# No Fault LLC v. Stockmeier Urethanes U.S.A., Inc.

> District Court, M.D. Louisiana · September 26, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11145272

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** September 26, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11145272

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that the federal policy is to decide “cases on the basis of substantive rights rather than technicalities was determinative”
- finding no “‘intentional acts’ exception to the [LPLA’s] exclusive remedy provision”
- stating that “sharp and technical condemnation of pleading[s]” no longer exist

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

NO FAULT LLC CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

STOCKMEIER URETHANES U.S.A., NO. 24-00578-BAJ-EWD
INC.

RULING AND ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion To Dismiss And Motion For Costs
And Attorney’s Fees (Doc. 23). Plaintiff opposes Defendant’s Motion. (Doc. 26).
Defendant filed a Reply Brief. (Doc. 27).
For the reasons below, Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED IN PART and
DENIED IN PART.
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This is a product liability action. (Doc. 1; Doc. 8). Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant manufactures and sells a polyurethane binder called Stobielast® S 136
(the “Binder”). (Doc. 8 at ¶ 6). The Binder, when combined with rubber components
or granules, is allegedly used to create safety surfacing for use under playground
equipment and on ball fields, walking and jogging tracks, and various types of outdoor
recreational surfacing. (Id. at ¶ 8).
Plaintiff allegedly purchased nearly $2 million of Defendant’s Binder, both
directly and through third parties, between 2020 to 2023. (Id. at ¶¶ 7–8). Plaintiff
alleges that it incorporated the Binder into safety surfacing in various playground
facilities and other multipurpose recreational facilities throughout the United States.
Ud. at § 10). Thereafter, more than 20 of Plaintiff's customers allegedly reported
performance issues with Plaintiffs safety surfacing, which was made with
Defendant’s Binder. (Ud. at 4 12-13; 21).
Plaintiff allegedly notified Defendant that it believed the Binder was
responsible for the product failures because it was the only common factor and
common product used at each of the sites exhibiting failures. Ud. at 13). Plaintiff
allegedly replaced or repaired the surfacing at issue at its own expense, incurring
significant loss and damage. (/d. at { 18). Plaintiff also alleges diminution in business
reputation. Ud. at 4 19).
Plaintiff asserts six causes of action against Defendant: (1) redhibition;
(2) product liability; (8) breach of warranty of fitness for use; (4) violation of the
Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act; (5) negligent or intentional misrepresentation;
and (6) legal subrogation. (See generally id.). Plaintiff asserts diversity jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 13832. Ud. at ¥ 3). Where jurisdiction is founded on diversity,
federal courts must apply the substantive law of the forum state. Meadors v.
D’Agostino, No. CV 18-01007-BAJ-EWD, 2020 WL 1529367, at *3
(M.D. La. Mar. 30, 2020) (citing Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)).
Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiffs Amended Complaint for forum non
conventens. (Doc. 12). The Court denied Defendant’s motion. (Doc. 45).
Now, Defendant moves to dismiss the entirety of Plaintiffs Amended
Complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
(Doc. 24). For the following reasons, Defendant’s Motion will be GRANTED IN

PART and DENIED IN PART.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of the complaint
against the legal standard set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, which

requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Determining whether a
complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that

requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”
Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 679.
“[F]acial plausibility” exists “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Hence, the
complaint need not set out “detailed factual allegations,” but something “more than
labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action”

is required. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. When conducting its inquiry, the Court
“accepts all well-pleaded facts as true and views those facts in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff.” Bustos v. Martini Club Inc., 599 F.3d 458, 461 (5th Cir. 2010)
(quotation marks omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
In its Motion, Defendant asks the Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint for failure to state a claim, arguing the following:
(1) the Louisiana Product Liability Act (“LPLA”) offers the exclusive theory of

liability against Defendant; (2) Plaintiff fails to adequately allege facts that, if true,
meet the requisite elements of its LPLA claims; and (3) Plaintiff’s Complaint merely
“regurgitate[s]” the elements of redhibition. Defendant also asks the Court to award
it attorney’s fees and costs, arguing that Plaintiff’s LUTPA claim is groundless, made
in bad faith, and asserted to harass Defendant. The Court will address each argument
in turn.

