 10 officers removed him from
his cell, destroyed his property, and strip searched
him. Ray does not allege he was put in an RHU cage.
The court finds that Ray sufficiently pleads a retaliation claim for each of
these incidents.
11
Assuming Ray’s facts are true, and reading them in a light most
favorable to Ray, Ray could show that (a) Ray and TSSN were associated
for protected expressive purposes, (b) Defendants’ use of the RHU cage
and/or destruction of property would dissuade others from associating to
express similar ideas or grievances, and (c) Defendants took these acts
because of Ray’s association with TSSN and TSSN’s expression of ideas
and grievances. Whether Ray can ultimately prove facts that satisfy these
elements is a question for another day. See, e.g., Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees,
486 U.S. 609, 622-23 (1984) (“According protection to collective effort on
behalf of shared goals is especially important in preserving political and
cultural diversity and in shielding dissident expression from suppression
by the majority. Consequently, we have long understood as implicit in the
right to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment a
corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety
of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends. . . .
The right to associate for expressive purposes is not, however, absolute.
Infringements on that right may be justified by regulations adopted to
serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas,
that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of
associational freedoms.”) (citations omitted).
2. Deficient pleading: Some of Ray’s other fact allegations, however,
do not lead to viable claims. The court finds that Ray’s allegation that
Roderick Gadson and Howard placed him in an RHU cage on April 1, 2024
(¶ 55) does not—by itself—plead a viable claim because Ray fails to plead
any facts linking that placement to TSSN or any other protected activity.
The court also finds that Ray’s allegation that Monika Gadson and
Webster moved him to a chair in the breezeway on May 2, 2024 (¶ 58) does
not plead a viable claim because the threat of being moved from a cell to
a breezeway chair would not dissuade others from engaging in protected
activity.
3. Qualified immunity: Because Ray seeks money damages, finding
that Ray pleaded a viable claim(s) does not end the analysis. Qualified
immunity protects government officials from being sued in their
12
individual capacities so long as “their conduct ‘does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.’” Vineyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1346 (11th Cir.
2002) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). “Once the
defendant establishes that he was acting within his discretionary
authority, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that qualified
immunity is not appropriate. [] To overcome a qualified immunity defense,
the plaintiff must make two showings. First, the plaintiff must establish
that the defendant violated a constitutional right. Second, the plaintiff
must show that the violation was clearly established.” Foulke v. Weller,
2024 WL 2761778, at *5 (May 29, 2024, 11th Cir.).
Each act Ray complains about (e.g., placement in an RHU cage, cell
searches) falls within Defendants’ discretionary authority as prison
officials. So Ray has the burden to plead facts that would show (1) a
constitutional violation and (2) the violative act violated Ray’s clearly
established rights. The court has found that Ray pleads facts that would
show a constitutional violation. The court now finds that when
Defendants allegedly began retaliating against Ray in March 2024, it was
clearly established that prison officials cannot retaliate against an inmate
because that inmate, or a person or group with whom the inmate is
associated for expressive purposes, complained about prison conditions.
“The First Amendment forbids prison officials from retaliating
against prisoners for exercising the right of free speech.” Farrow v. W.,
320 F.3d 1235, 1248 (11th Cir. 2003). Freedom of association is similarly
protected under the First Amendment. Roberts, 467 U.S. at 618 (“The
Court has recognized a right to associate for the purpose of engaging in
those activities protected by the First Amendment—speech, assembly,
petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion.”). “It is
an established principle of constitutional law that an inmate is considered
to be exercising his First Amendment right of freedom of speech when
he complains to the prison’s administrators about the conditions of
his confinement. It is also established that an inmate may maintain a
cause of action against prison administrators who retaliate against him
for making such complaints.” Smith, 532 F.3d at 1276.
13
If Ray can prove that prison officials locked him in a cage for hours
and/or destroyed his personal belongings because a political action group
was outside chanting protests against prison conditions and in favor of
Ray personally, see (doc. 21, ¶¶ 26-29), then Ray could show that
Defendants violated a clearly established right. The court recognizes that
“freedom of association is among the rights least compatible with
incarceration.” See Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131 (2003). But
accepting Ray’s pleaded facts as true, Defendants’ actions bear no
“rational relation to legitimate penological interests.” See id. at 132.
Defendants instead took adverse action against Ray solely because a
group he was associated with was protesting prison conditions just outside
St. Clair’s walls. So the court denies qualified immunity to Monika
Gadson, Speaks, Barnes, Billingsley, Dent, Hester, Allen, and Russell at
this time.