A. Whether the Louisiana Products Liability Act Bars Plaintiff’s Other
Claims.

Defendant argues that because it is a “manufacturer” under the LPLA, the
LPLA offers the exclusive theory of liability against it, and Plaintiff’s claims outside
of the LPLA must be dismissed. (Doc. 24 at 4–5). Plaintiff asserts five claims against
Defendant outside of the LPLA: (1) redhibition; (2) breach of warranty of fitness for
use; (3) violation of the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act; (4) negligent or
intentional misrepresentation; and (5) legal subrogation. (Doc. 8).
The LPLA’s exclusivity provision provides that the LPLA “establishes the
exclusive theories of liability for manufacturers for damages caused by their
products.” La. Rev. Stat. § 9:2800.52. The LPLA clarifies that a plaintiff “may not
recover from a manufacturer for damage caused by a product on the basis of any
theory of liability that is not set forth in this Chapter.” Id. “Damage” is defined as “all
damage caused by a product, including survival and wrongful death damages, for
which Civil Code Articles 2315, 2315.1, and 2315.2 allow recovery.” Id. § 9:2800.53(5).
Damage also includes “damage to the product itself and economic loss arising from a

deficiency in or loss of use of the product[, but] only to the extent that Chapter 9 of
Title VII of Book III of the Civil Code, entitled ‘Redhibition,’ does not allow recovery
for such damage or economic loss.” Id.
The LPLA defines a “[m]anufacturer” as “a person or entity who is in the
business of manufacturing a product for placement into trade or commerce.”
La. Rev. Stat. § 9:2800.53(1). A manufacturer also includes, inter alia, anyone “who
incorporates into the product a component or part manufactured by another

manufacturer.” Id. § 9:2800.53(1)(c). To bring it together, “[m]anufacturing a product
means producing, making, fabricating, constructing, designing, remanufacturing,
reconditioning or refurbishing a product.” Id. § 9:2800.53(1).
“Following that clear language, Louisiana state courts (including the
Louisiana Supreme Court), U.S. District Courts, and the [United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit] have almost uniformly held that the LPLA bars any

non-LPLA claim (except for claims arising under the redhibition articles) against a
manufacturer for damage caused by its products.”1 McKinney v. Superior Van &
Mobility, LLC, No. CV 20-1169, 2021 WL 1238906, at *4 (E.D. La. Apr. 2, 2021)

1 “The only exception (if it can be called that) to this general rule is very narrow: a
manufacturer may be held ‘vicariously liable for their employees’ negligence.’” McKinney,
2021 WL 1238906, at *4 (citing McCleary v. Elekta, No. 19-52, 2019 WL 5295699, at *3–4
(W.D. La. Oct. 18, 2019) (collecting cases and rejecting the plaintiff’s attempt to hold the
defendant liable under both the LPLA and general negligence theories).
(citing Reynolds v. Bordelon, 172 So. 3d 607, 612, 615 (La. 2015) (refusing to “accept
a general alleged warranty for purposes of an express warranty claim” under the
LPLA (emphasis added)); Payne v. Gardner, 56 So. 3d 229, 231 (La. 2011)

(“[P]laintiff’s exclusive remedy against [the manufacturer of an oil pumping unit]
sounds in products liability as governed by the [LPLA].”); Touro Infirmary v.
Sizelar Architects, 947 So. 2d 740, 744 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he LPLA
subsumes all possible causes of action” except for those found in the redhibition
articles); Scianneaux v. St. Jude Medical S.C., Inc., 961 F. Supp. 2d 808, 811–812
(E.D. La. 2013) (Vance, J.) (rejecting the plaintiff’s “freestanding theories” of, inter
alia, negligence); Automatique New Orleans, Inc. v. U-Select-It, Inc., No. 94-3179,