4. Supervisory Liability: Finally, the court must decide whether
Ray pleads facts that would attach supervisory liability to Wardens
Webster and Fox. “Supervisor liability under §1983 occurs either when
the supervisor personally participates in the alleged constitutional
violation or when there is a causal connection between actions of the
supervising official and the alleged constitutional deprivation. The causal
connection can be established when a history of widespread abuse puts
the responsible supervisor on notice of the need to correct the alleged
deprivation, and he fails to do so.” Braddy v. Florida Dept. of Labor and
Employment Sec., 133 F.3d 797, 802 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting Brown v.
Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 671 (11th Cir. 1990)).
The court finds that Ray has not plausibly alleged facts that show
Fox personally participated in a constitutional violation or sanctioned the
allegedly unlawful acts of his subordinates. Nor has Ray articulated the
existence of a widespread pattern and history of abuse within St. Clair
that would put Fox on notice. (Doc. 23, p. 24–26). All Ray claims is that
the Fox “must have known” of Ray’s abuse, which is insufficient to meet
the pleading standard. (Doc, 21, ¶124). So Ray has failed to state any
supervisory liability claim against Fox.

14
The court reaches the same result for Webster but for a different
reason. Ray pleads that on May 2, 2024, Webster personally participated
in the moving of Ray from his cell to “sit in a chair in the breezeway for
multiple hours” while TSSN protested outside. (Doc. 21, ¶58). As stated,
the court finds that having Ray sit in a chair rather than in his cell is not
an adverse action because knowledge of this act would not dissuade
another inmate from associating with FAM or TSSN or speaking out
against prison conditions.
2. Searches with property destruction
According to Ray, certain Defendants also performed unreasonable
searches and destroyed his personal property during and/or in retaliation
for TSSN protests outside St. Clair on these dates:
• March 30, 2024: Monika Gadson led a search of Ray’s
personal items that resulted in the desecration of his
religious items, the destruction of his headphones, and
the strewing of his other property on the ground. Speaks
and Barnes also participated.
• April 13, 2024: Dent led a search that resulted in the
desecration of other religious artifacts.
• May 3, 2024: Burns led a strip search that included the
destruction and taking of Ray’s personal goods, religious
items, and state-issued tablet.
As explained, each of these searches occurred during or just after a TSSN
protest. So the court finds that Ray pleads a viable retaliation claim for
these incidents for the same reason the court found Ray’s ‘RHU cage’
claims were viable—i.e., Ray could prove that Defendants took an adverse
action against Ray because of his protected association with TSSN, who
was engaged in protected speech.
The court similarly finds that neither Monika Gadson, Dent, nor
Burns is entitled to qualified immunity for the reasons explained in the
court’s RHU cage analysis. While each Defendant was acting in his or her
15
official capacity, each alleged act (if proved) would violate a constitutional
right that was clearly established at the time.
3. Solitary confinement with harsh conditions
According to Ray, multiple Defendants conspired to place and keep
him in solitary confinement cell C35 from April 1, 2024 through April 28,
2024 in retaliation for the TSSN protests:
• On April 1, an unnamed LESD agent ordered Ray into solitary
confinement;
• Within solitary confinement, Monika Gadson and Howard put
Ray in cell C35 because they knew it was flooded, covered in filth,
and lacked light and running water;
• Billingsley, Gadson, and Jackson fabricated a disciplinary
charge to make sure Ray stayed in solitary confinement, then at
the disciplinary hearing:
o Billingsley lied about finding a contraband cell phone;
o Gadson blocked Ray from calling witnesses; and,
o Jackson, as presiding officer, found Ray liable without
hearing from Ray’s witnesses; and,
• After ensuring Ray’s loss at the hearing, Gadson and Howard
failed to move Ray from cell C35 or provide Ray with cleaning
supplies to make C35 more livable.
(Doc. 21, ¶¶ 139-48). Assuming these facts are true and that Ray can tie
them to the TSSN protests as he claims, the court finds that Ray pleads a
viable retaliation claim for the same reason the court found Ray’s RHU
cage and property destruction claims were viable—i.e., Ray could prove
that Defendants took an adverse action against Ray because of his
16
protected association with TSSN, who was engaged in protected speech.1
The court similarly finds that neither Billingsley, Monika Gadson,
nor Jackson is entitled to qualified immunity for the reasons explained in
the court’s RHU cage analysis. While each Defendant was acting in his or
her official capacity, each alleged act (if proved) would violate a
constitutional right that was clearly established at the time.