1995 WL 491151, at *3 n.2 (E.D. La. Aug. 15, 1995) (finding it “inappropriate to
consider an independent negligence claim . . . because the LPLA is [plaintiff’s]
exclusive remedy against the defendants in this case”); Pitre v. Yamaha Motor Co.,
51 F. Supp. 3d 644, 658–61 (E.D. La. 2014) (Brown, J.) (rejecting, inter alia, a
negligence claim against the manufacturer); Grenier v. Med. Eng’g Corp.,
99 F. Supp. 2d 759, 763 (W.D. La. 2000) (same), aff’d, 243 F.3d 200 (5th Cir. 2001);

Stahl v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 283 F.3d 254, 261 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding no
“‘intentional acts’ exception to the [LPLA’s] exclusive remedy provision”); Jefferson v.
Lead Indus. Ass’n, Inc., 106 F.3d 1245, 1248 (5th Cir. 1997) (“Louisiana law eschews
all theories of recovery in this case except those explicitly set forth in the LPLA.”));
see also Celino v. Biotronik, Inc., 536 F. Supp. 3d 89, 111 (E.D. La. 2021) (“Courts
consistently hold that the LPLA bars plaintiffs from making a claim against a
manufacturer for damage caused by a product under LUTPA.”); Reddick v.
Medtronic, Inc., 2020 WL 2759077, at *4 (E.D. La. Apr. 14, 2020) (holding that the
LPLA bars LUTPA claims); Stahl v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 283 F.3d 254, 262

(5th Cir. 2002) (“Because there is no ‘intentional acts’ exception to the exclusive
remedy provision of the LPLA, [plaintiff] cannot bring intentional tort claims against
[defendant] under the Louisiana Civil Code for damages[.]”); Baudin v.
AstraZeneca Pharms. LP, 413 F. Supp. 3d 498, 503 (M.D. La. 2019) (“Therefore, any
claims of state law for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and redhibition based on
non-economic losses are improper and are dismissed with prejudice.”); Morris v.
Wykle Rsch., Inc., No. CV 05-204-JJB-SCR, 2006 WL 8432812, at *3

(M.D. La. Jan. 19, 2006) (“As previously noted, there are four claims that are
permitted and claims for fraudulent misrepresentation do not fall within the claims
permitted under the LPLA.”).
According to clear jurisprudence, all of Plaintiff’s claims asserted outside of the
LPLA, apart from Plaintiff’s claim for economic damages under a theory of
redhibition, are precluded by the LPLA. See Boutte v. Stryker Biotech, LLC,

67 F. Supp. 3d 732, 739 (M.D. La. 2014) (“Though the LPLA establishes the exclusive
theory of liability against manufacturers for products that cause injury, both parties
acknowledge that courts have interpreted the LPLA as preserving redhibition as a
cause of action to the extent that the plaintiff seeks recovery of economic losses.”);
Plaintiff’s arguments do not persuade otherwise.2

2 Plaintiff argues that its claims are “at their heart contract-based and implied-warranty-
Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN
PART. Plaintiff’s breach of warranty of fitness for use claim (Count III), LUTPA
claim (Count IV), and negligent or intentional misrepresentation claim (Count V) are

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.3 The Court will not dismiss Plaintiff’s
redhibition claim seeking economic damages based on the exclusivity of the LPLA.
B. Whether Plaintiff Has Stated A Claim Under the
Louisiana Products Liability Act.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s LPLA claim fails because Plaintiff did not
adequately allege facts that, if true, meet the requisite elements of its LPLA claims.
(Doc. 24 at 6). Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to adequately allege that its
product is “defective” or “unreasonably dangerous in construction or composition”
because Plaintiff did not allege: (1) a defect due to a “mistake” in the manufacturing
process; (2) that the Binder materially deviated from Defendant’s specifications;
(3) a defect other than in mere conclusory language; or (4) facts that, if true, establish

based,” and that Plaintiff pled its LPLA claim in the alternative. (Doc. 26 at 9). Plaintiff
argues that the LPLA is “emphatically not the exclusive remedy available to” it. (Id. at 15).
Plaintiff attempts to distinguish cases barring alternative theories of recovery against
manufacturers outside of the LPLA, contending that those cases are personal injury cases,
whereas this case is “primarily a contract-based case for economic damages and rescission
based upon breach of contractual statements and implied warranties[.]” (Id. at 17).

Turning to Plaintiff’s intentional or negligent misrepresentation claim, Plaintiff
argues that the damages arising from Defendant’s alleged misrepresentations are not
“caused by a product” but instead are caused by Defendant’s intentional or negligent
misstatements of facts in the course of contracting and selling its product. (Id. at 19).

3 Plaintiff’s subrogation claim asks the Court to permit Plaintiff to pursue claims on behalf
of its “end-customers,” including redhibition, warranty, product liability, LUTPA, and other
claims. (Doc. 8 at ¶ 54). Neither party has briefed the propriety of Plaintiff’s subrogation
claim, and the Court will not address it here, except to indicate that any claims Plaintiff may
seek to pursue via subrogation are similarly limited as described here.
that the Binder is “unreasonably dangerous.” (Doc. 24 at 7–9). Accordingly,
Defendant asks the Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s LPLA claim based on defect in
composition or construction. (Id. at 9).

Plaintiff responds that it clearly alleged that: (1) there was a defect in the
Binder (Doc. 8 ¶¶ 8, 13, 15, 16, 17, 23, 24, 25, 31); (2) Defendant manufactured the
Binder (Id. ¶¶ 6, 9, 11, 18, 23); (3) the defect was present at the time it left Defendant’s
control (Id. ¶¶ 16, 17, 24, 25, 44); and (4) Plaintiff suffered damages as a result of the
defects in Defendant’s binder (Id. ¶¶ 12, 13, 15, 18, 19, 26, 27).
To maintain a successful claim under the LPLA, a claimant must establish four
elements: (1) that the defendant is a manufacturer of the product; (2) that the

claimant’s damage was proximately caused by a characteristic of the product; (3) that
this characteristic made the product “unreasonably dangerous”; and (4) that the
claimant’s damage arose from a reasonably anticipated use of the product by the
claimant or someone else. Baudin v. AstraZeneca Pharms. LP, 413 F. Supp. 3d 498,
503 (M.D. La. 2019) (citing Ayo v. Triplex, Inc., 457 Fed. Appx. 382, 385–86
(5th Cir. 2012); Jack v. Alberto-Culver USA, Inc., 949 So.2d 1256, 1258 (La. 2007);

La. Rev. Stat. § 9:2800.54(A)).
A product is “unreasonably dangerous” under the LPLA in one of four ways:
(1) construction or composition; (2) design; (3) inadequate warning; or (4) failure to
conform to an express warranty. Baudin, 413 F. Supp. 3d at 503 (citing La. Rev. Stat.
§ 9:2800.54(B)). The “unreasonably dangerous” characteristic must exist at the time
the product left the manufacturer’s control or result from a reasonably anticipated
modification or alteration of the product. Baudin, 413 F. Supp. 3d at 503 (citing
La. Rev. Stat. § 9:2800.54(C)).
Here, Plaintiff appears to have adequately stated an LPLA claim against

Defendant. Plaintiff alleges the following:
a. Defendant is a manufacturer of polyurethane adhesives and binders.
(Doc. 8 ¶ 2).
b. The Binder, when combined with rubber components or granules, is used
to create safety surfacing for use under playground equipment and on ball
fields, walking and jogging tracks, and various types of outdoor recreational
surfacing. The Binder’s intended and specified use is as an additive to

rubber components for purposes of forming a mix to be used to create such
safety surfacing. Such use was described in Defendant’s Technical Data
Sheet for the Binder dated August 2020. (Id. ¶ 8).
c. Plaintiff’s customers reported failures with Plaintiff’s safety surfacing.
(Id. ¶ 12).
d. The Binder was the only common factor and common product used at all

sites exhibiting failures. (Id. ¶ 13).
e. These Binder failures have exhibited themselves in one (or both) of two
ways: as a “flaking” of rubber components from the cap layer of the safety
surfacing, or as delamination of the cap layer from the base or cushion layer
exhibiting as “tunneling,” “heaving,” or “buckling.” (Id. ¶ 15).
f. Plaintiff recently discovered due to Certificates of Analysis provided by
Defendant in late June 2024, that the Binder used in the sites reporting
failures exhibited lower viscosity than earlier specifications provided by
Defendant and Defendant lowered its acceptable viscosity range in its

testing protocols in 2022 without notification to Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 16).
g. The Binder supplied to Plaintiff has reduced viscosity levels. Reduced
viscosity levels in the Binder negatively affect the adhesion properties of
the Binder resulting in reduced adhesion and the flaking and
delamination[.] (Id. ¶ 17).
h. Plaintiff’s damages were proximately caused by a defect in the Binder that
was present when the product left [Defendant’s] control. As described by