—
To sum up Count V, the court finds that Ray sufficiently pleaded a
retaliation claim(s) against Monika Gadson, Allen, Speaks, Barnes,
Burns, Billingsley, Dent, Hester, Jackson, and Russell. The court further
finds that none of these Defendants is entitled to qualified immunity at
this point. The court will dismiss, however, Ray’s retaliation claims
against Roderick Gadson, Fox, Webster, and Howard for failure to state a
claim that can entitle Ray to relief. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
Count VI: Cruel & Unusual Punishment (money damages)
As recounted in Count V part 1, Ray alleges that certain Defendants
put him in an RHU cage from one to five hours during or just after TSSN
protests. In Count VI, Ray alleges that each placement in the RHU cage
amounts to deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
“[A] prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when two
requirements are met. First, the deprivation alleged must be, objectively,
‘sufficiently serious,’ and . . . [second], the prison official must have a
‘sufficiently culpable state of mind.’” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
834 (1994) (internal citations omitted). Recently, the en banc Eleventh
Circuit expounded on this test. See Wade v. McDade, 106 F.4th 1251 (11th
Cir. 2024). Under Wade, to prevail on an Eight Amendment deliberate
indifference claim, the inmate must prove three things: (1) “that the

1 At some point, Ray will have to explain certain things, such as, if Ray’s placement in cell C35
was retaliatory punishment for TSSN’s protests, then why did Defendants remove Ray from C35
and place him in an RHU cage during TSSN’s April 13 protest, then return him to C35 when
TSSN left? But for now, Ray is allowed to plead alternative theories of adverse action.
17
official was subjectively aware that the inmate was at risk of serious
harm, (2) “the official disregarded that risk,” and (3) “the official acted
with more than some requisite level of negligence.” Id. at 1255. Wade dealt
with the third factor and resulted in a decision that the requisite level of
culpability is much higher than mere negligence:
a deliberate-indifference plaintiff must prove that the
defendant acted with ‘subjective recklessness as used in the
criminal law,’ and that in order to do so, the plaintiff must
show that the defendant was subjectively aware that his own
conduct put the plaintiff at substantial risk of serious
harm—with the caveat that, in any event, a defendant who
“respond[s] reasonably’ to a risk, even a known risk, ‘cannot
be found liable’ under the Eighth Amendment[.]
Id. (citations omitted).
Ray fails to plead any facts that would show he was at risk of serious
harm while inside the RHU cage, much less any facts that would prove
any Defendant knew that such a risk existed and acted with a subjective,
criminal-level recklessness when putting Ray in the RHU cage any way.
So Ray fails to state a claim that could entitle him to relief on Count VI.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Further, because Ray fails to plead that any
official violated his Eighth Amendment rights, Ray necessarily fails to
plead supervisory liability against any Defendant. See Mann v. Taser
Intern., Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1309 (11th Cir. 2009). So the court will
dismiss Count VI without prejudice.
Count VII: Procedural Due Process (money damages)
As recounted in Count V part 3, Ray alleges that Billingsley,
Jackson, Monika Gadson, and an unnamed LESD agent conspired to place
and keep Ray in an unsanitary solitary confinement cell (C35) for nearly
a month. In Count VII, Ray alleges these acts also violated his procedural
due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.

18
To ultimately prove this claim, Ray must prove three things: “(1) a
deprivation of a constitutionally-protected liberty or property interest; (2)
state action; and (3) constitutionally-inadequate process.” Grayden v.
Rhodes, 345 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir.2003) (citing Cryder v. Oxendine,
24 F.3d 175, 177 (11th Cir.1994)). “Lawful imprisonment necessarily
makes unavailable many rights and privileges of the ordinary citizen . . .
[But prisoners] may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555–56 (1974).
That said, the Fourteenth Amendment does not create property
interests. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). Property
interests are instead “defined by existing rules or understandings that
stem from an independent source such as state law.” Id. The Supreme
Court held that “[s]tates may under certain circumstances
create liberty interests which are protected by the Due Process Clause.
But these interests will be generally limited to freedom from restraint
which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as
to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force,
nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515
U.S. 472, 484–85 (1995). With that backdrop, the court assesses Ray’s two
theories of Fourteenth Amendment liability.