[Defendant], the Binder is “designed to produce elastic safety surfacing”
when rubber granules are added to the binder per the Stobielast® S 136
Technical Data Sheet dated August 2020. In fact, when rubber granules
were mixed with the Binder it did not produce long lasting safety surfacing.
Instead, the Binder failed, resulting in property damage and the need for
ongoing repair and replacement of safety surfacing. [Plaintiff’s] damages

include all damages caused by the product, including damage caused to
Plaintiff’s safety surfacing and costs incurred to repair or replace damaged
surfacing into which the Binder was incorporated. (Id. ¶ 31).
i. The said defects in the Binder render the Binder unreasonably dangerous
in construction or composition and/or in design as defined under
La. R.S. 9:2800.54(B). (Id. ¶ 32).
j. Plaintiff’s damage arose from a reasonably anticipated use of the Binder as
specified by Defendant, including in its Technical Data Sheet. (Id. ¶ 33).
On a Motion to Dismiss, the Court must accept Plaintiff’s well-pleaded facts as

true and view those facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Bustos v.
Martini Club Inc., 599 F.3d 458, 461 (5th Cir. 2010). “[F]acial plausibility” exists
“when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)).
Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint sufficiently states a claim under the LPLA against
Defendant. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 (requiring a “short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”); Hollander v. Davis, 120 F.2d 131, 133
(5th Cir. 1941) (stating that “sharp and technical condemnation of pleading[s]” no
longer exist); Hines v. Wainwright, 539 F.2d 433, 434 (5th Cir. 1976) (stating that the
federal policy is to decide “cases on the basis of substantive rights rather than
technicalities was determinative”).
Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s LPLA claim is

DENIED.
C. Whether Plaintiff Has Stated a Claim for Redhibition.

Defendant similarly argues that Plaintiff’s redhibition claim fails because
Plaintiff’s Complaint merely “regurgitate[s]” the elements of redhibition.
(Doc. 24 at 11). Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s allegations of a redhibitory defect
are merely conclusory and should be dismissed. (Id. at 14).
Plaintiff responds that it has clearly alleged that: (1) the product at issue had
a vice or defect (Doc. 8 ¶¶ 8, 10, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 23, 24, 25, 28, 31, 44); (2) Defendant
manufactured the product at issue (Id. ¶¶ 2, 6, 9, 11, 18, 23, 31); (3) Plaintiff would

not have purchased the product had it known of the defects (Id. ¶ 12, 13, 15, 18, 19,
23 26); (4) the defect was non-apparent and existed at the time of the sale (Id. ¶ 24);
and (5) specific damages proximately flowing from defects in the product (Id. ¶¶ 12,
13, 15, 18, 19, 26, 27).
In Louisiana, every sale “carries with it the legal warranty that the thing sold
is free from hidden defects or redhibitory vices.” Johnson v. CHL Enters.,
115 F. Supp. 2d 723, 728 (W.D. La. 2000). A redhibitory defect is one that “renders

the thing useless, or its use so inconvenient that it must be presumed that a buyer
would not have bought the thing had he known of the defect.” La. Civ. Code art. 2520.
A purchaser may pursue a redhibition action and “recover directly from the
manufacturer for breach of warranty, despite the fact that there was no privity of
contract between them.” Aucoin v. S. Quality Homes, LLC, 2007-1014 (La. 2/26/08),
984 So. 2d 685, 692. However, such an action will only lie against the manufacturer