1. Solitary Confinement
Ray first complains about placement in a solitary confinement cell,
rather than general population. But Ray points to no Alabama statute,
ADOC policy, or precedent that creates a right to be housed in general
population. That said, the Supreme Court forged a second path for
inmates to find liberty interests in Sandin. “After Sandin, it is clear that
the touchstone of the inquiry into the existence of a protected, state-
created liberty interest in avoiding restrictive conditions of confinement
is not the language of regulations regarding those conditions but the
nature of those conditions themselves in relation to the ordinary incidents
of prison life.” Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 223 (2005). Ray could
thus plausibly state a liberty interest by showing that his time in cell C35
presented an “atypical, significant deprivation in which a State might
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conceivably create a liberty interest.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486.
In creating this “atypical deprivation” path, however, the Sandin
Court refused to find a state-created liberty interest against segregated
housing because the
record show[ed] that, at the time of Conner’s punishment,
disciplinary segregation, with insignificant exceptions,
mirrored those conditions imposed upon inmates in
administrative segregation and protective custody. . . . Thus,
Conner’s confinement did not exceed similar, but totally
discretionary, confinement in either duration or degree of
restriction. Indeed, the conditions at Halawa involve
significant amounts of ‘lockdown time’ even for inmates in
the general population. Based on a comparison between
inmates inside and outside disciplinary segregation, the
State’s actions in placing him there for 30 days did not work
a major disruption in his environment. Nor does Conner’s
situation present a case where the State’s action will
inevitably affect the duration of his sentence.”
Id. 486–87.
Ray’s pleaded facts largely mirror the facts the Sandin Court
rejected. While Ray alleges the C35 cell presented difficult (if not
abhorrent) conditions, he does not allege facts showing such conditions
were atypical, abnormal, or severe compared to the housing conditions of
general population or other solitary cells. Ray also doesn’t allege that the
reasons, frequency, or duration for which he stayed in the solitary
confinement unit were atypical of St. Clair’s normal practice. Nor does
Ray allege that his tenure in solitary confinement was for an indefinite
duration, impacted the length of his sentence, or affected any chance of
early release. And Ray pleads facts that would show other inmates were
housed in the same unit, meaning that his confinement was not wholly
“solitary.” See, e.g. (doc. 21, ¶¶ 46, 56). So the court finds that Ray fails to
plead facts that would establish that Ray had a protected interest in being
kept in general population, rather than the C35 solitary confinement cell.
20
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
2. Disciplinary Hearing
Ray next pleads that the disciplinary hearing that resulted in his
solitary confinement was a sham tainted by false testimony against him
and the preclusion of witnesses for him. While Ray may have pleaded facts
that would establish inadequate process, Ray still fails to plead a
protected liberty interest. According to Ray, the outcome of the
disciplinary hearing was continued time in solitary confinement. (Doc. 21,
¶¶ 69, 166). As explained, Ray has not plausibly alleged a liberty interest
in remaining in general population, rather than solitary confinement. So
even if Ray can prove his hearing was inadequate, he cannot prove that
inadequacy deprived him of a protected interest.
—
To sum up Count VII, Ray fails to plead facts that would establish
the loss of a protected interest. So Ray fails to plead a viable claim against
the participating officers (Monika Gadson, Jackson, and Billingsley) and
necessarily against their supervisors under a supervisory liability theory.
See Mann, 588 F.3d at 1309. So the court will dismiss Count VII without
prejudice.
C.
State-law claims
Because the court finds that Ray has pleaded at least one viable
claim under federal law, the court moves on to Ray’s state-law claims.
Count VIII: Intentional Infliction of Emotion Distress
Ray alleges certain Defendants intentionally caused him emotional
distress each time they put him in the RHU cage. Under Alabama law,
the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress and the tort of
outrage mean the same thing. Ex parte Lumbermen’s Underwriting
Alliance, 662 So. 2d 1133, 1134 (Ala. 1995). To state a claim under either,
Ray must prove a Defendant’s conduct: “(1) was intentional or reckless;
(2) was extreme and outrageous; and (3) caused emotional distress so
21
severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.”
Harrelson v. R.J., 882 So. 2d 317, 322 (Ala. 2003) (quoting Thomas v. BSE
Indus. Contractors, Inc., 624 So. 2d 1041, 1043 (Ala. 1993)).
Alabama courts mean it when they say “extreme” and “so severe;”
to state a claim, the alleged conduct must “go beyond all possible bounds
of decency” and must “be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in
a civilized society.” Id. at 322. As a result, the IIED tort is “extremely
limited,” and the Alabama Supreme Court has “recognized it in regard to
only three kinds of conduct: (1) wrongful conduct in the family-burial
context; (2) barbaric methods employed to coerce an insurance settlement;
and (3) egregious sexual harassment.” Potts v. Hayes, 771 So. 2d 462, 465
(Ala. 2000) (internal citations omitted). Although the Alabama Supreme
Court recognized that a viable claim could fall outside these three
categories, id., both that state court and the Eleventh Circuit have been
extremely reluctant to extend the tort to other categories of conduct. See,
e.g., Stancombe v. New Process Steel LP, 652 F. App’x 729, 739 (11th Cir.
2016); McIsaac v. WZEW-FM Corp., 495 So. 2d 649, 651 (Ala. 1986).
Ray’s confinement in an RHU cage does not fall into any one of the
three recognized IIED categories. For federalism reasons, this court will
not create a fourth category here. Federalism aside, the court further finds
that Ray’s placement in an RHU cell is not so extreme or severe as to “go
beyond all possible bounds of decency,” nor would it “be regarded as
atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized society.” Harrelson, 882 So.
2d at 322. So the court will dismiss Count VIII without prejudice.
Count IX: Conversion
Finally, Ray claims conversion against Monika Gadson, Speaks,
Barnes, Dent, and Burns. According to Ray, these Defendants violated
Section 6-5-260 of the Alabama Code when they unlawfully destroyed his
property during body and cell searches. (Id.). That statute provides:
The owner of personalty is entitled to possession thereof.
Any unlawful deprivation of or interference with such
possession is a tort for which an action lies.
22
Ala. Code § 6-5-260.
1. Sufficient pleading: “To prove conversion, [Ray] must present
evidence of a wrongful taking or a wrongful detention or interference, or
an illegal assumption of ownership, or an illegal use or misuse.” Ex parte
Anderson, 867 So.2d 1125, 1129 (Ala. 2003) (internal quotation omitted).
Showing “either title or possession is sufficient [for Ray to] maintain
a conversion action.” Id. According to Ray, he can prove conversion on
these dates:
• On March 30, 2024, M. Gadson, Speaks, and Barnes
searched Ray’s cell, “desecrated Plaintiff Ray’s sacred
religious items, broke his headphones, and otherwise
threw his property all over the ground,” (doc. 21, ¶194),
• On April 13, 2024, Dent searched Ray’s “person and
property and desecrated his religious items,” (id., ¶197),
and
• On May 3, 2024, Burns “destroyed or threw Plaintiff
Ray’s property and religious items all over the floor. Lt.
Burns removed several items from Plaintiff Ray’s
property, including a state-issued “J Pay tablet,” without
returning Plaintiff Ray’s property.” (id., ¶198).
Assuming these facts are true, Ray has sufficiently pleaded conversion of
property on all three dates because, regardless of ownership, Ray has
pleaded that the headphones, tablet, and religious items were all within
his possession when Defendants destroyed or took them.
2. State-agent immunity: That said, Alabama state officials sued in
their personal capacities for actions taken on behalf of the state are
immune against claims for actions done when exercising judgement in the
administration of a department or agency. See Ala. Code § 36-1-12; Ex
parte Butts, 775 So.2d 173 (Ala. 2000). But immunity will not protect state
officials that either (a) violate the United States Constitution or (b) act
23
“willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, [or] in bad faith.” See Ala. Code § 36-
1-12(d). Ray has pleaded facts that could establish one or both of these
exceptions. As explained, Ray pleads facts that would establish that the
searches occurred as part of an unconstitutional retaliation against Ray’s
first amendment rights. Further, citing the second exception, Ray pleads
that each Defendant acted “willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, or in bad
faith.” (Doc. 21, § 199). So the court cannot grant Defendants state-agent
immunity at the pleading stage. The court will therefore deny Defendants’
motion to dismiss Count IX.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to
dismiss the following claims, without prejudice:
e Count II;
e Count III;
e Count IV;
e Count V, limited to claims against Roderick Gadson, Fox,
Webster, and Howard;
e Count VI;
e Count VII; and,
e Count VIII against Webster, Fox, Mitchell, M. and R.
Gadson, Dent, Speaks, Barnes, and Howard.
The court DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss Counts I, V (against all
Defendants not named above), and IX.
The court gives Ray one chance to amend his complaint if he wishes.
Ray must file his amended complaint by October 17, 2025.
DONE and ORDERED on September 26, 2025.

7 Pil,
Ee 7

COREY L. MAZE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
24

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11145323. Public record. Not legal advice.