for “defects which ‘existed at the time the thing was delivered by the manufacturer
to the seller.’” Id. (quoting La. Civ. Code art. 2531); see also Casablanca Convertors,
Inc. v. Morning Paper, Inc., 627 So.2d 699, 700 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1993) (“In order to
establish a prima facie case in redhibition, a buyer must show that a non-apparent
defect existed at the time of sale.”); see also Leo v. Jeld-Wen, Inc.,
No. CV 16-00605-BAJ-EWD, 2018 WL 2187408, at *6 (M.D. La. May 11, 2018).
Plaintiff alleges the following:
a. The Binder manufactured/sold by Defendant contained latent defects that
rendered the product either absolutely useless or its use so inconvenient

and imperfect that Plaintiff would not have purchased it had Plaintiff
known of the defect. (Doc. 8 ¶ 23).
b. The defect in the Binder existed at the time of the sales to Plaintiff and was
not apparent to Plaintiff when the product was purchased and could not
have been discovered by simple inspection. (Id. ¶ 24).
c. Defendant knew or should have known that the Binder was defective and
would not perform as represented but failed to inform Plaintiff and it

further misrepresented that its product was suitable for use in Plaintiff’s
safety surfacing and that no changes had been made to the Binder’s design,
composition, and performance despite that Defendant knew this not to be
true. It is now known that, at the very least, the Binder used at the
damaged sites tested significantly lower in viscosity levels than the
represented viscosity parameters. (Doc. 8 ¶ 25).

d. Plaintiff has suffered and will continue to suffer substantial loss and
damages as a result of its use of the defective Binder. (Doc. 8 ¶ 26).
For the same reasons the Court will not dismiss Plaintiff’s LPLA claim, the
Court will not dismiss Plaintiff’s redhibition claim. Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion
to Dismiss Plaintiff’s redhibition claim is DENIED.
D. Whether Defendant is Entitled to Costs and Attorney’s Fees under
the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act.

The Court has already dismissed Plaintiff’s LUTPA claim. Defendant asks the
Court to award it attorney’s fees and costs under Louisiana Revised Statutes
§ 51:1409(A) because Plaintiff’s LUTPA claim was groundless, made in bad faith, and
asserted to harass Defendant. (Doc. 24 at 14). The statute provides, in part: “Upon a
finding by the court that an action under this Section was groundless and brought in
bad faith or for purposes of harassment, the court may award to the defendant
reasonable attorney fees and costs.” La. Stat. § 51:1409(A) (emphasis added).
Defendant argues that “[h]ad the plaintiffs or their counsel made the slightest
inquiry, they would have determined without the least bit of difficulty that no legal
basis for the LUTPA claim existed, and in fact has not existed since 1988 when the
LPLA was passed.” (Doc. 24 at 16).

Plaintiff responds that for the Court to award attorneys’ fees and costs under
LUTPA, Defendant would have to prove that Plaintiff’s claim was both groundless
and brought in bad faith or for purposes of harassment. (Doc. 26 a 19). Plaintiff
alleges that Defendant has not made such a showing. (Id.).
The language of the statute is discretionary, providing that the Court “may”
award reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. The Court declines to do so on the record
currently before it. Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees is DENIED

in this respect.
E. Plaintiff’s Request for Leave to Amend.
In the alternative, Plaintiff asks the Court for leave to amend its Complaint
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). (Doc. 26 at 22). Although leave to amend

should be freely given, the Court need not grant leave to amend if an amendment
would be futile. Matter of: Sherwin Alumina Co., L.L.C., 952 F.3d 229, 236
(5th Cir. 2020) (“[W]here amendment would be futile, the court need not grant the
plaintiff leave to amend.”). Here, the law is clear that Plaintiff’s non-LPLA claims are
barred, apart from Plaintiff’s claim for economic damages under a theory of
redhibition. No amendment would change this reality, and thus, an amendment
would be futile. The Court DENIES Plaintiff leave to amend.

IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion To Dismiss And Motion For
Costs And Attorney’s Fees (Doc. 23) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN
PART.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s breach of warranty of fitness for
use claim (Count III) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s claim under the
Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act (Count IV) is DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs negligent or intentional
misrepresentation claim (Count V) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion For Costs And
Attorney’s Fees (Doc. 23) is DENIED.

Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this 26% day of September, 2025

JUDGE BRIAN A. 7 KSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

17

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11145272. Public record. Not legal advice.